

Thomas Srampickal

The Concept of

CONSCIENCE

In today's
Empirical Psychology
and in the documents of the
Second Vatican Council

Resch

PERSONATION AND PSYCHOTHERAPY

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Foreword

Conscience is a central factor in human behaviour, and as such it reflects the complexity of the human personality. Hence its proper understanding requires the contribution of the various disciplines which are concerned with the study of man. In this respect, two disciplines which contribute much towards a proper understanding of conscience are psychology, which focuses on the 'phenomenological' aspect of human behaviour, and theology, which focuses on the 'transcendental' dimension of the human person.

Hence, Thomas Srampickal analyses 'Conscience' in the light of the contribution of Empirical Psychology and of the teachings of the Second Vatican Council. I whole-heartedly welcome this important and critical study, which has been accepted by the Alfonsian Academy, Rome, as dissertation for doctorate in Moral Theology, and do hope that it will contribute towards a more realistic and deeper understanding of the reality of conscience.

Innsbruck, 9 November 1976

Andreas Resch

I should like to express my sincere thanks to Professor Andreas Resch who, as director of this dissertation, was a source of constant encouragement and guidance from the beginning until the publication of this work. The valuable suggestions of Professor John O'Riordan and Professor Andreas Sampers are gratefully acknowledged here. I should also like to thank all those who, in one way or another, have promoted this work and its publication, especially Miss Mathilde Zimmermann without whose skill and patience this would have still remained in the manuscript form. Last, but not least, my thanks to all those authors and researchers the findings of whose study and research I have made use of in this work.

Pulincunnu, 9 November 1976

Thomas Srampickal

Abbreviations

AA	—	<i>Apostolicam Actuositatem</i> (Decree on the Apostolate of the Laity), W. M. Abbot (Ed.), Documents of Vatican II, London/Dublin, 1966, pp. 489 – 521.
AAS	—	<i>Acta Apostolicae Sedis</i> .
AG	—	<i>Ad Gentes</i> (Decree on the Church's Missionary Activity) W. M. Abbot, Ibidem, pp. 584 – 630.
DH	—	<i>Dignitatis Humanae</i> (Declaration on Religious Freedom) W.M.Abbot, Ibidem, pp. 675 – 696.
GE	—	<i>Gravissimum Educationis</i> (Declaration on Christian Education), W.M.Abbot, Ibidem, pp. 637 – 651.
GS	—	<i>Gaudium et Spes</i> (Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World), W.M.Abbot, Ibidem, pp. 199 – 308.
IM	—	<i>Inter Mirifica</i> (Decree on the Instruments of Social Communication), W. M. Abbot, Ibidem, pp. 319 – 331.
LG	—	<i>Lumen Gentium</i> (Dogmatic Constitution on the Church), W. M. Abbot, Ibidem, pp. 14 – 101.
LThK	—	H. Vorgrimler (Ed.), <i>Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche: Das Zweite Vatikanische Konzil</i> , 3 vols, Freiburg, 1966 – 1968.
OT	—	<i>Optatam Totius</i> (Decree on Priestly Formation), W.M. Abbot, Ibidem, pp. 437 – 457.
PC	—	<i>Perfectae Caritatis</i> (Decree on the Appropriate Renewal of Religious Life), W. M. Abbot, Ibidem, pp. 466 – 482.
PO	—	<i>Presbyterorum Ordinis</i> (Decree on the Ministry and Life of Priests), W. M. Abbot, Ibidem, pp. 532 – 576.
UR	—	<i>Unitatis Redintegratio</i> (Decree on Ecumenism), W. M. Abbot, Ibidem, pp. 341 – 366.

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THE CONCEPT OF CONSCIENCE
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Introduction

Conscience was traditionally a subject of discussion for Theology and Ethics, and there it was considered more or less as an 'internal agency' of moral sanctions, control and guidance, which the individual should follow.

As existentialistic and personalistic trends of thought began to permeate philosophy and theology, this 'intra-personal agency' gained more attention and importance. Consequently, modifications in the conception of conscience, emphasizing the personal, subjective or existential dimensions became more prevalent.

At the same time, there was a growing proof of and interest in the contribution of behavioural sciences like cultural anthropology, sociology and psychology. The cultural relativism or differences among cultures with regard to customs, norms and standards, found by anthropologists, as well as the great role of society and social structures in shaping the norms and standards of the individual, found by sociologists, began to emphasize the role of culture and society in the development and function of conscience.

From the psychological point of view, the theory that had been influencing the 'concept of conscience' upto a quarter of a century ago was the 'superego' concept of the Freudian depth psychology. Empirical psychology or the so-called scientific psychology, in its scientific tradition, was rather reluctant to study the subjective, intra-psychic phenomenon of conscience. In the empirical field there were only some isolated attempts to study the formation of character and the development of moral judgment; but no theoretical frame-work or concerted effort to analyse and investigate into the phenomenon of conscience.

The situation, however, changed around the year 1950. Empirical psychology began to show a great interest in and concern for the study of conscience. This resulted in a more systematic study – both in theoretical formulations and in empirical investigations – of conscience. Consequently, from different theoretical approaches, a good deal of research has been done into the phenomenon of conscience during the past quarter of this century. This

research — its findings and theoretical orientations — is the subject of our study. It is the above said period that we mean by 'today's' empirical psychology. Therefore, the empirical investigations we review and analyse are mainly those conducted during the years after 1950. However, this time limit cannot be followed too strictly because there were certain empirical studies conducted before this period, which have inspired much of contemporary research and still remain as major works in this field. We shall refer to such studies also. The important one among them is that of J. PIAGET whose study we shall analyze in detail.

Research into conscience during the above said period has attempted to investigate into various aspects of conscience: its nature, function, characteristics, and especially its development. Therefore, our study also takes account of these various aspects. Hence, the term '*concept* of conscience' in the title is to be broadly understood.

Empirical study of conscience, as we have already hinted at, is usually done within the frame-work of a theory or in the light of assumptions drawn from several theories. The three main theories which have inspired and guided contemporary research are *cognitive-developmental*, *identification*, and *learning* theories. Therefore, we shall discuss mainly these three theories of conscience, bringing under each theory its empirical findings. Relevant findings from other investigations, not strictly falling under these theories, are also reviewed and integrated into our study.

A word about the selection of research papers and articles. Though, broadly speaking, research relating to conscience may be said to be spread across the whole field of (child) socialization, more specifically, it is restricted to studies investigating the three dimensions of conscience (see p. 6). Even within this restricted field so much material has been published that some selection is necessary. We have therefore selected those works which are considered to be most representative, comprehensive, and relevant.

Our analysis of the empirical concept of conscience is followed by the study of the concept of conscience in the documents of the Second Vatican Council. Here we shall bring together all the conciliar texts speaking about conscience, and indicate the different (though related) shades of meaning the term

'conscientia' has in the council documents. We shall then analyse in detail the important council text on conscience, and also make a systematic presentation of other texts relating to conscience.

An unbiased understanding and synthesis of these two concepts (empirical and conciliar) of conscience, we believe, will complement each other and will give us an 'integral view' of conscience.

Hence the plan of our work. The whole work is divided into five parts:

Part I (chapters 1 — 5) introduces the empirical methods generally employed in the study of conscience; and brings together, as objectively as possible, the various empirical theories of conscience and their findings.

Part II (chapters 6 — 8) exposes the general psychological theories corresponding to the three theories of conscience.

Part III (chapter 9) makes a critical evaluation of the empirical study of conscience in the light of the psychological theories, and especially of empirical findings.

Part IV (chapter 10) analyses the concept of conscience according to the documents of the Second Vatican Council.

Part V (chapter 11) compares and synthesizes the two concepts of conscience.

Chapter I

Empirical Method in the Study of Conscience

PART I

EMPIRICAL PSYCHOLOGY AND THE PHENOMENON OF
CONSCIENCE

In this part we bring together various theoretical approaches to conscience in empirical psychology and findings of empirical investigations based on these theories.

As we have already mentioned, there are mainly three such theoretical approaches to conscience: the *cognitive-developmental* approaches, the *identification* theory, and the *learning-theory* approaches. These three approaches, together with the corresponding empirical research-findings, are dealt with respectively in chapters two, three and four.

The last chapter (chapter five) of this part gives a comparative view of the different theoretical approaches as well as a synopsis of the empirical findings. However, before discussing the theories and their findings, it is appropriate to see how and by what method empirical psychology studies conscience. Therefore, the first chapter is an introduction to these methods, and it should give us a general view of the research that is done in this field.

Empirical psychology's recent interest in the study of conscience has produced a large variety of investigations relating to conscience. In fact, the nature and variety of these investigations are such that there is, as R. C. JOHNSON and others observe, a "seeming chaos in the literature" published about "moral and conscience-related realms" in which "scholars have always acknowledged enormous complexity"¹. The purpose of this chapter is to indicate the basic features of these investigations. We shall indicate (A) the area in which conscience-related investigations are made, i. e. *conscience and socialization*, and (B) how conscience is subjected to empirical investigations and how it is measured, i. e. *dimensions of conscience and their assessment*.

A. Conscience and Socialization

Socialization in general refers to "the process by which individuals acquire the knowledge, skills, and dispositions that enable them to participate as more or less effective members of groups and society"². Becoming such an effective member of the society supposes the acquisition of a variety of skills and dispositions. One must, for example, develop cognitive skills that are needed for dealing intelligently with complex and changing requirements of daily life; must develop the ability to enter into satisfying relationships with others; must adopt the culturally accepted sex-role; should acquire an accepted mode of dressing, manners, etc.³

1 R. C. Johnson et alii (Eds), *Conscience, Contract and Social Reality*, New York 1972, p. 3.

2. Cfr. D. A. Goslin (Ed.), *Handbook of Socialization Theory and Research*, Chicago 1969, p. 3.

3. A. Bandura, "Socialization", in H. J. Eysenck et alii (Eds), *Encyclopedia of Psychology*, London 1972, Vol. 3, p. 229; also, D. Wright et alii, *Introducing Psychology*, Penguin Books 1970, p. 589.

Another important ability which the individual should acquire in order to be an effective member of the society, is the ability to behave and control oneself according to certain accepted values and norms⁴. This aspect of socialization is usually covered by the more common term 'moral development' or moralization. Hence, specifically, from the point of view of moral development the problem of socialization can be reduced to the question: "How does the amoral infant become capable of morality?"⁵ It is in the search for an answer to this problem that empirical psychology confronts and studies the phenomenon of conscience.

The aim of socialization is said to be achieved when the individual has incorporated or made his own the rules and norms of conduct, and thus comes to control himself from within, without the force of external agencies. This process of developing inner controls is usually called internalization⁶. It is in terms of such 'inner control in the realm of morality' that conscience is conceptualized and investigated in empirical psychology.

B. Dimensions of Conscience and their Assessment

We have seen that conscience is approached in terms of inner controls in the domain of morality. In order to make this inner control or conscience amenable to further empirical investigations, researchers generally distinguish three functions of conscience, which may be called the *three dimensions of conscience*. They are *cognitive* (or judgemental), *behavioural* and *emotional* dimensions of conscience⁷.

4. R. A. Levine, "Culture, Personality and Socialization" in D. A. Goslin (Ed.), *Handbook of Socialization Theory and Research*, p. 506.

5. L. Kohlberg, "Development of Moral Character and Ideology" in M. L. and L. W. Hoffman (Eds), *Review of Child Development Research*, New York 1964, p. 384.

6. A. Bandura, "Socialization", p. 229.

7. Cfr. G. B. Trasler "Conscience", in H. J. Eysenck et alii (Eds) *Encyclopedia of Psychology*, Vol. I, pp. 208 – 210. Also, R. C. Johnson et alii (Eds) *Conscience, Contract and Social Reality*, pp. 1 – 4. These dimensions of conscience are generally admitted by all researchers irrespective of their theoretical orientations. However, researchers differ, as we shall see in subsequent chapters, in their emphasis on one (or more) of these dimensions, and especially in their explanation of the developmental processes of conscience-dimensions.

The *cognitive dimension* refers to the cognitive process relating to "awareness of the nature and origin of rules of conduct, and ability to evaluate one's own actions and intentions"⁸. The development and function of such factors as moral thinking, judgment, values and ideals are included in this dimension. And this is a basic dimension of conscience because moral responses in whatever realm suppose the "understanding of our environment and the meaning we discover in it"⁹.

The method frequently used to assess the cognitive dimension of conscience is the '*clinical method*' first employed by PIAGET in his studies¹⁰. It is a "method of free conversation with the child"¹¹. The child is first presented with certain hypothetical moral problems¹², which he is asked to evaluate. His evaluative response is further probed by appropriate additional questions by the experimenter who always tries to adapt himself to the child's way of thinking. During such interrogation-response session (stimulus-response sequence) the experimenter "uses all the insight and ability at his command to understand" what the child thinks and says about the problem¹³. By careful analysis of children's responses to various such problems the experimenter assesses the cognitive dimension (nature of moral thinking, value conceptions, etc.) of conscience.

Behavioural dimension refers to "avoidance of proscribed behaviour and the tendency to act in ways regarded as meritorious, in the absence of punishment or external reinforcement"¹⁴. Such factors as internally motivated prosocial and altruistic behaviour, the ability for self-control in temptation situation, usually known as 'resistance to temptation', etc., are included in this di-

8. G. B. Trasler "Conscience", p. 208.

9. D. Wright, *The Psychology of Moral Behaviour*, Harmondsworth 1971, p. 152.

10. J. Piaget, *The Moral Judgment of the Child*, London 1972, p. 116.

11. J. H. Flavell, *The Developmental Psychology of Jean Piaget* New York 1963, p. 31.

12. In order to avoid repetition, here we do not give examples of such hypothetical moral problems used by researchers. These are given at appropriate places in subsequent chapters (see especially chapter II).

13. J. H. Flavell, *The Developmental Psychology of Jean Piaget* p. 28.

14. G. B. Trasler "Conscience", p. 208.

mension¹⁵. However, it is the factor of 'resistance to temptation' that has been subjected to much experimental study. R. GRINDER defines temptation operationally as follows: "a state of temptation exists for an individual when the addition or presence of a rewarding stimulus (incentive) increases the probability of a class of responses which is forbidden because of its incompatibility (conflict) with some socially expected behaviour"¹⁶.

Frequently used techniques to assess resistance to temptation are '*experimental temptation-situations*'. In these temptation-situations, which to a certain extent resemble ordinary life-situations, the subjects, being left alone, would be stimulated (by the prospect of obtaining certain attractive objects like toys, candies, verbal praise, money, etc.) to violate (e. g. cheat; disregard a given task or instruction; lie, etc.) certain accepted norms (honesty, responsibility, truthfulness, etc.)¹⁷. In such temptation situations, though the subject is led to think that he is unnoticed by anyone, in fact, his behaviour will be observed by some subterfuges (e. g. observation through a one-way screen). And temptation resistance is assessed according to the measure of subjects' behaviour-conformity to the accepted norms in spite of tempting objects. Whatever be the experimental designs used to assess temptation-resistance, the probability of transgression will depend on several factors like the subjects' estimation of the risk of being detected, the incentive value of the tempting object, the possibility of obtaining the object through other means etc.¹⁸. Hence, such variables are to be controlled in assessing the behavioural dimension of conscience through experimental temptation-situations.

The emotional dimension refers to the emotional reactions that follow an act of transgression or violation of accepted norm of conduct¹⁹. Researchers

15. Evidently, research on delinquency, psychopathy, etc., which indicate defective development (or absence) of 'inner controls' are also closely associated to the empirical study of conscience.

16. R. Grinder, "New Techniques for Research in Children's Temptation Behaviour", Child Development, 1961, p. 680.

17. For various techniques actually used in research see chapters III and IV.

18. R. Grinder, "New Techniques ...", p. 680.

19. Evidently, emotional reactions following an act of temptation-resistance or a praise-worthy action should also come under the emotional dimension of conscience. Examples of such reactions would be self-esteem, a sense of satisfaction, etc. Regret at

distinguish various such reactions: guilt, shame, anxiety (fear); self-criticism, confession, reparation, etc.²⁰.

A frequently used method for assessing the emotional dimension of conscience is '*projective tests*'. The subjects, for example, will be given incomplete stories in which the hero, who will be similar to the subject in age, sex, etc., violates certain accepted moral norms ... The subject is then asked to complete the story in his own way. It is presumed that the subject will identify with the hero and attribute to him the type of reaction he himself would have in a similar situation²¹. Thus from what he makes the hero do (make him feel guilty, confess, seek punishment ...) assessment is made of the emotional dimension of conscience.

In addition to the above mentioned techniques (clinical method, experimental temptation-situation, projective tests) researchers use also other techniques to assess conscience-dimensions. Frequently used methods among them are: *Self-reports*: — Here the subjects are interviewed and questioned about 'what they did or would have done in a particular situation' involving moral conflicts, or 'how they felt or would have felt (guilty, ashamed, afraid, need to confess ...) after transgressions', etc.

Reports from others: — For assessing conscience-related phenomena researchers resort also to reports from parents (especially mothers) about their children. Evidently, mothers can provide a lot of first-hand information about their children's (especially young ones') self-control, reactions after disobeying mothers' instructions, etc. Usually this is obtained through 'parent-interviews' systematically conducted by experienced researchers. Besides, reports from teachers and companions are also valuable sources of information.

Another method often used is *systematic observation*: Children are closely observed either in natural situations (e. g. during ordinary games) or in more

having lost some pleasurable object or satisfaction may also accompany this self-esteem. However, these reactions have received little attention in empirical research, while much study has been done on reactions following transgressions (Cfr. D. Wright, The Psychology of Moral Behaviour, p. 101).

20. G. B. Trasler, "Conscience", p. 209.

21. D. Wright, The Psychology of Moral Behaviour, pp. 107 — 108.

or less controlled situations as to their self-control, aggressiveness, emotional reactions after violating rules or instructions, etc.

The Generality of conscience. What has been said above refers to the assessment of one or more dimensions of conscience. Besides this, researchers have also tried to find the relationships between these dimensions of conscience. Thus, for example, they investigate whether an individual who *says* that stealing is wrong (cognitive dimension) will *behave* honestly (behavioural dimension) in an enticing temptation situation. Or, whether an individual who tends to show high degree of *guilt, confession, reparation, etc.*, after a transgression (emotional dimension) will also show a correspondingly high degree of *temptation resistance* (behavioural dimension). Again, it can be investigated whether an individual who *strongly condemns* a particular transgression (cognitive dimension) will also show *strong guilt, or reparation tendencies, etc.*, (emotional dimension) after such a transgression. Besides these relationships between dimensions of conscience, some investigations have been devoted to studying whether individuals show consistency within the same dimension, but in different situations. Thus, for example, concerning the behavioural dimension it can be investigated whether one who is honest in one situation (e. g. in a competitive examination) will be honest in another situation (e. g. in his money transactions). Above said studies about the relationships between dimensions of conscience, and consistency within single dimensions, are generally referred to as studies on the "generality of conscience"²².

The method used in studying the generality of conscience is of course correlational, that is, measures of conscience-dimensions obtained through various techniques (explained above) are correlated. At any rate, findings on the generality of conscience is important in understanding the nature of conscience: how consistent and unitary are the functions of conscience, and consequently, whether conscience itself is a unitary phenomenon.

Antecedents (and correlates) of conscience. Investigating conscience in its various dimensions and studying its generality is not the whole picture. Empirical psychologists are primarily interested in conscience-development. Hence, they try to isolate the factors that account for (or are related to) the deve-

lopment of one or other dimension of conscience. These factors may be referred to as antecedents (and correlates) of conscience. As we shall see, it is upon the area relating to antecedents of conscience that divergences (as well as complementarities) of different psychological theories are brought to bear the most. From different theoretical standpoints a variety of factors have been investigated and found to be affecting the development of one or more dimensions of conscience. Age-growth, intellectual development, social relationships and experiences, parent-child relationship, childhood training, methods of discipline, reward and punishment schedules, factors like sex, I. Q., and social class are among the frequently studied variables.

With this general introduction to empirical methods in the study of conscience, we shall now turn to the theories themselves and their findings.

22 .R. C. Johnson et alii (Eds), *Conscience, Contract and Social Reality*, p. 99.

The Cognitive — Developmental Approaches to Conscience

In this chapter we shall consider the cognitive-developmental approaches to the phenomenon of conscience. The cognitive-developmental theories focus on the cognitive aspects of moral responses, and hold that moral responses undergo developmental changes in accordance with the changes in the cognitive structures¹. In fact, the interest of these theories centres mainly on the moral thinking and judgment of the child, and on the factors that shape and modify it.

First, we shall study the theory of JEAN PIAGET, and then the theory of LAWRENCE KOHLBERG, which shall be followed by a consideration of other recent research on moral judgment.

A. The Theory of Jean Piaget

The pioneer work of PIAGET², *The Moral Judgment of the Child*, has provided, in the words of L. BERKOWITZ, "what is undoubtedly the most famous description of the development of moral judgment in children"³.

PIAGET begins his work with an investigation of how children between

1. Cfr. E. Turiel, "An Experimental Test of the Sequentiality of Developmental Stages in the Child's Moral Judgments" in R. C. Johnson et alii (Eds), *Conscience, Contract and Social Reality*, New York 1972, p. 308.

2. J. Piaget, *The Moral Judgment of the Child*, London 1972 (First published in French, *Le Jugement moral chez l'enfant*, Paris 1932; first English translation, *The Moral Judgment of the Child*, London 1932).

In psychological literature Piaget is generally considered to be the first one to study the development of the child's moral judgment. However, it may be noted that Piaget himself acknowledges a certain debt to the developmental studies of P. Bovet and J. M. Baldwin (see below, p. 277 ; cfr. also R. C. Johnson, "Early studies of children's moral judgments", *Child Development*, 1962, (33), 603 — 605).

3. L. Berkowitz, *The Development of Motives and Values in the Child*, New York, 1964, p. 45.

the ages of about 4 and 12 practise and conceive the rules of a game — the game of marbles played in French-Switzerland.

PIAGET has his reasons for beginning his study of the child's moral judgment with a study of its application and conception of the rules of games. He says that in the context of simple social games parental influence on the child's practice and conception of rules is reduced to a minimum. Therefore, this context provides the psychologist with a very good opportunity to study directly the spontaneous thought and behaviour of the child with regard to rules⁴. Besides, an understanding of the child's practice and conception of the rules of games should give us an insight into the child's conception and practice of moral rules themselves. For, "all morality consists in a system of rules, and the essence of all morality is to be sought for in the respect which the individual acquires for these rules"⁵. The young child's attitudes towards the rules of games, says PIAGET, is already the beginning of morality. Young children who just begin to play the game and are introduced by older children to the rules "aspire from their hearts to the virtue ... which consists in making a correct use of the customary practices of a game" ... and PIAGET asks: "If this is not morality, then where does morality begin?"⁶.

PIAGET has found that the young child (from about 4 to 7 years) has a "mystical respect" for rules. In his conception, they are sacred and inviolable; yet in practice he does not observe them so keenly. About this PIAGET adds, "it is only natural that a mystical respect for laws should be accompanied by a rudimentary knowledge and application of its contents"⁷. Gradually, the child masters the rules and makes them his own. As a result, older children (from about 10 years) conceive rules as being relative and as being the "product of mutual agreement and an autonomous conscience"⁸. This may be called a 'rational respect' for rules. However, older children, though

4. J. Piaget, *The Moral Judgment of the Child*, London 1972, p. 2.

5. J. Piaget, *ibidem*, p. 1.

6. J. Piaget, *ibidem*, p. 2.

7. J. Piaget, *ibidem*, p. 18.

8. J. Piaget, *ibidem*, p. 18.

conceive rules as being relative, practise them strictly. And PIAGET adds, "a rational and well-founded respect (for laws) is accompanied by an effective application of each rule in detail"⁹.

Against the above described background of the child's conception and practice of rules in games PIAGET investigates the development of the child's moral judgment. Owing to the complexity of the problems involved, here PIAGET limits his study to the "theoretical moral judgment", that is, 'the child's judgment of 'moral situations' in which he is not actually involved. (Hence, it is not a practical judgment)¹⁰.

PIAGET studies this by analysing chiefly children's concepts of law, responsibility, punishment and justice. These concepts were assessed through 'hypothetical moral situations' presented to children between the ages of 6 and 12 from the poorer parts of Geneva. As a result, PIAGET observes that the moral judgment of children within this age-range passes through two stages of development, of which the first is called *heteronomous* and the second, *autonomous*¹¹.

1. The Heteronomous Stage

The average age of the heteronomous stage is 7, the age-range being 6 to 8¹². Children's moral responses at this stage reveal an *heteronomous concept of law, objective responsibility, expiatory punishment and immanent justice*.

a) Heteronomous Concept of Law

Children belonging to the heteronomous stage consider moral laws as absolutely imposed from without by adults (that is, parents and other older people). For them, laws are unchangeable and demand categorical obedience.

9. J. Piaget, *ibidem*, p. 18.

10. J. Piaget, *ibidem*, p. 104.

11. J. Piaget, *ibidem*, p. 194. It may, however, be noted, as we shall see later, that Piaget does not insist on clear-cut stages.

12. J. Piaget, *ibidem*, p. 120.

Thus duty and obligation come from outside. Laws cannot be discussed or interpreted. The child considers any act of obedience to law and authority, irrespective of motive, as good. PIAGET says, 'The good is, therefore, rigidly determined by obedience', at this stage¹³.

b) Objective Responsibility

According to PIAGET'S investigations¹⁴ children about the age of seven are

13. Piaget, *ibidem*, p. 106.

14. In order to tap the aspect of responsibility in children's judgments Piaget gave them 'problem stories' relating to clumsiness and stealing, in which the material damage of the act and the 'culpable intention' of the agent were contrasted. Out of the several pairs used by Piaget, we quote two sample pairs, one for clumsiness and one for stealing, and a response to each.

'Clumsiness: (1) A boy who is called John is in his room. He is called to dinner. He goes into the dining room. But behind the door there was a chair, and on the chair there was a tray with fifteen cups on it. John couldn't have known that there was all this behind the door. He goes in, the door knocks against the tray, bang goes the fifteen cups and they all get broken.

(2) Once there was a little boy whose name was Henry. One day when his mother was out he tried to get some jam out of the cupboard. He climbed up on to a chair and stretched out his arm. But the jam was too high up and he couldn't reach it and have any. But while he was trying to get it he knocked over a cup. The cup fell down and broke

Stealing; (1) Alfred meets his friend who is very poor. This friend tells him that he has had no dinner that day because there was nothing to eat in his home. Then Alfred goes into a baker's shop and as he has no money, he waits till the baker's back is turned and steals a roll. Then he runs out and gives the roll to his friend.

(2) Henriette goes into a shop. She sees a pretty piece of ribbon on a table and thinks to herself that it would look very nice on her dress. So while the shop lady's back is turned, she steals the ribbon and runs away at once' (J. Piaget, *ibidem*, pp. 118-119).

A six-year-old boy answers to the first pair: The first boy is naughtier 'because he broke fifteen cups'. If I were the daddy, I would punish more 'the one who broke fifteen cups'. If I were the culprit in a similar situation I should be punished more 'because I broke more than one cup'. A girl of the same age answers to the second pair: The boy is naughtier because 'he took a roll. It is bigger'. Although he took the bread for the sake of his needy friend 'who had had no dinner' and she took the ribbon 'to make herself pret-

guided in their judgments by the material consequences and external aspects of the act, and do not take into consideration the intention of the agent. Therefore, children at this age, even when they understand the inculpable motive of the one whose action does more material damage and the culpable motive of the one whose action has less material damage, judge the former as more guilty than the latter. Hence, PIAGET notes, these responses show "what store the children set by material results, in spite of the fact that they have perfectly well understood the story and consequently the intentions of its characters, and what little account they take of the intentions which have caused these material happenings"¹⁵. Such a concept of responsibility PIAGET calls *objective responsibility*¹⁶.

Another spontaneous and universal phenomenon among children which PIAGET studies in order to analyse their concept of responsibility is their *conception and evaluation of lies*.

Six-year-olds usually define a lie as a 'naughty word' which one should not say¹⁷. These children seem to identify a lie with naughty words. This identification is not due to the child's ignorance that a lie "consists in not speaking the truth", but due to a "quaint extension of the word lie", says PIAGET¹⁸.

In the experience of the young child 'to tell lie is to commit a moral fault by means of language. And using naughty words also constitutes a fault by means of language', and both are forbidden by the adults¹⁹. Therefore, the young child who does not yet distinguish the two phenomena on the moral plane, guided by the external factor of 'forbiddenness', categorizes both as lies. This shows, PIAGET argues, that the interdiction of lying remains very external to the moral consciousness of the child at this stage²⁰.

ty' he should be given 'four slaps as punishment' and she, 'two slaps' (Piaget ibidem, pp. 120 - 127).

15. Piaget, ibidem, p. 123.

16. Piaget, ibidem, p. 107.

17. Piaget, ibidem, pp. 136-137.

18. Piaget, ibidem, p. 138.

19. Piaget, ibidem.

20. Piaget, ibidem, pp. 138, 139.

Sometimes children between 6 and 10 years give an apparently advanced definition of a lie as "what is not true". But PIAGET warns that even such a conception does not take the intention into proper account²¹. In the minds of these children there prevails a confusion between an intentional lie and an involuntary error, as is illustrated by the response of a six-year-old, which we quote in full:

'Clai (6): Do you know what a lie is? - It is when you say what isn't true. - Is '2+2=5' a lie? - Yes, it is a lie. Why? - Because it is not right. - Did the boy who said '2+2=5' know it wasn't right or did he make a mistake. - He made a mistake. - Then if he made a mistake, did he tell a lie or not. - Yes, he told a lie. - A naughty one? - Not very. - You see this gentleman (a student). - Yes. - How old you think he is? - Thirty. - I would say 28. - (The student says he is 36). - Have both told a lie or not? - Yes both lies. - Naughty ones? - Not so very naughty. - Which is the naughtiest, yours or mine, or both the same? Yours is the naughtiest, because the difference is biggest (cfr. moral realism). Is it a lie or did we just make a mistake. - We made a mistake. - Is it a lie all the same, or not? - Yes, it is a lie'²².

PIAGET adds that children at this stage, though able in practice to distinguish between intentional and involuntary acts, are unable to do so "on the plane of moral reflection"²³. Therefore, the child's moral thinking remains realistic and objectivistic.

According to PIAGET, the child's objectivistic attitude reaches its climax in its evaluation of lies. Even in cases where, as the child himself understands, the material damage was reduced to a minimum and no intention to deceive someone was present, the child's evaluation of a lie is based on purely external aspects. The seriousness of a lie is evaluated by its departure from reality in the literal sense, irrespective of motives. Hence, for the young child an 'improbable and unbelievable lie' is the worst²⁴.

From his investigations of the young child's concept of responsibility, PIAGET concludes: 'In the matter of clumsiness and theft the child ... seemed to judge of actions from their most external aspect (their results) before

21. Piaget, ibidem, p. 139.

22. Piaget, ibidem, p. 140.

23. Piaget, ibidem, p. 141.

24. Piaget, ibidem, pp. 144, 145, 147, 151.

taking any account of the intentions in play. The analysis of the evaluations relating to lies not only confirms this conclusion but allows us to go beyond it and say that even apart from all consideration of the material consequences of actions the child's mind remains set in the direction of objective responsibility.²⁵

c) Expiatory Punishment

After studying the concept of responsibility, PIAGET takes up the study of the related concepts of punishment and justice in children, of which we shall take the former in this subsection, postponing the latter to the next.

As a result of his study²⁶, PIAGET says that for small children the purpose of punishment is to inflict pain upon the culprit that will make him realize the seriousness of his offence. Inflicting arbitrary punishment as a necessary means of expiation is characteristic of this stage. They do not seek a relation between the nature of the offence and the quality of punishment, but equate the fairest punishment with the severest²⁷. That is, according to them, the severer a punishment the fairer and more effective it is. This has been shown by the judgment of the eight-year-old who said 'not going on the Roun-

25. Piaget, *ibidem*, p. 146

26. Summarized we give here one of the stories used by Piaget to investigate children's idea of punishment, and the response of an eight-year-old child to the same story.

'A little boy was asked by his mother to fetch bread for dinner....but the boy doesn't go...there is no bread on the table at dinner time...The displeased father thinks of three punishments for the boy: (1) not to allow the boy to go on the 'Roundabouts' the next day, a feast day, (2) not to give the boy any bread (from the little that is left over from the previous day) for dinner that day, and (3) not to help the boy when he needs help (e.g. to take down a toy from the top of a cupboard where the boy cannot reach). Piaget's subjects had to judge which of these three punishments was the fairest for the boy. It may be noted that Piaget qualifies the first of the above suggested punishments as expiatory, and the other two as reciprocity punishments.

An eight-year-old child says 'not to allow the boy to go on the Rounds is the fairest punishment' because the boy likes very much to go on the Rounds. (Piaget, *ibid.*, pp. 200, 204, 205, 210).

27. Piaget, *ibidem*, pp. 199, 211.

ds, the punishment which the boy disliked the most, is the fairest', and left out the other two which were in fact related to the nature of the offence. Such an arbitrary and pain-inflicting punishment PIAGET calls *expiatory punishment*²⁸.

d) Immanent Justice

PIAGET says that the young child's concept of justice is very much influenced by the idea of expiatory punishment²⁹.

His study³⁰ reports that the young child, who has a very absolute and categorical notion of law and obedience, believes in automatic punishment. He thinks punishments are immanent in things; even more, he thinks nature and things cooperate with adults to execute justice, especially when adult vigilance is wanting³¹.

Besides the idea of immanent justice, PIAGET notes that children about the age of seven are dominated by the idea of retributive justice, which again emphasizes the necessity of punishment for the misdoer. Here the youngster considers as just whatever the adult authority does or commands³².

28. Piaget, *ibidem*, p. 203.

29. Piaget, *ibidem*, p. 250.

30. The following story used by Piaget to tap the concept of justice and the response of a little girl to the same elucidates the point of immanent justice.

'Once there were two children stealing apples in an orchard. Suddenly a policeman comes along and the two children run away. One of them is caught. The other one, going home by a roundabout way, crosses a rotten bridge and falls into the water. Now what do you think? If he had not stolen the apples and had crossed the river on that rotten bridge all the same, would he also have fallen into the water?'

Here is the answer of a six-year-old girl: 'What happened? The bridge cracked. — Why? Because he had eaten the apples. — If he had not eaten the apples, would he have fallen into the water? — No. — Why? — Because the bridge would not have cracked' (Piaget, *ibidem*, pp. 250 — 252).

31. Piaget, *ibidem*, pp. 250, 255.

32. Piaget, *ibidem*, pp. 263, 265.

Besides the above mentioned four features (i.e. heteronomous concept of law, objective responsibility, etc.) of the heteronomous stage, Piaget observes another feature of this stage: collective responsibility. It refers to the young child's idea that all the mem-

2. The Autonomous Stage

The average age of the autonomous stage is 9, the age-range being from 8 to 11³³. The child at this stage reveals an *autonomous concept of law, subjective responsibility, reciprocity punishment, and distributive justice*.

a) Autonomous concept of law

The child of the autonomous stage gives up the absolute and categorical notion of law and obedience as cooperation and mutual respect among peers increases. For him law is not simply imposed from without, but grows out of mutual consent of the members of the group. Hence, laws are relative and changeable according to the agreement of group-members. As PIAGET says, at this stage, the idea of good as 'product of cooperation' replaces the idea of good as 'unconditional obedience' of the first stage³⁴.

b) Subjective Responsibility

From his study³⁵ of older children, PIAGET says that they - children aro-

bers of a group must be punished if the real culprit of a misdeed does not denounce himself. According to Piaget's interpretation two reasons are implied in this idea of collective responsibility: (1) the child's thinking that a misdeed must be punished at all costs, even if innocent people suffer (necessity of expiation), and (2) no member is completely innocent because the whole group refuses to denounce the offender. Hence all must be punished (cfr. Piaget, *ibidem*, pp. 236 - 238).

33. Piaget, *ibidem*, p. 120.

34. Piaget, *ibidem*, p. 194.

35. The sample stories quoted above (relating to objective responsibility) about clumsiness (the broken cups) and stealing (the bread roll and the ribbon) may be recalled here.

A ten-year-old child says to the first pair: The naughtiest is 'the one who wanted to take the jam' and broke one cup. Though the other one broke fifteen cups he didn't do it on purpose. Similarly, a nine-year-old child replies to the second pair: The little girl

und the age of 9 - judge moral responsibility not according to the material consequences and the external aspects of the act, but according to the intention of the agent. Hence, contrary to the first-stager, the second stager attributes little responsibility to the agent even if serious material consequences follow from an unintentional act. This is called *subjective responsibility*³⁶.

According to the Piagetian investigation, the shift from objective responsibility is manifested also in the second stager's *conception and evaluation of lies*.

The second stagers say that 'a boy who tells lie knows what he is doing, but doesn't want to say it. The other one (one who makes a mistake) does not know'... 'A lie is when you deceive someone else'... 'When you lie you are doing it on purpose...' ³⁷. These responses, based on subjective responsibility, clearly distinguish an intentional lie from an unintentional error.

A similar subjective trend is noted also in older children's evaluations of a lie, where they estimate its seriousness according to the deceitful intention, and not according to its departure from reality in the literal sense, nor according to the associated material aspects. Contrary to the belief of the first stagers, therefore, the second stagers consider an 'improbable and unbelievable lie' as a less serious one³⁸.

c) Reciprocity Punishment

From his study PIAGET notes that older children's concept of punishment is different from that of younger ones³⁹. For the older ones the essential

who took the ribbon for herself is the naughtiest, and she deserves more punishment. The boy took the bread for his needy friend (Piaget, *ibidem*, pp. 125, 128).

36. Piaget, *ibidem*, p. 129.

37. Piaget, *ibidem*, p. 143. It may be noted that these are 8 to 10-year-old children's responses to the question 'what is a lie?'.

38. Piaget, *ibidem*, pp. 144, 145, 153, 155.

39. The story quoted earlier in relation to expiatory punishment (that of the boy who didn't fetch bread) may be recalled here. To that story a ten-year-old child responds: the best punishment is that of the toy, because it shows him how one likes it when one does not give help. It is also the fairest because his mother does the same thing to

point in punishment ' is to do to the transgressor something analogous to what he has done himself, so that he should realize the results of his actions' for others⁴⁰. They do not believe that inflicting pain is a 'moral necessity'. Hence the best and fairest punishment is not determined by its *severity*, but by its *effectiveness* in attaining the purpose of the punishment, namely, to make the offender realize the impact of his actions on his relations with others and thus to restore the broken relations. Such a concept of punishment, PIAGET says, is based on *reciprocity*⁴¹.

d) Distributive Justice

According to PIAGET the shift from the heteronomous to the autonomous stage is well manifested in the older children's concept of justice.

The second stagers do not subscribe to the idea of a justice which is 'immanent' in things and emanate from them⁴². Besides this, in the place of the first stagers' concept of retributive justice, the second stagers develop the concept of *distributive justice*. This concept of justice, while deemphasizing the role of punishment, stresses the idea of strict equality among the members of the group⁴³.

Further, the concept of distributive justice is to be gradually overshadowed by that of 'egalitarian justice'. Egalitarian justice understands the demands of

him as he had done to her (i.e. not giving help when needed). Another older boy suggests that the punishment of not giving the boy any bread for dinner as the fairest because he wouldn't go and get any. He qualifies the one of not going the Roundabouts as less fair because there is no connection between the bread and the Roundabouts (Piaget, *ibidem*, pp. 214, 215).

It may be noted that the punishments suggested by the older ones are reciprocity punishments in the Piagetian terminology.

40. Piaget, *ibidem*, p. 215.

41. *Ibidem*. Here Piaget observes that the idea of 'sheer reciprocity' can sometimes be so predominant at this stage that certain punishments, though based on reciprocity, may appear very crude as in the case of the second response quoted above, 'not giving any bread for dinner' as the fairest punishment.

42. Piaget, *ibidem*, p. 255.

43. Piaget, *ibidem*, p. 265.

strict justice, but goes beyond them and considers the attenuating circumstances of the individual. Thus, a second stager who has attained the idea of egalitarian justice may allow himself to be guided by this kind of 'superior equality' or equity, rather than by 'justice pure and simple'⁴⁴.

3. The Two Moralities and Their Causal Factors

From his analysis of the two stages of the development of moral judgment in children, PIAGET speaks of *two corresponding moralities* and their *causal factors*. PIAGET calls the morality of the heteronomous stage *moral realism*, of which the causal factors are the child's (general) *realism* and *adult con-*

44. Piaget, *ibidem*, p. 271.

The following story and the two responses quoted will serve to elucidate the concepts of distributive (strict equality) and egalitarian (equity) justice: 'One afternoon... a mother had taken her children for a walk along the Rhone. At four O'clock she gave each of them a roll. They all began to eat their rolls except the youngest, who was careless and let his fall into the water. What will the mother do? Will she give him another one? What will the older ones say?'

A thirteen-year-old child says (example for distributive justice): 'They should have divided up what the other children had left and given some to the little chap — Was it fair to give him any more? — Yes, but the child ought to have been more careful... — What does fair mean? — It means equality among everyone'.

An eleven-year-old says (example for egalitarian justice): 'The little boy ought to have taken care. But then he was a little boy, so they might give him a little piece more. — What did the others say? — They were jealous and said that they ought to be given a little piece more too. But the little one deserved to be given a little piece more. The older ones ought to have understood. — Do you think it was fair to give him some more? — ... Of course, it was a shame for the little one. When you are little you don't understand what you are doing (Piaget, *ibidem*, pp. 267, 270, 271).

Besides the above-described four features (autonomous concept of law, subjective concept of responsibility, etc.) of the autonomous stage, Piaget observes still another feature of this stage: a special type of collective responsibility. This refers to (older) children's thinking that the whole group is punishable for the misdeed of one member who is not detected or denounced. This idea of collective responsibility is not based on the necessity of expiation (as heteronomous stagers think), but on the (older) child's sense of solidarity with the whole group that determines not to denounce the offender, and consequently becomes liable to punishment by the authority. This type of collective responsibility, says Piaget, is therefore voluntarily accepted (Piaget, *ibid.*, pp. 239, 240, 248).

straint. The morality of the autonomous stage is called *morality of cooperation*, of which the causal factors are *peer group cooperation* and a corresponding *intellectual development*.

a) Moral Realism: Realism and Adult Constraint

PIAGET describes *moral realism* as 'the tendency the child has to regard duty and the value attaching to it as self-subsistent and independent of the mind, as imposing itself regardless of the circumstances in which the individual may find himself'⁴⁵. The features studied in the heteronomous stage, namely, heteronomous and absolute concept of law, objective responsibility, expiatory punishment, immanent justice, etc., are typical of this moral realism⁴⁶.

According to PIAGET, the realism of the young child is a consequence of the child's *realism in general*. The young child is a 'general realist', that is, he tends to externalize and reify the contents of his mind. This is manifested in his tendency to materialize and project into the universe the realities of his psychic and social life⁴⁷.

Hence it is only to be expected that from the beginning the child should realize and even reify the moral laws he has to obey. Therefore, several rules given to the child (e.g. not to steal, not to spoil things, etc.) are conceived by the child as existing in themselves, independently of the mind, and consequently of individual circumstances and intentions⁴⁸. In this conception, says PIAGET, the aspect of responsibility is reduced to 'whether the law has been respected or violated' in the literal sense⁴⁹. If violated, it should be made good through punishment. And if violation went unnoticed by the authorities, it should be avenged by the physical forces⁵⁰.

Owing to this general realism in thinking, the child does not distinguish bet-

45. Piaget, *ibidem*, p. 106.

46. *Ibidem*.

47. Piaget, *ibidem*, p. 184.

48. Piaget, *ibidem*, p. 186.

49. Piaget, *ibidem*, p. 187.

50. *Ibidem*.

ween physical and moral laws, nor does he yet grasp the necessity and significance of such distinctions. This throws light also on the fact that youngsters identify lies with bad words or with involuntary errors⁵¹.

Therefore, PIAGET affirms, the young child's general realism and the consequent moral realism is partially due to the child's way of thinking, which is called '*egocentric thinking*'⁵². And egocentric thinking in the Piagetian theory is characteristic of the 'preoperational stage' of intellectual development⁵³. Thus, according to PIAGET, the morality of the child is partially rooted in the corresponding stage of its intellectual development.

The other factor responsible for the child's moral realism in PIAGET'S view is *adult constraint*⁵⁴. This includes the various authoritative restraints imposed on the child by the adults (parents and other older people) by means of rules and sanctions⁵⁵.

Such a moral constraint, says PIAGET, is 'characterized by unilateral respect', that is, the strong one-sided respect the child has for the adult ... and this respect 'is the source of moral obligation and of the sense of duty' for the young child⁵⁶. Hence, every command coming from a respected person is the starting point of an obligatory rule.⁵⁷

Therefore, the various rules and commands are absolute and categorical for the child, but remain external to its mind because of its egocentric thinking⁵⁸. Thus adult constraint, instead of minimizing the child's egocentrism, fosters it and its characteristic features in moral thinking⁵⁹. Besides, the unpsychological approaches (giving commands not bothering whether the child

51. *Ibidem*.

52. *Ibidem*.

53. Cfr. J. H. Flavell, *The Developmental Psychology of Jean Piaget*, New York 1963, p. 162.

A brief exposition of this developmental theory will be given in the second part of the thesis (see chapter VI).

54. Piaget, *ibidem*, p. 188.

55. Piaget, *ibidem*, pp. 129, 131.

56. Piaget, *ibidem*, p. 193.

57. Piaget, *ibidem*, 193.

58. Piaget, *ibidem*, pp. 131, 188.

59. Piaget, *ibidem*, pp. 131, 230, 259.

understands them, the pleasure taken by some parents in using authority, etc) and objectivistic sanctions⁶⁰ of the average parents add to the realism of the young child.

Thus adult constraint, together with the general realism (or egocentric thinking) of the child, shapes the young child's moral realism.

However, adult constraint in the early stage of development, says PIAGET, is not accidental, but characteristic of the process of moral development, because moral rules are 'constituted, transmitted or preserved only through the external pressure exercised by the individuals upon each other' and not through an 'internal biological heredity'⁶¹. And the young child, in its early stage of development, is obviously subjected to the pressure of adults (especially parents) for whom it has a unilateral respect. This, says PIAGET, is a fundamental fact of the psycho-social development of man⁶².

b) Morality of Cooperation: Peer-Group Cooperation and Intellectual Development

The *morality of cooperation* (or autonomous morality) may be described as a morality which results from the child's perceiving 'the point of view of those around him' and thus emphasizes the aspects of motive and solidarity⁶³. It is attained, in the Piagetian view, through the realization that moral rules grow out of mutual relationships.

60. Piaget, *ibidem*, pp. 129, 190. Here Piaget calls attention to the fact that an average parent gets more annoyed and angry at the child who inculpably breaks fifteen cups than at the one who culpably breaks only one. Such are instances of objectivistic sanctions which are many in daily life and add to the child's moral realism.

Even in a very liberal education, Piaget notes, certain impacts of constraint are inevitable. For, the ordinary routine like 'eating at a certain time', 'going to sleep at night' etc. are enough to instill categorical and objectivistic conceptions in the mind of the young child (Piaget, *ibidem*, pp. 188, 199).

61. Piaget, *ibidem*, p. 183. It may be noted that here Piaget draws heavily upon the sociological theories of E. Durkheim (see below p. 277).

62. Piaget, *ibidem*, p. 183.

63. Piaget, *ibidem*, p. 133.

The main factor which promotes autonomous morality says PIAGET, is cooperation among equals or *peer-group cooperation*. What is needed for passing from moral realism to autonomous morality is that the child has opportunity to establish social relationships on the basis of mutuality and equality⁶⁴. And peer group cooperation, which is founded on mutual respect,⁶⁵ provides the child with this opportunity. Hence, it is peer group cooperation 'that delivers the child both from egocentrism and the results of this (adult) constraint'⁶⁶ and leads it to autonomous morality.

According to PIAGET the role of cooperation and mutuality in the development of morality is so great that it alone seems to be sufficient to bring about this development. Thus, speaking about the concept of justice in the autonomous stage, PIAGET says: 'The conclusion which we shall finally reach is that the sense of justice, though naturally capable of being reinforced by the precepts and the practical example of the adult, is largely independent of these influences, and requires nothing more for its development than mutual respect and solidarity which holds among children themselves'⁶⁷. This is so because, according to PIAGET, 'the rule of justice is a sort of immanent condition of social relationships or a law governing their equilibrium'⁶⁸. Because, thus, the rule of justice is social interaction's law of equilibrium, justice develops as peer group cooperation or interaction and solidarity grows⁶⁹.

Besides peer group cooperation, there is another factor required for the growth of the autonomous stage. It is the *intellectual development* of the child, which of course is related to age. The idea of mutuality and solidarity as well as the ability to generalize and differentiate the aspects of a moral situation, all of which are implied in the morality of cooperation, suppose the stage of 'concrete operations' on the intellectual plane. Among other things, this stage makes the child capable of 'reversible thought'⁷⁰.

64. Piaget, *ibidem*, p. 134.

65. Piaget, *ibidem*, p. 227.

66. Piaget, *ibidem*, pp. 184, 194.

67. Piaget, *ibidem*, pp. 195 – 196.

68. Piaget, *ibidem*, p. 196.

69. Piaget, *ibidem*, p. 196.

70. Piaget, *ibidem*, pp. 312, 194, cfr. also, J. H. Flavell, *The Developmental Psychology of Jean Piaget*, pp. 164, 165, 174.

Just as adult constraint strengthens and consolidates the egocentrism and the moral realism of the first stage, cooperation and intellectual development seem to influence each other and thus facilitate moral development in the second stage. PIAGET asks, 'How does psychological intelligence advance with age if not by means of increased cooperation? Cooperation, of course, presupposes intelligence, but this circular relation is perfectly natural: Intelligence animates cooperation and yet needs this social instrument for its own formation'⁷¹. This double causality of the moral development of the child according to PIAGET'S theory is well summarized by D. WRIGHT as follows: 'It is through the clash of wills in the context of mutual respect within the peer group, and through the need to resolve conflicts between equals, that the child is forced to apply this capacity (the capacity for operational thinking) to his social relationships. The outcome is the morality of cooperation'.⁷²

c) The Pattern of Moral- and Conscience-Development according to Piaget

According to PIAGET'S findings reviewed above, there are two stages or at least 'two distinct processes'⁷³ in the moral development of the child, the average age of the first stage being 7, and that of the second 9. The first stage is characterized by moral realism, which is caused by the child's egocentrism and adult constraint which is founded on unilateral respect. The 'moral equilibrium' of this stage is an unstable equilibrium because it does not allow the personality to grow and develop to its full extent⁷⁴, and hence it has to pass to a stable equilibrium.

As the child grows, moral laws begin to be interiorized. The first stage is

71. Piaget, *ibidem*, p. 168.

72. D. Wright, *The Psychology of Moral Behaviour*, Harmondsworth 1971, p. 158.

73. Let us note that Piaget does not insist on clear-cut stages of development because the features of either stage are partially found in the other. Sometimes the same child shows both the tendencies with regard to the same moral concept. Hence Piaget speaks of at least 'two processes one of which on the whole precedes the other in the moral development of the child, although the two partially synchronize' (Piaget, *ibidem*, pp. 119, 120).

74. Piaget, *ibidem*, pp. 324, 325.

gradually overshadowed by the second, characterized by the morality of cooperation, which is caused by the child's intellectual development and especially by peer group cooperation which is founded on mutual respect. This morality constitutes the normal equilibrium⁷⁵.

Applying PIAGET'S two-stage development of moral judgment to conscience, it can be said that conscience, in as far as it has a cognitive dimension,⁷⁶ develops in two stages. The conscience of the first stage — *the heteronomous conscience* — is characterized by moral realism, and has its source of moral obligation in the child's unilateral respect for adults. This is an immature form of conscience, with an unstable equilibrium. The conscience of the second stage — *the autonomous conscience* — is characterized by autonomy and mutuality, and implies a stable equilibrium. Here the sense of obligation arises out of equality and mutual respect. This is a mature form of conscience.

Thus PIAGET'S theory implies that conscience develops with age, and the key factors in this development are social relationships based on equality and mutuality, and intellectual development.

B. The Theory of Lawrence Kohlberg

PIAGET'S conclusions about the two stages of moral development gave impetus to several researchers to make further study of the problem. It is, however, L. KOHLBERG who, guided by the cognitive-developmental approach

75. Piaget, *ibidem*, p. 324.

76. We saw that Piaget's investigations were meant mainly to study the child's theoretical moral judgment, and not so much the practical moral judgment. Here, however, we may note what Piaget says about the relationship between the development of theoretical and practical moral judgments.

The child's theoretical moral judgment, says Piaget, is 'an adequate and progressive conscious realization' of his practical judgment. This means that theory is formed out of practice through conscious realization of what is practised. This therefore supposes a time-lag between the practical and the theoretical, the former preceding the latter. Hence the theoretical judgment a child makes at a given time 'corresponds broadly speaking with the concrete and practical judgments which the child may have made on the occasion of his own actions' during the preceding years. Thus development shows itself first in practice and then in theory (Piaget, *ibidem*, pp. 113, 115).

and following PIAGET, has made extensive study and major contribution in this line⁷⁷.

Analysing children's responses to moral problems, KOHLBERG has isolated about 25 aspects of children's moral thinking and judgment, which 'represent basic moral concepts believed to be present in any society'⁷⁸. (Table 1 presents these basic moral aspects). For example, punishment (aspect 10), rights of property (aspect 19), contract (aspect 23) etc. are all culturally universal concepts entering into moral thinking and judgment⁷⁹. According to KOHLBERG, these basic aspects of moral thinking and judgment pass thro-

77. It should, however, be noted that in working upon Piaget's theory, Kohlberg has thoroughly elaborated and recast it.

The basic data of Kohlberg's study come from two-hour tape-recorded interviews with his subjects. In these interviews the subjects had to evaluate moral dilemmas (for example, cfr., below the problem of the woman dying of cancer) involving conflict between obedience to authority and individual human needs.

The subjects of Kohlberg's original study were 72 boys of three age-groups, 10, 13, 16, from middle and lower class families in Chicago. He has also studied a group of 24 delinquents of 16 years of age, another group of 24 six-year-olds, and a third group of 50 thirteen-year-old boys and girls from near Boston. Besides, Kohlberg reports that his study has been extended to children belonging to different cultural backgrounds (e.g. Switzerland, Belgium, Turkey, Malasia, Israel, Chinese, etc.) (L. Kohlberg, 'The development of children's orientations toward a moral order', *Vita Humana*, 1963 (6), p.12).

78. Kohlberg, 'Stage and Sequence: The cognitive developmental approach to socialization', in D.A. Goslin (Ed.), *Handbook of Socialization Theory and Research*, Chicago 1969, p. 376)

79. Kohlberg distinguishes two types of moral concepts or aspects: Those that have a 'formal cognitive base' and those that do not have such a 'formal cognitive base'. The distinction is based on 'cognitive form' and 'cognitive content'. Those that have a formal cognitive base imply a differentiation in the form of cognition (e.g. a differentiation between the physical and the mental). The basic aspects (cfr. the table) all have a formal cognitive base. Those that do not have a formal cognitive base imply only a differentiation in the content of cognition (not in the form of cognition). Examples for those that do not have a formal cognitive base would be 'peer-loyalty' as opposed to 'adult-loyalty' (as in Piaget's autonomous stage), favouring retaliation by the victim rather than punishment by authority, etc. Such aspects do not suppose a formal cognitive base because 'there is nothing cognitively more mature to preferring a peer than an adult', says Kohlberg. Such differentiation is a matter of 'content rather than form' (Kohlberg, 'Stage and Sequence', pp. 375 - 376).

Code	Description	Aspects
I. Value	Locus of value - modes of attributing (moral) value to acts, persons, or events. Models of assessing value consequences in a situation.	1. Considering motives in judging action. 2. Considering consequences in judging action. 3. Subjectivity vs. objectivity of values assessed. 4. Relation of obligation to wish. 5. Identification with actor or victims in judging the action. 6. Status of actor and victim as changing the moral worth of actions.
II. Choice	Mechanisms of resolving or denying awareness of conflicts.	7. Limiting actor's responsibility for consequences by shifting responsibility onto others. 8. Reliance on discussion and compromise, mainly unrealistically. 9. Distorting situation so that conforming behavior is seen as always maximizing the interests of the actor or of others involved.
III. Sanctions and Motives	The dominant motives and sanctions for moral or deviant action.	10. Punishment or negative reactions. 11. Disruption of an interpersonal relationship. 12. A concern by actor for welfare, for positive state of the other. 13. Self-condemnation.
IV. Rules	The ways in which rules are conceptualized, applied, and generalized. The basis of the validity of a rule.	14. Definition of an act as deviant. (Definition of moral rules and norms.) 15. Generality and consistency of rules. 16. Waiving rules for personal relations (particularism).
V. Rights and Authority	Basis and limits of control over persons and property	17. Non-motivational attributes ascribed to authority (knowledge, etc.) (Motivational attributes considered under III) 18. Extent or scope of authority's right. Rights of liberty. 19. Rights of possession or property.
VI. Positive Justice	Reciprocity and equality.	20. Exchange and reciprocity as a motive for role conformity. 21. Reciprocity as a motive to deviate (e.g., revenge). 22. Distributive justice. Equality and impartiality. 23. Concept of maintaining partner's expectations as a motive for conformity. Contract and trust.
VII. Punitive Justice	Standards and functions of punishment.	24. Punitive tendencies or expectations. ...Notions of equating punishment and crime. 25. Functions or purpose of punishment.

Table. 1. The Basic Aspects of Moral Thinking and Judgment.
(From: L. Kohlberg, "Stage and Sequence", pp. 378, 379)

ugh six stages of development, and 'each of these concepts is differently defined and used at each of the six stages'⁸⁰. These developmental stages, named after their basic orientations, are the following.

Stage 1. Punishment and obedience orientation.

Stage 2. Naive instrumental hedonism.

Stage 3. Good-boy morality of maintaining good relations, approval of others.

Stage 4. Authority maintaining morality.

Stage 5. Morality of contract and of democratically accepted law.

Stage 6. Morality of individual principles of conscience⁸¹.

Therefore, in accordance with these six stages, the development of children's moral thinking and judgment passes through six stages.

1. The Three Levels (Six Stages) of Moral Development

KOHLBERG reduces the above-said six stages of moral development to *three levels* of development, each level consisting of two stages. These levels are:

- a. The *premoral level*
- b. The *conventional role-conformity level*
- c. The *level of self-accepted moral principles*⁸²

80. Ibidem.

81. Kohlberg, 'The development of children's orientations toward a moral order', pp. 13 – 14.

82. In discussing the various stages of development we note the basic features like value orientation, motivation, 'right and wrong' conceptions, etc., of each stage. Besides, we quote below one of the ten moral dilemmas used by Kohlberg in his studies. It is concerned with the 'value of human life'. How children at the various stages of development would respond to this dilemma is supposed to show the developmental changes in their moral judgment and ideology. Therefore, in discussing the stages we shall refer to children's changing concepts about the 'value of life' as revealed through their responses to the following moral dilemma: 'In Europe a woman was near death from a special kind of cancer. There was one drug that the doctors thought might save her. It was a form of radium that a druggist in the same town had recently discovered. The drug was expensive to make. He paid 200 dollars for the radium and charged 2000 dollars for a small

a) The Premoral Level

The first level, called *premoral*, includes the *first* and *second* stages of moral development.

First stage

Though no fixed age can be set for the emergence of this stage, usually it is prevalent upto the *age of seven* and decreases afterwards⁸³.

For a child of this stage, 'moral values' reside in physical objects and external happenings. He attributes 'moral values' to these factors and his moral judgment is based on physical and objectivistic conceptions. Hence regarding the dilemma quoted, 'the value of a human life is based on the social status or physical attributes of its possessor'⁸⁴. As regards the motivation for moral

dose of the drug. The sick man's husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the money but he could get together about 1000 dollars which is half of what it costs. He told the druggist that his wife was dying and asked him to sell it cheaper or let him pay later. But the druggist said: 'No, I have discovered the drug and I am going to make money from it'. So Heinz got desperate and broke into the man's store to steal the drug for his wife. Should the husband have done that? Why? (Kohlberg, 'The development of children's orientations', pp. 13 – 14, 18.)

83. Kohlberg, 'The development of moral character and moral ideology' in M.L. Hoffman and L.W. Hoffman (Eds), *Review of Child Development Research*, New York 1964, pp. 402, 403.

84. Kohlberg, Ibidem, p. 402.

It is interesting to note how a boy of 10 related the necessity of saving a human life to the importance of the person to be saved, and his importance to the amount of furniture he possessed. To the interviewer's question 'Would it be all right to put the druggist in the electric chair for murder?', the boy says: 'If she could be cured by the drug and they didn't give it to her, I think so, because she could be an important person like Betsy Ross, she made the flag. And if it was President Eisenhower, he is important, and they'd probably put the man in the electric chair because that's is not fair'. (Should the punishment be more if he is an important person?), 'If someone important is in a plane and is allergic to heights and stewardess won't give him the medicine because she's only got enough for one and she's got a sick one, a friend in back, they would probably put the stewardess in a lady's jail because she didn't help the important one'. (Is it better to save the life of one important person or a lot of unimportant people?) 'All the people

responses, the first stager is guided by the external motives of fear of punishment and of pleasing those in authority, so that he may escape punishment⁸⁵. Thus even in his motivation the first stager is externally oriented.

Second Stage

This stage shows a prevalence between *seven* and *ten years* of age, and declines after ten⁸⁶.

The moral thinking of the second stager is based on a need-serving point of view. What satisfies his (and occasionally of others as well) needs is valuable according to him. He would define as right and justifiable those actions that serve his own (and others') wishes and needs, physical and quasi-physical needs⁸⁷. Here, therefore, the 'value of life is seen as instrumental to the satisfaction of the needs of its possessor or of other persons'⁸⁸. The main motive for moral response at this stage is the desire to obtain 'goods and rewards' from others, which of course are instrumental to need-satisfaction⁸⁹.

b) The Conventional Role-Conformity Level

The second level comprises the *third* and *fourth* stages of moral development.

that aren't important because one man just has one house, may be a lot of furniture, but a whole bunch of people have an awful lot of furniture and some of these poor people might have a lot of money and it doesn't look it' (Kohlberg, 'The development of children's orientations', p. 19.).

85. Kohlberg, 'The development of children's orientations', p. 20.

86. Kohlberg, 'The development of moral character', pp. 402 – 403.

87. Kohlberg, 'The development of children's orientations', p. 23.

88. Kohlberg, 'The development of moral character', p. 402.

An illustration of this instrumental view of life is given in the response of a 10-year-old boy to the question whether 'mercy-killing' is right or wrong. He says, 'it is according to how you look at it...'. He means to say that if the suffering patient wants to end her painful life there is nothing wrong in 'mercy-killing' (Kohlberg, 'The development of children's orientations', p. 23.).

89. Kohlberg, 'The development of children's orientations', p. 14.

Third Stage

The prevalence of this stage becomes clearer during the period between *ten* and *thirteen years* of age, and usually it stabilizes after thirteen⁹⁰.

The moral thinking of the third stager is principally based on conformity to the expectations of others, especially family and community members. He wants to be a good and pleasing self before the community. For him 'moral value' resides in doing what others (family and community members) expect from him. He would, therefore, define right action in terms of others' consensus⁹¹. 'The value of human life' for him 'is based on the empathy and affection of family members and others to its possessor'⁹². The main motivating factor at this stage is the 'anticipation of praise and blame' of family and community members. Approval of others is a final internal goal for the third stagers⁹³.

Fourth Stage

This stage too is prevalent during the period between *ten* and *thirteen years* of age, and in the latter half of this period this stage is more prevalent than the previous stage. This stage also stabilizes after thirteen⁹⁴.

Morality at this stage is based on a respect for authorities and a sense of

90. Kohlberg, 'The development of moral character', pp. 402 – 403.

91. Kohlberg, 'Stage and Sequence', p. 376.

92. Kohlberg, 'The development of moral character', p. 402.

This ideology is rather well manifested in the response of a 13-year-old boy to the druggist's problem. He says: 'It was the druggist's fault, he was unfair ... Heinz loved his wife and wanted to save her. I think anyone would do ... (if a case is charged) the judge would look at all sides ...'. Kohlberg observes that the boy's reasoning based on the kind of people involved and the conventional views about 'the unfair druggist', 'the loving husband', 'what everyone would do', 'the understanding judge' etc. is typical of this stage. The boy thinks that he expresses and shares the community view; that the community view is the right one; and that in doing so he becomes good and pleasing to others (Kohlberg, 'The development of children's orientations', p. 25.).

93. Ibidem.

94. Kohlberg, 'The development of moral character', pp. 402 – 403.

obligation to keep the given social order.⁹⁵ For a fourth stager 'moral value' resides in the maintenance of the conventional social order as such and the demands of authorities. He is, therefore, concerned with what his authorities as well as his rights and duties in the given order would demand from him. He would define right and wrong in terms of these demands. This moral ideology is reflected also in the evaluation of the value of life which is 'conceived as sacred in terms of its place in a categorical moral or religious order of rights and duties'⁹⁶. The fourth stagers want to avoid 'the censure by legitimate authorities and the resultant guilt' feelings⁹⁷. Consequently, the main motivating factor in moral responses is the 'anticipation of praise and blame' (i.e. approval and disapproval) from established authorities⁹⁸.

c) The Level of Self-Accepted Moral Principles

The third level includes the *fifth* and *sixth* stages of moral development.

Fifth Stage

This stage shows increase from *thirteen* to *sixteen years* of age.⁹⁹

For fifth stagers 'moral values' seem to reside in keeping the norms and standards which are mutually agreed upon and meant for the common good¹⁰⁰. A rather rational view of laws as serving the cause of common welfare — KOHLBERG says, 'a rationality' inspired by 'social contract legalism' —

95. Kohlberg, 'Stage and Sequence', p. 376.

96. Kohlberg, 'The development of moral character', p. 402.

This concept of moral values (as based on an order of rights and duties) is manifested in the response of a 16-year-old boy to the question 'should the doctor mercy-kill the woman?'. He says: 'The doctor wouldn't have the right to take a life, no human has the right. He can't create life, he shouldn't destroy it' (Kohlberg, *ibidem*, p. 401)

97. Kohlberg, *ibidem*, p. 400.

98. Kohlberg, 'The development of children's orientations', p. 25.

99. Kohlberg, 'The development of moral character', pp. 402 — 403.

100. Kohlberg, 'Stage and Sequence', p. 376.

is predominant at this stage¹⁰¹. Hence right and wrong are defined in relation to these institutionalized laws. Human life is valued at this stage 'both in terms of its relation to community welfare and in terms of life being a universal human right'¹⁰². However, KOHLBERG observes, a conflict between what is 'right' for the individual in a particular situation and what is 'right' for the community as a whole is typical of this stage¹⁰³. Boys at this stage want to avoid being judged as 'inconsistent and non-purposive' in their behaviour and social relations, especially in relation to common welfare. Hence the prevailing motive at this stage is a need to maintain a reasonable self-respect and the respect of others¹⁰⁴.

Sixth Stage

This stage too shows increase from *thirteen* to *sixteen years* of age.¹⁰⁵

For individuals at this stage moral values reside in keeping the universal principles of morality¹⁰⁶. Sixth stagers mean to say that moral decisions are made in terms of 'principles of conscience' and they define conscience as a 'choosing and self-judging function...'¹⁰⁷. Because individuals at this stage have grasped the universality of moral principles, they are capable of going beyond individual moral rules, and of thinking and judging in terms of general principles of morality. This is reflected also in their 'belief in the sacredness of human life as representing a universal human value of respect for the individual'¹⁰⁸. As regards motivation, the sixth stager is motivated by the

101. Kohlberg, 'The development of children's orientations', p. 28.

102. Kohlberg, 'The development of moral character', p. 402.

103. Kohlberg, 'The development of children's orientations', p. 29.

104. Kohlberg, 'Stage and Sequence', p. 382.

105. Kohlberg, 'The development of moral character', pp. 402 — 403.

106. Kohlberg, 'Stage and Sequence', p. 376.

107. Kohlberg, 'The development of children's orientations', p. 28.

108. Kohlberg, 'The development of moral character', p. 402.

These aspects are manifested in the responses of a 16-year-old boy to the druggist's problem. He says: 'By the law of society he (the husband) was wrong, but by the law of nature or of God the druggist was wrong and the husband was justified. Human life is above all financial gain. Regardless of who was dying, if it was a total stranger, man has a duty to save him from dying' (Kohlberg, *ibidem*, p. 401).

need to be consistent with his own moral principles and thus avoid the 'self-condemnation' (or guilt) that would follow from the violation of one's principles¹⁰⁹.

Thus the child's moral judgment and ideology progresses in the course of its development from objectivistic-external orientations towards more and more subjective-internal orientations.

2. Invariant Sequence and Age-Trend Development

According to KOHLBERG, the six moral stages "form an *invariant developmental sequence*"¹¹⁰. It means that the stages "represent a developmental continuum, in which each individual passes through the stages in the prescribed sequence".¹¹¹ Hence in the course of development an individual cannot skip stages nor can he develop in any other order. Therefore, the attainment of a stage is dependent on the attainment of the previous stage. Thus an individual who has attained the sixth stage of moral development should have gone through the preceding five stages.¹¹² Besides, "a stage of thought involves a reorganization of the preceding modes of thought, with an integration (not an addition) of each previous stage with... new elements of the later stages."¹¹³ Because each stage is thus a reorganization, and consequently a displacement of the preceding stage, the child tends to reject the preceding modes of thought.¹¹⁴ This implies a qualitative difference between the stages. Thus, for example, a second stager (instrumental hedonistic stage) re-

109. Kohlberg, 'The development of moral character', pp. 400, 401.

110. Kohlberg, 'The development of moral character', p. 404.


111. E. Turiel, 'An Experimental Test', p. 316.

112. Cfr. Kohlberg, 'Stage and Sequence' p. 385.

113. Turiel, 'An Experimental Test', p. 316.

114. Cfr. Turiel, *ibidem*, p. 309. According to Kohlberg's findings, about 50 per cent of a subject's moral judgments fits his predominant stage or mode of thinking. Thus, for example, 50% of the moral judgments and evaluations a second stager makes at a given time are, as a rule, of instrumental-hedonistic type. The remainder are distributed around the predominant stage in a decreasing manner as one moves further from it. The distribution of stage-usages is given in Figure 1 (Cfr. Kohlberg, 'Stage and Sequence', p. 387).

Figure 1
Profile of stage usage



jects the first-stage moral response as "fearful and foolish"; a third-stager (good-boy, empathy, approval stage) rejects the second-stage response as 'egoistical and ignoring moral feelings'; similarly a fourth stager (authority maintaining stage) rejects the third-stage response as 'based on personal feelings and relationships rather than upon moral rules'.¹¹⁵ The above indicated reasonings, which are qualitative, for rejecting the lower stages also show that there is a qualitative (rather than quantitative) difference between the stages.¹¹⁶

Further, according to the cognitive-developmental theory, the six stages show a regular *age trend development*¹¹⁷. This does not mean that each individual passes through all the stages, attaining the final stages at a given age,


115. J. Rest et alii, 'Level of Moral Development as a Determinant of Preference and Comprehension of Moral Judgments Made by Others', *Journal of Personality*, 1969 (37), p. 238.

116. Cfr. Rest et alii, *ibidem*, p. 237.

117. Kohlberg, 'The Development of Moral Character', p. 404.

Figure 2

Mean per cent of total moral statements of each of six moral judgement types at four ages.



for as D. WRIGHT observes "no one has yet described a childhood morality which could not be found in some adults".¹¹⁸ Age trend development means only that there is an increasing use of the higher stages according to age-growth, or, the more advanced a stage, the more age-growth is required for

118. D. Wright, *The Psychology of Moral Behaviour*, p. 172.

its use.¹¹⁹ As we have already mentioned, the first level (stages 1 and 2) decreases with age; the second level (stages 3 and 4) increases up to the age of thirteen; and the third level (stages 5 and 6) continues to increase from thirteen to sixteen. (Figure 2 shows the 'mean per cent of total moral statements of each of six moral judgment types (stages) at four ages: 7, 10, 13, 16). It is clear from figure 2 that though there is an age trend development, the second level (stages 4 and 3) are 'on average' more predominant even at the age of sixteen.

Besides, though an age trend development may be found everywhere, the 'age-stage' correspondence shows considerable variation according to societies and social backgrounds. (Figures 3 and 4 are examples for such variations. Figure 3 shows 'age trends' in *middle class urban boys* in three nations, and figure 4 shows 'age trends' in *isolated village boys* in two other nations). These figures show that middle class urban boys have an 'average development' at four ages, while in isolated village boys the first stage is the predominant one even at the age of sixteen.

The above shown age trends, says KOHLBERG, indicate two things. First, "large groups of moral concepts and ways of thought only attain meaning at successively advanced ages", and secondly, that they "require the extensive background of *social experience* and *cognitive growth* represented by the age factor".¹²⁰

3. Intellectual Development

As we have already mentioned, *intellectual* development or *cognitive growth* is necessary for the development of moral stages according to the cognitive-developmental theory. Each level (or stage) of development implies a cognitive growth not attained by the previous one. We summarize this growth below.

The *first stager* reflects the features of egocentric thinking. His moral thinking is based on 'primitive value assumptions' from the cognitive point

119. It may be noted, as we shall see soon, that age-growth alone is not enough for the development of moral stages.

120. Kohlberg, "Stage and Sequence", p. 385, 386.

Figure 3

Age trends in moral judgement in middle class urban boys in three nations.





Figure 4

Age trends in moral judgement in isolated village boys in two nations.



of view. He is not able to distinguish between the physical and the moral values; nor between the subjective and objective.¹²¹

The *second stager* shows an awareness of his ego-needs and of the needs of others. This implies exchange, reciprocity and subjective-objective distinction. Though for him moral value is still need-based, he begins to distinguish it from purely physical values. Thus, KOHLBERG concludes, the second stager's morality reflects "both cognitive advance and a firmer internal basis of judgments"¹²² than the first stager's.

The features of the *third and fourth stages* represent a morality based on role-taking; on conformity to the expectations of others.¹²³ Role-taking implies the "ability to understand the interaction between the self and another as seen through the other's eyes".¹²⁴ Cognitively it supposes the ability to make "specific inferences about others' capabilities, attributes, expectations, feelings and potential reactions".¹²⁵ This moral level presupposes the level of 'concrete operations' intellectually.

Finally, the *fifth and sixth stages* moral thinking imply a cognitive structure capable of responding in terms of formal, universal principles. Intellectually this corresponds to the level of 'formal operations'.¹²⁶

This analysis shows that "intellectual development is an important condition" for the development of the child's moral judgment, though it alone does not explain the development of moral stages.¹²⁷

121. Kohlberg, "The Development of Children's Orientations", pp. 18, 20.

122. Kohlberg, *ibidem*, p. 24. — Though Kohlberg's first and second stages correspond to Piaget's heteronomous and autonomous stages respectively, there are differences in interpretation. For example, Piaget's heteronomous stager is motivated by the unilateral respect for the adults (an internal motive), while Kohlberg's first stager is motivated by the fear of punishment (an externalized motive). Besides, though Kohlberg has found an increase in reciprocity in the second stage he does not attribute any properly moral significance to it at this stage (it is merely 'quid pro quo'), while Piaget does so to the autonomous stage. (Cfr. Kohlberg, *ibidem*, p. 18).

123. Kohlberg, *ibidem*, p. 26.

124. R. L. Selman, "The Relation of Role-Taking to the Development of Moral Judgment in Children", *Child Development*, 1971 (42) p. 80.

125. *Ibidem*.

126. Kohlberg, *ibidem*, p. 29.

127. Kohlberg, "Stage and Sequence", p. 391.

4. Social Experience

Besides intellectual development, the other factor needed for moral development is the individual's *social experience*, that is, his interaction with a social and moral environment.¹²⁸ Encountering a socio-moral environment, the child attempts to actively cope with this environment and "organize his social experiences" and in this process the child develops the different stages of his moral order.¹²⁹ Therefore, the stages of moral development represent "structures emerging from the interaction of the child with his social environment" and stage to stage movement represents the way in which the various aspects (commands, prohibitions, standards, sanctions, etc.) of the sociomoral order "are taken up into the child's organization of a moral order".¹³⁰ Hence, stage-changes occur as the growing child reorganizes his moral order as a result of his interaction with the social environment.

Here KOHLBERG distinguishes two aspects of social experience: (a) *general social environment* providing general role-taking opportunities, and (b) *specific social interaction* fostering stage development of morality.

Here Kohlberg makes some pertinent observations about certain 'cognitive-moral' relationships: 'One may be a theoretical physicist (so intellectually capable of formal operations) and yet not make moral judgments at the principled level'.

Besides, children below average in I. Q. are almost all below average in moral maturity. But children above average in I. Q. are equally likely to be low or high in moral maturity ... Dull children, who attain formal operations slower than brighter children, tend to develop more slowly in moral judgment. Thus "cognitive maturity is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for moral judgment maturity".

128. E. Turiel, "Developmental Processes in the Child's Moral Development", in P. Mussen et alii (Eds), *Trends and Issues in Developmental Psychology*, New York 1969, p. 95.

The child's environment is called 'moral' in so far as it presents rules, standards, values and principles, adds Turiel.

129. Turiel, *ibidem*, p. 95. The internal mechanism which causes this process is what may be called 'cognitive conflict' and the consequent reorganization of the structure, which shall be briefly discussed in the second part of the thesis.

130. Kohlberg, "Stage and Sequence", p. 386.

a) General Social Environment

According to KOHLBERG, what basically stimulates moral development is social role-taking, that is, socially interacting with or reacting to the other as some one like the self and reacting to the self's behaviour in the role of the other.¹³¹ This interaction, therefore, supposes mutual expectations based on equality. And social interaction or role-taking is promoted evidently by active social participation. 'The first prerequisite for role-taking is participation in a group or institution. Participation is partially a matter sheer amount of interaction and communication in the group, since communication presupposes role-taking'. Hence, "the more the individual is responsible for the decision of the group, and for his own actions in their consequences for the group, the more must he take the roles of others in it".¹³² That is, the more active, responsible and significant the participation the more role-taking there is. What is important for moral development in this context is a social environment which provides opportunities for such a role-taking. And there are in every society, adds KOHLBERG, basic social institutions or groups which provide the growing child with increasing opportunities for such role-taking. Important among such institutions are family, peer group, institutions of law, government and work.¹³³

However, participation in none of the above said institutions is uniquely or critically necessary for moral development. Thus about family interaction KOHLBERG says, "family participation is not unique or critically necessary for moral development", that is, family is not a uniquely necessary setting for normal moral development.¹³⁴ Highly warm families, with complete absence of punishment, have not found to foster moral growth. Nor does the fact that 'bad families' lead to moral pathology prove the necessity of a good family for moral development, argues KOHLBERG.¹³⁵ Similarly, while peer

131. Kohlberg, *ibidem*, p. 398.

132. Kohlberg, *ibidem*, p. 399.

133. Kohlberg, *ibidem*, pp. 397, 401.

134. Kohlberg, *ibidem*, p. 399.

135. Kohlberg, *ibidem*, p. 400.

group participation is positively related to moral development, its role is not unique or critical.¹³⁶

Thus according to KOHLBERG, the role of the above said institutions or social groups is to provide a social environment for general role-taking opportunities, and in this sense they are important for moral development, although individually taken their role is not unique or critical.

b) Specific Social Interaction for Stage Development

The above said general role-taking or social interactions do not account for the development of specific stages in moral growth. Social stimulation in the form of specific socio-moral concepts, reasonings and experiences is required for the development of particular stages. This is explained as follows.

Though the child encounters a variety of stimuli in the form of various experiences he does not respond to all of them equally because some of them are too high, and some others too low, for his moral structure. Thus, for example, if a second stager (instrumental hedonism) encounters moral reasonings based on universal principles of morality (that is, sixth stage) he cannot assimilate them, and hence they will not help him change his present moral structure; similarly, if an advanced stager is exposed to lower-stage moral concepts they will be 'too simple' for him and will not help his development either.¹³⁷ Besides, there is a tendency to assimilate 'new experiences' to one's existing stage, if possible.¹³⁸

Therefore, "the problem of moral change would appear to be one of presenting stimuli which are both sufficiently incongruous as to stimulate a conflict in the child's existing stage schemata and sufficiently congruous as to be assimilated with some accommodative effort".¹³⁹ Hence the effectiveness of social stimuli to produce developmental changes depends on the 'structural

'match' between the stimuli encountered and the individual's existing stage.¹⁴⁰ The most effective 'structural match' in this sense, hold the theorists, is had when the individual encounters social stimuli corresponding to the *stage directly above* the existing stage.¹⁴¹ Thus, the socio-moral experiences most conducive to the development, for example, of the second stager would be those corresponding to the third stage. These would be more effective (than stimuli corresponding to other stages) in stimulating a conflict in the existing second stage structure, and at the same time in being assimilated with some accommodative effort.

Accordingly, the moral concepts and experiences that are most suitable for the development of an 'authority maintaining' fourth stager would be those of the 'democratically-oriented' fifth stager. Similarly, a second stage boy living in a slum (supposedly an environment where consideration and affection for others is lacking) is not likely to receive from his social milieu the experiences conducive to his development to the third stage (which is based on the affection and approbation of the 'significant others'). If the boy has also a 'bad family', where no experience and example of affection and altruism are encountered, then there is no third stage "moral material to be assimilated".¹⁴² The most likely consequence of this would be the arrest of the boy's moral growth, though he will grow further intellectually and in age.

In ordinary developmental situation, however, there are better chances. As we have already indicated, the child's social milieu varies, becomes widened and complex as he grows. And participating in different social groups and institutions the growing child encounters various demands, experiences and values. And in the course of 'normal' development these various demands, experiences and values provide the child with material to discriminate and assimilate according to his developmental level, and thus they contribute to his moral development.¹⁴³

136. Ibidem.

137. Turiel, "Developmental Processes", p. 100; also Turiel, "An Experimental Test", p. 316.

138. Kohlberg, "Stage and Sequence", p. 402.

139. Ibidem.

140. Turiel, "Developmental Processes", p. 100.

141. Turiel, "An Experimental Test", p. 316.

142. Kohlberg, "Stage and Sequence", p. 404.

143. Kohlberg, "The Development of Moral Character", p. 407; cfr. also, Turiel, "Developmental Processes", p. 100.

From his study, KOHLBERG concludes, "universal and regular age trends of development may be found in moral judgment, and these have a formal cognitive base".¹⁴⁴ Such age trends in moral development, we have seen, presuppose corresponding intellectual development and social experiences. Regarding social class differences that may be found in the development of moral thinking and judgment KOHLBERG says, "these are not class differences in values, but class differences in the cognitive and social stimulation of development".¹⁴⁵ Besides, factors like I.Q., sex, and specific training practices do not seem to cause the age trends of development, but only stimulate or retard it.¹⁴⁶

5. Further Empirical Investigations into Kohlberg's Theory

Besides KOHLBERG'S original research (on which his theory is based) there have been further studies which attempted to investigate one or another point implied in his theory. It is the findings of these studies that are reviewed here. Of the three studies reviewed, the first two investigate the 'invariant sequence' of developmental stages and the type of moral reasoning and experience that foster development the most, and the last investigates the role of cognitive-growth in moral development.

144 Kohlberg, "Stage and Sequence", p. 375. It is to be noted that Kohlberg attributes 'universal age trend development' only to the 'basic aspects' of moral thinking and judgment. It is these basic aspects that have a 'formal cognitive base'. Therefore, no 'universal age trend development' is attributed to those aspects of moral thinking and judgment which have no 'formal cognitive base'.

145 Ibidem.

146. Kohlberg, "The Development of Moral Character", pp. 398, 406. — For example, illustrates Kohlberg, "even the permissively reared child appears to have a 'natural' tendency to define good and bad in terms of punishment, a tendency which his awareness of punishment by teachers, police, and other parents seem sufficient to stimulate. While specific punishment practices or cultural ideologies do not appear necessary for the formation of the young child's moral ideology of punishment, they may lead to the persistence of this ideology into adolescence or adulthood".

a) Sequence of Moral Stages

In this experimental study¹⁴⁷ E. TURIEL investigated the theory of invariant sequence of moral stages. In accordance with the 'invariant sequence theory' it was hypothesized that: (i) "subjects exposed to reasoning corresponding to a *stage directly above* their dominant stage would be influenced more than those exposed to reasoning corresponding to a *stage further above*", and (ii) "subjects exposed to a *stage one above* would be influenced more than those exposed to a *stage below their own*". This second hypothesis implies that the subjects show, in the course of development, a tendency to reject lower stages.

The subjects were 44 boys (seventh graders from New Haven) between the ages of 12 and 13.7, who belonged to middle class, and were matching in I.Q. Through a pretest-interview (using six of the moral problems previously used by KOHLBERG, e.g. that of the woman dying of cancer and her husband) the dominant moral stages of the subjects were determined.

"All subjects of a given dominant stage were randomly assigned to the control group or to three experimental groups (N=11 per group). In the experimental treatments, administered 2 weeks after the pretest, subjects were exposed to moral reasoning in individual role-playing situations with an adult experimenter. In one treatment the reasoning presented was *one stage below* the initial dominant stage (-1 treatment); the second treatment group was exposed to reasoning that was *one stage above* (+1 treatment); and in a third treatment the reasoning presented was *two stages above* (+2 treatment). Members of the control group were not seen by the experimenter for any kind of treatment".

The following two reasonings (one objecting to stealing the drug and the other favouring stealing) are examples of +1 treatment to which a second stage was exposed. These examples, therefore, correspond to stage 3. It may be recalled that stage 3 is a 'good-boy morality of maintaining good relations and approval of others' as the following reasonings exemplify: (a) "You really shouldn't steal the drug. There must be a way of getting it. You could get help from someone. Or else you could talk the druggist into letting you pay later. The druggist is trying to support his family, so he should get some profit from his business. Maybe the druggist should sell it for less, but still you shouldn't just steal it".

147. E. Turiel, "An Experimental Test of the Sequentiality of Developmental Stages in the Child's Moral Judgments". in R.C. Johnson et alii (Eds) *Conscience, Contract and Social Reality*, pp. 308 — 318.

(b) "You should steal the drug in this case. Stealing isn't good, but you can't be blamed for doing it. You love your wife and are trying to save her life. Nobody would blame you for doing it. The person who should be blamed is the druggist who was unjust, mean and greedy".

One week after the experimental treatments the subjects were tested again (post test) to see the differences in their moral thinking and judgment. Here the subjects were to give their own solutions to 9 problem-situations (6 used in the pretest, and 3 used in the experimental treatments)¹⁴⁸

It was found that of the three treatments "the +1 treatment was the most effective condition in moving the subjects up one stage". This is clear from table 2, which shows that +1 score of the +1 treatment was significantly larger than the +1 scores of any other group, the difference being significant at the .005 level.¹⁴⁹ However, as regards the impact of the three experimental treatments upon shifts towards respective stages, it was found (contrary to the hypothesis) that -1 treatment caused more -1 shift than +1 treatment caused +1 shift (table 2). Here TURIEL observes that the experimental groups' scores may have been influenced also by factors other than experimental manipulations, and hence the scores should be corrected. The corrected (by reducing the control scores from the corresponding experimental scores) scores showed some significant differences with regard to the effect of the three treatments upon shifts towards respective stages.¹⁵⁰

Findings also indicate that exposure to lower stages (-1 stage) can cause a regression in moral thinking and judgment. This finding is to be taken with caution, says TURIEL, because the -1 scores of the -1 group and -1 scores of the control group did not reach acceptable significance level (table 2)¹⁵¹. Finally, as the table shows, +2 treatment did not show a significantly greater effect than the control or other experimental conditions in moving subjects up 2 stages.¹⁵²

148. Ibidem, pp. 309 – 312.

149. Ibidem, p. 314.

150. The corrected means (cfr. table) were: -1 treatment = .096; +1 treatment = .144; +2 treatment = .014. Accordingly, the difference between +1 and +2 treatments was significant at the .005 level; between +1 and -1 at the .10 level; and between -1 and +2 at the .05 level (ibidem, pp. 313 – 314).

151. Ibidem, pp. 314 – 315.

152. Ibidem, p. 315.

Mean Direct Posttest Stage Scores (in Proportions) on the Stages One Below (-1), the Same As (0), One Above (+1), and Two Above (+2) the Pretest Dominant Stage

Table 2

Stage level relative to pretest dominant stage ^a	Condition groups ^b			
	-1 treatment	+1 treatment	+2 treatment	Control
-1	.336₁₁	.183 ₁₃	.209 ₁₃	.240 ₁₁
0	.283	.346	.374	.395
+1	.131 ₁₁	.266₁₃	.145₁₃	.122 ₁₁
+2	.057	.102	.099	.085

Note: Dunnett *t* tests were computed for each boldface figure against each of the other three figures in the same row. Tests significant at the .05 level, Group 11 > 13; at the .025 level, 11 > 12; at the .005 level, 22 > 21, 22 > 23, 22 > 24.

^a Each subject had received pretest scores at each developmental stage, the highest of these indicating his dominant stage. On the posttest, for each individual the proportion of his total score was calculated for each level listed in the left column.

^b N = 11 in each group.

What the findings of this study go to show is that subjects more easily "understand and utilize concepts that are directly above their dominant stage than concepts that are 2 stages above", and that subjects assimilate the next higher-stage concepts more readily than the lower-stage concepts even though they understand these latter concepts as well as or even better than the former ones. These data support, observes TURIEL, the theory of invariant sequence according to which the development of moral stages takes place in prescribed sequence, and each stage is a "reorganization of the preceding modes of thought".¹⁵³

b) Preference and Comprehension of Moral Judgments

In this study¹⁵⁴ J.REST, L.KOHLBERG and E.TURIEL investigated children's preference and comprehension of moral judgments made by others. This was also meant to be a replication of TURIEL'S study reviewed above.

Here the subjects were 22 (11 boys and 11 girls) fifth graders (between the ages of 10.6 and 12.3) and 23 (12 boys and 11 girls) eighth graders

153. Ibidem, p. 316.

154. J. Rest, E. Turiel and L. Kohlberg, "Level of Moral Development as a Determinant of Preference and Comprehension of Moral Judgments Made by Others", *Journal of Personality*, 1969, pp. 225 – 252.

(between the ages of 13. 4 and 14. 6). All were from catholic parochial schools in New York.

Through a pretest of administering five 'moral problems' similar to those used by KOHLBERG, the subjects' dominant stages were assessed. Then they were exposed to a "series of moral arguments that were at three different stages" in relation to the subject's dominant stage: -1, +1, and +2 treatments. This was done in the following manner: The subjects were given two booklets (one for each conflict situation, called situation II and III), each comprising four parts. The first part of each booklet contained a moral problem. One of the two moral problems was KOHLBERG'S case: the woman dying of cancer... (situation III). The second part of the booklet contained six pairs of advice, given by different friends as possible solutions to the conflict. Of these, 2 sets were one stage below (-1) the dominant stage, 2 sets, one stage above (+1), and 2 sets, two stages above (+2). Part three of the booklet contained a few sets of questions (e.g. 'Would you choose the two friends whom you think have given the best advice? Can you say why you have chosen these?') which asked the subjects to choose the best, smartest, good and the worst advice from the given ones. Part four contained a question which asked for the subjects' own advice on the situation (e.g. "Suppose you were one of Heinz's friends and he comes to you for advice. What would you tell him to do?"). Situation III, however, had an additional question aimed at assessing the subjects' 'recall capacity': 'Now we should like to know what you remember about the advice that was given to Heinz by his friends. Please list below as much of that advice as you can recall'. The subjects, being grouped according to their dominant stages, were given the appropriate booklets.¹⁵⁵

It was found that the "subjects tended to choose the advice of the stage above their dominant stage... whether preference was stated in terms of 'best', 'smart', or 'good'". And at the same time they tended to pick the advice of the stage below as the 'worst advice', this choice being significant at the .01 level (table 3).¹⁵⁶

As regards subjects' comprehension of moral reasoning, it was found that "the accuracy of the recapitulation decreased as the stage level increased" (ta-

ble 4). As the table shows, subjects who showed preference for -1 advice recapitulated it correctly 64% of the times; those who preferred +1 advice recapitulated it correctly 43% of the times; and those who preferred the +2 advice recapitulated it only 28% of the times. These differences in the accuracy of recapitulation are significant at the .001 level.¹⁵⁷

Table 3
Percentage choice of advice at difference levels for two Situations (II and III)

Stage level of advice	Best			Smart			Good			General preference ^a			Worst		
	-1	+1	+2	-1	+1	+2	-1	+1	+2	-1	+1	+2	-1	+1	+2
S's stage															
1 II	00	25	75	00	00	100	00	13	88	00	11	89	61	38	00
II	38	25	38	45	09	45	14	71	35	15	50	38	38	22	22
III	00	58	42	03	40	37	25	50	25	08	37	35	54	29	11
2 II	04	50	46	08	67	25	13	50	38	08	57	35	67	08	25
II	06	50	44	06	57	37	15	41	44	08	50	41	56	18	28
III	06	44	50	02	45	53	18	30	32	08	46	46	50	21	29
3 II	33	46	21	31	46	23	38	42	21	34	45	22	42	35	33
II	21	29	50	14	22	64	55	09	56	27	21	52	38	33	29
III															
Totals	12	44	44	11	46	43	24	39	37	15	43	42	51	23	26

^aGeneral preference includes data from all questions asking for best, smart, and good advice.
^bStage 1 subject had no -1 choice and the same stage statements were substituted.

Table 4
Percentage of recapitulations of advice at each stage relative to S's own stage.

Stage of the advice recapitulated	Stage of S's recapitulation						
	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3
-1 as "preferred advice"	06	03	<u>64</u>	14	11	02	00
-1 as "worst advice"	02	06	<u>79</u>	11	02	00	00
+1 as "preferred advice"	03	05	27	18	<u>43</u>	03	00
+1 as "worst advice"	04	06	34	16	<u>36</u>	04	00
+2 as "preferred advice"	02	07	18	19	26	<u>28</u>	00
+2 as "worst advice"	05	05	57	05	00	<u>30</u>	00
Stage of advice recalled	05	08	38	15	25	09	00

^aUnderlined figures are "correct" recapitulations of the original statements of advice.

As regards recalling various sets of advice, more -1 advice was recalled than any other, with a steady decline of correct recall as stages of advice advanced (table 4).¹⁵⁸

The authors observe that it is the above said two findings, that is, prefe-

155. Ibidem, pp.227 - 230.

156. Ibidem, p. 232. The percentages given in table 3 represent the relative frequencies that -1, +1 and +2 advice was picked as a preference. The choices of the two situations are presented separately, and subjects grouped according to their dominant stage. The totals at the bottom of the table are the percentages of all the subjects in both situations choosing the -1, +1, and +2 advice (Ibidem, p. 232).

157. Ibidem, p. 233.

158. Ibidem, p. 234

rence for higher stages and better comprehension of lower stages that "combine to produce more assimilation of +1 thinking than -1 or +2 thinking".¹⁵⁹ Non-comprehension prevents +2 stage from being effectively assimilated, while non-preference prevents -1 thinking from being readily assimilated. And +1 thinking is thus in optimum condition, from the point of view of preference and comprehension, to be effectively and readily assimilated.¹⁶⁰

Summarizing their findings the authors say that "children prefer concepts that are above their predominant stage (whether one or two stages up) to concepts that are below; children find thinking two stages above their own more difficult to comprehend than thinking one stage above, and thinking one stage above more difficult than thinking one stage below; and accordingly, children assimilate thinking that is directly above their own stage more readily than thinking that is either one stage below or two stages above their own".¹⁶¹ These findings, especially the last one, substantiate the theory of 'invariant sequence' of moral stages.¹⁶²

c) Formal Operations and Principled Morality

This research¹⁶³ intended to study the relationship between cognitive growth and moral development, more specifically the relationship between formal operational thinking and principled morality. According to KOHLBERG'S theory, we have seen, the morality of self-accepted principles requires the capacity for formal operational thinking on the logical level. Hence the hypotheses of this study were (a) "that there is a substantial and predictable relationship between formal operations and principled moral reasoning, (b) that formal operations are a necessary condition for the deve-

159. Ibidem, p. 235.

160. Ibidem, p. 237.

161. Ibidem.

162. Ibidem. The authors observe certain other trends evidenced by the data: There was a general tendency among the subjects to distort advice to either the existing stage ("0") or the lower stage (-1). A "strong tendency to distort disliked advice to the -1 level" was especially remarkable. These trends also indicate that there is a hierarchy in the subjects' comprehension of moral concepts and reasonings. (Ibidem, p. 234).

163. C. Tomlinson-Keasy and C.B. Keasy, 'The Mediating Role of Cognitive Development in Moral Judgment', *Child Development*, 1974, pp. 291 - 298.

lopment of principled moral reasoning, (c) that there is a decalage between the attainment of formal operations and its application to the area of moral reasoning, and (d) that formal operations are not sufficient condition for the emergence of principled moral reasoning".

The subjects were 30 sixth grade girls (public school students from California) and 24 coeds (college students from New Jersey). The girls were of average intelligence, and the coeds above average. Evidently these two groups (school level & college level) represent contrasting stages of cognitive development.

All subjects were given six moral dilemmas (e.g. that of the woman dying of cancer...) for evaluation. At a later date (after 4 months for the graders and 7 months for the coeds) they were given three formal operation tasks (taken from B. INHELDER and J. PIAGET, *The growth of logical thinking from childhood to adolescence*, New York 1958). The following (the 'balance') is an example of the formal operational tasks: "Now, here is a balance. You see you can put one weight on each side and it will balance, or you can put two weights on one side and one on the other and it will balance, or you can put three weights on one side and one on the other to make it balance. (The experimenter demonstrated this in the same manner for all subjects). Now your task is to figure out how you make it balance with one weight on each side, with two weights on one side and one on the other, and with three weights on one side and one on the other. Do you understand". Once the subjects understood the problem, they were left alone to work, but observed through a one-way mirror. (It may be noted that from the way the subjects go about their tasks - e.g. how systematically they test the effects of each weight, how they control other factors involved, etc. - their logical-thinking level is assessed).¹⁶⁴

Correlating the scores of 'moral tasks' and 'formal operational tasks', a significant relationship ($p < .01$) was found between formal operations and principled moral thinking in the case of the girls and the coeds.¹⁶⁵

In order to test whether this relationship is a necessary one (i.e. not mere parallel developments), the subjects were systematically divided into the following four groups according to the number of tasks on which they indicated formal operational thinking: - *concrete*: here *no evidence* of formal operation was present; *transitional*: formal operation on *one task*; *somewhat formal*: formal operation on *two tasks*; *integrated formal*: formal operation on *all*

164. Ibidem, pp. 292 - 294

165. Ibidem, p. 294

three tasks.¹⁶⁶ And then an analysis of variance was done.

The results showed that "the mean moral judgment scores of both girls and coeds differed significantly as a function" of the development of logical thinking ($p < .01$ for girls; $p < .05$ for the coeds)¹⁶⁷ (table 5). As the table shows, 8 coeds at the integrated formal level expressed principled moral thinking (5th and 6th stages) in 41% of their responses, conventional moral thinking (3rd and 4th stages) in 54% of responses, and pre-conventional moral thinking (1st and 2nd stages) in 5% of responses. On the other hand, the two coeds at the concrete level expressed the highest pre-conventional moral thinking in the coed-group. Among the girls, however, even the only subject who was at the integrated formal level was predominantly conventional in her moral thinking. Further, as the girls' responses to logical problems became more concrete, their responses to moral problems became more pre-conventional.¹⁶⁸

Table 5

MEAN PERCENTAGE OF MORAL RESPONSES FOR SUBJECTS AT DIFFERENT CONCEPTUAL LEVELS

	COEDS			GIRLS		
	N	Principled (%)	Conventional (%)	N	Principled (%)	Conventional (%)
Integrated formal	8	41	54	5	0	64
Somewhat formal	8	26	58	7	1	31
Transitional	5	23	61	12	1	29
Concrete	2	28	50	10	1	22

The necessary dependence of principled moral thinking on the attainment of formal operations becomes clearer when the relationship between a subject's dominant moral stage (i.e. the stage to which 50% of her moral responses belong) and level of her logical thinking is seen (table 6). As the table shows, none of the 2 coeds at the lowest logical level (concrete level) was a 'principled moral thinker'; both (100%) were conventionals. Of the 5 coeds at the transitional level, 1 (20%) was a principled moral thinker, and 4 (80%) were conventionals. And of the 8 coeds at the integrated formal level, 3 (38%) were principled moral thinkers, and 5 (62%) were conventionals.¹⁶⁹ Looking

Table 6

COGNITIVE AND MORAL JUDGMENT LEVELS OF INDIVIDUAL SUBJECTS

	GIRLS				COEDS			
	Conventional		Preconventional		Principled		Conventional	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Integrated formal ..	1	100	0	0	3	38	5	62
Early formal	3	43	4	57	1	11	8	89
Transitional	0	0	12	100	1	20	4	80
Concrete	0	0	10	100	0	0	2	100

at the girls' data, it is seen that all 22 (100%) belonging to the two lowest levels of logical thinking (concrete and transitional) were predominantly pre-conventional in moral thinking, and as their formal operation capacity increased they advanced to the conventional level. Besides, as already noted, among the girls the only integrated formal thinker was a conventional moral thinker.¹⁷⁰

These findings go to show that while formal operational thinking is necessary for principled moral thinking, it alone is not sufficient for the development of the latter: Thus, for example, of the 8 integrated formal thinkers among the coeds only three were predominantly principled moral thinkers. Further, if cognitive progress alone accounts for moral responses then subjects with similar cognitive skills should show similar levels of moral thinking. But an analysis of the data (e.g. of the transitional and early formal subjects) showed that subjects in each of these groups did not differ on cognitive skills, but differed significantly on moral reasoning. This difference was significant at the .001 level for both the groups.¹⁷¹

Summarizing the findings of this study we may say that it confirms the hypothesis that cognitive growth (specifically in this study 'formal operations') is a prerequisite for moral development, though it alone does not account for moral development.

166. Ibidem.

167. Ibidem.

168. Ibidem, p. 295

169. Ibidem, p. 295. — The authors observe that the 38% of principled moral think-

king found in their subjects is substantially higher than the 10% principled moral thinking usually found in a college population.

170. Ibidem.

171. Ibidem, p. 296.

6. Conscience in Kohlberg's Theory

According to KOHLBERG'S six-stage development of moral judgment, we may say that conscience, in as far as it implies a judgmental aspect, develops in six stages. In the course of development, it becomes gradually freed from 'externalized principles and values' and comes to develop more and more general principles and internal values, which become the individual's self-guiding values and ideals in his moral responses.¹⁷²

Further, the development of moral thinking and judgment, says KOHLBERG, is so related to the behavioural and emotional aspects of conscience that "once moral judgment development is understood, the development of moral action and affect becomes much more intelligible and predictable".¹⁷³ This implies a certain positive relationship among the three aspects (judgmental, behavioural and emotional) of conscience in the process of their development.

Hence the moral behaviour of an individual will show correspondence to the stage of his moral judgment development. For example, KOHLBERG reports from the findings of a study, in a situation where 'keeping a contract' conflicts with 'respecting a third party's right', the fifth stages (whose moral ideology is based on contract legalism) tend to keep the contract and disregard the third party's right, while the sixth stages (whose morality is based on universal principles of justice) tend to disregard the contract and respect the individual's right¹⁷⁴. This also implies that the intrinsic motive for behaviour, that is, basing it on internal principles and ideals, grows as moral judgment maturity develops. Thus moral judgment maturity has an influence on moral behaviour, although the latter is influenced by other factors as well.¹⁷⁵

172. Kohlberg, "Stage and Sequence", pp. 411 – 413.

173. Kohlberg, *ibidem*, p. 374.

174. Kohlberg, *ibidem*, pp. 395, 396.

175. Kohlberg, *ibidem*, pp. 394 – 396.

In fact Kohlberg conceives the behavioural dimension of conscience in terms of ego development or ego strength. Ego strength includes ability for self-control, capacity for postponing gratification, capacity for maintaining focussed attention, control of unsocial fantasies, and self-esteem. In other words, maturity and consistency in moral behaviour seem to depend very much on those factors of personality, which help one make mature decisions (Kohlberg, "Development of Moral Character", pp. 381 – 391, 408).

As regards moral emotions, says KOHLBERG, changes are to be found according to the development of moral judgment. While young children (first and second stages) show signs of excessive fear after violating 'moral rules', older children (fourth stages and above) show symptoms of "self-critical guilt".¹⁷⁶

The difference between the two kinds of reactions is that in the first case "the bad feeling is interpreted by the child as fear of external sanctioning forces while in the other case it is interpreted by the child as produced by the self's own moral judgments".¹⁷⁷ "Guilt in its most precise sense" adds KOHLBERG, "is the moral self-judgment and it presupposes the formation of internal or mature standards of moral judgment".¹⁷⁸ Thus moral judgment maturity is related to moral emotions. Besides, there is a difference between fear and guilt in their relation to moral behaviour (i.e. resistance to temptation).

While anticipated guilt is often effective in preventing the individual from going against his ideals and values, anticipated fear of punishment is not so effective: "Intense fear of punishment does not predict to resistance to temptation, whereas self-critical guilt does".¹⁷⁹ Thus in the course of development there seems to be a certain 'consistency' among the three aspects or dimensions of conscience.

In a related study, P.F. Grim, L.Kohlberg, and S.H. White investigated the relationship between attention-abilities of children and their temptation resistance. The subjects were 22 first graders and 26 sixth graders. They found in both groups of subjects significant correlations between good performance of attention and temptation resistance. And the highest correlation ($r = .61$ and $.59$ for the groups respectively) was seen between high variability of reaction time and high cheating. Interpreting the findings the authors say that moral behaviour or temptation resistance (at least in the group studied) is not simply a function of fear of punishment or anticipated guilt, but more of ego strength, which in turn includes factors relating to cognitive-voluntary ability of sustained attention. (P. F. Grim, L.Kohlberg, and S.H. White, "Some Relationships between Conscience and Attentional Processes", *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 1968 (vol. 8, no. 3) pp. 239, 249 – 250).

176. Kohlberg, "Stage and Sequence", p. 392.

177. *Ibidem*.

178. *Ibidem*.

179. *Ibidem*.

KOHLBERG'S theory also implies, from the judgmental aspect, that conscience makes a universal, age trend development. This development supposes intellectual growth and socio-moral experiences for the integration of moral ideals and values. Thus, according to the cognitive-development approaches, the "process of moralization" and conscience development implies the "existence of a series of internally patterned or organized transformations of social concepts and attitudes, transformations which constitute a developmental process".¹⁸⁰

C. Further Research into Moral Judgment

We have already seen that PIAGET'S conclusions initiated a stream of empirical investigations into moral judgment, and that KOHLBERG has elaborated and modified Piagetian conclusions within the frame-work of the cognitive-developmental theory. However, there have been several other (more or less) independent studies about the development of moral judgment. For the sake of convenience we shall divide these studies into two groups: (1) *Studies about the correlates of moral judgment*, and (2) *Comparative studies*.

1. Studies about the Correlates of Moral Judgment

Practically every investigation of moral judgment conducted after the publication of PIAGET'S work makes reference to his theory. While these studies confirm some of his conclusions, they criticize some other conclusions of his, or shed light on certain variables affecting moral judgment, which were ignored by PIAGET, like social class, I.Q., (to which he makes passing reference), sex-difference, religion, etc. It is some of such pertinent studies that are reviewed below.

180. Kohlberg, "The Development of Children's Orientations", p. 32.

a) Children's Concepts of Justice

In this study ¹⁸¹ D.DURKIN attempts to test two problems implied in PIAGET'S conclusions: whether his conclusions based on "interviews with children from the poorer parts of Geneva" apply also to "children in general". Hence she questions children from a "different nationality and economic status", but similar in age to the Piagetian subjects. DURKIN also tests if intelligence, rather than chronological age, is the significant factor in the development of the child's concepts of justice (equalitarian and egalitarian justice).

The subjects were 101 boys and girls belonging to 2, 5, and 8 grades in a public school in the U.S.A., the mean ages of the three groups being 7.8, 10.9, and 13.9. As for economic status, 75% of the second graders, 68% of the fifth graders and 80% of the eighth graders were of average economic status, while the rest in each group was divided fairly equally between rich and poor. The following is a sample story used to assess the subjects' concepts of justice: (a) "One day when they were at recess Bennet hit Van. What should Van do? Why?"

To those subjects who gave an equalitarian response (i.e. hit back) to the above problem, the following question (b) was also given to test PIAGET'S contention that 'equalitarian subjects' would not resort to arbitrary punishment or revenge: (b) "What if Van hit Bennet back and give a push besides? What would you think about that? Why?"

The mean I.Q. of the three groups were : 103.4, 101.6, and 103.4.¹⁸²

It was found that 27 subjects in all advocated a return of aggression; but none "approved of returning 'a push besides' ", which according to them would make the fight unfair (table 7). As the table shows, strict equality seems to be predominant among the fifth graders (about 11 years old): fifteen out of 38 of them proposed hitting back. Second graders (about 8 years old) and eighth graders (about 14 years old), on the contrary, seem to seek justice more in the persons of authority. DURKIN adds that this similarity between the second and eighth graders does not imply an identical moral thinking because reference to authority was "a quick and apparently easy solution to the problem" for the second graders, while the eighth

181. D.Durkin, "Children's Concepts of Justice: A Comparison with the Piaget Data", Child Development, 1959, pp. 59 — 67.

182. Ibidem, pp. 60 — 62.

Table 7
KINDS OF RESPONSES AND NUMBER OF SUBJECTS GIVING THEM

Kind of Response	G R A D E		
	2	5	8
Tell authority person	15	13	27
Return identical aggression	8	15	4
Other	5	10	4
Ignore aggression		6	1
Withdraw from situation	3		2
Have aggressor apologize		2	
Tell aggressor to stop		2	
Exclude aggressor from play	1		
Do nothing			1
Undecided	1		

graders referred to authority rather to check a possible chain-reaction of aggression among equals than as a good and easy solution.¹⁸³

Besides, 6 fifth graders (15.8%) and 12 eighth graders (34.3%) expressed concern for the particular circumstances of the situation, like motive for aggression, its severity, etc. This result means "a significant relationship between a subject's concern for particulars (egalitarian justice) and his CA level" (chi square result: 12 (.001 < p < .005)).¹⁸⁴

As regards I.Q., DURKIN found no significant relationship between I.Q. and the child's responses in the second and eighth graders, while a significant relationship was found for the fifth graders, and when the whole group was combined (table 8). Further, no significant relationship was found between the child's concern for particulars of the situation (egalitarianism) and I.Q. From these findings DURKIN concludes: "The emergence of what PIAGET calls 'equity' does not appear to be significantly related to intelligence".¹⁸⁵

According to the findings of this study, therefore, there is a positive, significant relationship between the development of the concept of justice and the age of the child; his justice concept develops from equalitarian to egalitarian as he grows (from about 11 years of age). But the findings do not support PIAGET'S contention that "acceptance of reciprocity as a justice

183. Ibidem, p. 65.

184. Ibidem, p. 63.

185. Ibidem, p. 64.

principle increases with age",¹⁸⁶ for it has been found that eighth graders showed a decrease in equalitarianism, and sought justice more in the person of authority. Regarding the role of I.Q. in the development of justice concept the findings do not provide a definite conclusion. It appears more that it is not specially related to the development of the concept of justice.¹⁸⁷

Table 8

KINDS OF RESPONSES AND NUMBER OF SUBJECTS AT TWO DIFFERENT IQ LEVELS GIVING THEM

IQ Level	Tell	Hit Back	Other	Chi Square	p
Grade 2 (N = 27)				1.84	< .50
Above Median	5	5	3		
Below Median	9	3	2		
Grade 5 (N = 38)				7.42	< .05
Above Median	3	8	8		
Below Median	10	7	2		
Grade 8 (N = 35)				1.04	< .70
Above Median	14	1	2		
Below Median	13	3	2		
Grades 2, 5, 8				6.17	< .05
Above Median	21	16	13		
Below Median	33	11	6		

b) Social Class and Moral Judgment

Here L. BOEHM and M. NASS¹⁸⁸ investigated the influence of social class upon children's moral judgment. The subjects were 160 boys and girls, 81 from the working class and 79 from the upper middle class, first to sixth gra-

186. Ibidem, p. 66.

187. It may be noted that Durkin had similar findings (about the relationships of age and I.Q. to the development of justice concepts) in another study, employing children of low socio-economic class as subjects (cfr. D. Durkin, "Children's Concepts of Justice: A Further Comparison with the Piaget Data", Journal of Educational Research, 1959, pp. 252 - 257).

188. L. Boehm and M. Nass, "Social Class Differences in Conscience Development", Child Development, 1962, pp. 565 - 574.

ders (6–11 years old) from public schools in the U.S.A. The social class groups were matching in age, sex and I.Q. The following four aspects of moral judgment were investigated: consideration of motive vs. physical injury caused in an aggression situation (Fight story), consideration of intentions vs. material damage (Cup story), attitude towards "lying" out of ignorance vs. lying intentionally (Lost story), and tendency towards peer preference vs. authority preference (Scout story).

The following is a sample story (Scout story) used to measure the attitude of peer preference vs. authority preference:

"A group of children X years old (of the subject's age) want to give a surprise birth-day party for their scout leader. One boy has accepted the responsibility of decorating the room. He wonders whom he could ask for advice".

- i. Whom do you think he might ask?
- ii. He thought of asking his teacher who knows a lot about English... but she does not know anything about art. He also thought of asking a boy in his class who is a good artist....
- iii. He asked both and they gave him two different ideas. Whose one do you think he followed?
- iv. He thought both the ideas were equally good. Which one you think he followed.
- v. A friend heard about it and thought that the child's idea was better
- vi. If he follows the friend's advice, how will he feel toward the teacher when she finds out he didn't follow her advice?

The responses were classified into three types according to PIAGET'S stages: (i) morality of constraint, (ii) intermediate stage of interiorization without evaluation, and (iii) morality of cooperation.¹⁸⁹

The findings of the study indicate that age is the only factor that is significantly related to the development of conscience. When the subjects below 9 years were combined and were tested against the combined group of 9 years and above, there appeared a significant relationship between age and maturity of moral responses. This suggests that the age of nine is a "crucial turning point towards greater maturity" in moral development.¹⁹⁰ (cfr. table

189. Ibidem, pp. 566 – 569. – It was hypothesized that middle class children will consider more the motive and intention in evaluating situations involving aggression, property-damage, etc., and lower class children, the physical injury and the material value involved. But no class difference was presumed with regard to the subjects' attitude towards lying and peer – vs. authority-preference.

190. Ibidem, pp. 570 – 571. – It may, however, be noted that age differences do not

9 which gives detailed data on age, the aspect of moral judgment (i.e. type of story), and the maturity of responses).

However, the hypothesis that middle class children will consider more the motive and intention underlying a moral situation than the material damage and material value involved, which was supposed to be stressed by the working class children, was not supported by the findings (cfr. responses to the 'fight' and 'cup' stories in table 9). Here the responses to the cup story indicate a trend which shows that working class children were more concerned with material consequences (p was between 10 and 5 percent levels). In the

Table 9
PERCENTAGES OF RESPONSES IN THE SCORING CATEGORIES WITH
CHI-SQUARE VALUES*

Basis of Comparison	Fight Story			Cup Story			Lost Story			Scout Story		
	t	2	3	t	2	3	t	2	3	t	2	3
Working Class	38	10	52	28	34	38	12	20	68	11	25	64
Upper Middle Class ..	26	19	55	16	30		05	14	81	13	26	61
	$\chi^2 = .18$			$\chi^2 = 3.62$			$\chi^2 = 3.11$			$\chi^2 = .20$		
Boys	23	34	43	23	34	43	11	21	68	10	32	58
Girls	40	10	50	16	44	40	12	14	74	06	28	66
	$\chi^2 = .32$			$\chi^2 = .07$			$\chi^2 = .00$			$\chi^2 = 1.05$		
Below 9 Years	45	23	32	34	45	21	17	38	45	08	38	54
9 Years and Above ..	23	15	62	06	27	67	06	10	84	08	23	69
	$\chi^2 = 4.82^\dagger$			$\chi^2 = 35.27^\ddagger$			$\chi^2 = 13.13^\ddagger$			$\chi^2 = 1.13$		

* All χ^2 data are based on the combination of scoring categories "1" and "2" tested against "3."

† Significant at the .05 level.

‡ Significant at the .01 level.

show a significant difference with regard to peer- vs. authority preferences (cfr. scout story). On this aspect, high level of mature responses are found in both age groups. About this Boehm remarks that "American children are emancipated from adult authority" comparatively "at an earlier age". Ibidem, p. 571.

In fact, in an earlier study Boehm reports that American children transfer their parent-dependency to peer-dependency earlier than Swiss children. She also observes that the American child's "conscience is turned primarily toward social adjustment, the Swiss child's is geared toward character improvement" (Boehm, "The Development of Independence", in R.C. Johnson et alii (Eds), *Conscience, Contract and Social Reality*, p.207).

responses to the fight story no trend was clear¹⁹¹. An important reason for the failure to find support for class differences, says BOEHM, was that working class group in this study was very much exposed to the influences of the middle class, which reduced the effects of social class differences.¹⁹²

The other two hypotheses — that there would not be significant differences between the social classes as regards the subjects' attitude towards lying and peer- vs. authority-preferences — were supported by the data (cfr. 'lost' and 'scout' stories). These findings also indirectly show that social class differences do not significantly influence moral development.¹⁹³

The data show further that sex differences do not have a significant relationship to moral judgment maturity, although upto the age of 9 girls seem to score better on maturity; but after 9 boys seem to do better (table 9). The findings, however, indicate that children's moral responses are situation specific, i.e. the measure of immaturity (or maturity) changes depending upon the problem presented. For example, percentage of immature responses varies from 5 (middle class subjects to 'lost' story) to 26 (middle class subjects to 'fight' story); from 11 (working class subjects to 'scout' story) to 38 (working class to 'fight' story). (The finding of situation-specificity is significant at the .001 level).¹⁹⁴

Besides, BOEHM adds that "a number of children who responded least maturely in 'fight' and 'scout' stories gave more mature responses in the other two series" without presenting a "choice between peer and authority". This seems to reveal an additional fact, that is, "an increase in maturity of conscience" does not necessarily imply "a decrease in authority dependence".¹⁹⁵

The findings of BOEHM'S study may be summarized as follows: Age is a basic factor in the development of conscience. Social class does not appear to have a significant influence upon the maturity of conscience. Nor is the maturity of conscience significantly dependent on independence from authority,¹⁹⁶ and neither sex has an advantage over the other with re-

191. Boehm and Nass, *ibidem*, p. 570.

192. *Ibidem*, p. 572.

193. *Ibidem*, p. 570.

194. *Ibidem*, pp. 570 — 572.

195. *Ibidem*, p. 572.

196. To study the effect of close, constant peer interaction upon moral judgment

gard to moral maturity. However, children's moral sense was very much dependent on the specific situations they had to evaluate.

Table 10

DIFFERENCES IN PROPORTIONS OF "J" RESPONSES FOR COMPARABLE CATEGORIES
GIFTED (A) vs. AVERAGE (B)

Group	CUP STORY Number of Responses No. %	"J" Difference between Responses Percentage	LOST STORY Number of Responses No. %	"J" Difference between Responses Percentage	FIGHT STORY Number of Responses No. %	"J" Difference between Responses Percentage	SCOUT STORY Number of Responses No. %	"J" Difference between Responses Percentage
A. Age 6	28	12 42.8	28	19 67.9	21	9 42.9	28	13 46.4
B. Age 6	27	6 22.2	27	13 48.1	24	9 37.5	27	13 48.1
		+30.6		+19.8		+5.4		-1.7
A. Age 7	31	17 48.6	34	28 82.4	26	16 61.5	35	29 82.9
B. Age 7	31	10 32.3	29	18 62.1	21	9 39.1	32	15 46.9
		+16.3		+20.3*		+22.4		+36.0**
A. Age 8	30	15 50.0	31	26 83.9	25	20 80.0	31	20 64.7
B. Age 8	29	13 44.8	29	21 72.4	24	11 45.8	29	20 69.0
		+5.2		+11.5		+34.2**		-3.3
A. Age 9	29	26 89.7	28	27 96.4	21	15 71.4	29	20 69.0
B. Age 9	26	21 80.1	26	22 84.6	24	15 62.5	26	19 73.1
		+9.6		+11.8		+8.9		-4.1
A. Ages 6-9	122	70 57.4	121	100 82.6	91	60 64.5	123	82 66.7
B. Ages 6-9	113	50 44.3	111	74 66.7	95	44 46.3	114	67 58.8
				+15.9**		+18.2**		+7.9

* $p \leq .10$.

** $p \leq .05$.

Table 11

DIFFERENCES IN PROPORTIONS OF "J" RESPONSES FOR COMPARABLE CATEGORIES
GIFTED, UPPER CLASS (A) vs. AVERAGE, UPPER CLASS (B)

Group	CUP STORY Number of Responses No. %	"J" Difference between Responses Percentage	LOST STORY Number of Responses No. %	"J" Difference between Responses Percentage	FIGHT STORY Number of Responses No. %	"J" Difference between Responses Percentage	SCOUT STORY Number of Responses No. %	"J" Difference between Responses Percentage
A. Age 6	17	9 52.9	17	11 64.7	12	4 33.3	17	10 58.8
B. Age 6	13	5 38.5	13	9 69.2	13	4 30.8	17	5 38.5
		+14.4		-4.5		+2.5		+20.3
A. Age 7	23	12 52.2	22	21 95.5	16	11 68.8	23	19 82.6
B. Age 7	16	4 25.0	14	8 57.1	12	4 33.3	17	8 47.1
		+27.2*		+38.4**		+35.5*		+35.5**
A. Age 8	20	11 55.0	21	21 100.0	17	14 82.4	21	13 61.9
B. Age 8	14	6 42.9	14	10 71.4	11	3 27.3	14	11 78.6
		+12.1		+28.6**		+55.1**		-16.7
A. Age 9	19	18 94.7	18	17 94.4	14	9 64.3	19	11 57.9
B. Age 9	12	11 91.7	12	11 91.7	11	7 63.6	12	7 58.3
		+3.0		+2.7		+0.7		-0.4
A. Ages 6-9	79	50 63.3	78	70 88.6	59	38 64.4	80	53 66.2
B. Ages 6-9	55	26 47.3	53	38 71.7	47	19 38.3	56	31 55.4
		+16.0*		+16.9**		+26.1**		+10.8

* $p \leq .10$.

** $p \leq .05$.

Table 12

DIFFERENCES IN PROPORTIONS OF "J" RESPONSES FOR COMPARABLE CATEGORIES
GIFTED, WORKING CLASS (A) vs. AVERAGE, WORKING CLASS (B)

Group	CUP STORY Number of Responses No. %	"J" Difference between Responses Percentage	LOST STORY Number of Responses No. %	"J" Difference between Responses Percentage	FIGHT STORY Number of Responses No. %	"J" Difference between Responses Percentage	SCOUT STORY Number of Responses No. %	"J" Difference between Responses Percentage
A. Age 6	11	1 27.3	11	8 72.7	9	5 55.6	11	1 27.3
B. Age 6	14	1 7.1	14	4 28.6	11	5 45.5	14	8 57.1
		+20.2		+44.1**		+10.1		-29.8
A. Age 7	12	5 41.7	12	7 58.3	10	5 50.0	12	10 83.3
B. Age 7	15	6 40.0	15	10 66.7	11	5 45.5	15	7 46.7
		+1.7		-8.4		+4.5		+36.6*
A. Age 8	10	4 40.0	10	5 50.0	8	5 75.0	10	7 70.0
B. Age 8	15	7 46.7	15	11 73.3	11	8 61.5	15	9 60.0
		-0.7		-23.3		+13.5		+10.0
A. Age 9	10	8 80.0	10	10 100.0	7	6 85.7	10	9 90.0
B. Age 9	14	10 71.4	14	11 78.6	11	8 61.5	14	12 85.7
		+8.0		+31.4		+24.2		+4.3
A. Ages 6-9	43	20 46.5	41	30 69.8	44	23 52.3	43	20 46.5
B. Ages 6-9	58	24 41.4	58	36 62.1	48	26 54.2	58	36 62.1
		+5.1		+7.7		+10.5		+5.1

* $p \leq .10$.

** $p \leq .05$.

c) Social Class and I.Q. in Relation to Moral Judgment

In this study¹⁹⁷ L. BOEHM investigated the effects of differences in intelligence ability and social class upon the development of moral judgment. The subjects of this study were 237 children between the ages of 6 and 9. The distribution of the subjects according to social class and I.Q. was as follows: gifted children (I.Q. over 110) from the upper class 80, and from the lower class 43; average children (I.Q. between 90 and 100) from the upper class 56, and from the lower class 58. Their moral judgment maturity was assessed from their evaluation of stories which were the same as those (cup story, lost story, fight story and scout story) mentioned in the preceding study. The responses were classified into three types according to the Piagetian levels of maturity: (i) morality of constraint, (ii) intermediary level, and (iii) morality of cooperation. It may be noted that "3" responses in this study refer to mature moral responses, that is, the third type.¹⁹⁸

Comparing children's responses according to age-groups, it was found that gifted children gave "3" responses at an earlier age, and at each age level they obtained more "3" scores than average children, except for the scout story, with the social classes combined (table 10). This difference between the gifted and the average children was specially conspicuous in the upper class than in the working class, that is, gifted children of the upper class gave significantly more "3" responses (except for scout story) than average upper class children, while gifted working class children gave (in all but scout story) only a slightly higher (non-significant) proportion of "3" responses than working class children of average intelligence (tables 11 and 12).¹⁹⁹

maturity, Kugelmass and Breznitz compared Israeli kibbutz children (who are very much exposed to peer group socializing influences) with those from ordinary home backgrounds. But they found no significant differences between the two groups in moral maturity, as measured through subjects' consideration of intentionality in evaluating moral situations (S.Kugelmass and S.Breznitz, "The Development of Intentionality in Moral Judgment in City and Kibbutz Adolescents", Journal of Genetic Psychology, 1967, pp. 103 - 111.

197. L.Boehm, "The Development of Conscience: A Comparison of American Children of Different Mental and Socio-Economic Levels", Child Development, 1962, pp. 575 - 590.

198. Ibidem, pp. 576 - 579.

199. Ibidem, p. 585.

In responding to the fight and scout stories (which were meant to assess peer reciprocity and authority dependence), however, the working class children of both intelligence levels gave more mature responses than their upper class counterparts (tables 13 and 14).²⁰⁰

As regards the age at which a majority of children gave "3" responses, it varied according to the specific situation (story), the child's social class, and I.Q. A majority of the gifted children of the upper class gave mature responses to the cup story (intention vs. material consequences) at the age of

Table 13

DIFFERENCES IN PROPORTIONS OF "3" RESPONSES FOR COMPARABLE CATEGORIES
GIFTED, UPPER CLASS (A) VS. GIFTED, WORKING CLASS (B)

Group	CUP STORY			LOST STORY			FIGHT STORY			SCOUT STORY		
	Number of Responses	"3" No. %	Difference between Percentages	Number of Responses	"3" No. %	Difference between Percentages	Number of Responses	"3" No. %	Difference between Percentages	Number of Responses	"3" No. %	Difference between Percentages
A, Age 6	17	9 52.9		17	11 64.7		12	4 33.3		17	10 58.8	
B, Age 6	11	3 27.3	+25.6	11	8 72.7	-8.0	9	5 55.6	-22.3	11	3 27.3	+31.5*
A, Age 7	23	12 52.2		22	21 95.5		16	11 68.8		23	19 82.6	
B, Age 7	12	5 41.7	+10.5	12	7 58.3	+37.3**	10	5 50.0	+18.8	12	10 83.3	-0.7
A, Age 8	20	11 55.0		21	21 100.0		17	14 82.4		21	13 61.9	
B, Age 8	10	4 40.0	+15.0	10	5 50.0	+50.0**	8	6 75.0	+7.4	10	7 70.0	-8.1
A, Age 9	19	18 94.7		18	17 94.4		14	9 64.3		19	11 57.9	
B, Age 9	10	8 80.0	+14.7	10	10 100.0	-5.6	7	6 85.7	-21.4	10	9 90.0	-32.1*
A, Ages 6-9	79	50 63.3		78	70 88.6		59	38 64.4		80	53 66.2	
B, Ages 6-9	43	20 46.5	+16.8*	43	30 69.8	+18.8**	34	22 64.7	-0.3	43	29 67.4	-1.2

* p ≤ .10.

** p ≤ .05.

Table 14

DIFFERENCES IN PROPORTIONS OF "3" RESPONSES FOR COMPARABLE CATEGORIES
AVERAGE, UPPER CLASS (A) VS. AVERAGE, WORKING CLASS (B)

Group	CUP STORY			LOST STORY			FIGHT STORY			SCOUT STORY		
	Number of Responses	"3" No. %	Difference between Percentages	Number of Responses	"3" No. %	Difference between Percentages	Number of Responses	"3" No. %	Difference between Percentages	Number of Responses	"3" No. %	Difference between Percentages
A, Age 6	14	5 35.7		14	9 64.3		11	4 36.4		14	5 35.7	
B, Age 6	14	1 7.1	+28.6**	14	4 28.6	+36.4**	11	5 45.5	+9.1	14	8 57.1	-21.6
A, Age 7	16	1 6.3		14	8 57.1		12	4 33.3		17	8 47.1	
B, Age 7	15	6 40.0	+33.8	15	10 66.7	-9.6	14	5 35.7	+27.2	15	7 46.7	+0.4
A, Age 8	11	9 81.8		14	10 71.4		11	4 36.4		14	11 78.6	
B, Age 8	15	7 46.7	+35.1	15	11 73.3	-1.9	11	8 72.7	-36.3**	15	9 60.0	+18.6
A, Age 9	12	11 91.7		12	11 91.7		11	7 63.6		12	7 58.3	
B, Age 9	14	10 71.4	+20.3	14	11 78.6	+13.1	14	9 64.3	+2.3	14	12 85.7	-27.4
A, Ages 6-9	55	26 47.3		54	38 70.4		47	18 38.3		56	18 32.1	
B, Ages 6-9	58	24 41.4	+6.9	58	36 62.1	+9.6	48	25 52.1	+15.0	58	36 62.1	-6.7

* p ≤ .10.

** p ≤ .05.

200. Ibidem.

6, while the majority of the gifted working class children gave such responses at the age of 9. The children of average intelligence did not show any class difference, the age of mature responses being 9 for both classes. Mature responses were given to the lost story (attitude towards lying) at the age of 6 by a majority of the gifted children of both social classes and by a majority of the upper class average children. Average working class children responded maturely to this story at the age of 9. "3" responses were given to the fight story (aggression among peers) by a majority of the upper class gifted children at the age of 7, while such responses were given to this story by a majority of working class gifted children at the age of 6. In responding maturely to this story, the upper class children of average intelligence also lag behind their working class counterparts by one year, the respective ages being 9 and 8. Mature responses were given to the scout story (peer preference vs. authority) by a majority of the gifted upper class children at age of 6, by a majority of the working class gifted children at 7, and by upper class average children at 8. (The age of the average working class children could not be determined for this story).²⁰¹

The findings of this study may be summarized as follows: Intellectually gifted children show, in comparison to children of average intelligence, earlier maturity of moral judgments concerning distinctions between intention and material consequences of action.

Upper class children attain moral maturity in this respect earlier than working class children. Regarding the differences between the gifted children of the two social classes, BOEHM says that "the less verbally inclined, though gifted, working class child could be as 'moral' in his actions as gifted upper middle-class children, but might appear less mature because of an inadequate way of expressing himself in judging actions".²⁰²

201. Ibidem, p. 586.

202. Ibidem, p. 589.

It may be noted that the influence of social class differences upon moral judgment has been revealed by several other studies as well. Reacting to Piaget's conclusions, M.R. Harrower and E.Lerner were two early researchers who called attention to the role of social class differences.

Studying children from different social classes, Harrower (M.R. Harrower, "Social Status and Moral Development", British Journal of Educational Psychology, 1934/4) found that "children from the higher status families tended to display relatively mature moral

Working class children of both intelligence levels tend to show earlier peer reciprocity and adult independence than upper class children.

d) Moral Judgment: Its Consistency and Certain Factors Affecting Its Development

R.C. JOHNSON²⁰³ studied children's moral judgment responses and measured the degree of intercorrelation among various areas or aspects of moral judgment: intercorrelations within and between areas were measured. *Within areas* refers to the consistency of moral judgment within the same area, for example, whether a child who shows 'immanent justice' in his response to one problem will show 'immanent justice' to another similar problem. *Between areas* refers to consistency in different areas, for example, whether a child who shows a feature of immature morality (e.g. immanent justice) will also show other features of immature morality (e.g. objective responsibility). The data on intercorrelation are in fact very important for answering a pertinent question JOHNSON poses in this context: "Whether there is such a thing as moral judgment, as such, or whether moral judgment merely consists of a number of specific areas of response that are essentially unrelated to one another".

The subjects of the study were 807 students belonging to 5 (93 boys and 97 girls), 7 (97 boys and 76 girls), 9 (125 boys and 143 girls) and 11 (84 boys and 92 girls) grades of public schools in the U.S.A. The areas of moral judgment investigated were the following five: *immanent justice* (belief that punishment emanates from things), *moral realism* (judging by consequences rather by motives), *retributive-expiatory* punishment vs. *restitutive-reciprocity* punishment, belief in the *efficacy of severe punishment*, and *communi-*

judgments, and that this disparity was apparent in infancy and remained throughout childhood". Similarly, Lerner (E.Lerner, Constraint Areas and Moral Judgment in Children, Wisconsin 1937) also found that "children living in higher status families tended to display more mature forms of moral judgment than their lower status contemporaries" (cfr. W. Kay, Moral Education, London 1975, p. 62). For brief reviews of related research one may see W. Kay, Moral Education, pp. 60 - 69.

203. R.C. Johnson, "A Study of Children's Moral Judgment", Child Development, 1962, pp. 327 - 354. - Though this study is not, as the author himself observes, a formal test of Piaget's theory, several ideas implied in Piaget's theory were in fact tested in this (Johnson, ibidem, pp. 329 - 330).

cable responsibility (belief that all the members of a group are equally guilty for the misdeed of any one member). These areas or aspects of moral judgment were measured through 'moral questions' quite similar to those used by PIAGET, but were "more difficult and were oriented to an older age-group". Instead of the Piagetian interviews, however, JOHNSON used paper and pencil test. Responses which rejected immanent justice, moral realism, retributive-expiatory punishment, efficacy of severe punishment and communicable responsibility²⁰⁴ were rated as mature responses.

JOHNSON also tested the relation of moral judgment responses to the following variables: age, I.Q., sex-differences, parental occupation (all of which were obtained from school records), adult constraint (which was measured in terms of parental attitudes of 'ignoringness', 'possessiveness' and 'domination'), and egocentrism (measured in terms of concreteness and abstractness in thinking).²⁰⁵

As regards correlations of responses *within moral judgment areas* "102 out of the 120 correlations were positive and significant" (tables 15 – 19). Res-

Table 15

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN RESPONSES HAVING TO DO WITH
IMMANENT JUSTICE

	Question 6	Question 11	Question 16
Question 1			
Grade 5	+.17*	+.36**	-.01
Grade 7	+.43**	+.17*	+.07
Grade 9	+.59**	+.40**	+.55**
Grade 11	+.27**	+.40**	+.42**
Question 6			
Grade 5		+.79**	+.74**
Grade 7		+.63**	+.74**
Grade 9		+.73**	+.81**
Grade 11		+.81**	+.77**
Question 11			
Grade 5			+.78**
Grade 7			+.71**
Grade 9			+.74**
Grade 11			+.78**

* Significant at the .05 level.

** Significant at the .01 level.

204. According to Piaget, however, very young children who think whatever done by adults to be right, and older children who stand for group solidarity, judge according to communicable responsibility, while middle age-group rejects communicable responsibility (cfr. Piaget, *Moral Judgment of the Child*, p. 248).

205. Johnson, *Ibidem*, pp. 330 – 340.

Table 16

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN RESPONSES HAVING TO DO WITH
MORAL REALISM

	Question 7	Question 12	Question 17
Question 2			
Grade 5	+.42**	+.33**	+.35**
Grade 7	+.33**	+.18*	+.24**
Grade 9	+.45**	+.12	+.23**
Grade 11	+.64**	+.19**	+.57**
Question 7			
Grade 5		+.41**	+.53**
Grade 7		+.23**	+.47**
Grade 9		+.22**	+.38**
Grade 11		+.21**	+.57**
Question 12			
Grade 5			+.47**
Grade 7			+.35**
Grade 9			+.53**
Grade 11			+.11

* Significant at the .05 level.

** Significant at the .01 level.

Table 17

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN RESPONSES HAVING TO DO WITH
RETRIBUTION VS. RESTITUTION

	Question 8	Question 13	Question 18
Question 3			
Grade 5	+.21**	+.35**	+.21**
Grade 7	+.19**	+.37**	+.07
Grade 9	+.41**	+.58**	+.24**
Grade 11	+.16*	+.60**	+.37**
Question 8			
Grade 5		+.36**	+.39**
Grade 7		+.29**	+.17*
Grade 9		+.15*	+.14*
Grade 11		+.17*	+.25**
Question 13			
Grade 5			+.26**
Grade 7			+.41**
Grade 9			+.35**
Grade 11			+.24**

* Significant at the .05 level.

** Significant at the .01 level.

Table 18

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN RESPONSES HAVING TO DO WITH
EFFICACY OF SEVERE PUNISHMENT

	Question 9	Question 14	Question 19
<i>Question 4</i>			
Grade 5	+.09	+.16*	+.30**
Grade 7	+.09	+.12	+.13
Grade 9	+.22**	+.19**	+.45**
Grade 11	+.23**	+.24**	+.16*
<i>Question 9</i>			
Grade 5		+.73**	+.58**
Grade 7		+.81**	+.61**
Grade 9		+.57**	+.51**
Grade 11		+.76**	+.53**
<i>Question 14</i>			
Grade 5			+.57**
Grade 7			+.44**
Grade 9			+.46**
Grade 11			+.43**

* Significant at the .05 level.

** Significant at the .01 level.

Table 19

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN RESPONSES HAVING TO DO WITH
COMMUNICABLE RESPONSIBILITY

	Question 10	Question 15	Question 20
<i>Question 5</i>			
Grade 5	+.16*	+.51**	-.20**
Grade 7	+.54**	+.29**	+.05
Grade 9	+.36**	+.25**	+.20**
Grade 11	+.19**	+.28**	-.20**
<i>Question 10</i>			
Grade 5		+.38**	-.51**
Grade 7		+.48**	+.18*
Grade 9		+.30**	+.03
Grade 11		+.28**	-.14*
<i>Question 15</i>			
Grade 5			-.26**
Grade 7			+.02
Grade 9			+.01
Grade 11			+.01

* Significant at the .05 level.

** Significant at the .01 level.

ponses to four 'immanent justice' questions showed comparatively higher correlations among themselves than did responses to questions in other areas show. And responses to only one question (question 20, relating to communicable responsibility) had a few significant negative correlations (among 5 and 11 graders) with other questions in the same area. The findings, however, do show that "correlations in all areas of moral judgment were such that ...one can legitimately discuss areas of moral judgment, that these areas exist, since responses to the different questions within areas were almost always correlated positively and significantly with one another".²⁰⁶

With regard to correlations *between moral judgment areas*, of the 40 correlations 20 were significant: one negatively (moral realism with communi-

Table 20

CORRELATIONS OF RESPONSES BETWEEN MORAL JUDGMENT AREAS

	Moral Realism	Retribution vs. Restitution	Efficacy of Severe Punishment	Communicable Responsibility
<i>Immanent Justice</i>				
Grade 5	.12	.27**	.00	.13
Grade 7	.29**	.18*	.17	.06
Grade 9	.16*	.09	.14	.12
Grade 11	.07	.19*	.27**	.09
<i>Moral Realism</i>				
Grade 5		.23*	.34**	.30**
Grade 7		.33**	.32**	.18*
Grade 9		.20*	.33**	.15
Grade 11		.16	.10	.00
<i>Retribution vs. Restitution</i>				
Grade 5			.18*	.16
Grade 7			.33**	.18*
Grade 9			.30**	.00
Grade 11			.21*	.09
<i>Efficacy of Severe Punishment</i>				
Grade 5				.21*
Grade 7				.06
Grade 9				.08
Grade 11				.04

* Significant at the .05 level.

** Significant at the .01 level.

cable responsibility for the 7th graders), one curvilinearly (immanent justice with efficacy of severe punishment for 11 graders) and eighteen positively (table 20).²⁰⁷ The table shows that correlations between areas of moral judgment are closest among moral realism, retributive vs. restitutive punishment, and efficacy of severe punishment, while immanent justice responses correlate with other areas less closely, and communicable responsibility still less. The findings support that there is a positive correlation also between areas of moral judgment, though it is much lower than correlations within areas.²⁰⁸

As regards *variables affecting moral judgment*, JOHNSON'S findings show that higher *I.Q.* and higher *parental occupation* were more closely related to moral judgment maturity in the areas of moral realism, retributive vs. restitutive punishment, and efficacy of severe punishment than were any other variables investigated in this study (table 21). And JOHNSON adds "since parent's occupation and child's *I.Q.* were themselves correlated", moral judgment maturity seems to reflect more basically the influence of *I.Q.* rather than that of parental occupation.²⁰⁹ It may, however, be noted that immanent justice and communicable responsibility were not so closely related to *I.Q.* and parental occupation.

Chronological age was positively and significantly related to maturity in all areas of moral judgment. (table 21)

As regards *freedom from egocentricity* (measured through abstractness in thinking), only 6 out of 45 correlations were significant: of these six, 5 were positively related to moral maturity, and one was negatively²¹⁰ related to moral maturity (table 21). As for *egocentricity* (measured through concreteness), three correlations were significant: 2 were positively²¹¹ related to moral maturity, and one was negatively related (table 21).

As regards *parental attitudes*, for which only 8 out of 45 correlations were

207. Ibidem, p. 347.

208. Ibidem, p. 350.

209. Ibidem, p. 347.

210. It may be noted that this negative correlation is a finding contrary to Piaget's theory, which says that 'freedom from egocentricity' fosters moral maturity.

211. Again, this positive correlation implies certain inconsistencies with the Piagetian data, according to which 'egocentricity' is a hindrance to moral maturity.

Table 21
SIGNIFICANT CORRELATIONS OF ANTECEDENT FACTORS WITH
MORAL JUDGMENT RESPONSES

Factor	Immanent Justice	Moral Realism	Retribution vs. Restitution	Efficacy of Severe Punishment	Communicable Responsibility
I.Q.17(9)* .23(11)†	.34(5)* .36(7)* .31(9)* .20(11)*	.31(5)* .42(7)* .23(9)*	.24(5)* .30(7)* .30(9)*	
Parent Occupation21(9)‡ .22(11)‡	.21(7)‡ .17(9)‡ .16(11)‡	.23(5)‡ .23(7)‡	.18(5)‡	
Age (entire sample combined)35§	.35§	.25§	.26§	.12§
Abstractness20(9)† .26(11)†	.25(7)†	.26(7)†	.34(9)† .46(11)‡	
Concreteness31(11)**		.36(7)††	.38(9)††
Parent Attitudes					
Ignoringness31(9)§§		.39(7)‡‡		.32(7)‡‡
Possessiveness53(11)§§				.32(7)‡‡ .52(11)‡‡
Dominativeness44(11)§§	.40(11)‡‡
Extremeness of Point of View32(11)§§			.40(9)§§	.29(7)§§ .40(11)§§

NOTE.—Grade level at which correlation was found is indicated in parentheses following each coefficient.

* High *I.Q.* positively related to mature judgment.

† *I.Q.* related to moral judgment curvilinearly; highest and lowest *I.Q.* made most mature responses.

‡ Higher parental occupation positively related to mature moral judgments.

§ Increasing age positively related to mature moral judgments.

† High abstractness positively related to mature moral judgments.

‡ High abstractness negatively related to mature moral judgments.

** High concreteness negatively related to mature moral judgments.

†† High concreteness positively related to mature moral judgments.

‡‡ High amounts of the parent attitude positively related to mature moral judgments.

§§ High amounts of the parent attitude negatively related to mature moral judgments.

significant, it was found that 'Possessiveness' and 'Dominativeness' (both of which imply more 'adult constraint') were in two instances (one of immanent justice and one of efficacy of severe punishment) negatively related to moral judgment maturity, and in three instances (all three of communicable responsibility) positively related to moral judgment maturity. 'Ignoringness' (which implies less adult constraint) was in one instance (of immanent justice) negatively related to maturity, and in two instances (one of retributive vs. resti-

tutive punishment, and one of communicable responsibility) positively related to maturity.²¹²

Extremeness of point of view on the part of the parent, which was itself not related to the other three parental attitudes mentioned above, was significantly and negatively related to moral judgment maturity in four instances (table 21).

The data on parental antecedents suggest, as the table shows, that the impact of parental attitude is felt much more in the areas of immanent justice and communicable responsibility, and not so much in the other three areas, in which the other antecedents, especially I.Q. and parental occupation, are more influential.²¹³

The findings of JOHNSON'S study may be summarized as follows: children's moral responses show a consistency, more so within areas, and less between areas; and this consistency indicates the existence of "what might be called a general factor of moral judgment".²¹⁴ As regards variables affecting moral judgment, age was a factor which fosters maturity in all areas; I.Q., and parental occupation appeared to be the main contributing factors in the areas of moral realism, retributive vs. restitutive punishment, and efficacy of severe punishment. The influence of parental attitudes, which was not very consistent, was found to be more in the areas of immanent justice and communicable responsibility.

e) The Development of Moral Judgment and Conscience

N. BULL²¹⁵ studied children's moral judgment from childhood to adolescence. His subjects were 360 students from the south-west part of England. They included students from primary schools upto college, with an age range between 7 and 17. They were divided into six age-groups (7, 9, 11, 13, 15, 17), each group consisting of sixty subjects, equal number of boys and girls.

212. Ibidem, p. 349.

213. Ibidem.

214. Ibidem, p. 351.

215. N. Bull, *Moral Judgment from Childhood to Adolescence*, London, 1969.

Using mainly projective tests and interviews (written tests were also used) the author investigated the subjects' thinking and judgment about four moral problems: value of life, cheating, stealing and lying.²¹⁶

For the purpose of our study, we shall divide BULL'S investigation into two sections: (i) the *development of moral judgment*, and (ii) the *development of conscience*.

(i) The Development of Moral Judgment

Showing a picture of a drowning child, crying for help, and another child perplexedly watching the situation, the interviewer tells the subject: "Here is the picture of a boy/girl of about the same age as you. He/she has gone for a walk in the country far from home. He/she is all alone. Suddenly the boy/girl hears a cry for help, and sees someone struggling in the lake nearby. He/she does not know the boy/girl who is in danger of drowning. There are no other people there and there's no phone-box for miles. What is the boy/girl going to do?"²¹⁷

The subjects' initial responses were followed by further probe questions (e.g. why save life) by the interviewer.

Similar projective tests were conducted also for the other three problems: cheating, stealing, and lying.

According to his findings, BULL distinguishes four stages in the development of the child's moral judgment. These stages are: *anomy*, *heteronomy*, *socionomy*, and *autonomy*.²¹⁸

Anomy: This is called the stage of premorality, and seems to be prevalent upto the age of about 6. Children at this stage show 'anomalous (lawless) behaviour' which is controlled rather by the experiences of pleasure and pain than by any rule. Sample responses to the cheating problem show this attitude: It would be alright if you could cheat without getting caught, or cheating is wrong because "you only get caught".²¹⁹

216. Ibidem, pp. 46, 47, 48, 59, 60.

217. Ibidem, pp. 67, 68.

218. These four stages were first proposed, as the author himself notes, by McDougall (*An Introduction to Social Psychology*, London 1908). Bull emphasizes that these are not clear-cut stages, which are once attained and then left behind by the individual in the process of development. On the contrary, "all four stages can and do survive into adult life". Hence they are better called "levels of moral judgment" rather than stages (Bull, *ibidem*, pp. 26 - 28).

219. Ibidem, p. 29, 124.

Heteronomy: This is called also the stage of external morality. BULL observes that the borderline between this stage and the previous one is imprecise. However, at the age of 7 children do quote their parents as the source of moral rules. The morality of heteronomous stage is "dominated by rules imposed by others", e.g. parents, teachers, religious authorities, police, etc, and the controls of behaviour are the "sanctions of reward and punishment". Stealing is wrong because "if her teacher knew she would be punished". The girl will not steal because "teacher's told it's wrong," etc., are typical responses of this stage.²²⁰ BULL emphasizes, as the responses do show, that "heteronomy is a vital stage in moral development" because "only through imposed discipline" can the child come to achieve self-mastery.²²¹

Socionomy: This is qualified 'external-internal' morality because of its transitional character from externality to internality. An "inner moral awareness" which marks the beginning of this stage, shows itself about the age of 8. There occurs "dramatic development within the individual so that external morality of heteronomy is increasingly internalized to become part of the child himself".²²² "Social praise and blame" (public opinion) become the chief controllers of behaviour at this stage. Two factors are involved in this development, adds BULL. The child's self-respect which prompts him to be a respectable member of the community, and (mutual) respect for other members of the community, which is expressed through reciprocity and sympathy. Here are a few sample responses of this stage: "She want someone to save her if she was in the water. It's important to help people in need. They depend on you". And another one: "If I were there I'd want to be saved". All people "want to live, to enjoy life...Human beings are much more important (than animals) to God because He made them".²²³

Autonomy: This is called also the stage of internal morality, and it begins to develop between the years of 11 and 13. Now the individual controls himself by his inner ideals, and becomes independent of social sanctions. Growth in autonomy supposes increase in emotional autonomy (trying to be

220. Ibidem, pp. 30, 31, 153.

221. Ibidem, p. 30.

222. Ibidem, pp. 26, 32, 33.

223. Ibidem, pp. 79, 80.

oneself, breaking the ties of childhood), value autonomy (accepting one's own value system) and behaviour autonomy (making decision for oneself). Conscience is very often referred to as the guide of moral conduct at this stage.²²⁴ "All lives are of the same value. No one is more important than another. You wouldn't think of yourself. Conscience would make you do it" (i.e. trying to save the drowning child). Another one: I would try to save her because "I wouldn't want anyone's death on my conscience". Still another one: To save the child is the "natural thing to do. You'd have bad conscience if you didn't..."²²⁵ (These are sample responses to the 'value of life problem' at the autonomous stage).

In his book BULL reports a wide variety of responses obtained from his subjects to the four problems. A noteworthy feature is that practically all levels of judgment are found in all age-groups, though in varying degrees. Thus anomy, though minimally, is found even among the 17-year-olds, while autonomy, though to a small degree, is found among the 9-year-olds (7-year olds didn't show any autonomy)(cfr. figures 5 – 8 for each of the four moral problems).

More conspicuous, however, is the clear developmental pattern that takes place between the ages of 7 and 17 (cfr. the figurec). For example, one may take the development of autonomy evidenced in the responses to 'value of life' question: autonomy, which makes its appearance (except for the half score for girls already at the age of 9) at 11, makes a conspicuous progress at 13 (especially girls), attaining further progress between 13 and 17 (especially boys). Thus, the findings show a clear developmental pattern in moral judgment, from anomy through heteronomy and socionomy to autonomy, between the ages of 7 and 17.

(ii) The Development of Conscience

Analysing the responses of different age-groups to the moral problems presented, especially those responses which make references to conscience, we get the following "pattern of development of conscience".²²⁶

224. Ibidem, pp. 32 – 34.

225. Ibidem, pp. 81, 83.

226. As far as we know, this is the only study which reports children's own concepts

As already noted, at 7 years of age there is no sign of internalization. What prevails is the fear of punishment and hope of reward.²²⁷

It is with the nine-year-groups that the first 'remote evidence of conscience' or 'interiorized moral feelings of disquiet at awareness of having done wrong', as exemplified in the following responses, emerge: "He'd feel awful. He knows he shouldn't have done it" (about stealing). "You would know yourself, even if you weren't caught and punished".²²⁸ Here the fear of external punishment merges into "inner discomfort" or guilt which gradually "develops into conscience".²²⁹

It is with the 11-year-olds that the "actual term 'conscience' first appears" in the responses of the children.²³⁰ 38% of this age-group (total in the group 60) made explicit references to conscience while an additional 25% expressed interiorized guilt feelings. Here are a few examples: (If you steal) ... "you feel a coward. You have a guilty conscience. It's what tells you to do right and not to do wrong...you are born with it". Or, conscience is "an inside feeling telling you you've done wrong or right. You are born with it. It comes from God". Another says, conscience is "a person inside you which tells you to do the opposite of what your mind says"; and still another, "It is a little man inside you, prodding you all the time. He's been there since you were born". As the responses reveal, the eleven-year-olds show an inner sense of morality based on conscience, though their concepts of conscience (a person inside, a little man, etc.) "are personified, primitive, and pictorial".²³¹

With the 13-year-olds, the use of the term conscience is doubled. 73% of the 60 subjects in this age-group explicitly used 'conscience' in their responses; besides, 8% expressed guilt feelings. Here are a few descriptions of conscience given by these subjects: Conscience is "a feeling from your heart. You

of conscience in some detail, which is of interest for our study. This is the main reason why we treat this in a section different from that of 'moral judgment'.

227. Ibidem, p. 102.

228. Ibidem.

229. Ibidem.

230. Bull observes that the term 'conscience' was never introduced into interviews. Only when the subject himself used the term, did the interviewer take it up and seek definition of it (Ibidem, p.102).

231. Ibidem, pp. 103, 104, 110.




Figure 5

The value of life

Figure 7




Figure 6




Figure 8




TABLE OF I.Q. VALUES

AGE-GROUP	7	9	11	13	15	17
BOYS	108.2	110.8	112.8	114.8	116.4	118.4
GIRLS	108.8	107.8	105.8	104.8	103.5	102.2

NOTE: N = 50 PER AGE-GROUP (30 BOYS + 20 GIRLS)

are born with it. It is like Jesus talking to us". Another one, "you are born with it. Your parents and friends help it grow. Even if nobody found you out, you still worry". Again, "it is something inside that tells you when you have done wrong". And, "it's inside your brain. You are born with it. You learn from parents, teachers and friends".²³² The thirteen-year-olds have a clearer conceptualization of conscience: as something residing chiefly in the mind or heart, present from birth, shaped by parents and teachers, indicating right and wrong from within.

With the 15-year-olds, the use of the term 'conscience' seems to stand still, if not regress, in comparison with the 13-year-olds. 68% of these subjects referred to conscience, and another 12% expressed interiorized guilt feelings. Their descriptions of conscience were similar to those of the 13-year-olds, in such terms as 'feeling guilty', 'something that sticks on your mind', etc.²³³

The use of the term 'conscience' reaches its climax with the 17-year-olds, 97% of whom referred to conscience in their responses. Several subjects still describe conscience as something that 'disturbs you', 'something like a pin-prick', etc.²³⁴ But there are also more enlightening responses: Conscience is "a mental reaction. It plays on your mind and matures with it. It's a sense of right and wrong, developed by school, your upbringing, your parents. Religion would help it, if you were religious. It would make a strong conscience". And another, "conscience is given to you by others, you would have no conscience without other people — except about killing. It changes as you grow". And a third one, "it is an inner part of you which pricks your mind when you have done something you shouldn't have done. If you were brought up like Kim, you wouldn't have feelings of guilty conscience".²³⁵ These and similar responses show conscience as part of oneself, indicator of right and wrong; its development depends, to a great extent, on upbringing and social relations.

Measured by the subjects' use of the term 'conscience', we have the follo-

²³² Ibidem, pp. 105, 106.

²³³ Ibidem, p. 111.

²³⁴ These responses do indicate how difficult it is even at the age of 17, when the subjects have attained the stage of autonomous morality, to give clear formulations of their idea of conscience.

²³⁵ Ibidem, pp. 108, 109.

wing pattern of conscience development (table 22). (Subjects' expression of conscience-related guilt is also shown in the table).²³⁶

Table 22

Age-group (N=60)	Guilt-Responses	Conscience-Respon.	Consc. & Guilt Respon.
9 year	13	—	13
11 year	14	23	37
13 year	5	44	49
15 year	7	41	48
17 year	—	58	58

This pattern of conscience development according to age is "quantitative rather than qualitative", because the subjects' conceptions of conscience seem to imply different degrees of interiorization, or as BULL observes, "no attempt was made as such to measure depth of interiorization, if such a measure is conceivable".²³⁷ At any rate, as it has been shown by the subjects' own definitions and descriptions, these concepts of conscience do imply a good deal of interiorization (especially with the older age-groups), though even the 17-year-olds struggle to translate their idea of conscience into clear expressions.

What the findings go to show is that conscience, as well as children's concept and awareness of conscience, develops with age. Conscience seems to have its forerunner in the 'sanctions of heteronomy', which with interiorization gradually merges into "inner discomfort" at doing wrong or not doing the good already learnt during heteronomy. One must add to this the complementary feeling of satisfaction at avoiding wrong or doing good (based on the experience of reward during heteronomy), which is also part of the 'inner moral sense'.²³⁸ It is this 'inner discomfort' and 'inner satisfaction' from which the child's concept and awareness of conscience seems to develop. The 11-year-olds have rather anthropomorphic concepts of conscience, while at 13 years of age they have more refined concepts about it: as something in the mind, feeling in the heart, reaction of the mind, guide of right and wrong

236. Ibidem, p.112.

237. Ibidem.

238. Ibidem, p. 109.

from within, etc. Many a subject repeats that 'it is there when you are born', but it grows, and parents and teachers help it grow. The 17-year-olds stress further the role of upbringing and social relationships when they say "you would have no conscience without other people".

From the above analysis, which shows clearly that children's own experience of conscience is rather complex, we may draw the following points: conscience, which develops with age, progresses from external, heteronomous orientation toward interiorization and autonomy, guiding one with regard to the right and wrong of his conduct. It supposes 'something inborn' or an "innate moral capacity", which is further developed and shaped by upbringing and social interactions.

f) Religion and Moral Judgment

D.WRIGHT and E.COX²³⁹ investigated adolescents' severity of moral judgment and related it to various indices of religious belief and practice. The effect of sex differences was also investigated. The subjects were 2276 sixth graders — nearly equal number of boys and girls — from 96 "maintained grammar schools" in England. 35 of the schools were coeducational. The age-range of the subjects was 16 — 18; and they were of above average intelligence.

The severity of moral judgment was assessed through the subjects' ratings of different forms of behaviour, which included gambling, drunkenness, smoking, lying, stealing, premarital intercourse, suicide and colour bar. The following was the scale for rating: (a) It is always wrong, (b) It is usually wrong but is excusable in certain circumstances, (c) It is usually excusable but is sometimes wrong, (d) It is never wrong, and (e) I have not made up my mind. Subjects' religious belief and practice was assessed from the following religiosity indices: confidence in God (five-point-scale), confidence that Jesus Christ was the Son of God (five-point-scale), frequency of church attendance (four-step-measure), and measure of private prayer (three-step-measure).²⁴⁰

The findings show that extreme religious positions, that is, those who sco-

239. D. Wright and E.Cox, "A Study of the Relationship between Moral Judgment and Religious Belief in a Sample of English Adolescents", *Journal of Social Psychology*, 1967 (72), p. 135 — 144.

240. Ibidem, pp. 136 — 137.

red high on the religiosity indices, are significantly (often very highly) related to severity of moral judgment in both sexes (table 23).²⁴¹ As the table shows, all percentages of those who take extreme religious positions are higher than the corresponding ones for the whole sample. Commenting on the reasons given by the 'religious' and the 'non-religious' groups, the authors make the following observation: the non-religious seem to think that if a behaviour has no undesirable consequences for others, it is not a matter for the moral evaluation of others, while the religious, on the other hand, seem to think that any form of behaviour concerns God and others because one's life is not completely his own, and hence subject to moral evaluation.²⁴²

As for sex differences, it was found that girls were significantly more severe in their moral judgments on all the given items, except stealing and smoking (table 23).²⁴³

241. Only the percentages showing the relationship between "extreme religious positions" and "severe moral judgment" (i.e. 'always wrong' category) are given in the table. For the sake of comparison, the table gives also percentages of the total sample, who fall into the extreme positions, and the corresponding percentage of those subjects who endorse either A or B on every moral item.

However, the findings show no significant differences for different religious denominations.

242. Ibidem, p. 142.

243. On the whole it may be noted that two items received uncompromising condemnation: colour bar and stealing. This seems to indicate that property right and 'socio-personal' rights were of great importance for the subjects of this study. (Ibidem, p. 138 - 139).

Here we may note the findings of another study about the impact of religion upon moral judgment. In a comparative study, L. Boehm investigated the moral maturity (i.e. judging an action in terms of motives rather than consequences) of 110 catholic students and 112 public school students from New York area. The children were 6 - 9 years old, and their moral maturity was assessed through Piagetian type stories.

It was found that catholic students (regardless of socio-economic class and I.Q. level) scored significantly higher on maturity of moral judgment at an earlier age than public school students. Boehm observes that the catholic's consideration of age 7 as the age of reason, preparation of catholic children for confession and communion, instructions given to them about the distinction between sins (voluntary) and imperfections (involuntary), etc., foster the early development of mature moral judgment in catholic students. (L. Boehm, 'The Development of Conscience: A Comparison of Students in Catholic Parochial Schools and in Public Schools', *Child Development*, 1962, pp. 233 - 251).

Table 23

THE PERCENTAGES OF THOSE ENDORSING THE "ALWAYS WRONG" CATEGORY, WHO FALL IN THE EXTREME RELIGIOUS POSITIONS

Moral issue	Completely confident of the existence of God	Completely confident Jesus was the Son of God	Weekly churchgoing	Daily private prayer
<i>Boys</i>				
Gambling	37.0	44.2	59.5	42.1
Drunkenness	35.8	36.2	46.8	32.4
Smoking	21.9	21.9	35.7	25.1
Lying	32.7	33.6	41.4	32.6
Stealing	21.9	21.8	32.3	21.6
Premarital Sexual Intercourse	35.6	35.8	44.8	30.2
Suicide	30.1	30.6	40.1	31.9
Color Bar	22.0	22.5	32.7	23.4
Total sample	19.6	20.9	30.1	20.4
Subjects endorsing A or B on all items	48.6	50.7	61.4	44.3
<i>Girls</i>				
Gambling	59.6	63.4	76.7	55.1
Drunkenness	49.3	52.4	54.1	48.3
Smoking	46.7	47.0	54.5	50.4
Lying	51.0	50.6	56.9	48.6
Stealing	42.0	43.4	51.6	39.1
Premarital Sexual Intercourse	50.6	53.1	60.0	47.1
Suicide	56.2	54.3	62.8	48.0
Color Bar	42.8	42.5	51.8	39.1
Total sample	39.1	39.4	49.7	37.7
Subjects endorsing A or B on all items	61.8	66.7	73.5	69.8

Note: "A" means the action is judged to be always wrong, and "B" means the action is judged to be usually wrong but excusable in certain circumstances.

2. Comparative Studies

By comparative studies we mean here those investigations which studied the relationship of the cognitive dimension of conscience with other dimensions (behavioural and affective). They investigate, for example, whether maturity in moral judgment corresponds positively to the capacity for temptation resistance, guilt feelings, etc. It may, however, be noted that such comparative studies, in comparison to studies on the development of moral judgment and its variables, are fewer. Here we review the findings of these studies.

a) Relation between Moral Judgment and Moral Behaviour

R. GRINDER²⁴⁴ tested the relationship between certain aspects of moral

244. R. Grinder, "Relations between Behavioral and Cognitive Dimensions of Conscience in Middle Childhood", *Child Development*, 1964, pp. 881 - 891.

development. The following hypotheses (implied in the Piagetian theory) were tested: (i) children's resistance to temptation will increase with age, (ii) moral judgment based on morality of constraint (e.g. moral realism, immanent justice) will decrease with age, (iii) there will be negative association between resistance to temptation and immaturity of moral judgment.

The subjects were 106 children from the second (20 boys and 15 girls), fourth (18 boys and 16 girls), and sixth (17 boys and 20 girls) grades of a "lower middle-class public elementary school", the mean ages of the three groups being, 7.5, 9.6, and 11.7. Resistance to temptation was measured through a 'raygun shooting game' (see chapter III for the details of this game) where each subject, left alone, was to take 20 shots. The subjects were promised beautiful medals (M&M) for every point they got above 35; but by a prearrangement, only 32 points could be won with 20 shots. Hence medals could be won only by violating the rules of the game (e.g. take extra shots, falsify the score-book, etc.). From this test, resistance to temptation was assessed in two ways: simply on the basis of attainment or non-attainment of medals, and on the basis of low or high conformity to rules. High conformity included those who followed the rules exactly and those who made slight violations; low conformity included those who violated the rules flagrantly. The aspects of the morality of constraint (moral realism immanent justice) were assessed through 'moral problems' similar to those used by PIAGET (e.g. broken cups, rotten bridge).²⁴⁵

It was found for boys and girls that temptation-resistance, as measured through attainment or non-attainment of medals, did not show a significant relationship with age. In this sense, capacity for temptation-resistance does not grow with age. However, as regards readiness to follow rules and instructions (conformity to rules) it was found significantly more in older girls than in younger ones. But conformity to rules did not show a significant growth with age in the case of boys. (Table 24)²⁴⁶

Again, moral realism and immanent justice was found significantly more in the thinking and judgment of the younger subjects of both sexes than of the older ones (table 24).²⁴⁷

As regards the relationship between temptation-resistance and maturity of moral judgment (i.e. decrease in moral realism and immanent justice), the findings showed no significant relationship, except that girls with low

245. Ibidem, pp. 883 – 886.

246. Ibidem, p. 887.

247. Ibidem.

moral realism show significantly more conformity to rules. But decrease in moral realism in boys, and decrease in immanent justice in both sexes, were not associated with high temptation-resistance (table 25).²⁴⁸ This indicates

Table 24
Comparisons by Sex between the Measures of Conscience Development and Age

Dimensions of Conscience	B O Y S				G I R L S			
	7-8	9-10	11-12	χ^2	7-8	9-10	11-12	χ^2
<i>Resist-Yield, M&Ms</i>								
Resist	5	4	4		2	7	7	
Yield	12	14	10		12	7	10	
				ns				ns
<i>Conformity to Rules</i>								
Low	10	9	7		12	5	4	
High	7	9	7		2	9	13	
				ns				14.4**
<i>Moral Realism</i>								
Low	5	7	16		2	6	18	
High	15	10	1		13	9	1	
				18.7**				23.7**
<i>Immanent Justice</i>								
Low	2	6	12		7	8	16	
High	18	11	5		8	7	3	
				14.5**				6.0*

* Significant at or beyond .05 level, two-tail.

** Significant at or beyond .01 level, two-tail.

Table 25
Comparisons by Sex between the Behavioral and Cognitive Measures of Conscience Strength

Behavioral Measures	COGNITIVE MEASURES					
	Moral Realism			Immanent Justice		
	Low	High	χ^2	Low	High	χ^2
Resist—Yield, M&Ms						
Boys Resist	7	6		2	11	
Boys Yield	.17	17		15	19	
			ns			ns
Girls Resist.	.10	6		10	6	
Girls Yield	.13	15		.17	11	
			ns			ns
Conformity to Rules						
Boys Low	.11	13		9	15	
Boys High	.13	10		8	15	
			ns			ns
Girls Low	5	16		12	9	
Girls High	.18	5		15	8	
			11.0**			ns

** Significant at or beyond .01 level, two-tail, corrected for continuity.

248. Ibidem, p. 888

that there is no necessary positive relationship between temptation-resistance and maturity of moral judgment.

GRINDER further reports that sex differences of the subjects did not show any significant relation to moral judgment maturity.²⁴⁹

Summarizing the findings of GRINDER'S study we can say that children's moral judgment matures with age, it progresses from moral realism to autonomous morality. However, neither age growth nor maturity of moral judgment showed a significant relationship with the capacity for temptation-resistance, except for girls' conformity to rules.²⁵⁰

249. Ibidem, p. 889. — However, in an investigation with 113 boys and 112 girls (ninth graders of public elementary school in Honolulu) Porteus and Johnson measured affective (guilt-feeling, responses of confession and restitution) and cognitive (immanent justice, moral realism) aspects of conscience through story-completion tests. They found that girls, in comparison to boys, were more mature on both the aspects: i.e. girls expressed more of those post-transgressional responses and showed less moral realism and immanent justice in their judgments than boys did. Besides, they also found a significantly positive association between measures of guilt and moral judgment (i.e. those who were more mature in moral judgment expressed more post-transgressional reaction) when both the sexes were combined ($p < .001$), separately for boys ($p < .02$), but, however, not for girls separately. Hence the authors add: "Although girls are more mature in both types of judgment, they are less consistent than boys in responding to the two types of stories". (B. Porteus and R.C. Johnson, "Children's Responses to Two Measures of Conscience Development and Their Relation to Sociometric Nomination", R.C. Johnson et alii (Eds), *Conscience, Contract and Social Reality*, pp. 148 — 150).

250. G.R. Medinnus also studied the relationship between the behavioural and the cognitive aspects on conscience with 74 (38 boys and 36 girls) students of sixth grade (about 12-years-old). The behavioural aspect (capacity for temptation resistance) was measured by a ray-gun game, and the cognitive aspect (moral judgment maturity according to the external or internal orientation) was assessed from their evaluation of a 'moral problem', where a group of Airforce cadets stole examination papers and sold to their companions. It was hypothesized that subjects with internalized moral judgments would show more temptation resistance than the externalized subjects.

But the findings showed little association between moral judgment and actual moral behaviour. As Medinnus reports, out of the 39 'externalized subjects' 19 yielded and 20 resisted; and out of the 19 'internalized subjects' 9 yielded and 10 resisted ($\chi^2 = .01$, ns) (cfr. G.R. Medinnus, "Behavioural and Cognitive Measures of Conscience Development" *The Journal Genetic Psychology*, 1966, pp. 148 — 149).

Still another related study was conducted by E.A. Nelson, R.Grinder and A.M. Bia-

Table 26

Correlation Matrices ^a														
	IQ	RG	MM	MC	SP	Sq	Circ	Cns	MJ	IG	EG	EC	NU	SD
IQ														
Raygun	-.24													
Magic-Mirror	-.26	-.15												
Multiple-Choice	.26	.16												
Speed	-.24	.21												
Squares	-.25	.41	.19											
Circles	.04	.15	-.05	.28										
Consistency	-.10	.24	.01	.11	.02									
Moral Judgment	-.01	.22	.13	.21	.24	.65								
Internalized Guilt	.31	-.38	-.19	-.20	-.06	-.24	-.01							
Externalized Guilt	.40	-.23	-.02	-.24	-.14	-.07	-.13	.06						
Ego Overcontrol	.41	-.16	.01	.10	.16	-.10	.07	.15	.24					
Neurotic Undercontrol	-.20	-.05	.03	.02	-.18	.06	.04	-.04	-.04	-.27				
Social Desirability	.24	-.17	.09	-.14	-.15	-.23	-.23	.11	.18	.19	.08			
	.02	.04	-.20	-.10	.05	.09	-.02	-.11	-.13	-.11	-.28	-.41		
	-.17	.01	.08	.29	.12	-.02	.02	-.14	.07	.18	.21	.38	-.52	

Boys above diagonal, girls below

b) Factors Affecting Altruism

R. UGUREL-SEMIN²⁵¹ investigated different factors relating to moral judgment and behaviour by studying children's 'generosity'. Her subjects were 291 (146 boys and 145 girls) kindergarten and primary school children from Istanbul, between the ages of 4 and 16.

'The experiment required the child to divide an unequal number of nuts between himself and another child. Different pairs of children divided from 5 to 15 nuts'. The following example illustrate the procedure: "A (6 years, 1 month) and B (5 Years, 10 months) are sitting at table. The E places 9 nuts on the table and says, "A, you see the nuts? You are going to share them with B. B, will you leave the room for a moment and wait outside until I call you". B goes out. "A, how are you going to share them?" A replies, "Half for me and half for him". B is called in and sits down. "B has come back", E remarks. "What are you going to do?" I will give him half and keep half for myself". He counts the nuts. "There are four for me and four for him, if I leave

ggio, who investigated the interaction of cognitive, personality, and situational factors in children's transgression behaviour. The subjects were 42 boys and 55 girls, sixth graders from elementary schools in a semi-rural community in the U.S.A. The mean I.Q. were 108.8 and 114.5 for the boys and girls respectively.

The cognitive measures included moral judgment maturity (according to Kohlberg's stages) and I.Q. Personality measures included internalized guilt (remorse), externalized guilt (fear of punishment), ego-overcontrol (excessive self-control and over conformity), neurotic under control (inefficient control of impulse and disdain for social rules), and social desirability (desire to please others). The transgression measures included six temptation tasks, which varied according to the nature of the task (academic or game-like), setting (individual or group), the incentive given (material or symbolic), etc. Ray-gun game, for example, was one of the six temptation situations.

It was found that I.Q. fostered temptation resistance and consistency of behaviour in both sexes. Similarly, maturity of moral judgment was another factor which positively contributed to temptation resistance (especially in academic contexts). Internalized guilt was found to foster temptation resistance (in boys), while externalized guilt was found inefficient in deterring transgression, especially in the face of achievement incentives. Besides, the findings also show some intersituational consistency in behaviour (cfr. table 26) (E.A.Nelson, R. Grinder, and A.M.Biaggio, "Relationships among Behavioural, Cognitive-Developmental, and Self Report Measures of Morality and Personality", *Multivariate Behavioural Research*, 1969 (4), pp. 483 – 500).

251. R. Ugurel-Semin, "Moral Behaviour and Moral Judgment in Children", *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1952, pp.463 – 474.

this one out". "What are you going to do now?" E asks. "I'll leave it out. Four for him and four for me." "But," E suggests "instead of leaving it out, put it where you like." First A adds it to his pile, then brings it near to B's pile and touches it. Finally he keeps it for himself. "Is that all right?" he asks. "I don't know; perhaps it is" he is told. "I know that it is all right like this," A says. "Why is it all right?" "Because it is a sharing as between brother and sister." The author remarks, "some children took as long as ten minutes to decide how to divide the nuts; others shared them equally, requesting the experimenter to keep the remaining one for a sister who was at home. And there were some who carefully felt each one in turn to make sure that they picked the best for themselves or their companions."

The following were the pertinent aspects investigated: types of moral behaviour (in the area of generosity) and their relation to age, sex differences and moral conduct, socio-economic group and moral behaviour, family size and moral behaviour, relation between moral judgment and behaviour, types of moral judgment and their relation to age and moral behaviour.²⁵²

UGUREL-SEMIN divides the behaviour of her subjects into three types: selfish, equalitarian and generous. Only 14% of the subjects were selfish (keeping more, giving less), 42% were equalitarian (shared equally) and 44% were generous (giving more, keeping less), (table 27).

As regards the relationship between moral behaviour and age, selfish tendency, which is at its climax between the ages of 4 and 6, completely disappears at 12. Similarly, generosity increases after 6 years, the most generous age of the child being 8. Thus egocentrism decreases as generosity increases. Equalitarianism continues to grow until 11 – 12 years, where it seems to

Table 27
Moral Behaviour of Subjects Regardless of Age, Sex,
Economic Status, or Family Size


Groups	Subjects	
	%	N
Those who give less (selfish)	14	40
Those who share equally (equalitarian)	42	123
Those who give more (generous)	44	128
Total	100	291

252. Ibidem, pp. 463 – 464.

reach its highest point. In fact, between 8 and 12 years of age equalitarianism appears to be the dominant attitude of the child; and from the age of 12 onwards the child seems to fluctuate constantly between equalitarianism and generosity (table 28 and figure 9).²⁵³

Table 28

FREQUENCY OF GENEROUS, EQUALITARIAN, AND SELFISH CHOICES ACCORDING TO AGE				
AGE	GENEROUS N %	EQUALITARIAN N %	SELFISH N %	NUMBER OF CASES
4-5	1 33	— —	2 67	3
5-6	3 20	2 13	10 67	15
6-7	12 52	4 17	7 31	23
7-8	28 63	9 21	7 16	44
8-9	16 37	17 40	10 23	43
9-10	22 49	23 51	0 0	45
10-11	13 32	25 61	1 3	41
11-12	8 29	19 68	3 7	28
12-13	15 62.5	9 37.5	0 0	24
13-14	6 35	11 65	0 0	17
14-15	3 75	1 25	0 0	4
15-16	1 25	3 75	0 0	4
Total	128	123	40	291



UGUREL-SEMIN observes that at 11 – 12 years of age the child becomes capable of formal operations. Hence, in the moral realm, he becomes capable of basing his judgments on the abstract idea of law, or of justice, or of goodness and love. This explains partially the constant fluctuation between equalitarianism and generosity after 12.²⁵⁴

Sex-differences showed no special bearing on moral behaviour in this study (table 29).²⁵⁵

253. Ibidem, pp. 464 – 465.

254. Ibidem, p. 465.

255. Ibidem.

Table 29

Moral Behavior According to Sex

GROUPS	BOYS		GIRLS	
	%	N	%	N
Generosity	44	64	44	64
Equality	42	61	43	62
Selfishness	14	21	13	19
Total	100	146	100	145

As for *socio-economic status* in relation to moral behaviour, it was found that poor children were as generous as the rich,²⁵⁶ and more generous than the middle-class. Besides, they were more equalitarian and less selfish than the rich and the middle class (table 30).²⁵⁷

Table 30

MORAL BEHAVIOR ACCORDING TO ECONOMIC STATUS

Groups	NUMBER OF SUBJECTS	RICH		MIDDLE-CLASS		POOR	
		%	N	%	N	%	N
Generosity	95	62	23	44	19	61	33
Equality	49	14	5	30	13	36	31
Selfishness	23	24	9	26	11	3	3
Total	167	100	37	100	43	100	67

As regards *family size* (families with one, two or more than two children) and moral behaviour, it was found that children from larger families were slightly more generous and equalitarian, and less selfish (table 31).²⁵⁷

As regards the *relationship between moral judgment and behaviour*, UGUREL-SEMIN observes, the behaviour of equalitarian and generous children were more consistent with their judgment in comparison to the said consistency of the selfish children, who often said, for example, "I must give

256. Ibidem.

257. Ibidem, p. 466.

Table 31

MORAL BEHAVIOR ACCORDING TO FAMILY SIZE

Groups	NUMBER OF SUBJECTS	ONE CHILD		TWO CHILDREN		MORE THAN TWO CHILDREN	
		%	N	%	N	%	N
Generosity	95	52.2	12	62.0	32	55.0	31
Equality	49	17.3	4	21.0	11	37.0	34
Selfishness	23	30.4	7	17.0	9	8.0	7
Total	167	99.9	23	100.0	52	100.0	92

more", but actually "he keeps more for himself".²⁵⁸

As regards the *development of moral judgment*, UGUREL-SEMIN distinguishes seven types of moral judgment, and relates them to age and moral behaviour. These types of judgment, which constitute a pattern of development or evolution, are the following: egocentrism, sociocentrism (obedience to religio-moral rules and customs), awareness of social reactions (public opinion), superficial reciprocity (nominal sharing with others), deeper and enlarged reciprocity (maintenance of common interests and friendships), and altruism and justice (table 32).²⁵⁹

Table 32

RELATIONSHIP OF TYPE OF MORAL JUDGMENT TO AGE AND MORAL BEHAVIOR

TYPES OF MORAL JUDGMENT	MEDIAN AGE		GENEROUS		EQUALITARIAN		SELFISH		TOTAL
	YEARS	MONTHS	N	%	N	%	N	%	
Egocentrism	7	3	3	25	15	75	20
Sociocentrism	9	2	53	82	3	4	9	14	65
Awareness of social reaction	9	3	13	91	1	7	14
Superficial reciprocity	9	5	10	32	21	68	31
Deeper and enlarged reciprocity; cooperation	10	5	11	44	13	46	35
Altruism	10	5	27	84	3	10	34
Justice	10	10	39	100	39
Total			119	81		25			226

This progress, says the author, may be summarized as a change from centralization to decentralization: that is, the young child is egocentric and cannot distinguish himself from others, nor the subjective from the objective; from this egocentrism he passes to socio-centrism, which reflects the pressures of social rules; then through a deeper understanding of reciprocity and cooperation the child, on his own accord, comes to accept the demands of

258. Ibidem, p. 467.

259. Ibidem, p. 468.

altruism and justice. The change from centralization to decentralization thus implies a progress from external orientation to internalization and autonomy.

The findings may be summarized as follows: the child's moral behaviour (generosity) develops with age, from selfishness to equality and generosity. Large family, and rich and poor (in comparison to middle-class) socio-economic status seem to foster generosity, while sex-differences showed no bearing on this behaviour. The actual correspondence between judgment and behaviour was not consistent. Seven types of moral judgment, which show a pattern of development, were found, and one or more of them were predominant in each type of moral behaviour (i. e. selfishness, equalitarianism and generosity).²⁶⁰

260. Ibidem, p.472.

In a related study, B. J. Handlon and P. Gross studied the sharing behaviour of children. The subjects were 18 preschool children and 25 children from the fourth, fifth, and sixth grades of a public school. The subject's sharing behaviour was assessed from how he shared with his companion an unequal number of pennies or seals, which they together had earned during an 'experimental game'. Each child divided the pennies or seals in the absence of his companion (who was asked by the E to go out momentarily), but in the presence of the E.

The findings of this study confirm several findings reported by Ugurel-Semin. It was found that as age increases, the child becomes more generous, i.e. he gives more to his companion and keeps less for himself. The increase of generosity by age was significant at the .02 level or better. It was also found that the highest degree of selfishness occurred in the preschool age; the transition from selfishness to generosity occurred between the fourth and fifth grades (i.e. between about 10 and 11 years), and this transition was complete by the sixth grade (about 12 years old). Besides, according to this study, altruistic behaviour did not show any significant differences between boys and girls, nor between only children and children with siblings (cfr. B.J.Handlon and P.Gross "The Development of Sharing Behaviour in Children", Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1959, pp.425 - 428).

Here we may also note certain pertinent observations D. Krebs makes after a thorough review of research on altruism: "Although the common notion that females are more altruistic than males was supported more often than the reverse, support was by no means consistent". Again, "although the findings are not entirely consistent, there is support for the notion that altruism increases with age. And "there was some indication that people from large families are more altruistic than people from small families." ... "Members of the working class and entrepreneurial middle class tended to behave in

3. Correlates and Consistency of Moral Judgment

In the light of the findings reviewed above, we shall try to assess the important correlates of moral judgment, as well as its consistency (generality).

It may be noted that all the studies found that moral judgment matures with *age*, a conclusion established by several other studies as well, including those of PIAGET and KOHLBERG.²⁶¹

As regards other factors, the studies have not obtained very consistent findings. As for I.Q., DURKIN found no significantly positive association between I.Q. and maturity of justice concept. But JOHNSON found significant positive relationship between I.Q. and maturity in three aspects of moral judgment (moral realism, punishment, and severity of punishment), though the role of I.Q. was not significant with regard to justice concept and communicable responsibility. Again, BOEHM found that I.Q. was significantly related moral maturity, as measured through consideration of intentionality vs. consequences of action. We may also recall KOHLBERG'S findings that children with low I.Q. are almost all below average in moral maturity, and that dull children attain moral judgment maturity slower than brighter children. These findings indicate that I.Q. is a positive contributing factor to moral judgment maturity, that is, the more intelligent a child is the maturer his moral judgment is likely to be; but the role of I.Q. is not equal in all areas of moral judgment, it being very insignificant in the area of justice concept.

Social class differences, studied by BOEHM and NASS, did not appear to be a significant factor in the development of moral judgment. But in another study BOEHM found that high social class fostered earlier maturity of judgment (i.e. consideration of motives rather than consequences of action). KOHLBERG'S findings also show that higher status in the social hierarchy facilitates easier and earlier attainment of moral maturity.²⁶² The findings of

accord with the norm of reciprocity"...while"bureaucratic middle classers, on the other hand, were more socially responsible" (D.Krebs, "Altruism — An Examination of the Concept and a Review of the Literature", Psychological Bulletin, 1970, pp. 286, 290, 298).

261. Cfr. also, D.Wright, The Psychology of Moral Behaviour, p. 162.

262. Kohlberg, "Development of Moral Character", p. 162.

HARROWER as well as that of LERNER also show that high social class is a better promoter of moral judgment maturity than is lower social class. In the light of these findings, higher rank on the social scale can be considered as a factor that promotes the maturity of moral judgment.

As for *sex-differences*, we have again divergent findings. PORTEUS and JOHNSON found that girls showed more maturity in judgment than boys did. And according to BULL, girls were practically always (i.e. in all age-groups) ahead of boys, the differences being very remarkable between the ages of 11 and 13.²⁶³ GRINDER, however, found no sex-differences in his measures of moral judgment maturity. And finally, BOEHM and NASS found that upto the age of 9 girls were ahead of boys in moral judgment, but afterwards boys took the lead. If these findings warrant any (tentative) conclusion it is in favour of girls: girls tend to show more moral judgment maturity than boys do. This should not be surprising in the light of the fact that girls undergo more rapid developmental changes than boys of comparable age.

As regards *adult constraint*, it was found, as JOHNSON'S study showed, on the whole, to hinder moral maturity; but moral maturity did not necessarily imply an increased independence from authority, as the study of BOEHM and NASS showed. And according to his findings BULL strongly emphasizes that autonomy is attained, not independently of heteronomous rules and regulations, but through a process of going through them. Besides, close and constant association with peers by itself does not seem to contribute significantly to moral judgment maturity, as the findings of KUGELMASS and BREZNITZ indicated.

Finally, findings about the influence of *religious belief* on moral judgment are not specially revealing. WRIGHT and COX found that extreme religious positions were related to severity in moral judgment or, in other words, highly 'devout' people seemed to subscribe to a rigorous morality (as measured through moral judgment); but such severe judgments were not necessarily characterized by moral realism. BOEHM found that catholic children showed earlier maturity than others, a finding which shows the importance of maturity-oriented instruction in the child's moral development.

As regards *consistency of moral judgment*, studied by JOHNSON, it was

263. Bull, Moral Judgment from Childhood to Adolescence, pp. 88, 114, 72.

found that children's responses to moral problems were sufficiently interrelated as to show that there is such a thing as moral judgment, that is, moral judgment is "a specific and identifiable aspect of human ability,"²⁶⁴ and not simply a number of unrelated critical judgments about certain specific areas called moral. HARTSHORNE and MAY (see below p. 135) also found evidence for some consistency in children's moral judgments.

Regarding the *relationships among the different dimensions* (cognitive, behavioural and emotional) of conscience, the studies of GRINDER and MEDINNUS found no positive, significant relationship between moral judgment maturity and temptation resistance. UGUREL-SEMIN, who reports an increase in altruism with age, does not report any notable correspondence between judgment and actual behaviour.

However, KOHLBERG reports findings which show moderately good correlations between maturity of moral judgment and measures of temptation resistance, and between maturity of moral judgment and teacher's ratings of conscience ($r = .31$) and fairness with peers ($r = .51$).²⁶⁵ HARTSHORNE and MAY also found more or less similar relationship ($r = .34$) between moral conduct and moral knowledge (see below p. 135). Besides, NELSON and others (see above p. 96) found that I.Q. and maturity of moral judgment foster temptation resistance and a certain consistency of behaviour. And according to the findings of GRIM and others (see above p. 59) temptation resistance was more a function of ego strength.

The indication of these findings is that there is only a low relationship between moral judgment and moral behaviour, and this means that moral behaviour is not simply a function of moral judgment. However, as the findings indicate, certain cognitive factors (e.g. I.Q., and the ability to make evaluations) which foster maturity of moral judgment foster also a consistent organization of one's behaviour and self-control, which, of course, is subject to motivational and situational factors (see p. 144).

As regards the relationship between moral judgment and moral emotion, findings are scanty. KOHLBERG'S findings indicate that post-transgression reactions show more maturity (passes from fear and anxiety to confession,

264. Kay, *Moral Development*, p. 114.

265. Kohlberg, "Development of Moral Character", p. 408.

and then to guilt) according as moral judgment matures.²⁶⁶ PORTEUS and JOHNSON also found a positive, significant relationship between moral judgment maturity and emotional reactions after transgressions (see above, p. 94). These findings imply that the more moral insight one has the more likelihood there is of a corresponding evaluation of one's behaviour, and consequently of feeling remorse in a corresponding manner.

266. Kohlberg, *ibidem*, pp. 410 — 411; (see p. 59)

Chapter III

The Identification Theory of Conscience

While the *cognitive-developmental* approach focuses on the development of 'moral thinking and judgment', the *identification theory*¹ purports to give a more comprehensive picture of conscience. It has a different approach and different emphases.

From the point of view of the identification theory, we shall discuss what conscience is and the factors involved in its development. Then we shall review the empirical findings based on the identification theory of conscience.

A. Conscience as Inner-Control

According to the identification theory, conscience is a special type of self-control.² In order to clarify the nature of this control *three types of control* are distinguished: purely *external control* of the child, the child's *self-control based on punishment and reward*, and the child's *inner control*.

First, there is the purely *external control* of the child. The young child does not know what he may do and what he may not. He has to be constantly supervised and controlled (for example, a twelve-month-old may put his

1. Here we are not interested in the clinically-based psychoanalytical theory of identification and conscience, but in a more empirically-oriented theory of identification and conscience-development. This latter has of course drawn its major inspiration from the psychoanalytical and the stimulus-response theories (cfr. J.M. Whiting, "Resource Mediation and Learning by Identification" in I. Iscoe and H.W. Stevenson (Eds), *Personality Development in Children*, Texas 1960, p. 112).

The important contributors to this theory are R.R. Sears, E. Maccoby, H. Levin, W. Allinsmith, R. Grinder, R. Burton, J. M. Whiting, I. L. Child, etc. They subscribe to a process of identification and conscience development, though certain differences (especially with regard to the motives of identification) of opinion are found, which we shall indicate in due course.

2. R. R. Sears, E. Maccoby, and H. Levin, *Patterns of Child Rearing*, Evanston 1957, p. 362.

hand into fire unless parents stop him). All such controls come under purely external control³.

The second type of control is the child's *self-control* which is dependent on the "*fear of punishment or hope of reward*". If the child is punished for a wrong-doing, especially if punished several times, "he may learn not to do it any more". For him, the wrong-doing is associated with the punishment he has received for it. Thus he will avoid wrong-doing because of the fear of punishment. Similarly, a good behaviour may be encouraged by the reward one has received for it. Such controls, though coming from within the individual (hence called 'self-control'), are simply an extension of the purely external control because they depend "on the immediate (or near future) presence of some one who can punish or reward"⁴.

The third type of control "is the child's *inner control*". This is dependent neither on the external control of the parents nor on the 'punishment and reward factors'. It comes wholly "from within the child himself". He instructs himself how to behave; tries to control himself according to this self instruction; and when he goes against his self instruction the punishment comes from within⁵. This inner control of the child, which needs no external agency, "appears to come from a genuine acceptance of the parents' standards of conduct as his own....The term *conscience* is applied to this kind of inner control"⁶. Conscience, therefore, is the internal self-control which develops as a

3. Cfr. Ibidem.

4. Sears et alii, *ibidem*, pp. 363, 364.

5. Sears et alii, *ibidem*, p. 364.

6. Sears et alii, *ibidem*, p. 365.

Here we quote an instance of this inner control which according to Sears (and others) is the "muted birth cry of conscience": "Martha's parents brought her along one Sunday afternoon when they came for a visit. She was seventeen months old, full of curiosity and mischief. While we had coffee and cookies, she thirstily drank down a glass of milk, ate half a cookie, and began an eager exploration of her surroundings. Toddling most of the time, crawling occasionally, she left trails of crumbs and tipped-over cups where she went. One of the floor lamps fascinated her especially. It was tall and straight, made of single glossy round of wood just the right size for Martha to get a good full grip on. When she stood up against it, clutching happily, the lamp teetered and swayed in what was obviously an entrancing fashion for Martha.

Twice her father had to put down his cup and leap across the room to prevent a

result of the child's internalizing or incorporating into himself the "values expressed by the parents"⁷. Because parents usually express the values of their culture, children come to internalize the values of parental culture.⁸

The theorists maintain that this inner control has three indications or criteria. One of them is the child's self-instruction in accordance with the values and standards he has incorporated (the cognitive dimension). A second one is the "maintenance of control" in temptation-situations, where no risk of being detected or punished is present (the behavioral dimension). The third one is the occurrence of "guilt feelings", that is, "painful feelings of self-blame, self-criticism or remorse" which result from violating one's standards of behaviour (the emotional dimension)⁹.

According to the theorists, some signs of this inner-control called conscience are found already before the child is two years old. Gradually the child controls more and more of those behaviour which are displeasing to the pa-

crash. Twice he said clearly and distinctly, "Now Martha, don't touch". Each time he took her by the hand and led her over to some toys. These attracted her only briefly.

After the second interruption Martha began a general exploration of the room again. Now she went a little slower, and several times glanced at her father. As she came closer to the lamp, however, she stopped looking his way and her movements were all oriented toward the lamp. Deliberately she stepped toward it, came within a couple of feet of it, and lifted her arm partly a little jerkily, and then said sharply, commandingly, "Don't touch".

There was an instant of struggling silence. Then she turned and stumbled across the room, flopped down on the floor, and started laughing excitedly. Her father, laughing with her, and obviously adoring, reached out and hugged and snuggled her for several minutes" (Sears et alii, *ibidem*, pp. 365, 366.)

7. Sears et alii, *ibidem*, p. 366.

In speaking about 'parental identification' or 'identification with the parent', etc, what is meant by the term 'parent' is the 'main care-taker' of the child in its early life, which is usually the mother. If some one else is the main care-taker in the early life of the child, this person will be the chief identificand for the child. (Sears et alii, *ibidem*, p. 373; also, J. M. Whiting, "Fourth Presentation" in J. M. Tanner and B. Inhelder (Eds), *Discussions of Child Development: II*, Tavistock 1954, p. 187).

8. M. L. Hoffman, "Identification and Conscience Development", *Child Development*, 1971 (42), p.1071.

9. Sears et alii, *ibidem*, p. 366; also, J. M. Whiting and I. L. Child, *Child Training and Personality Development (A cross cultural study)*, New Haven 1953, p.219.

rent. However, it is during the period between the "first six to ten years of life"¹⁰ that the process of learning this inner control chiefly goes on... and the extent "to which conscience will operate through all the rest of life" depends on its development during this period.¹¹ The development of conscience after this important period is mainly an increase in the content or scope of control, not in the process of control.¹² As the child grows, he understands better the complex forms of social behaviour, and there emerge for him new aspects of his behaviour which should be subjected to internal control, but the very "process of internal controlling was learned already in childhood", especially between the first six to ten years of age.¹³

B. The Development of Conscience

According to the identification theory, a chain of interrelated factors are involved in the development of conscience: conscience develops as a result of the child's internalization of parental values through a special form of learning. This learning has its motives, and the strength of these motives varies according to certain factors in the early parent-child interaction.

1. Identification and the Learning of Values

The inner control or conscience implies a special kind of learning process called *identification* or role-taking.¹⁴ We shall see (a) *what identification is*, and (b) *the process of identification*.

10. Sears et alii, *ibidem*, p. 367.

11. *Ibidem*.

12. Sears et alii, *ibidem*, p. 368.

13. *Ibidem*.

14. Sears et alii, *ibidem*, pp. 370, 374.

a) What Is Identification

J. M. WHITING describes *identification* as the "general process by which a person learns the role of another by interacting with him".¹⁵ R. SEARS (and others) describe role-taking (or identification) as "the discovering and learning of new actions by observing what others do, and then practising it by *pretending to be the other person*".¹⁶

In order to bring out the characteristic features of 'learning by identification', the theorists contrast it with other forms of learning: namely, 'learning by direct tuition', 'trial and error learning', and imitation.

Identification is different from 'learning by direct tuition' because in the latter the instructions for behaviour come from others, while in identification "the child's selection of actions to perform" comes from "his own observation of what the role requires".¹⁷ It is different from 'trial and error learning' because in trial and error the learner does not pretend to be in the other's role, while in identification the child has to "perceive and imagine himself in the place of a model".¹⁸ It is different also from imitation, which is overt or manifest, while identification is covert or hidden. Besides, imitation refers to the "single aspects of the model's behaviour, whereas identification implies taking another's "role itself....with all the feelings, attitudes, values and actions that he attributes to the person who actually occupies the role".¹⁹ Hence, through identification with the parent the child comes to adopt everything in parental behaviour that "he perceives as appropriate to

15. Whiting, "Resource Mediation and Learning by Identification", p. 113.

16. Sears et alii, *ibidem*, 369.

17. Sears et alii, *ibidem*, p. 370.

18. *Ibidem*.

19. *Ibidem*.

It should, however, be noted that this distinction between identification and imitation proposed by the identification-theorists is not accepted by all. Some social learning theorists (for example A. Bandura) question the validity of such distinctions, and consider 'imitative learning' as the basic form of learning implied in identification (see below p. 279). Besides, in a later work Sears himself considers 'imitative learning' as a preliminary process implied in identification (R. Sears, L. Rau and R. Alpert, *Identification and Child Rearing*, Tavistock 1966, p. 4).

the parental role".²⁰ Parent's "moral values and strictures, the attitudes and behaviours" which are characteristic features of conscience or inner control are evidently part of the parental role which the child adopts.²¹ Thus identification plays the key role in the process of learning social roles and in the development of conscience.²²

b) The Process of Identification

Learning by identification is however a gradual process. Already at the age of two the child shows reactions and interests similar to those of the parent. Young children, for example, can be heard giving "stern commands and admonitions" to themselves, their play-dolls, siblings and even to their parents, just as their parents would do towards them. Such role-taking seems to be very clear in children's play of sex-roles.²³ Boys behave as if they were 'fathers' and girls behave as if they were 'mothers'. However, it is argued that young children are often discouraged from, and even punished by parents for, acting out parental roles outwardly. For example, children are not allowed to give stern commands to their parents, nor may the youngster 'spank' his parents as they might have spanked him when he misbehaved. Besides, because the child is still young and immature, he may not be successful at playing the parental roles externally.²⁴ Therefore, he gives up the external practice (or overt practice) of taking parental roles.

Giving up overt role-practice does not mean that the child stops role-taking. The child continues role-taking covertly, that is, by indulging in "fantasy in which he sees himself" as the model (e.g. the parent) whose role he takes.²⁵ Such covert practice helps the child to increase both "his latent

20. R. Sears, E. Maccoby and H. Levin, "Signs and Sources of Conscience" in R. C. Johnson et alii (Eds), *Conscience, Contract and Social Reality*, p. 218.

21. Sears et alii, *Patterns of Child Rearing*, p. 374.

22. Sears et alii, *ibidem*, pp. 368, 370.

23. Sears et alii, *ibidem*, p. 369.

24. E. Maccoby, "Role-Taking in Childhood and Its Consequences for Social Learning", *Child Development*, 1959 (30), p. 243; also, Whiting, "Resource Mediation", p. 118.

25. Whiting, *ibidem*, p. 119.

skill in playing the role as well as his desire for overt-practice.²⁶ This means that through repeated covert practice of parental roles the child develops "behaviour potentials (habits)" which will facilitate his taking of those roles overtly when appropriate situations or "necessary stimulating conditions" arise.²⁷

Such appropriate situations for the overt performance of the covertly practised roles may emerge at different situations in life, add the theorists. Thus, for example, "when the child grows up and has children of his own, the actions which he has learned that are appropriate to the role of the parent should emerge".²⁸ Hence WHITING claims that "a mother will frequently respond to her first child exactly as her own mother had treated her, even though she had not been aware of practising such behaviour...".²⁹ For another example, if a preadolescent boy sees one of his age-mates breaking certain rules, he (the first boy) will try to enforce them, provided he has sufficiently learned through covert practice in childhood the rule-enforcing behaviour of his parents. Here the age-mate's violation of rules is an appropriate occasion (it gives the necessary stimulation) for the first boy to overtly take the role of rule-enforcing which he learned in early childhood.³⁰

About the importance of covert role-practice in the learning of social behaviour patterns MACCOBY says: "We conceive of covert practice of adult role behaviour as a basic process underlying the child's acquisition of behaviour tendencies that are matched to the perceived behaviour of a model".³¹ And in the words of WHITING: "It is this fantasy of being someone other than himself that we would like to define as identification, and we would like to make the explicit assumption that such fantasy-role playing will produce

26. Whiting, *ibidem*, p. 120.

27. E. Maccoby, "The Taking of Adult Roles in Middle Childhood", *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1961 (63), pp. 494, 503.

However, Maccoby observes that through role-taking the child does not learn "all features of parental behaviour" equally well. He should learn, for example, verbal behaviour more efficiently than motor skills by this means. (cfr. Maccoby, "Role Taking in Childhood", pp. 247, 251).

28. Maccoby, "The Taking of Adult Roles", p. 494.

29. Whiting, "Resource Mediation", p. 122.

30. Maccoby, *ibidem*.

31. Maccoby, *ibidem*, p. 495.

appreciable 'savings' when the opportunity arises for him to perform overtly the coveted role".³²

From what has been said above, it follows that the measure of the child's adoption of parental values and standards and the consequent conscience development depends on the measure of the child's identification with the parents. The stronger and faster the identification, the stronger and faster will be the development of conscience. Thus, the immediate explanation for individual differences in conscience development is to be sought for in individual differences in the measure of identification.³³ This leads us to the question 'why does the child identify with the parent at all?', that is, the motives of identification.

2. The Motives of Identification

The identification-theorists hold that learning by identification supposes, like other forms of learning, motivation and reinforcement. It means that there should be a 'want' on the part of the child, which impels him to perform actions as though he were in the place of his parent, and the performance of these actions "should bring about a rewarding state of affairs" which will impel him to repeat the actions.³⁴ Different motivational theories have been proposed by different theorists. The important ones among those theories are (a) *secondary reward value*, (b) *status envy*, and (c) *control of sources of power*.³⁵

32. Whiting, *ibidem*, p. 119.

33. Sears et alii, *Patterns of Child Rearing*, p. 368.

34. Sears et alii, *ibidem*, p. 370.

35. A major factor which gives rise to 'different theories' of identification (or better the 'nuances of identification theory') is the difference of views with regard to the motives of identification, and these differences have implications also for the development of conscience. Therefore, we review the important motives as proposed by the theorists, without making a synthesis of the different views.

a) Secondary Reward Value

A young child is in constant need of his mother. She is needed for the satisfaction of all his needs, or she provides for the child the primary rewards which satisfy his needs. Because of this nurturing and care-taking, the child becomes emotionally dependent on the mother. Consequently, the mother and all that she does "become environmental events that have a reward value for the child",³⁶ that is, an acquired or *secondary reward value*. And, once the mother and maternal actions have acquired such a reward value, the child wants her always to be available to him.

But gradually the mother's presence and attention to the child becomes less constant. She may have to look after the needs of her husband, of other children, etc. Besides, this lessening of attention is needed also for the growth of the child's independence. However, the child begins to feel the deprivation of the close and constant maternal contact to which he has been accustomed and he becomes anxious whether he has the continuing love and support of the mother. He, on his part, tries to provide a substitute for the rewarding activities of the mother by role-playing (imitating) mother's nurturing activities. Thus, behaving like the mother becomes self-rewarding.³⁷

b) Status Envy

J.M. WHITING has proposed another (though not entirely different) motive for identification, called *status envy*.³⁸ It means that a person will envy the status of any one who more efficiently controls and consumes (or enjoys) the resources which he (the first one) covets, but of which he is deprived and over which he has no direct control. Consequently, he will identify with

36. Sears, Rau and Alpert, *Identification and Child Rearing*, p. 3.

37. Sears, Rau and Alpert, *ibidem*, pp. 3 – 4. This theory of 'secondary reward value' was first proposed by O.H. Mowrer. Mowrer, however, did not invoke it to explain the development of values and character, but to account for the 'psychology of the talking birds' and for the acquisition of certain social skills in human subjects (see below p. 284).

38. Whiting, "Resource Mediation", p. 118.

the envied person.³⁹ Here the word 'resource' means anything an individual wants, such as "food, water, sex....privilege, freedom from pain...love and praise".⁴⁰ The person who directly controls the resources is called "resource mediator", and those who depend on him for the resources are said to have only 'indirect control' of resources.⁴¹ Thus the parents are mediators of several resources for the young child, and he has only indirect control over those resources.

According to the theory, therefore, the child will envy the status of the parent and identify with the parent if she withholds from the child the resources he covets. But if the parent gives him the resources he covets, he will not envy the status of the parent because "in this instance he, the child, is the consumer of the resources and already occupies the envied status",⁴² and consequently there will be no identification. Again, if the parent gives the resources to somebody else (e.g. a younger sibling) the child will envy and identify with that person also (i.e. the younger sibling). For another example, when the child perceives that his father enjoys (in preference to himself) the love and care of his mother, the child will envy the status of the father and identify with him.⁴³ WHITING adds, the more a child envies the status of another person, the more he identifies with him; and more envied will be the status of that person who, in the child's view, controls and consumes the more valuable resources.⁴⁴ Thus *control and consumption of resources* is the motive for identification according to the *status envy* theory.

c) Control of Sources of Power

E. MACCOBY has proposed a theory according to which role-taking is motivated by the child's need to *control the sources of power*. "We suggest there is a more important condition governing the frequency of covert practice of

39. *Ibidem*.

40. Whiting, *ibidem*, p. 113.

41. Whiting, *ibidem*, p. 115.

42. Whiting, *ibidem*, p. 118.

43. *Ibidem*.

44. Whiting, *ibidem*, pp. 118, 119.

another's responses, and this condition has to do with the power relationships between the two people concerned....the more power another individual exercises over ego, the more ego will rehearse alter's actions in the absence of alter'.⁴⁵

Consequently, learning by role-playing takes place more in early childhood, when the child is completely dependent upon others; as the child grows older and becomes increasingly capable of satisfying his needs without depending on others, the role of this form of learning decreases.⁴⁶

The underlying factor in all the three above-mentioned motives of identification is the young child's *dependency* on his parents. He needs their love, care, support, etc. Therefore, the strength of the young child's identification with the parent and the consequent conscience development depends on the 'strength' of his dependency on them.⁴⁷

3. Parental Antecedents of Identification

According to the theory, certain aspects in parent-child interaction are important contributing factors to the child's dependency motive. These factors, therefore, affect the strength of the child's identification with the parent. These factors are (a) *parental love and nurturance*, (b) *high standards of conduct and love-oriented discipline*, and, according to WHITING, (c) *behaviour-contingent mediation of resources*.

a) Parental Love and Nurturance

A major factor which fosters identification is *parental love and nurturance*.⁴⁸ As we have already noted, the child's dependency has its origin in the maternal nurturance and care-taking. Therefore, the child will not be motiva-

45. Maccoby, "Role-Taking in Childhood", p. 245.

46. Maccoby, *Ibidem*, p. 246.

47. Cfr. Sears et alii, *Patterns of Child Rearing*, p. 372; Whiting, 'Fourth Presentation' p. 186.

48. Sears et alii, *Patterns of Child Rearing*, p. 372.

ted for identification if he has not experienced any love and nurturance from the parent. Hence all theorists agree that a 'reasonable' atmosphere of love and nurturance is required for the child to develop dependency on the parent and thus to be motivated for identification.⁴⁹ However, it is difficult, as all theorists agree, to specify the 'amount' of love and nurturance required for an appropriate identification. SEARS seems to imply that the more love and nurturance is given the stronger and faster will be identification and conscience development because warm and nurturant behaviour fosters the child's dependency.⁵⁰ Accordingly, he adds, "conscience will develop more rapidly, and will be more complete at kindergarten age, in those children who were given the greatest love and affection in early childhood."⁵¹

The need for parental love and nurturance implies conversely that where at least a 'minimum' of it is not given there will be little or no identification, and consequently little or no development of conscience.⁵²

b) High Standards of Conduct and Love-Oriented Discipline

High standards of conduct refer to *high and demanding norms* set for the child by the parents with regard to obedience, achievement, cleanliness and order, table manners, independence, etc. When the standards are high, it is more difficult for the child to reach those requirements and to obtain the rewards associated with them. This will prompt the child to try hard to come up to those standards, and also for a stronger imitation of those parental behaviours which come to be rewarded.⁵³

Another important factor contributing to strong identification is parents' use of *love-oriented discipline*.⁵⁴

Disciplinary methods are generally divided into two categories: *love-oriented* (called also 'psychological discipline') and *materialistic* (called also 'physi-

49. Whiting, "Fourth Presentation", p. 186.

50. Sears et alii, "Signs and Sources of Conscience", p. 212.

51. *Ibidem*.

52. Whiting, "Fourth Presentation", p. 186.

53. Sears, Rau and Alpert, *Identification and Child Rearing*, p. 6.

54. Sears et alii, *Patterns of Child Rearing*, p. 372.

cal discipline').

Love-oriented discipline involves "giving or withdrawing love as means of rewarding or punishing the child's behaviour".⁵⁵ Examples for these are praising the child, showing affection etc. for good behaviour; not showing affection, explicitly stating that the parent does not like the child, refusing to speak with him, isolating him, etc. (all these are usually labelled 'love-withdrawal') for misbehaviour. Reasoning with the child, that is, explaining to him the consequences of his actions for others as well as for himself, is also considered as a psychological or love-oriented method of discipline.⁵⁶

Materialistic discipline involves giving or withholding 'material things' without reference to the factor of love. Examples for these are giving tangible rewards like candy, money, etc., for good behaviour; depriving the child of needful things and privileges, scolding, spanking, etc., for misbehaviour.⁵⁷

Love-oriented methods of discipline foster identification because they touch the child's basic need for parental love. As already noted, the child's dependency and anxiety over the loss of love motivates him for identification. And love-oriented discipline (e.g. love-withdrawal) makes the child more anxious about parental love. Thus it causes stronger identification. Therefore, says SEARS, it is parental love and nurturance, combined with love-oriented discipline, that fosters identification.⁵⁸

Materialistic discipline, add the authors, does not promote identification. On the contrary, those methods prompt the child to reactions like 'flight from punishment', 'avoiding the parent', 'counter aggression', etc.⁵⁹

c) Behaviour-Contingent Mediation of Resources

In accordance with his status envy theory, WHITING suggests certain paren-

55. Sears et alii, "Signs and Sources of Conscience", p. 215.

56. R. Sears, "The Growth of Conscience", in I. Iscoe and H.W. Stevenson (Eds), *Personality Development in Children*, Texas 1960, pp. 104, 105; also, Sears et alii, "Signs and Sources of Conscience", pp. 215, 216.

57. Sears, "The Growth of Conscience", p. 104.

58. Sears et alii, "Signs and Sources of Conscience", p. 217.

59. Sears et alii, *Patterns of Child Rearing*, p. 373.

tal practices which should foster identification. Since status envy is based on the control and consumption of resources, the measure of identification will depend on parents' mediation of resources. If resource mediation is such that it enhances status envy, it will also foster identification. In this context WHITING distinguishes different 'types' and *contingencies* of resource mediation.

First we give the different *types* of mediation. They are: *Resource-giving*, which refers to giving the child the various resources. Thus a parent "may provide the child with food, solace him, or praise him," etc. *Resource-withholding*, which refers to refusing to give the child the resources. For example, the parent may "refuse to give him dessert, restrict his freedom, or withhold her love," etc. *Resource-deprivation*, which refers to taking away the resources which the child has been enjoying. Thus a parent "may spank him, criticize him, or take away the privilege that he has previously enjoyed." Physical punishments are considered here as 'resource-deprivation' because they deprive "the child of the resource of freedom of pain".⁶⁰

Now regarding the *contingencies* of resource mediation. Contingency of mediation refers to the reason for which a resource is mediated.⁶¹ According to WHITING, the important contingencies are: *child-need contingency*, where the mediation of resources is dependent on the need of the child. And this is demanded by the "care-taking function of the mediator". *Child-behavior contingency*, where the mediation of resources is dependent on the behaviour of the child. Resources are given for the good behaviour of the child; and they are withheld or deprived of when the child misbehaves. And this is demanded by the "teaching or disciplinary role of the mediator".⁶²

According to status envy theory, some giving of resources is to satisfy the needs of the child is a necessary precondition for identification. If the child has not enjoyed any resource and experienced its value, he may not covet it,

60. Whiting, "Resource Mediation", p. 115.

61. Whiting, *ibidem*, p. 116.

62. *Ibidem*. We may note still a third contingency called "mediator need contingency". Here the mediation of resources is based on the needs of the mediator. The self-interests of the mediator (e.g. of the parent) are more important than the need and behaviour of the child.

Whiting observes that these various contingencies are not mutually exclusive; they may overlap at times.

nor envy the one who controls and consumes it. But giving of resources alone is not enough for motivating the child to identify with the parent, because in such a situation the child already enjoys the resources and occupies the enviable status. Hence, resource-withholding or deprivation is also needed for identification. Only then does the child begin to realize that the parent has "more efficient control of resources, begins to envy her status" and attempts to identify with her.⁶³

Hence WHITING observes that during early infancy when the mother does "her best to give the child everything he wants" no identification will take place. The 'amount' of resources given during this period will help the child only to perceive the value of those resources, but they do not prompt him to identification. And "it is only when the mother begins to socialize the child, however, and for the purpose of controlling him and training him, begins to withhold or deprive him of resources, that the process of identification begins".⁶⁴ In the process of socialization, adds WHITING, the giving of resources should be contingent upon the good behaviour of the child, and the withholding or deprivation of resources should be contingent upon the bad behaviour of the child, that is, *behaviour-contingent mediation of resources*. This "will lead to a high degree of status-envy and frequent covert practice" and consequently fosters the learning of the "disciplinary and moral roles of his parents".⁶⁵

The aspects of parent-child interaction discussed above, and considered to be fostering identification, imply that an 'amount' of parental love and nurturance (giving of resources) is necessary for identification and conscience development. But that alone is not sufficient. It should be combined with high standards of conduct and discipline. As WHITING would say, the child should be made to feel that the parent has more efficient control of the resources and thus come to envy the status of the parent. And the disciplinary methods highly conducive to identification are the love-oriented ones.

63. Whiting, *ibidem*, p. 119.

64. *Ibidem*.

65. Whiting, *ibidem*, p. 124.

C. Empirical Findings of the Identification Theory of Conscience

According to the identification theory, we have seen that conscience develops as a result of the child's identification with the parent. We have also seen the important motives for identification as well as the important parental antecedents of identification, and that these motives and antecedents affect the development of conscience.

Here we shall now review the empirical findings based on the identification theory of conscience. The empirical studies in this area may be broadly divided into three categories: (1) studies about the *behavioural dimension* of conscience, (2) studies about the *emotional dimension* of conscience, and (3) *comparative studies* about the behavioural and the emotional dimensions of conscience.

1. Studies about the Behavioural Dimension

Because conscience is the product of the internalization of parental behavioural standards and values through identification, the individual who has developed a conscience should behave in conformity to these standards and values. Therefore, self-control or conformity to internalized standards in a temptation situation is an important index of conscience development.⁶⁶ Strong resistance to temptation therefore indicates a well developed conscience. In the same way, low resistance to temptation indicates a poorly developed conscience. Hence, studies about the behavioural dimension focus, from the positive side, on behavioural conformity to the accepted standards and values (resistance to temptation), and from the negative side, on behaviour which reflects high rate of non-conformity to the cultural standards and values, like frequent crime, aggression, delinquency, etc. (anti-social behaviour).⁶⁷

66. Whiting, "Fourth Presentation", p. 185.

67. We may not take this division too strictly or exclusively because these studies are complementary.

a) Studies about Resistance to Temptation

These are mainly experimental assessments of temptation resistance, investigating primarily parental attitudes and rearing practices which are thought to affect the development of resistance to temptation. Attempts have been made also to assess the possible influence of age, sex-differences, etc., on temptation resistance, and also to investigate consistency of temptation-resistance behaviour.

(i) Factors Affecting Temptation Resistance in Four-Year-Old Children.

Employing a temptation situation, R. BURTON, E. MACCOBY and W. ALLINSMITH⁶⁸ (henceforth we shall refer only to BURTON) measured 77 (40 boys and 37 girls) four-year-old children's resistance to temptation, and related it to the rearing practices of their parents, which were obtained through parent-interviews. The children were in general "from well established middle class homes" in Boston (U.S.A.) and the religious preferences of the parents were mainly Jewish and Protestant.

The child was to play a 'bean-bag' game in order to win an attractive toy as a prize. A bean-bag game "consists of a 1 ft. by 4 ft. board on which there are five lights in a row"....It appears to the child that hitting a wire (with a bean-bag), which was stretched along behind the board, would turn on the light. The child should turn on a definite number (e.g. 3) of lights in order to win a prize. Being left alone to play, the child was given five bean-bags which he could throw over the board and hit the wire and thus turn on the lights. But each bag he may throw only once and one at a time. However, the 'turning on' of the lights was so controlled by a hidden experimenter that the child could not turn on the required number of lights to win the prize without violating some rules of the game. The child's behaviour in this situation (conformity to rules in spite of the attractive toys, or violation of the rules to win the toy) was taken as an index of his resistance to temptation.⁶⁹

68. R. Burton, E. Maccoby and W. AllinSmith, "Antecedents of Resistance to Temptation in Four-Year-Old Children", *Child Development*, 1961 (32), pp. 689 – 710.

69. *Ibidem*, pp. 692 – 693.

This study, in accordance with the identification theory, had the assumption that in general children who had severe training (that is, severity in weaning, toilet train-

BURTON found that the following antecedents were related to resistance to temptation in his subjects (see also table 33).

Severe weaning, that is, "abrupt weaning in which the mother refuses to comply with the child's demands for the bottle" was positively related to resistance to temptation. "The more severe the weaning, the more conformity to rules"⁷⁰ This relationship was, however, significant only for boys; for girls, positive, but non-significant. *Toilet-training*: Long continued bowel training that is, bowel training that lasted for a longer period (whether began early or late) was also positively related to resistance to temptation. This was also significant only for boys. It is argued that toilet-training that lasted for a long period implies "a greater total amount of pressure in this behavioural system" than does a brief training period. Hence greater amount of pressure or "heavy socialization pressure" seems to lead boys "to greater resistance to temptation at a later time".⁷¹

Sex-training: Regarding sex-training, boys who received from their mothers explanations about sex (i.e. about the origin of babies) were found to resist temptation better than others. This, however, had a negative (non-significant) relation to girls' resistance to temptation.⁷² It was further hypothesized that "severe non-permissive" sex training (conditions that will create in the child sex anxiety) will be negatively related to resistance to temptation, that is, it fosters cheating because subjects with high sex anxiety would not be able to delay gratification. However, BURTON reports that such severe sex training "did not prove to be associated with yielding to temptation",⁷³ though it was found that children who showed 'high reaction' (great amount of curiosity, feeling that something was wrong with themselves) when they first "found out about sex differences" tended to cheat, especially girls.⁷⁴

Activity level of the child was another factor that was related to resistance to temptation. The more active the child during infancy (during the first

ing, sex training, high standards of cleanliness, etc.) as well as psychological discipline and parental warmth will resist temptation better.

70. *Ibidem*, pp. 695, 702.

71. *Ibidem*, p. 703.

72. *Ibidem*, p. 697.

73. *Ibidem*, p. 698.

74. *Ibidem*.

year) and early childhood (between the first and second year), the more resistant to temptation he is. This finding also was significant only for boys. The parent of the active child, argues BURTON, feels that the child "exposes

Table 33

CHILDREARING AND CHILD BEHAVIOR RELATED TO RESISTANCE TO TEMPTATION

		RESISTANCE TO TEMPTATION					
		BOYS		GIRLS			
		High	Low	High	Low	Significance	
Activity level during first year	High	14	4	13	9	Boys* Girls Combined: $\chi^2 = 3.67$	
	Low	8	13	7	7		
Activity level between one and two years	High	14	4	11	5	Boys* Girls Combined: $\chi^2 = 7.53^{**}$	
	Low	8	14	9	12		
Severity of weaning (age of beginning not considered here)	High	14	5	11	9	Boys* Girls Combined: $\chi^2 = 2.55$	
	Low	7	12	6	8		
Time between initiation and completion of bowel training	"Short"	5	13	7	7	Boys** Girls Combined: $\chi^2 = 4.00^*$	
	"Long"	13	4	12	10		
Age when stayed dry during day	Early	8	15	7	10	Boys** Girls Combined: $\chi^2 = 7.85^{**}$	
	Late	13	3	13	7		
Explanations given about origin of babies							
	Rarely	10	15	13	8	Boys* Girls	
	Often (whenever S might ask)	11	3	7	9		
S's reaction when he learned about sex differences	High	6	9	3	9	Boys Girls* Combined: $\chi^2 = 6.46^*$	
	Low	16	9	16	7		
S's reaction to being sent to room	High	9	10	8	7		
	Low	13	7	12	9		
Timidity	High	7	5	9	7		
	Moderate	7	9	6	4		
	Low	8	4	5	6		
Techniques used for teaching S not to touch objects							
	Stops before touches	9	12	7	11	Boys Girls Combined: $\chi^2 = 4.37^*$	
	Waits to see if he really plays with it	12	6	13	6		

(table continued on next page)

CHILDREARING AND CHILD BEHAVIOR RELATED TO RESISTANCE TO TEMPTATION

		RESISTANCE TO TEMPTATION					
		BOYS		GIRLS			
		High	Low	High	Low	Significance	
Mother's attitude toward cleanliness	Relaxed	13	2	4	5	Boys** Girls	
	Concerned	9	16	16	12		
Does S understand what cheating means?	Yes	10	7	5	9		
	No	12	11	15	7		
Usual technique of discipline							
	Reasoning	0	0	1	1		
	Visible suffering	0	0	0	1		
	Withdrawal of love	0	0	1	0		
	Isolation	7	8	6	5		
	Deprivation of privilege or object	3	4	0	4		
	Scolding	2	2	7	3		
	Physical punishment	10	4	4	3		
Scolding and physical punishment vs. all others: Boys Girls Combined: $\chi^2 = 2.79$ ($p < .10$)							
Frequency of Mother's use of reasoning as teaching technique	High	8	12	5	9	Boys Girls Combined: $\chi^2 = 5.41^*$	
	Low	14	6	15	8		
Use of "I'm not going to talk to you until you behave better"	Yes	12	3	5	6	Boys* Girls	
	No	10	15	15	11		
Use of deprivation of privileges	High	10	8	8	13	Boys Girls*	
	Low	10	10	12	3		
Frequency of Mother's playing with S just for her own pleasure	High	14	8	10	15	Boys Girls*	
	Low	8	10	9	2		
S's initial anxiety in the experiment	High	5	9	8	1	Boys Girls*	
	Moderate	8	7	8	9		
	Low	8	3	4	7		

NOTE.—Throughout this table the variable being considered was divided at the median.

* $p \leq .05$. ** $p \leq .01$.

himself to dangerous and forbidden things" oftener. Consequently, the parent of the active child is urged to control the actions of the child in order to protect the child himself, the family property, etc. Especially during the "reaching and touching stage" these children "receive more training in not touching". This prepares him for better resistance to temptation later.⁷⁵

Another factor, *parental concern about the child's general cleanliness*, was found to be negatively related to resistance to temptation. This finding also was valid only for boys: "The greater the mother's concern about cleanliness,

75. Ibidem, p. 702.

the greater her son's tendency to cheat".⁷⁶

Techniques of Discipline: BURTON found that scolding and physical punishment (both materialistic methods) "were more effective in producing resistance to temptation in four years olds" than the psychological punishments.⁷⁷ It was also found that 'reasoning with the child' (psychological discipline) was negatively related to resistance to temptation, that is, high use of parental reasoning meant high tendency to cheat. Of the psychological methods only mother's 'refusing to speak with the child' when he misbehaved had some positive relation to temptation resistance, that too only for boys.⁷⁸

Parental warmth and affection was positively but not significantly related to temptation resistance for boys. Thus boys from 'warm homes' tended to resist temptation better than others. But girls who received more love and affection from their mothers tended more to cheat. Thus girls from "cold homes" seemed to resist temptation better.⁷⁹ This is so, it is argued, because "girls are more sensitive to punishment by the mother because mother is the girl's chief identificand". BURTON implies that such a fear of punishment will prompt the child to be on the look out for the cues of punishment (which shall be more apparent in the behaviour of 'cold mothers') and thus avoid the occasions of punishment, i.e. resist temptation.⁸⁰

Such an association of cold home with resistance to temptation in girls, adds BURTON, does not contradict the assumption of the identification theory that basic parental nurturance and affection is a precondition for identification and conscience development. The authors say that mothers take "reverse policies" in training girls in infancy and pre-school years. In infancy mothers are highly warm and nurturant to girls but in preschool years they make relatively severer demands on them (in training the boys mothers are believed to be more consistent in infancy and preschool period). Hence, it is argued, "currently cold mothers of girls may have been 'warmer' du-

ring the infancy years". So they are basically nurturant.⁸¹

Thus according to the findings of this study, certain parental practices which seem "to reflect heavy socialization demands" or severity foster resistance to temptation in children (significantly in boys). These are: frequent control of the (active) child in infancy and early childhood, severity of weaning, long toilet training, use of scolding and physical punishment, and less use of reasoning with the child. But certain other practices which may be considered 'lenient' or 'permissive' also seem to foster temptation resistance in boys, while they foster (non-significantly) cheating in girls. These are: 'warm home', explanation about sex, lenient attitude towards cleanliness, and the use of withdrawal of love (refusing to speak with the child when he misbehaves).⁸²

(ii) Parental Rearing Practices and Temptation Resistance in Preadolescents

The subjects of this study by R. GRINDER⁸³ were 140 children (70 boys and 70 girls) between the ages of 11 and 12. They represented different religious beliefs. The sample was from 26 sixth-grade classes in 8 schools near Boston (U.S.A.).

GRINDER relates the child's resistance to temptation to early parental rearing practices, which were obtained through mother interviews when the child was 5-6 years old. The parental practices are divided under three headings: (a) parental warmth and nurturance, (b) general socialization pressures (which include level of parental demands and restrictions, techniques of discipline, level of obedience enforced by parents) and (c) specific socialization pressures (which include weaning, toilet training and sex training).

The child's temptation resistance was measured in a way similar to that mentioned in the previous experiment. Here the child was to play "ray-gun shooting" game in order to win attractive badges as acknowledgment of his ability to shoot. The introduction by the experimenter runs in the follow-

81. Ibidem.

82. Ibidem, pp. 707, 708.

83. R. Grinder, "Parental Childrearing Practices, Conscience, and Resistance to Temptation of Sixth-Grade Children", *Child Development*, 1962 (33), pp. 803 - 820. It may be of interest to note that this is a follow up study of 140 of the original 379 five-year-olds, described in Sears et alii, *Patterns of Child Rearing* (see p. 157)

76. Ibidem, p. 699.

77. Ibidem, p. 705.

78. Ibidem, p. 700.

79. Ibidem, p. 706.

80. Ibidem.

ing manner. "... I am interested in finding out how well kids of your age can shoot a ray-gun like this at a high speed rocket (showing a model of the ray gun)...To those of you who are good shooters, I am going to give this marksman badge" ... those who are better will be given the "sharp-shooters badge"... and those who are still better will be given the "expert badge". Your teacher is going to name some of you to play the game..and they will come with me.. The child is left alone to play ... However, he cannot get the required scores to win a badge (35 scores with 20 shots in order to win the marksman badge, 40 scores for the sharpshooter, and 45 for the expert) without violating some regulations, because the scores are so prearranged that the honest shooter gets only 32 scores for 20 shots. The child's behaviour in this situation (conformity to rules or violation of rules) was the index of his resistance to temptation.⁸⁴

According to GRINDER'S findings, the measure of parental *warmth and nurturance* in early childhood is unrelated to resistance to temptation of 11-12-year-old boys and girls. Hence GRINDER observes: "Warmth as a background factor out of which dependency can develop has little significance upon resistance to temptation of pre-adolescents"(table 34).⁸⁵

General socialization pressures: It was found that *boys* whose parents set "high standards for neatness and orderliness" were more temptation resisting than those who had low standards. Similarly, boys upon whom high level of obedience was enforced also tended to resist temptation better. High use of praise (a psychological disciplinary method) was another factor which seemed to foster temptation resistance in boys. For *girls*, withdrawal of love and reasoning with the child (both psychological methods) seemed to foster the capacity for resisting temptation. According to GRINDER'S findings, physical punishments are negatively related to temptation resistance, that is, it fosters cheating in boys and girls (table 34).⁸⁶

Specific socialization pressures: For *boys*, short duration of bowel training and severe pressure against sex-play tended to foster resistance to temptation. For *girls*, however, early weaning, short or moderate duration of toilet training, and moderate severity of sex-training seemed to be posi-

84. Grinder, *ibidem*, pp. 804 — 809.

85. *Ibidem*, pp. 812, 817.

86. *Ibidem*, pp. 815, 816.

Table 34

COMPARISONS BY SEX BETWEEN INDICES OF EARLY CHILDREARING AND TEMPTATION BEHAVIOR AT AGE 11 OR 12

Hypothesis and Childrearing Antecedents	B O Y S			G I R L S		
	Resist	Yield	χ^2	Resist	Yield	χ^2
WARMTH						
1. Warmth and Nurturance						
Mother's warmth (III-15)			2.94			.37
High ..	6	17		10	17	
Moderate ..	9	19		10	21	
Low ..	2	17		5	7	
GENERAL SOCIALIZATION PRESSURES						
2. Demands and Restriction						
Standards for neatness and orderliness (II-61)			16.49*			1.56
High ..	11	9		6	15	
Moderate ..	6	24		15	20	
Low ..	0	19		4	10	
3. Techniques of Discipline						
Extent of use of praise (III-37) ..			3.19			1.33
High ..	6	13		14	19	
Moderate ..	8	18		4	11	
Low ..	3	22		7	15	
Extent of use of isolation (III-52)			1.89			1.05
High ..	3	18		10	16	
Moderate ..	5	14		4	12	
Low ..	1	11		8	12	
Extent of use of withdrawal of love (III-53)59			3.87
High ..	2	5		5	3	
Moderate ..	2	9		7	5	
Low ..	5	11		4	11	
Extent of use of reasoning (III-57)			.97			3.79
High ..	6	13		8	10	
Moderate ..	3	12		8	11	
Low ..	3	13		1	9	
Extent of use of tangible rewards (III-36)57			.00
High ..	7	23		9	17	
Moderate ..	4	16		8	15	
Low ..	6	14		7	13	

* Significant at or beyond .05 level, two-tail.

(table continued on next page)

COMPARISONS BY SEX BETWEEN INDICES OF EARLY CHILDREARING AND TEMPTATION BEHAVIOR AT AGE 11 OR 12

Hypothesis and Childrearing Antecedents	B O Y S			G I R L S		
	Resist	Yield	χ^2	Resist	Yield	χ^2
GENERAL SOCIALIZATION PRESSURES (continued)						
Extent of use of deprivation of privileges (III-47)			2.82			3.22
High ..	7	16		8	16	
Moderate ..	2	17		11	11	
Low ..	8	19		6	18	
Extent of use of physical punishment (III-46)			1.38			.38
High ..	3	16		6	13	
Moderate ..	4	13		6	12	
Low ..	10	23		13	20	
4. Level of Obedience						
Mother's realistic standards for child's obedience (II-73)			5.75			.45
High ..	5	7		8	13	
Moderate ..	3	26		8	18	
Low ..	9	20		9	14	
SPECIFIC SOCIALIZATION PRESSURES						
5. Weaning						
Age at beginning weaning (II-29)			1.15			5.17
Early ..	6	15		9	19	
Moderate ..	4	18		11	9	
Late ..	7	15		4	15	
Severity of weaning (II-35)			1.59			1.63
High ..	6	19		10	13	
Moderate ..	5	22		9	14	
Low ..	6	11		6	17	
6. Toilet Training						
Age at beginning bowel training (II-46)73			3.97
Early ..	6	25		15	26	
Moderate ..	7	17		4	14	
Late ..	3	10		6	4	
Age at completion of bowel training (II-48)			1.93			3.61
Early ..	4	14		12	13	
Moderate ..	2	13		7	12	
Late ..	11	24		5	18	

* Significant at or beyond .05 level, two-tail.

(table continued on next page)

COMPARISONS BY SEX BETWEEN INDICES OF EARLY CHILDREARING AND TEMPTATION BEHAVIOR AT AGE 11 OR 12

Hypothesis and Childrearing Antecedents	B O Y S			G I R L S		
	Resist	Yield	χ^2	Resist	Yield	χ^2
SPECIFIC SOCIALIZATION PRESSURES (continued)						
Duration of bowel training (II-49)			8.70*			12.59*
Short ..	6	10		7	10	
Moderate ..	0	19		17	16	
Long ..	10	21		0	16	
Severity of toilet training (II-51)			3.09			1.87
High ..	5	6		4	5	
Moderate ..	4	18		7	20	
Low ..	8	27		14	20	
7. Sex Training						
Severity of pressure against masturbation (II-57)			1.49			6.05*
High ..	2	16		4	11	
Moderate ..	1	5		5	1	
Low ..	6	17		4	8	
Severity of pressure against sex play (II-59)			4.35			.69
High ..	6	14		6	7	
Moderate ..	1	6		2	3	
Low ..	0	11		5	11	
8. Control of Aggression						
Permissiveness for aggression toward parents (III-30)			2.56			3.10
High ..	3	20		8	8	
Moderate ..	9	19		5	17	
Low ..	5	14		11	18	
Punishment for aggression toward parents (III-31)			2.15			.22
High ..	6	16		9	16	
Moderate ..	11	30		11	23	
Low ..	0	6		4	6	

* Significant at or beyond .05 level, two-tail.

vely related to resistance to temptation (table 34).⁸⁷

Thus, according to the findings of this study, high parental standards and restrictions, psychological discipline, short duration in toilet training and strict sex training fostered temptation resistance in boys; whereas psychological discipline, early weaning, short or moderate duration in toilet training and moderately strict sex training fostered temptation resistance in girls.

87. Ibidem.

(iii) Temptation Resistance: Its Correlates and Consistency

Using 40 kindergarten children as subjects (21 boys and 19 girls), R. SEARS, L. RAU and R. ALPERT⁸⁸ investigated the following aspects relating to temptation resistance: sex differences, age differences, consistency of temptation resistance, and parental antecedents of temptation resistance. While parental antecedents (disciplinary techniques, weaning, standards of achievement, etc.) were assessed through parent-interviews, the child's temptation resistance was assessed through the following temptation situations: candy temptation, ring-toss game, toy temptation, quoting rules situation, and the disappearing hamster which gave two measures (latency and seriousness of response). The temptation situations were made similar as far as possible in order to reduce 'situation specificity'. The following (candy temptation) is a sample situation: The child is taken by the E to a room....to play a very special game...When they enter the room, there is a large plate of candies on the table....the E makes it clear that the candies do not belong to 'us', and 'we' must not touch it... then the E takes the subject to a particular corner of the room, which is arranged for the game...on the pretext of having to make a phone call the E goes out, telling the child to wait and play with the (discarded) toys that lie near there until he returns...Child's temptation resistance is measured by the degree of transgression he displays during the eight-minute-absence of the experimenter.⁸⁹

Regarding the relationship between *sex and temptation resistance*, of the six temptation resistance measures, in one (quoting rules) girls showed significantly more resistance than boys. As for the other five measures, girls showed slightly more (non-significant) resistance than boys (table 35).⁹⁰ The findings therefore support that girls are more temptation resisting than boys.

As regards the relationship between *age and temptation resistance*, the correlations were, as table 35 shows, non-significant. However, the general tendency of the findings indicates a greater temptation resistance in older boys and in younger girls (It may be noted that the highest age variation in this group was only 18 months).⁹¹

88. Sears, Rau and Alpert, *Identification and Child Rearing*, pp. 199 – 240.

89. *Ibidem*, pp. 205 – 207.

90. *Ibidem*, p. 211.

91. *Ibidem*, p. 213.

Table 35
Conscience Measures: Means, Standard Deviations, Significance of Sex Differences, and Correlations with Age

(Values for deviation doll-play measures are actual per cents; others are ratings.
An asterisk on the p-value indicates girls greater than boys)

Conscience Measures	Var. No.	Boys		Girls		p (2-tail)	r with age	
		Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.		Boys	Girls
Parent Interviews								
Signs of conscience: pooled .	89	4.52	1.37	4.84	1.14	n.s.*	39	17
Assessment: RTT								
Candy temptation	205	2.52	1.34	2.86	1.10	n.s.*	22	-03
Ring-toss game	206	5.88	2.34	5.95	1.76	n.s.*	01	-59
Toy temptation	207	2.38	1.40	2.50	1.21	n.s.*	48	07
Quoting rules situation . .	208	2.57	1.22	3.42	1.35	.05*	37	-14
Hamster: response latency .	209	4.00	2.84	4.44	3.18	n.s.*	25	-07
Hamster: response								
seriousness	210	2.30	1.35	2.50	1.54	n.s.*	20	-23
Total standard score . . .	211	12.68	3.89	14.64	4.44	<.001*	39	-23
Assessment: Hamster								
Internal conflict	227	2.05	1.13	2.21	1.06	n.s.*	-23	09
Reaction to deviation . . .	228	3.52	1.43	3.21	1.64	n.s.	05	-13

Regarding the *relationships among various temptation situations*, the findings show a *moderately stable factor* of temptation resistance: the median of the girls' fifteen correlations was .28, and that of the boys' fifteen correlations was .24. And the authors add, "although only six of the 30 coefficients reach the .05 level of significance, the differences of the medians from zero are highly significant, and the consistency of the positive relationship suggests that we are justified in using the summary score as a measure of a moderately stable quality of resistance to temptation" (table 36).⁹²

As regards *parental antecedents*, it was found that the fathers of the *honest boys* were ambivalent to their sons: that is, they were affectionately demonstrative to the boys and also hostile towards them. Besides, the fathers were concerned about teaching their sons about what is 'right and wrong'. The findings also show that honest boys were more attached to their fathers and were rather distant from their mothers. Further, the severity of weaning was negatively related to temptation resistance, while maternal warmth showed no significant association with it (table 37).⁹³

For *honest girls*, it was found that their fathers kept a distance from them,

92. *Ibidem*, pp. 214 – 215.

93. *Ibidem*, pp. 228 – 230.

Table 36

Resistance to Temptation: Correlations among the Six Assessment Measures
(Girls above the diagonal, boys below)

RTT Measures	Var. No.	Variable Number					
		205	206	207	208	209	210 211
Candy temptation	205	•	03	13	26	04	-02 40
Ring-toss game	206	13	•	23	45	53	72 72
Toy temptation	207	44	08	•	03	28	29 45
Quoting rules	208	20	35	39	•	44	48 76
Hamster: latency of response	209	10	20	31	16	•	76 73
Hamster: seriousness of response	210	-09	35	24	40	55	• 78
Total standard score	211	50	61	66	65	61	63 •

Table 37

Resistance to Temptation (211):
Correlations with Parent Interview and Mother-Child
Interaction Measures at Level $p < .05$

GIRLS	
56. Father's demand for aggression toward peers	71
72. Father's use of ridicule	51
78. Extent of parents' disagreement about child rearing (pooled)	46
107. Father's satisfaction with child's socialization	-68
125. Father's permissiveness for dependency	-61
133. Mother's achievement standards for child	60
150. Mother's sociability	47
156. Strictness of father's parents	-56
157. Warmth of mother's parents	-46
322. Mother's pressure for child's independence (MCI)	50
331. Mother's responsiveness to child (MCI)	59
369. Mother's use of reasoning with child (MCI)	51
BOYS	
7. Severity of child's current separation from father	-46
13. Duration of breast feeding	-46
15. Severity of child's reaction to weaning	-47
17. Severity of child's feeding problems	-47
84. Father's stress on importance of teaching right and wrong	45
111. Extent child imitates parents (pooled)	-50
121. Father's affectional demonstrativeness toward child	52
141. Father's hostility to child	60
142. Severity of child's current separation from mother	68
147. Parental discrepancy score	-43

ridiculed them. However, these girls were encouraged by both parents to be independent, and aggressive to their peers. Other factors which fostered girls' temptation resistance were mothers' use of reasoning with their daughters (psy-

chological discipline), high standards set by both the parents, and mothers' responsiveness to them (table 37).⁹⁴

Thus, SEARS' findings show that fathers have a special role (showing affection, teaching about right and wrong, disciplining) in fostering boys' temptation resistance, while a similar role (setting high standards, psychological discipline, responding to their problems) seems to fall on mothers in the case of girls' temptation resistance. Besides, though not conclusive, some evidence was found for a greater temptation-resistance capacity in girls, while age-differences showed no significant influence on resistance to temptation. Finally, the findings lend some support for what may be called a 'moderately stable temptation-resistance quality'.⁹⁵

94. Ibidem, pp. 229 — 231.

95. Regarding the consistency of moral behaviour, here we may briefly note the findings of a rather early study (inspired, of course, not by identification theory, but by Thorndike's behaviourism) initiated at Columbia University by H. Hartshorne and his collaborators, and published in the now classical volumes: H. Hartshorne and M. A. May, *Studies in the Nature of Character: Vol. I, Studies in Deceit*, New York 1928; Vol. II, *Studies in Service and Self-Control*, New York 1929; H. Hartshorne and F. K. Shuttlesworth, Vol. III, *Studies in the Organization of Character*, New York 1930.

Through a variety of tests and 'real life situations' they investigated the moral knowledge and behaviour of about eleven thousand 11 — 16-year-old school children. Moral knowledge was assessed, for example, through paper and pencil tests, in which the subjects had to evaluate various statements. Moral conduct was studied in various class room tests, competitive games, etc., which provided opportunities for cheating, lying and stealing. Other kinds of behaviour like kindness, serviceability, etc. were also investigated.

The correlations they found among measures of honest behaviour in different situations were positive, but very low (average 0.20 — 0.25). The relationship between moral knowledge and moral knowledge was not high either ($r = .34$). Relatively more consistency was found in moral knowledge, i.e. moral knowledge scores of various tests correlated better ($r = .40$).

The challenging conclusion they drew from their findings was that moral behaviour is situation-specific, that is, the consistency with which one is "honest or dishonest is a function of the situations in which one is placed in so far as (i) these situations have common elements, (ii) he has learned to be honest or dishonest in them, and (iii) he has become aware of their honest or dishonest implications or consequences".

Accordingly, one cannot speak of generality of moral behaviour, or predict about moral behaviour, because "a person acts in each situation according to the way he has been taught to act under these particular situations"....and predictability between situat-

(iv) Sex, Age and Temptation

R. P. WALSH⁹⁶ studied the relationships between sex, age and temptation resistance. The subjects were 114 children (53 boys and 61 girls) between the ages of 6 and 8. They were divided by sex into four age-groups of six-months range.

The subject was taken to a school-room in order to play a game, where 12 highly attractive toys and a jar of candy were prominently displayed on a table. Then, on the pretext of having to call someone, the E goes out after telling the child: "I am going to leave you here for about 15 minutes., okay? When I get back, we 'll play the game, and you can show me how good you can do it. And, o yes, don't touch any of the things on the table. They are for

tions "depends on the number of identical elements which the two settings share". Hence, a person who cheats in one situation (e.g. a competitive examination) may not cheat in another (e.g. competitive games). Consequently, there are no consistent cheaters or non-cheaters. These conclusions of Hartshorne and May were considered to be a blow to what is called "traits of personality", like honesty, kindness, etc.

However, the situation-specificity of moral behaviour (and denial of personality traits) proposed by Hartshorne and May was questioned by subsequent researchers (e.g. G. Allport, *Personality*, London 1937; H.J. Eysenck, *The Structure of Human Personality*, London 1970). Eysenck, for example, argued that if moral behaviour were completely situation-specific, then the correlations should have been all around zero. But the fact that all correlations were positive (though low) argues for some generality of moral behaviour.

Besides, subjecting the very data of Hartshorne and May to a more sophisticated statistical analysis, R. Burton found more generality of behaviour than did the original researchers, and thus softened their conclusion a little. Burton says: "The conclusion to draw from these analyses is not greatly different from that made by Hartshorne and May, but the strong emphasis on lack of relation between tests is removed. Our analyses indicate that one may conclude there is an underlying trait of honesty which a person brings with him to a resistance to temptation situation" (cfr. Hartshorne and May, "Methods Used by the Inquiry for Measuring Deception", in R. C. Johnson et alii (Eds), *Conscience, Contract and Social Reality*, p. 64 ff; Hartshorne and May, "The Specific Nature of Conduct and Attitude", in Johnson et alii, *Ibidem*, p. 103; R. Burton, "Generality of Honesty Reconsidered", in Johnson et alii, *Ibidem*, pp. 106, 116; H.J. Eysenck, "Traits", in H. J. Eysenck et alii (Eds), *Encyclopedia of Psychology*, London 1972, Vol. 3, pp. 340-342.)

96. R. P. Walsh, "Sex, Age, and Temptation", *Psychological Reports*, 1967(21), pp. 625 - 629.

some party in another grade". Subjects' behaviour in this temptation situation was recorded in one of the following three categories: (a) rigid control, with minimal interest in the toys, etc., (group I), (b) natural curiosity, but didn't go against the instruction (group II), and (c) yielding to temptation by playing with the toys or eating some of the candy (group III). For the yielders (group III) two measures were taken: Latency Time score (LT), that is, the period (number of minutes) elapsed between first being left alone and the moment of yielding to temptation, and Play Time score (PT), that is, the period (number of minutes) yielders actually engaged in the forbidden behaviour.⁹⁷

Concerning the relationship between *sex and temptation resistance*, it was found that out of the total 44 (39%) yielders, 23 were boys and 21 girls. Of the total 70 (61%) non-yielders, 32 were boys and 38 girls. This difference between the sexes is not significant (table 38). However, it was found that female yielders resisted temptation for a longer time (LT) than male yielders ($t = 1.62$, $df = 42$, $p = .06$). Similarly, girls spent significantly less time engaged in the forbidden behaviour (PT) than boys did ($t = 3.24$, $df = 42$, $p = .005$) (table 39).⁹⁸

With regard to *age and temptation resistance*, the findings showed that subjects of all age-groups were more or less equally distributed over the different categories, and the differences among the age-groups were not significant (table 40). Commenting on this, the researcher says: "It appears there is no neat chronological time table between the ages of 6 and 8 by which a child can be expected to demonstrate self-control when faced with a tempta-

Table 38
REACTIONS TO TEMPTATION BY AGE AND SEX

Age	Male						Female					
	I		II		III		I		II		III	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
6-6.5	5	33	5	33	5	33	4	22	7	39	7	39
6.6-7	6	46	3	23	4	31	6	35	5	29	6	35
7-7.5	5	36	3	21	6	43	4	25	4	25	8	50
7.6-8	2	18	3	27	6	55	5	50	3	30	2	20
Totals	18	34	14	26	21	40	19	31	19	32	23	36

97. *Ibidem*, p. 626.

98. *Ibidem*, pp. 626 - 627.

Table 39

TIME REACTIONS (MIN.) OF SUCCUMBERS BY AGE AND SEX												
Age	Male						Female					
	N	Latency		Play		N	Latency		Play			
		M	SD	M	SD		M	SD	M	SD		
6-6.5	5	2.80	.73	5.00	1.30	7	5.28	1.98	4.57	1.21		
6.6-7	4	1.75	.48	10.50	2.73	6	5.33	2.11	4.50	1.94		
7-7.5	6	7.00	1.92	6.00	1.75	8	6.50	1.70	2.38	.56		
7.6-8	6	2.83	.60	7.66	1.52	2	7.50	n.c.	3.00	n.c.		
Totals	21	3.81	3.41	7.15	3.96	23	5.91	4.47	3.65	3.20		

Note.—Total Means: $t_{Lr} = 1.62, p = .06$; $t_{Pr} = 3.24, p = .005$; n.c. = not calculated.

Table 40

Temptation Behavior	AGE VS TEMPTATION BEHAVIOR							
	Age							
	6-6.5		6.6-7		7-7.5		7.6-8	
I	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
II	9	28	12	40	9	30	7	33
III	12	36	8	27	7	23	6	29
	12	36	10	33	14	47	8	38

tion situation".⁹⁹

In short, this study shows that temptation resistance, when measured by frequency, is not influenced by sex differences. But girls do show longer resistance as well as less engagement in the forbidden behaviour than boys. And age, by itself, did not appear to be a decisive factor in temptation-resistance behaviour.¹⁰⁰

99. Ibidem, p. 628.

100. With regard to the relationship between sex-differences and temptation resistance, the study of W.D.Ward and A.F.Furchak is also relevant. They measured childrens' temptation resistance, that is, length of time children refrained from touching certain forbidden toys. The subjects were 12 (6 boys and 6 girls) kindergarten children and 12 (6 boys and 6 girls) second graders from a New York school. The findings reveal that girls show significantly more ($p < .02$) self-control than boys do. And grade level (i.e. age growth) did not make any significant differences in temptation resistance (W.D. Ward and A.F.Furchak, "Resistance to Temptation among Boys and Girls", Psychological Reports, 1968 (23), pp. 511 — 514).

Another study relating to transgression (cheating behaviour) comes from E. Aronson and R.Mettee, and it indicates the complexity of responses in a temptation situation.

(b) Parental Antecedents, Correlates, and Generality of Temptation Resistance

Drawing upon the findings of the studies reviewed in this chapter (and also of relevant studies in the preceding chapter), we shall assess the parental antecedents, correlates, and generality of temptation resistance.

(i) Parental Antecedents

Empirical findings about parental attitudes and rearing practices relating to temptation resistance, reviewed above, have more discrepancies among them than agreements. In this context the comment of D. WRIGHT is pertinent: "The contradictory nature of these results together with the fact that in each study a great many aspects of childrearing bore no relation at all to moral behaviour, creates an impression of total inconclusiveness".¹⁰¹ We

They found that change in self-esteem affects one's behaviour in a temptation situation, that is, low self-esteem is likely to lead to cheating while high self-esteem fosters honest behaviour. The subjects were 45 females from introductory psychology classes at the University of Texas. They were randomly assigned to one of three self-esteem conditions: high (HSE), low (LSE), and neutral (NSE). After a personality test, the subjects were given false feed-back, which was supposed to induce either an increase (HSE) or a decrease (LSE) or no change (NSE) in their self-esteem. Then they participated in a competition of cards-game, which provided opportunities to cheat and win. Detection of cheating was 'apparently impossible'.

As for the findings, analyses of variance on continuous data were all non-significant, though mean differences of cheating among the three groups imply a trend showing that change in self-esteem affects behaviour in a temptation situation (mean cheats: LSE = 1.87, NSE = 1.54, HSE = 1.07). However, when subjects were divided into two categories (those who never cheated and those who cheated at least once in the game) it was found that 13 of the LSE group ($N = 15$) cheated at least once, whereas only 6 of the HSE group ($N = 15$) did so ($\chi^2 = 7.00, p < .005$).

These findings lend some support to the view that high self-esteem deters transgression because it is considered to be inconsistent with such a person's self-expectancy. Similarly, a reduction in self-esteem may foster dishonest behaviour, because it is consistent (or not very inconsistent) with low self-expectancy (E.Aronson and R. Mettee, "Dishonest Behaviour as a Function of Differential Levels of Induced Self-Esteem", Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1968 (vol.9/2), pp. 121 — 127).

101. D. Wright, The Psychology of Moral Behaviour, p. 65.

should, all the same, try to draw out what is relevant in these findings.

None of the studies found a positive, significant relationship between parental warmth and nurturance (which is basic for identification and conscience development) and resistance to temptation. This is a point of agreement among the studies reviewed.

This however does not seem to argue against the need of parental love and nurturance for the development of conscience and moral behaviour in the child. All that the findings seem to indicate is that while a *'basic amount' of love and nurturance* is essential for the development of moral behaviour, more of it may not cause a notable difference in this behaviour. Because the subjects in these studies were all from 'intact families' they may have all enjoyed that basic parental love and nurturance, and additional measures of it did not show any significant bearing on their temptation resistance.¹⁰²

We should also note SEARS' findings which ascribe a special role to a warm *father-son relationship* and to *father's disciplinary attitude* in fostering the boy's resistance to temptation. The role of father-son relationship was emphasized also by MACKINNON'S findings (see below, p.174). A similar role seems to be allotted to the *mother* with regard to girls by SEARS'S findings; that girls are more sensitive to punishment by mothers is suggested also by BURTON'S findings.

Now with regard to more discrepant findings. BURTON found that physical punishments were more conducive to temptation resistance, while GRINDER and SEARS found that psychological punishments were more conducive to temptation resistance.

BURTON indicates that in the case of young children (e.g. 4 – 5 years old) the 'aversive stimulus' of physical punishments may be more effective than that of psychological punishments. But as the child grows, "with greater cognitive development, and perhaps increasing identification"... he is able to "comprehend the more symbolic, psychological forms of punishment which may have acquired their aversive value."¹⁰³ Hence psychological discipline may be more effective with older children. This explanation throws light on BURTON'S own findings (where the subjects were 4 years old) and on

102. Cfr. Grinder, "Parental Childrearing Practices", p. 817.

103. Burton et alii, "Antecedents of Resistance to Temptation", p. 706.

GRINDER'S findings (where the subjects were 11 – 12 years old), but not on SEARS' findings whose subjects also were young (4 years old).

What clearly emerges from these findings, however, seems to be the *need of disciplining* the child. The parents should discipline the child if he is to learn self-control. To the question 'which disciplinary method – psychological or physical – is more effective for this learning', one cannot perhaps give an unqualified answer. Though love-withdrawal discipline, based on the child's need for parental love and nurturance, has great potential in motivating the child for self-control, the pain associated with physical punishment (which need not necessarily be harsh) may have more immediate and effective result upon the temptation resisting behaviour of young children. Besides, it should be noted that even the so-called physical punishments imply an element of 'love-withdrawal'. Psychological punishments may work more effectively with older children.

Again, a relaxed parental attitude towards cleanliness fosters temptation resistance (for boys) according to BURTON, whereas high standards of neatness and orderliness is conducive to temptation resistance (for boys) according to GRINDER. Further, while according to BURTON and GRINDER severe (or early) weaning was positively related to resistance to temptation, SEARS found the contrary. While BURTON reports that long duration of bowel training (heavy socialization pressure over a long period) fostered resistance to temptation (esp. for boys), GRINDER found that short duration (which however is considered as more frustrating than long duration) was conducive to temptation resistance (for boys); for girls GRINDER found short or moderate duration to be better. Regarding sex-training, BURTON reported that explanation about sex (which is considered as a 'lenient method' of training) fostered temptation resistance in boys, while the same fostered cheating in girls. But according to GRINDER, severe parental pressure against overt sexual behaviour (masturbation, sex-play) fostered temptation resistance in boys, while a moderate pressure was better for girl's temptation resistance.

From such inconsistent findings relating to severity of weaning, toilet-training and sex-training, classified as 'specific socialization areas' by GRINDER (only 'parental standards for neatness and orderliness' belongs to 'general socialization area'), it is difficult to arrive at any conclusion. (It appears

that the effect of severity in these areas is different for both the sexes, though we cannot indicate any such effect with certainty). One is however led to think that given a *general disciplinary attitude* on the part of the parents, the severity of training in these specific areas, taken as single variables, probably are not deciding factors in the child's temptation-resisting behaviour.

Thus, from our analysis of the empirical findings, the following factors seem to emerge as fostering the child's temptation resistance and conscience development: *Basic parental love and nurturance, disciplining the child*, employing psychological as well as physical (for young children) methods of discipline, *father-son relationship*, which implies a warm relationship between father and son as well as father's special role in disciplining the son, *mother's special role in disciplining the daughter*, and perhaps a *moderately strict attitude in overall discipline*.

(ii) Correlates of Temptation Resistance

The correlates mainly investigated are sex-differences and age. However, findings about the impact of these variables upon temptation resistance are not very consistent or conclusive either.

Sex-differences. BURTON and others, with their four-year-old subjects, found no sex-differences in temptation resistance (see above p.124). Similarly, in two of his studies (see above, p. 129) GRINDER found no reliable sex-differences in temptation-resistance behaviour among subjects ranging in age between 7 and 12.¹⁰⁴ There are also other related studies which do not report notable differences between sexes in resisting temptation.¹⁰⁵

But SEARS, ALPERT, and RAU found that four-year-old girls were more temptation resisting than boys of the same age (see above, p. 132). Again, WALSH, with his 6 – 8 years old subjects, found that girls resisted temptation for a longer time and engaged less time in the forbidden behaviour than boys did (see above, p. 173). WARD and FURCHAK also had similar findings (see above, p. 138).

104. Cfr. Grinder, "Parental Childrearing Practices" p. 819, and Grinder, "Relations between Behavioral and Cognitive Dimensions". p. 889.

105. Cfr. the studies by R. Medinnus (above, p. 94), and R. Grinder and R. McMichael (below, p. 173).

It may be noted that some of the above studies did not find significant differences between sexes, while some others had findings favouring girls: that is, when notable differences are found, they suggest that girls are more temptation resisting than boys.

Age. Longitudinal studies investigating age-growth and possible changes in temptation resistance have not been made. However, cross-sectional studies conducted in this area report no necessary correspondence between age-growth and temptation resistance capacity. For example, GRINDER (above see p. 94), SEARS, ALPERT and RAU (above p. 132), and WALSH (above p. 137) did not find support for a (positive) relationship between age and resistance to temptation.

However, several studies¹⁰⁶ have found that altruistic behaviour increases with age.

(iii) Generality of Temptation Resistance

Finally, question may be raised about the generality or consistency of an individual's behaviour in temptation situations.

From their findings HARTSHORNE and MAY argued against consistency of behaviour in situations of temptation; but their emphasis on situation-specificity was softened by others (see above, p. 136). Besides, subsequent findings also support a low consistency in individuals' temptation resistance (or yielding): SEARS, RAU, and ALPERT found evidence for a moderately stable factor of resistance to temptation (see above, p. 133); GRIM, KOHLBERG, and WHITE (see p. 59) also found low to moderate correlations (from .27 upto .66) among different measures of cheating;¹⁰⁷ again, NELSON, GRINDER, and BIAGGIO had findings supporting low correlations among various temptation resistance measures (see above, p. 95); NELSON, GRINDER and MUTTERER also found correlations (varying between .05 and .55) among different measures of temptation resistance.¹⁰⁸

106. (see p. 101).

107. Cfr. Grim, Kohlberg and White, "Some Relations between Conscience and Attentional Processes", *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 1968 (vol. 8/3), p. 248.

108. D. Wright, *The Psychology of Moral Behaviour*, p. 53.

The conclusion that emerges from these findings is that there is some (not high) consistency in an individual's behaviour when faced with temptations. We may say that an individual has a general disposition of moral restraint which is operative in situations of temptation.

But this behavioural consistency or general disposition does not seem to be a completely independent factor, but related to a general personality factor called 'ego strength' (see above, KOHLBERG, p. 58 ; GRIM, KOHLBERG, and WHITE, p. 59), which accounts for impulse control, accurate performance, etc., also in non-moral situations.

And there is some evidence that behavioural consistency is fostered by factors like I. Q., maturity of moral judgment (see NELSON, GRINDER, and BIAGGIO, p. 96) and age-growth (see PECK and HAVIGHURST, p. 190), all of which seem to contribute to ego strength.¹⁰⁹

However, the above said behavioural consistency or general disposition of self-control is only one of the many factors that affect behaviour in tempting situations. As the studies have shown, there are several other factors that influence an individual's actual behaviour in a temptation situation. Thus, change in self-expectancy (ARONSON and METTEE, see p. 139), need-frustration,¹¹⁰ nature of incentives,¹¹¹ risk of detection, group affiliation,¹¹² etc., also affect behaviour in a temptation situation. Therefore, though some generality of temptation-resistance behaviour may be found in individuals, it does not help successful prediction of behaviour because this is subject to the influence of several situational and motivational factors. And it seems reasonable to conclude that the low correlations among various temptation-resistance measures found by the studies mentioned above are due to the influence of motivational and situational factors.

109. Cfr. Peck and Havighurst, *The Psychology of Character Development*, New York 1960, p. 86.

110. Aronson and Mettee, "Dishonest Behaviour as a Function of Differential Level of Induced Self-Esteem", p. 127.

111. Nelson, Grinder and Biaggio, "Relationships among Behavioral, Cognitive-Developmental and Self-Report Measures...", p. 491.

112. Cfr. D. Wright, *The Psychology of Moral Behaviour*, pp. 60 – 63.

(c) Studies about Anti-Social Behaviour

These studies concentrate on aggressive and anti-social behaviour, investigating parental and familial antecedents which contribute to such behaviour.

(i) Parental Antecedents of Aggression

W. McCORD, J. McCORD and A. HOWARD¹¹³ investigated aspects of family environment that were related to aggression in non-delinquent boys. The subjects of the study were 174 boys of about 14 – 15 years of age. They came primarily from lower class districts of Massachusetts, U.S.A. It should be noted that these boys were not delinquents, but what may be called 'normally aggressive', that is, engaging in activities that 'hurt or injured someone'. Based on data obtained from a long period (5 3/4 years on average) of observation and tests, these boys were divided into three categories: 25 were consistently and overtly *aggressive*, that is, they often got involved in aggressive acts like bullying smaller children, attacking teachers, etc. "In response to almost any form of frustration, they reacted with verbal abuse, open rage, and attempts to destroy the frustrating object". 97 were *normally assertive*, that is, at times they participated in fights, bullying, etc. Their aggressive reactions were, however, more realistic and could be considered as "sporadic exceptions to the general pattern of their lives". 52 were consistently *non-aggressive*, that is, outbursts of rage and attacks were exceptionally rare in their case. They were placid and friendly, and could meet frustrations calmly and realistically.

Aspects of family environment included such variables as parents' attitude towards each other, their affectionate relationship to the son, method and consistency of discipline, etc. These aspects were assessed through long and careful observation by various investigators.¹¹⁴

It was found that mothers' use of *physical punishment*, called punitive discipline here – angry abuse, slaps or beatings, etc. – was significantly related to high aggression in boys. As the authors observe, "a significantly lower proportion of the non-aggressive boys than of the aggressive or assertive children

113. W. McCord, J. McCord and A. Howard, "Familial Correlates of Aggression in Non-Delinquent Male-Children", *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1961 (vol. 62/1), pp. 79 – 93.

114. Ibidem, pp. 80 – 81.

were raised by 'punitive' mothers'', the difference being significant at the .025 level. However, a comparison of the effects of the fathers' disciplinary techniques did not show any significant difference.(table 41)¹¹⁵ It was also found that children who were *often threatened* by their mothers with dire consequences if they disobeyed, were more likely to become aggressive than those rarely threatened, the difference being significant at the .05 level(table 42).¹¹⁶ Another factor that contributed to aggression in boys was *parental rejection*, which included such factors as parents' fundamental dislike for the boy and the expression of it, cruel treatment, neglect,etc. As table 43 shows, 95% of the aggressive boys had at least one parent who was rejecting, while the majority of the assertive boys (60%) and of the non-aggressive boys (68%) had both affectionate parents. The effects of rejection was significant at the .001 level.¹¹⁷

The above mentioned parental attitudes and modes of action — rejection, threats, punitiveness, etc. — in fact destroy the child's sense of security and undermine his self-concept as an individual of worth and significance.

Table 41

PARENTAL METHODS OF DISCIPLINE AND THE CHILD'S AGGRESSION (in percentages)			
	Aggressive Boys (N = 24)	Assertive Boys (N = 95)	Nonaggressive Boys (N = 49)
Mother's method of discipline:			
Punitive	54	48	31
Nonpunitive	46	52	69
	100	100	100
Father's method of discipline:			
Punitive	58	49	41
Nonpunitive	42	51	59
	100	100	100

115. Ibidem, p. 83.

116. Ibidem.

117. Ibidem, pp. 83 — 84.

Table 42

PARENTAL USE OF THREATS AND THE CHILD'S AGGRESSION
(in percentages)

	Aggressive Boys (N = 22)	Assertive Boys (N = 78)	Nonaggressive Boys (N = 41)
Frequent use of threats by the parents	64	44	32
Infrequent use of threats by the parents	36	56	68
	100	100	100

Table 43

PARENTAL RELATION WITH THE BOY AND THE CHILD'S AGGRESSION
(in percentages)

Parental Attitudes Toward the Child	Aggressive Boys (N = 19)	Assertive Boys (N = 78)	Nonaggressive Boys (N = 41)
Affectionate mother and:			
affectionate father	5	60	68
rejecting father	37	19	17
Rejecting mother and:			
affectionate father	47	5	10
rejecting father	11	16	5
	100	100	100

Consequently, they will serve only to "arouse pervasive aggressive tendencies in the child; he is not only extremely frustrated by these attacks but he is implicitly taught that aggression is the 'way of the world' ".¹¹⁸

Another general set of factors was also found to be related to aggression. Parents who placed *high demands* (e.g. with regard to school performance, cleanliness, politeness, etc.) on their children had non-aggressive children, while the parents of the aggressive and the assertive children made low demands. This difference was significant at the .005 level (table 44). Similarly, boys who were *directly supervised* (watched and advised as needed) were less

118. Ibidem, p. 84.

aggressive than those left unsupervised, the difference being significant at the .05 level (table 45). *Maternal control*¹¹⁹ of the child was another factor related to aggressive behaviour. The findings show that aggressive children were either overcontrolled or subnormally controlled by their mothers; assertive children belonged to all three categories in more or less equal proportion; non-aggressive children were very often overcontrolled or also subnormally controlled ($p < .005$) (table 46).¹²⁰

Another factor which appears to have special significance was *consistency* of parental discipline. It was found that the parents (especially mothers) of non-aggressive boys were consistent in their discipline, while those of the

Table 44

PARENTAL DEMANDS ON THE CHILD AND THE
BOY'S AGGRESSION
(in percentages)

Parental Demands	Aggressive Boys (N = 26)	Assertive Boys (N = 96)	Nonaggressive Boys (N = 51)
High	16	24	45
Low	84	76	55
	100	100	100

Table 45

SUPERVISION OF THE CHILD AND THE
BOY'S AGGRESSION
(in percentages)

Supervision	Aggressive Boys (N = 25)	Assertive Boys (N = 97)	Nonaggressive Boys (N = 52)
Present	52	61	75
Absent	48	39	25
	100	100	100

119. Maternal control was divided into three categories: overcontrol (refers to mothers who demand complete submission from their sons), normal control (refers to mothers who are concerned about their sons' activities, but allow certain freedoms), and subnormal control (refers to mothers who were negligent and unconcerned about their sons' activities) (cfr. Ibidem, p. 85).

120. Ibidem.

Table 46

MOTHER'S CONTROL OF THE BOY AND
BOY'S AGGRESSION
(in percentages)

Mother's Control	Aggressive Boys (N = 25)	Assertive Boys (N = 97)	Nonaggressive Boys (N = 51)
Overcontrolled	40	27	53
Normal control	16	40	31
Subnormal control	44	33	16
	100	100	100

aggressive and of the assertive children were inconsistent, the difference being significant at the .01 level (table 47).¹²¹

Another set of factors that fostered aggressive behaviour of boys was *parental discord and dissatisfaction*, i.e. intense conflict between parents, their low esteem for each other, lack of affective demonstration between them, dis-

Table 47

CONSISTENCY OF PARENTAL DISCIPLINE AND
BOY'S AGGRESSION
(in percentages)

	Aggressive Boys (N = 25)	Assertive Boys (N = 97)	Nonaggressive Boys (N = 52)
Consistency of mother's discipline:			
Consistent	28	42	52
Erratic	72	58	48
	100	100	100
Consistency of father's discipline:			
Consistent	28	30	40
Erratic	72	70	60
	100	100	100

121. Inconsistency means that for the same action the child is sometimes severely punished, sometimes not punished or even encouraged to behave so. Thus often discipline was very much dependent on parents' mood, immediate situation, etc. (Ibidem, pp. 85 – 86).

satisfaction and disgust with their role as father (or mother), and disagreement about the methods of child rearing. All these factors (except the last one which was significant at the .10 level) contributed significantly ($p < .05$ or better) to the development of aggressive behaviour (table 48). This finding shows that aggressive boys (and to a lesser extent also assertive boys) were brought up in families disordered by a high degree of parental conflict and antagonism, while, on the other hand, non-aggressive boys came more often from families where parents respected each other, agreed on basic va-

Table 48

	Aggressive Boys (N = 21)	Assertive Boys (N = 83)	Nonaggressive Boys (N = 43)
Parental conflict:			
Intense	38	36	12
Some	38	27	47
None	24	37	31
	100	100	100
Parental esteem:			
High mutual esteem	50	52	79
One parent disrespected the other parent	25	20	13
Mutually low esteem	25	28	8
	100	100	100
Parental role satisfaction:			
Both parents dissatisfied	45	26	12
One parent dissatisfied	5	25	19
Neither parent dissatisfied	50	49	69
	100	100	100
Parental conflict about the child:			
Intense conflict	24	10	10
Some conflict	38	30	24
No conflict	38	60	66
	100	100	100
Parental affection for each other:			
Affectionate	15	38	44
Sporadically affectionate	40	27	36
Indifferent	10	8	10
Antagonistic	35	27	10
	100	100	100

lues and issues, and were relatively satisfied with their role in life.¹²²

Summarizing the findings of this study, we can say, in the words of the researchers themselves, that "the *aggressive boys* were most likely to have been raised by parents who (a) treated the boy in a rejecting, punitive fashion; (b) failed to impose direct controls on his behaviour; (c) offered him an example of deviance and (d) were often involved in intense conflict. The *non-aggressive boys* came from a strikingly contrasting environment — a home in which they were (a) treated in an affectionate, non-punitive manner; (b) guided by a consistent set of controls; (c) exposed to examples of social conformity; and (d) reared by affectionate, satisfied parents. The *assertive boys* generally resembled the non-aggressive children in that they were reared by relatively affectionate, nonthreatening parents; thus they were not victimized by the rejection characteristic of the families of aggressive boys.... They resembled the aggressive boys, however, in that their parents (a) often failed to impose consistent controls; (b) were deviant models; and (c) often were in open conflict" (table 49).¹²³

Table 49

Environmental Conditions	Aggressive Boys	Assertive Boys	Nonaggressive Boys
Parents' emotional relationship with the boy	Rejecting Punitive Frequent use of threats	Affectionate Relatively punitive ^a Infrequent use of threats	Affectionate Nonpunitive Little use of threats
Instillation of direct controls	Overcontrolled or subnormally controlled by mothers Low demands on the child Lack of supervision Inconsistency in discipline	Normally or subnormally controlled by mothers Low demands Relatively little supervision of the child ^a Relatively inconsistent in discipline ^a	Normally or overcontrolled by mothers High demands Firm supervision of the child Consistent in discipline
Parental model	Socially deviant	Relatively deviant ^a	Socially conformist
Parental relationship to each other	A high degree of general conflict Lack of mutual esteem Dissatisfaction with role in life Unaffectionate	High degree of general conflict Relatively low mutual esteem ^a Relatively dissatisfied with role ^a Affectionate	Low degree of general conflict High mutual esteem Satisfied with role Affectionate

^a In comparison to the background of nonaggressive boys.

¹²² Ibidem, pp. 88 — 89.

¹²³ Ibidem, pp. 91 — 92.

Here we may note that the well-known study of S. Glueck and E. Glueck (Unra-

(ii) Family Structure in Relation to Anti-Social Behaviour

M.K.BACON, I.L.CHILD and H.BARRY (henceforth reference only to BACON) made a cross cultural study of crime and theft¹²⁴ and related the ratings of crime and theft to the subjects' sex-role identification in childhood and to parental training practices. It is reasonable to think, says BACON, that "if certain cultural features foster the development of criminal behaviour, they should be found preponderantly in societies with a high frequency of crime". Hence these researchers chose "48 societies, mostly

velling Juvenile Delinquency, New York 1950) had similar findings with regard to delinquency. The Gluecks studied two groups — an experimental group of 500 delinquents and a control group of 500 non-delinquents — of boys from the "underprivileged areas of Greater Boston" (U.S.A.). Both the groups were matched in ethnic origin, I.Q., age etc. The age range of the subjects were between 9 and 17; the average age of the delinquents being 14.8, and that of the non-delinquents 14.6.

It was found that a "substantially lower percentage of the mothers of the delinquents (72.1% compared with 95.5% of the non-delinquents) held their sons in affectional warmth".

Another notable factor of delinquency was the permissiveness of the mothers: 56.8% of the mothers of the delinquents in contrast to 11.7% of the mothers of the non-delinquents "paid little attention to the boy's behaviour"; "and only 4.2% of the delinquents' mothers, in sharp contrast to 65.6% of the non-delinquents', met the happy and wholesome standard of both firmness and kindness in their disciplinary practices".

The fathers, in comparison with the mothers, were overstrict with the boys, this being true of 25% of the delinquents' fathers and less than 10% of the non-delinquents' fathers. Inconsistency in disciplinary practices were "more than twice as prevalent among delinquents' fathers as among the non-delinquents' fathers (46.1% vs. 17.9%)".

Another outstanding feature with regard to disciplinary practices was that the delinquents' parents resorted considerably more to physical punishment and much less to 'reasoning' with the "boy about his misconduct". (Cfr. S. Glueck and E. Glueck, *Delinquents and Non-delinquents in Perspective*, Cambridge (Massach.) 1968, pp. 3,4,13,16.)

However, the Gluecks do not reduce the cause of delinquency to parental practices and home-background alone, though they are very important. Other factors like poverty-stricken and degrading sub-cultural milieu, physical make-up, etc., also contribute to delinquency. (Cfr. S. Glueck and E. Glueck, *ibidem*, pp. 170, 171 etc.)-

124. M.K.Bacon, I.L.Child and H.Barry, "A Cross-cultural Study of the Correlates of Crime", in R.C.Johnson et alii (Eds), *Conscience, Contract and Social Reality*, pp. 246-258. — In studying criminal behaviour Bacon distinguishes two kinds of criminal behaviour: personal crime: that is, crime intended to injure or kill a person; and theft: that is, stealing of personal property, and property meant "anything upon which society placed value" (*ibidem*, p. 247)-

preliterate, scattered over the world" for the study. Adequate information about the aboriginal child-rearing practices and about the frequency of adult crime in these societies "was obtained from ethnographic studies available in the literature or in the Human Relations Area Files".

The family structure of the above mentioned societies were grouped into four types according to the degree in which father-child relationship is fostered within these structures. These four family structures are: *Monogamous nuclear*: where "father, mother and children eat, sleep and entertain under one roof". *Monogamous extended*: where "two or more nuclear families live together under one roof". *Polygynous polygynous*: where the man lives together with his several wives and their children. *Polygynous mother-child*: where each wife lives together with her children in a separate house, while the man lives alone...divides his time among his several wives..."and usually does not sleep in the house of any wife during the 2 or 3 years when she is nursing each infant".¹²⁵

As regards *personal crime*, it was found that personal crime has a high positive association with "prolonged, exclusive mother-child" relationship. Societies in which prolonged (e.g. one year or more) mother-child sleeping arrangements, to the exclusion of the father (e.g. polygynous mother-child), exist, have high frequency of crime (table 50). Another factor which was significantly and positively related to crime was the 'anxiety producing independence-training of the child' (table 51).¹²⁶

It is argued that through prolonged and exclusive relationship with the

125. *Ibidem*, pp. 246 — 250.

The child's chance for identification with the father, observe the authors, is the highest in the first type (monogamous nuclear) of families, and the least in the last type (polygynous mother-child) of families where early father-child contact is reduced to a minimum.

It was hypothesized that crime "is in part a defence against initial feminine identification". Therefore, whatever fostered strong mother-son identification and decreased father-son identification in the first few years of the child should foster criminal behaviour (only male criminality is meant here). According to the hypothesis therefore, criminal behaviour should be high in societies where polygynous mother-child family system exists, and low in societies where monogamous nuclear family system exists. And the second rank for high frequency of crime should be for societies with polygynous polygynous family system, and second rank for low frequency of crime should be for monogamous extended family system.

126. *Ibidem*, p. 256.

Table 50

Frequency of Theft or Personal Crime in Relation to Family Structure and Household

Family Structure and Household*	Frequency of Theft		Frequency of Personal Crime	
	Low	High	Low	High
Monogamous Nuclear	7	2	5	1
Monogamous Extended	7	3	6	3
Polygynous Polygynous	7	6	3	7
Polygynous Mother-Child	1	11	3	6

Note: Each entry in the table gives the number of societies in our sample which have the particular combination of characteristics indicated for that row and column.

The total number of cases in the left-hand and right-hand parts of this table and in the various divisions of succeeding tables varies because lack of information prevented rating some societies on some variables. In testing each relationship we have of course been able to use only those societies for which the relevant ratings are available. The division into "low" and "high" was made as near the median as possible.

* See Murdock (1957).

Table 51

Child Training Factors Associated with Theft or Personal Crime

Factor	Theft		Personal Crime	
	N	r	N	r
1. Childhood Indulgence*	45	-.41**	42	-.10
2. Responsibility Socialization Anxiety*	43	+.48**	41	+.20
3. Self-Reliance Socialization Anxiety*	43	+.35*	41	+.24
4. Achievement Socialization Anxiety*	36	+.41*	35	+.20
5. Obedience Socialization Anxiety*	40	+.32*	39	+.06
6. Dependence Socialization Anxiety ^b	31	+.14	28	+.56**
7. Mother-Child Sleeping ^c	20	+.40	19	+.46*
8. Infant Indulgence*				
9. Age of Weaning*				
10. Oral Socialization Anxiety ^b				
11. Anal Socialization Anxiety ^b				
12. Sex Socialization Anxiety ^b				
13. Aggression Socialization Anxiety ^b				
14. Nurturance Socialization Anxiety*				
15. Total Pressures toward Responsibility, Nurturance, Self-Reliance, Achievement, and Obedience*				

Note: In this table the correlations are Pearsonian coefficients, thus reflecting all available degrees of gradation in score rather than simply classifying societies as high and low. Factors 8-15 showed no significant relationship with either Theft or Personal Crime.

* See Barry, Bacon, and Child (1957).

^b See Whiting and Child (1953).

^c See Whiting, Kluckhohn, and Anthony (1958).

* $p \leq .05$.

** $p \leq .01$.

mother and with little contact with the father in early life, the boy identifies with the mother and develops a great dependency on her. Consequently, the subsequent socialization process, that is, the boy's training to be independent and masculine, for which he has found no model, produces emotional dis-

turbances in him. If the training is abrupt and punitive, it adds to the anxiety of the child. These factors, add the authors, "would tend to produce in the child persistent attitudes of rivalry, distrust and hostility, which would probably continue into adult life".¹²⁷ Thus the findings seem to indicate that crime in adult life is in part due to the lack of the individual's (the boy's) early identification with the father, and hence also "a defence against initial female identification".¹²⁸

With regard to *theft*, it was found that societies where children enjoy a high gratification of needs in childhood (between the ages of 5 and 12) have low ratings on theft; and societies with low gratification are high in theft. Another factor found to be related to theft is the method employed by parents in training the child in responsibility, obedience, self-reliance, and achievement. The findings show that parental training, which was punitive, and aroused high anxiety (called socialization anxiety) in the child about failing to be responsible, obedient, etc., fostered theft in later life (table 51).¹²⁹ According to the authors, the underlying factor which motivates theft is the "feelings of deprivation of love" and "one source of such feelings is punitive and anxiety-provoking treatment during childhood".¹³⁰

The findings of the above studies about 'anti-social' behaviour corroborate several findings already discussed with regard to temptation resistance.

All the three studies (including that of the GLUECKS) confirm the need for parental love and nurturance for the development of the child's moral behaviour. While the studies about resistance to temptation did not find a positive, significant relationship between parental love and the child's temptation resistance, studies in anti-social behaviour amply support that substantial lack in love and nurturance is detrimental to the child's moral development. Hence, again the need for *basic parental love and nurturance*. Further, the findings reveal the need of giving the child *high standards* of perfor-

127. Ibidem.

128. Ibidem, pp. 248 - 249.

129. Ibidem, p. 253.

130. Ibidem.

mance, and the importance of *controlling and guiding* him; but they equally stress that *disciplinary methods* should *not be harsh, threatening or high anxiety-provoking*. Similarly, parental *concord* and *self-acceptance* are also important. And BACON'S findings call attention to the importance of father-son relationship for the development of prosocial behaviour in the boy.

2. Studies about the Emotional Aspect

Since the child who has developed a conscience should behave in accordance with the internalized standards and values, the transgression of these standards and values will be followed by feelings of remorse and self-blame in the child, because he applies to himself the disapproving judgment passed on him by his parents when he misbehaved earlier. As SEARS observes, "The parents almost invariably point to the child himself as the blame-worthy agent in a deviation, and hence the child comes to do the same. He attributes the blame to himself when he deviates. This is the origin of guilt".¹³¹ The feelings of remorse and self-blame after transgression, called guilt-feeling, is, as we have already indicated, an important index of conscience. High guilt feelings is supposed to indicate a well developed conscience, and low guilt feelings and fear-based reactions, a poorly developed conscience.¹³² It is even assumed, more in tune with the psychoanalytical theory, that individuals who experience high guilt after transgression will show high resistance to temptation because one resists temptation in order to avoid the painful guilt feelings.¹³³

(a) Studies about Guilt Feelings

Since the identification theory considers different post-transgressional reactions like confession, reparation, remorse, etc., as expressions of guilt,

131. R. Sears, "Identification as a Form of Behavioral Development" in D.B. Harris (Ed.), *The Concept of Development*, Minneapolis 1957, p. 159.

132. Whiting, "Fourth Presentation", p. 185.

133. Burton et alii, "Antecedents of Resistance to Temptation", p. 690; also, Whiting and Child, *Child Training and Personality*, p. 226

studies about guilt feelings investigate these various forms of guilt, and relate them to parental attitudes and rearing practices, and to other variables like sex, age, etc.

(i) Parental Love and Discipline in relation to Guilt

R. SEARS, E. MACCOBY and H. LEVIN¹³⁴ (henceforth reference only to SEARS) measured 379 (202 boys and 177 girls) five-year-old public school kindergarten children's reactions after doing something forbidden by their mothers, and related these measures to parental attitudes and rearing practices. The children were all from the Greater Boston area (U.S.A.), and included middle and working classes.

The children's reactions¹³⁵ as well as parental practices were obtained through mother interviews. Here we quote from the interviews with three mothers who report on their children's post-transgressional reactions. The first two reports indicate good development of conscience, and the third one, poor development of conscience:

Interviewer (I): "We'd like to get some idea of how Sid reacts when he is naughty? When he deliberately does something he knows you don't want him to do, when your back is turned, how does he act?"

The first mother (M) says: "Very seldom does that. But a few times that he has done something he shouldn't do, that I don't know anything about, if I am in the other room, he just can't hold it in very long. And finally he comes to me and says, "Mother" — and I'll say "What" — "I did something I shouldn't have done". Instead of leaving it and getting away with it, he usually comes over and tells me what he's done. He usually comes, I mean, and it is not very long after he's done it. He can hardly hold it in to himself, you see".

I: "Are there any situations in which he doesn't do this? In other words..."

M: "Never comes across one that he didn't. Even when he does something outside that he shouldn't do, and I don't even know about it, he could

134. Sears et alii, *Patterns of Child Rearing*, Evanston 1957.

135. Sears divides the post-transgressional reactions of five-year-old children into two kinds: those that indicate a good development of conscience, like confession, acknowledgement of misdeed, apology, seeking of punishment, etc., all of which are subsumed under the title 'guilt feelings' (though Sears indicates that some of these reactions, for example, confession, can be mere fear-responses) and those that indicate a poor development of conscience, like denial of misdeed, avoiding parents' presence, hiding the misdeed, etc., which are usually called fear-reactions.

very easily not say a word to me. Instead he comes and says "You know what I did?". And if something goes wrong in school he'll say, "Something happened today. My teacher had to speak to me". And he does n't have to tell me, but he does; he comes right over and tells me. I don't know why. I should think if I were a child I'd keep it to myself but he doesn't; he comes and tells me and I would never know about it. I mean it — you know the old saying — "What you don't know, won't hurt you". He evidently doesn't know it yet".

The second mother says to the same question about her child: "He knows he has incurred our displeasure, and he says that he is sorry, he apologizes. Right away when he incurs this displeasure he gets discouraged, because right away he puts his arms around you and says "I love you so much, I love you so much, I won't do it again". And I say, "You have said that now, and if you do it again, that time you're going to have to be punished". And that's what happened. I've forgotten what it was, but it was something that I figured was not safe, so he did do it again, and he came and told me, and I said "Now what is going to happen?" and he said, "I guess I have to be spanked". I said "That is right. Because it is too much to expect you to remember; and it would be dangerous for me to go along on that assumption, because I would be the one that would be sorry if you were hurt. I would never forgive myself because I slipped up in not teaching you the danger. It is a sorrowful thing to me to have to teach you through pain".¹³⁶

While the above given mother-reports indicate good development of conscience (the second one shows 'highly developed conscience' according to SEARS), the following is the third mother's report which indicates a poorly developed conscience.

I: "We would like to get some idea how Billy acts when he's naughty...?"

M: "Well, right now he is lying. If he is caught, he will lie his way out, which is very disturbing to me. If there is anything I can't stand it's lying. I just want him to face the fact that he's been naughty, and I will be much kinder with him; but sometimes if he's very bad, I just put him up in his room, which has a terrible effect on him. Sometimes I just give him a good scolding, and sometimes I fall back on the old dodge of telling him when his father gets home he will deal with him, which I know is wrong, but I just don't know how to handle him. I'll admit he is a problem."

I: "What about if he does something when your back is turned, how does he act then?"

M: "And if I find out afterwards?. Well, that is usually the story, and it

136. Sears et alii, "Signs and Sources of Conscience", pp. 209 — 210.

will come to my attention that he has broken something, and I will call him and try to get him to tell me why he did it; and I will admit I don't get very far. I don't know how to handle Billy".

I: "Does he ever come and tell you about it without your having to ask him?"

M: "No, he would never admit that he has done something. It is only when Dick tells me or I just discover it".

I: "When you ask him about something he has done that he knows he's not supposed to do, does he usually admit or deny it?"

M: "He denies it. He will do anything to get out of admitting it".¹³⁷

SEARS found that *maternal warmth* and *acceptance* was positively, though not significantly, related to guilt feelings in 5 — 6-year old children, especially boys. Another factor positively related to the development of guilt was parents' use of *love-oriented disciplinary methods*. It was also found that materialistic discipline was negatively related to the development of guilt feelings (tables 52 — 54).¹³⁸

Table 52

High Conscience: Relationship to Child Dependency and Maternal Acceptance-Rejection

Acceptance-Rejection of Child	Percentage of Children Rated as Having High Conscience	
	Less Dependent	More Dependent
Boys:		
Rejected	10% (30) *	15% (.26)
Accepted	21% (.58)	33% (.55)
Girls:		
Rejected	18% (.17)	31% (.27)
Accepted	36% (.60)	37% (.46)

* Figures in parentheses are number of cases.

Another factor found to be positively related to the boy's guilt development was the *relationship with the father*. Boys accepted by the father showed high guilt feelings, while those rejected by the father tended to have low guilt feelings. It is interpreted, in accordance with the identification theory, that father is the chief identificand of the boy and hence acceptance by the father is necessary for conscience development and guilt feelings, while reje-

137. Sears et alii, *ibidem*, p. 210.

138. Sears et alii, *ibidem*, pp. 213, 216.

Table 53

High Conscience: Relationship to Techniques of Discipline Employed by the Parents

Parents	Percentage of Children Rated High on Conscience	Number of Cases
High in their use of praise		181
Low in their use of praise	$r = .18$	192
High in their use of isolation		152
Low in their use of isolation	$r = .00$	167
High in use of withdrawal of love		81
Low in use of withdrawal of love	$r = .09$	107
High in their use of reasoning		192
Low in their use of reasoning	$r = .18$	91
High in use of tangible rewards		188
Low in use of tangible rewards	$r = -.04$	181
High in use of deprivation of privileges		213
Low in use of deprivation of privileges	$r = -.07$	156
High in use of physical punishment		175
Low in use of physical punishment	$r = -.20$	197

Table 54

High Conscience: Relationship to the Mother's Warmth and Her Use of Withdrawal of Love

	Percentage of Children Rated High on Conscience
Mother relatively cold, and:	
Uses withdrawal of love fairly often	18%
Uses little or no withdrawal of love	25%
Mother relatively warm, and:	
Uses withdrawal of love fairly often	42%
Uses little or no withdrawal of love	24%

ction by the father will adversely affect the development of the boy's conscience.¹³⁹

139. Sears et alii, *Ibidem*, p. 215.

With regard to the importance of 'acceptance by the father' for the boy's conscience development Sears reports that "only 11 percent of the father-rejected boys had a 'high conscience', while 22 percent of the non rejected ones were so rated. The comparable figures for the girls are 26 and 29 percent — a purely chance variation. The boys' difference is reliable at about the .05 level" (Sears et alii, *ibidem*).

Similar findings about parental antecedents of guilt feelings are reported by S.M.

Thus, SEARS' findings indicate that parental love and acceptance, together with love-oriented discipline, fosters the development of guilt feelings; and acceptance by the father is a positive contributing factor to the development of guilt in the boy.

(ii) Status Envy and Guilt Feelings

In a cross-cultural study¹⁴⁰ J. M. WHITING measured adult subjects' guilt feelings, and related it to status envy as measured through family structure.

He studied 28 primitive societies from different parts of the world. The family structures in these societies were divided into four types (as we saw in BACON'S study): monogamous nuclear, monogamous extended, polygynous polygynous and polygynous mother-child. WHITING observes that the possibility for father-child rivalry (status envy) will be highest in 'monogamous nuclear' family structure, where the mother (wife) has to care for all the members. Second highest will be in 'monogamous extended' structure, where the mother's nurturant role is diffused because of grand-parents, etc. The third place will be for 'polygynous polygynous' structure, where each mother can devote herself more to her own children because the man has

Unger. According to Unger, guilt implies a two stage process: a verbal evaluative process (e.g. I did wrong) and an autonomic-visceral reaction of fear and anxiety which is triggered by the verbal evaluation. Besides Unger distinguishes two types of guilt-reactions: (i) dependable guilt potential, that is, guilt reaction contingent upon clear transgressions, and (ii) generalized guilt apprehensiveness, that is, frequent and pervasive worry about wrong-doing.

The subjects were 328 sixth grade public school children from Auburn, New York. Four parental antecedents were assessed: degree of nurturance (care-affection-companionship), frequency of psychological discipline, frequency of physical discipline and frequency of unclear and negative responses (e.g. not forgiving the child for a long time, threats like 'God will punish you', etc.).

It was found that high parental nurturance and predominant use of psychological discipline were significantly ($p < .001$) related to dependable guilt potential. But, as negative and unpredictable punitive practices increased, the dependable guilt potential was increasingly accompanied by a generalized guilt apprehensiveness. Besides, a generalized guilt apprehensiveness was found to be fostered also by a highly frequent use of psychological discipline (S.M. Unger, "Antecedents of Personality Differences in Guilt Responsivity", *Psychological Reports*, 1962 (10), pp. 357 — 358).

140. J.M. Whiting, "The Superego: A Mechanism of Social Control", in R.C. Johnson et alii (Eds), *Conscience, Contract and Social Reality*, pp. 241 — 245.

several wives. The rivalry will be the least in the 'polygynous mother-child' structure where the father's presence is reduced to the minimum.

The intensity of guilt feelings was measured according to how the sick people in these societies explained the cause of their illness. If they blamed themselves for being ill, it was a index of guilt. As the author says, "self-recrimination as a response to illness seemed to us a probably useful index of the degree to which guilt feelings are strong and widely generalized". And this index of guilt was thought to give an estimate of the readiness of a member of any society to "accept personal responsibility for wrong doing".¹⁴¹

WHITING found that *father-child rivalry* (status envy) was positively and highly significantly related to the development of guilt feelings. Individuals who grew up in societies where monogamous nuclear family structure was prevalent, showed the highest guilt feelings as measured through patient responsibility (table 55). Another factor related to guilt feelings was *early*

Table 55

PATIENT RESPONSIBILITY	FAMILY AND HOUSEHOLD STRUCTURE					
	Murdock (14)					
Whiting and Child (23)	Family: Household:	Polygynous Mother-Child	Polygynous Polygynous	Monogamous Extended	Monogamous Nuclear	
High					16 Alorese	
					13 Chamorro	
					14 Lakher	
				11 Arapesh	10 Lepcha	14 Manus
				11 Chiricahua	21 Maori	17 Navaho
Low		12 Dahomeans	14 Kwoma	10 Papago	18 Pukapuka	
		9 Azande	5 Comanche	3 Chenchu	5 Trobrianders	
		8 Bena	8 Kwakiutl	9 Samoans		
		3 Chagga	6 Tanala			
		6 Kurtachi	9 Teton			
Low		5 Lesu	8 Wogeo			
		4 Thonga				
% High		14%	38%	67%	86%	

This table shows the relationship between family and household structure with patient responsibility, the index of guilt used by Whiting and Child. The number before each society is its value for this score. The order of the percentages is as predicted, and the differences between monogamous and polygynous family structure are significant. $P = .009$ (Fischer exact test).

141. Whiting, *Ibidem*, p. 243. In accordance with the status envy theory it was hypothesized that very high guilt feelings will be found in societies with very high father-child rivalry (i.e. monogamous nuclear system) and very low guilt feelings in societies with very low father-child rivalry (i.e. polygynous mother-child system).

weaning, but it was positively related to guilt only where father-child rivalry existed (table 56).¹⁴²

Table 56

FAMILY STRUCTURE <i>(Murdock)</i>	AGE OF WEANING <i>(Whiting and Child)</i>	PATIENT RESPONSIBILITY <i>(Whiting and Child)</i>	
		Low	High
Monogamous	Early	1	6
	Late	4	2
Polygynous	Early	5	1
	Late	6	3

This table shows the interaction between family structure and age of weaning in producing patient responsibility. It will be seen that the age of weaning is related to patient responsibility only in monogamous societies. Although a nonparametric test does not yield significant results, a Pearson r between these variables yields a coefficient of -0.71 , which is significant at the 5% point.

(iii) Parental Rearing Practices in Relation to Guilt in Preadolescents

W. ALLINSMITH¹⁴³ measured the intensity of children's guilt feelings over hostile thoughts (death wishes), theft and disobedience, and related it to parental practices of weaning, toilet training and current disciplinary method. His subjects were 112 boys of about 13 years old (junior high school students) from Detroit area (U.S.A.). They included both middle and working classes.

Guilt-intensity measures were obtained through story completion tests. Here we quote two stories, one relating to death wishes and one to disobedience. *Death-wishes*: "Dave likes his baseball coach. The other day the coach promised him privately that Dave could pitch in the big game on Saturday. When the team meets for final practice, the coach doesn't say anything to Dave about pitching. Dave is afraid he has forgotten or changed his mind. He keeps thinking to himself over and over again: 'The coach isn't going to keep his promise. I hope he doesn't even make the game. I wish he'd drop dead'".

When Dave arrives at the game on Saturday afternoon...(from this point the story proceeded in two different ways, as follows) (i) he sees from the scoreboard that he is scheduled to pitch; (ii) he hears that the coach has just been in an accident and has been taken to hospital. Everyone is worried. The game is about to begin. Dave sees from the scoreboard that he is scheduled to pitch".

142. *Ibidem*, pp. 244, 245.

143. W. Allin Smith, "Learning of Moral Standards", in D. Miller and G. Swanson (Eds) *Inner Conflict and Defence*, New York 1960, pp. 141 - 176.

Disobedience: "One day Ted's mother goes visiting a friend of hers in another town. At noon just after lunch Ted phones his mother and talks with her. She tells him to be a good boy and says she will be home at supper time. Now Ted is all alone with nothing to do. He thinks of the boxes in the top of his mother's closet. She has told him *never* to take down the boxes. He knows that his mother won't be at home till supper time ". (In a second version of the same story it was added), "Ted climbs up and takes down the boxes".

Intensity of guilt was measured according to how the boys completed the stories. For example, if the second version of the story about 'death-wishes' ended like "the hero relinquishes the desired opportunity to pitch" and rushes to the hospital to see the coach, or explicitly expresses remorse, etc., it meant high guilt. If the hero suffers serious injury, strong emotional upsets, "long prison sentences," etc., it was signs of extreme guilt feelings. "If the hero pitches in the game" and feels only slight discomfort, it was taken as an index of low guilt.¹⁴⁴

ALLINSMITH found that *earliness in weaning* and *severity of toilet training* had different effects upon the intensity of guilt over different transgressions.

With regard to *death wishes*, it was found that among the subjects who were early weaned or severely toilet trained "the proportion in the middle category on intensity of guilt exceeds the proportion in the high category" (curvilinear relation). Thus early weaning and severe toilet training were related to

144. AllinSmith, *Ibidem*, pp. 141, 145, 146, 149.

The second version of the story about 'death wishes' was thought to be more effective in arousing 'vacarious responses of guilt' than the first version. The second version of the 'disobedience story' was meant to tap the 'temptation resistance' capacity (whether the hero will abstain from the contemplated misdeed or not).

It was presumed that early weaning, severe toilet training and current psychological discipline would be positively related to the intensity of guilt feelings.

AllinSmith's explanation for the effectiveness of psychological discipline in producing guilt was that it provides the child with a parental model of self-restraint and of a non-aggressive way of expressing disapproval. Such example from the part of the parent might make the child "inhibited or guilty about his own hostile tendencies". Parents who favour corporal punishments provide the child with a model of 'aggressive behaviour', and hence at least implicitly approve aggression from the part of the child (*Ibidem*, pp. 154, 155.).

medium intensity of guilt over death wishes (table 57).¹⁴⁵

With regard to guilt over *theft*, it was found that early weaning was significantly related to low guilt. And with regard to *disobedience*, early weaning as well as severe toilet training were associated with low guilt (table 57).¹⁴⁶

As regards current *parental disciplinary method* — psychological or physical — this study found no significant relationship between this variable and the intensity of guilt feelings.¹⁴⁷

Table 57

Background Conditions and Severity of Guilt

Condition	Severity of Guilt about:											
	Death Wishes				Theft (Revised)				Disobedience			
	Trends: Boxes with Largest Frequencies	N	χ^2	Proba- bility	Trends: Boxes with Largest Frequencies	N	χ^2	Proba- bility	Trends: Boxes with Largest Frequencies	N	χ^2	Proba- bility
Weaning	Early weaning & medium guilt (curr.)	101	10.88	<.01	Early weaning & low guilt	97	8.49	<.02	Early weaning & low guilt	88	3.71	.06
Toilet training	Severe training & medium guilt (curr.)	100	8.41	<.02	—	97	.18	<1.00	Severe training & low guilt	89	3.74	.05
Discipline	—	108	5.86	<.30	Mixed disc. & high guilt	104	6.22	.19	—	95	.79	<.70
Obedience requests	—	78	.77	<.70	—	76	.63	<.80	—	69	.48	<.50
Social class	—	108	1.09	<.60	Middle class & low guilt	104	5.46	.07	—	95	.003	<1.00

These findings show that the effect of severity of training upon later guilt can be quite different, even contrary, according to the matter of violation or "content of guilt". ALLINSMITH proposes that the intensity of guilt feelings may be primarily related to those behaviors which were of special concern to the parents at the time of weaning. Thus, for example, if a child is weaned rather early (when he is less mobile and cannot overtly react to the 'frustrating parental control', but can show his displeasure only through his 'wishes and feelings of rage' against the parents), he may associate parental disapproval of his behaviour with his wishes and feelings against the parent. This may positively contribute to later intense guilt over hostile and aggressive tendencies, thoughts and wishes. But if the child is weaned later (when he is more mobile and can overtly react to parental control), he relates parental

145. *Ibidem*, p. 157.

146. *Ibidem*, pp. 161, 162.

147. *Ibidem*, p. 157.

disapproval to his overt behaviour "like testing of parental prohibitions concerning property right", disobedience, etc. This may positively contribute to later intense guilt over 'violations concerning property' (theft), disobedience, etc.

According to ALLINSMITH'S findings, therefore, all guilt feelings cannot be reduced to any single source in the early training practices. Hence he adds, "early rearing factors may be important, but may have different meanings in different moral contexts".¹⁴⁸

(iv) Parent Discipline and Children's Moral Development

M.L.HOFFMAN and D.SALZTSTEIN¹⁴⁹ (henceforth reference only to

148. Ibidem, p. 164.

We may also briefly note the findings of other relevant studies relating to guilt:

i) Although Allinsmith did not find a positive, significant relationship between psychological discipline and guilt intensity in this study, in another study, using 236 young adults (college students) of middle class, he found that guilt over hostile thoughts (anger) against a "friendly male authority figure" was positively and significantly (for male subjects), and positively though not significantly (for female subjects), related to psychological punishment employed by the mothers when the subjects were about 10 – 12 years old (W.Allinsmith and T.C.Greening, "Guilt over Anger as Predicted from Parental Discipline: A Study of Superego Development" (American Psychologist, 1966 (10), 320 (abstract)

ii) M.L.Hoffman reports that C.M.Heinicke ("Some Antecedents and Correlates of Guilt and Fear in Young Children". Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Harvard University, 1953) found severe weaning to be related to high guilt in young children's responses to interview questions dealing with their conceptions of right and wrong and how they feel and act when they have done something wrong. He also found that the children's guilt was positively related to parental use of psychological punishment (M.L. Hoffman, "Child Rearing Practices and Moral Development", pp. 301, 303.).

iii) Similarly, from another cross-cultural study J.M. Whiting and I.L.Child conclude: "We have some dependable evidence of the predicted relationship that guilt feelings as measured by patient responsibility for illness are related to the relative importance of love-oriented techniques in the punishment of children by their parents. But certainly there is no evidence to suggest a very close relationship here" (J.W.M.Whiting and I. L.Child, *Child Training and Personality: A Cross-cultural Study*, p. 246).

149. M.L. Hoffman and D. Saltzstein, "Parent Discipline and the Child's Moral Development", in R.C. Johnson et alii (Eds), *Conscience, Contract and Social Reality*, pp. 221 – 237.

HOFFMAN) measured six indices of conscience and related them to the past and present parental disciplinary practices.

The subjects of the study were 270 (146 boys and 124 girls) middle class children and 174 (91 boys and 83 girls) lower class children. All were 7th graders (12 – 13 years) from Detroit area.

The indices of conscience measured were: guilt after transgression, internalized moral judgment, confession, acceptance of responsibility, consideration for others, and identification. Identification is added here, notes HOFFMAN, not because it is a 'direct moral index', but because of its supposed relationship to moral development.

Intensity of guilt feelings were tapped through semi-projective story completion tests (e.g. a story involves a young child who through negligence contributed to the death of another child), internalized moral judgment was measured through the child's judgement of hypothetical moral problems relating to cheating and stealing. Child's readiness to confess and accept responsibility was obtained from teachers' and parents' reports, and consideration for others was measured through peer-ratings. Identification measure was assessed through child's responses to several questions relating to identification (e.g. "Which person do you want to be like when you grow up?")

Measures of parental disciplinary practices were obtained from the child as well as from both the parents.¹⁵⁰

150. Hoffman, and Saltzstein, Ibid, 223 – 225.

Here we may note a pertinent distinction Hoffman makes regarding disciplinary methods. They are first divided into power-assertive (i.e. materialistic) and non-power-assertive (i.e. psychological) methods. Non-power-assertive is further distinguished into love-withdrawal and induction methods. Induction implies appealing to the child's "empathy potential", making him aware of the consequences of his actions for others (parents, peers, etc.). Hoffman adds that by love-withdrawal the child realizes only the "painful psychological consequences" of his actions for himself. But by induction, he realizes the painful consequences of his actions for others.

In order to be effective, any disciplinary technique should capitalize on the "emotional and motivational tendencies" of the child. Where an affective parent-child relationship exists, love-withdrawal can motivate the child to control his impulses because he needs the parental love. But another "important emotional resource" long neglected by psychologists, adds Hoffman, is empathy which is observed in children "much before the child's moral controls are firmly established". Hence, Hoffman says, of the three disciplinary methods (power-assertion, love-withdrawal, induction), "induction seems most capable of enlisting the child's natural proclivities for empathy"...which "adds to the aroused need for love the pain which the child vicariously experiences from having harmed another", thus intensifying his motivation to learn moral rules and control his impulses (Ibidem, pp. 234 – 235).

It was found that "frequent use of *power-assertion* by the mother is constantly associated with weak moral development", while the use of *induction* is "constantly associated with advanced moral development" for middle class children (table 58).¹⁵¹ Besides, *love-withdrawal* was seen to relate infrequently and even negatively to the development of moral indices (tabl. 58).¹⁵² However, boys' consideration for others was positively related to mothers' use of power assertion. Such altruistic behaviour of boys may be motivated by the boys' need for approval by peers, and not by any intrinsic motive, observes HOFFMAN.¹⁵³

Table 58

Statistically Significant Relations between Child's Morality Indexes and Mother's Discipline Techniques: Middle Class

Morality index	Power assertion			Love withdrawal			Induction re parent			Induction re peers'		
	Boys	Girls	Sum	Boys	Girls	Sum	Boys	Girls	Sum	Boys	Girls	Sum
Guilt (child's response)	-p*	-c*					+c*	-p*	+c*	-p*		-p**
		-n*										
		-p*										
Internal moral judgment (child's response)	-n*	-c*		-c*	-c*		+c*					
Confession (mother's report)	-p**		-p**				+n*		-c*			
Accepts responsibility (teacher's report)	-c*	-c*	-c**	+n*			+c*		+c**			
		-n*	-n**				+n*					
							+p*					
Consideration for other children (peers' ratings)	+n*	-p*		-p*					+c*		-p**	-p**
									-n*			
Identification (child's response)	-c*	-c*	-c**	-n*			+p*	+c*	-c*			

Note: The data sources of the significant findings summarized in Tables 58 — 60 are indicated as follows: c (child report), n (parent report of current practices), p (parent report of past practices).

* Data on induction regarding peers are incomplete since these data were obtained only from the parent reports of past practices.

* $p < .05$.

** $p < .01$.

For the lower class children, it was found that guilt was positively associated with *love-withdrawal* by the mother, but unrelated to *power-assertion* and *induction*.¹⁵⁴ However, the boys' consideration for others was positively

151. Ibidem, p. 229

152. Ibidem, p. 230

153. Ibidem.

154. Ibidem.

related to maternal use of power assertion as in the case of the middle class boys. (table 59)

Table 59

Statistically Significant Relations between Child's Morality Indexes and Mother's Discipline: Lower Class

Morality index	Power assertion			Love withdrawal			Induction re parent		
	Boys	Girls	Sum	Boys	Girls	Sum	Boys	Girls	Sum
Guilt (child's response)						+c*			
Internal moral judgment (child's response)									+c*
Accepts responsibility (teacher's report)									
Consideration for other children (peers' ratings)	+c*								+c*
Identification (child's response)						-c*		-c*	

Note: Interview data were not obtained from the lower-class parents. Thus all entries in Tables 3 and 4 are based on child reports. For the same reason lower-class data on confession and on induction regarding peers were unavailable.

* $p < .05$.

Thus, the assumed effectiveness of induction-discipline in fostering moral development seems to be supported only in the case of middle-class children. The failure to obtain the same result for the lower class HOFFMAN attributes to the "more diffuse socializing process" of that class, i.e. a socialization process that is shared by several agents: mother, father, other members of the (extended) family, so that the role of the mother is not so crucial in the lower class as in the middle class.¹⁵⁵ (For findings on the relationship between moral indices and parents' affection, see table 60).

155. Ibidem, p. 231.

Here we may note the findings of another study by Hoffman. With 125 boys and girls (seventh graders from Detroit area) he studied the differences in conscience-related phenomena (guilt-feelings, impulse tolerance, etc.) between humanistic and conventional children. The humanistic are those "whose judgments showed concern for human consequences of behaviour and consideration of extenuating circumstances"; the conventional are those whose "judgments showed rigid adherence to institutional norms regardless of consequences and circumstances".

In this study guilt-feelings were measured by story completion tests, and parental antecedents were obtained from children's as well as parents' reports.

Hoffman found no significant difference between the conventional and humanistic

Table 60

Statistically Significant Relations between Child's Morality Indexes and Parent's Affection

Morality index	Middle class						Lower class					
	Mothers			Fathers			Mothers			Fathers		
	Boys	Girls	Sum	Boys	Girls	Sum	Boys	Girls	Sum	Boys	Girls	Sum
Guilt (child's response)	+c*		+c*									
Internal moral judgment (child's response)		+c*	+n*			+n*						
Confession (mother's report)	+c*		+c*			+p*						
Accepts responsibility (teacher's report)		+n*			+n*							
Consideration for other children (peers' ratings)	+p*	+c*	+c*				+c*			+c*		
Identification (child's response)	+c**	+c**	+c**				+c*					

* $p < .05$.

** $p < .01$.

groups as regards their readiness to confess, feel guilty and accept responsibility. But he found that the humanistic subjects' (especially boys) experience of guilt was due to their "awareness of harmful consequences of their behaviour for others". The conventional subjects' guilt-feelings, on the other hand, seemed to result more from an awareness (and intolerance) of their own unacceptable impulses.

As regards parental antecedents, no noteworthy difference was found in the affectionate parent-child relationship between the two groups. As for discipline, the following significant difference was found: the conventional children had more love-withdrawal and induction regarding parent; the humanistic children had "more inductions pointing up matter-of-fact requirements of the situation" or "matter-of-fact" induction. (Matter-of-fact induction refers to 'parent's explaining a situation, emphasizing its factual aspects rather than personal ones. This is a subdivision of the 'general induction method', already mentioned in the Hoffman and Saltstein study). In fact, the disciplinary pattern of the conventional's parents always included "some form of love-withdrawal", while the way of the humanistic's parents was "varied and discriminating — ranging from power assertion to total permissiveness depending on the situation".

On the basis of his findings Hoffman has the following concluding comments on disciplinary techniques: ... All discipline techniques have power assertive, love-withdrawal and inductive components. The primary function of the first two is motive arousal and of the last, providing a morally relevant cognitive structure. When degree of arousal is optimal, (as often in the case of humanistic children), the child attends to and is subject to maximum influence by the cognitive material. Thus he focuses on the human consequences of his behaviour for others, i.e. empathic considerations. With

(b) Antecedents, Correlates, and Consistency of Guilt

The findings of the studies on post-transgressional guilt feelings reviewed above appear to be more consistent among themselves than the findings on temptation resistance.

SEARS and others found a positive relationship between parental love and acceptance and guilt feelings. WHITING'S findings also support that basic nurturance (resource giving) is needed for the development of guilt feelings. Hence *parental love and nurturance* is a basic requirement for an appropriate development of guilt feelings in the child. And practically all studies report a positive relationship between *love-oriented discipline* and guilt. Within love-oriented discipline itself, an optimum degree of *induction* appears to have, as HOFFMAN has shown, a special role in fostering genuine guilt feelings, based on the child's empathic understanding of the consequences of his actions for others.

With regard to the effect of early weaning (and severe toilet training) upon guilt, ALLINSMITH found quite different results depending on the matter of violation. According to WHITING, early weaning fostered guilt only in the context of status envy. However, HEINICKE is reported to have found a positive relationship between guilt and early weaning. In the light of these findings, it is difficult to arrive at any (tentative) conclusion about the impact of early weaning (and toilet training) on the development of guilt feelings. However, severe training practices in these areas seem to have even less influence on the development of guilt feelings than they have on temptation-resistance behaviour.

As for other factors found to be related (correlates) to guilt, there is some too much arousal (as in the case of conventional subjects) the cognitively relevant material serves primarily as a cue of unacceptable impulse expression, the avoidance of which — rather than consideration of others — then becomes the basis of the child's morality. The parents of the conventional children may thus not only fail to pick up and build upon the child's empathic potential, but their frequent withdrawal of love may actually blunt the child's empathic sensitivity, make him less aware of others' feelings, and thus deprive him of the basis for humanistic morality". (Cfr. M.L.Hoffman, "Conscience, Personality, and Socialization Techniques", Human Development, 1970, pp 90, 105, 106, 113, 118).

indication that *sex-differences* affect guilt feelings, i.e. girls show more guilt-responses (especially in the form of confession) than boys do. This was supported, for example, by the findings of REBELSKY and others (see p. 173), PORTEUS and JOHNSON (see p. 94), McMICHAEL and GRINDER (see p. 174), and SEARS and others.¹⁵⁶

Data about the impact of other variables like I.Q., age, etc., upon guilt feelings are fragmentary and inconclusive.

Regarding the generality or *consistency of guilt*, the available data are again scanty and not very conclusive. ALLINSMITH found that the feeling of guilt varies according to the matter of violation. Consequently, he remarked: "It is necessary to speak of 'guilts' rather than of 'guilt', and to be sensitive to the complexities of moral learning".¹⁵⁷ However, SEARS and others found some positive relationship between two measures of guilt (emotional upset and confession) in their five-year-old subjects.¹⁵⁸ Besides, STEPHENSON found that 'normal subjects' were notably more guilt-prone than psychopathic subjects (see below, p. 199), a conclusion supported also by the findings of McCORD and McCORD (see p. 200).

Hence, it is reasonable to assume that there is a general tendency for (normal) people to feel 'guilty' after a transgression. But, what forms it takes and how intensely it is felt depends on previous experiences and learning (see p. 227 ff.).

3. Comparative Studies about the Behavioural and the Emotional Dimensions

Though resistance to temptation and guilt feelings are considered to be respectively the *behavioural* and the *emotional* dimensions of conscience, empirical findings, however, do not indicate a close, positive relationship between them.¹⁵⁹

156. Sears, Rau and Alpert, *Identification and Child Rearing*, pp. 211 – 212.

157. AllinSmith, "Learning of Moral Standards", p. 165.

158. Sears, Rau and Alpert, *Identification and Child Rearing*, pp. 216 – 217.

159. As we have already remarked, the identification theory implies a close, positive relationship between guilt feelings and temptation resistance. It is even assumed that the

First, we have found no consistent evidence that these aspects of conscience have the same parental antecedents (see pp. 139, 171). While the development of guilt feelings shows a positive and consistent association with parental love and nurturance and love-oriented discipline, the association of these variables with resistance to temptation is not so close and consistent. Further, factors of 'general and specific socialization practices' (e.g. the level of parental demands, severity of weaning, toilet training and sex training) do seem to have more bearing on temptation resistance than upon guilt feelings.

Then, a comparison between the measures of guilt and temptation resistance in several of the above studies does not warrant a consistent and close relationship between these two dimensions.¹⁶⁰

motive for resisting temptation is the avoidance of guilt feelings.

160. Besides the studies reviewed above (on 'resistance to temptation' and on 'guilt feelings'), here we may briefly note the findings of four other related studies, which, among other things, investigated the relationship between guilt feelings and resistance to temptation.

i) F. Rebelsky, W. AllinSmith and R. Grinder investigated children's use of confession and related it to sex-differences and to temptation resistance. The subjects were 138 (69 boys and 69 girls) eleven-year-olds from Massachusetts. Temptation resistance was measured by 'ray-gun-game', and confession responses, through story completion tests. Of the eight stories, four were completed before the temptation test, and four afterwards.

The findings showed that girls make confession responses more than boys do. It was also found that non-cheaters expressed more confession responses than cheaters. This indicates a positive relationship between temptation resistance and guilt feelings; however, this positive relationship "was mainly a function of the girl subjects" (table 63) (F. Rebelsky, W. AllinSmith and R. Grinder, "Resistance to Temptation and Sex Differences in Children's Use of Fantasy Confession", in R.C. Johnson et alii (Eds), *Conscience, Contract and Social Reality*, pp. 340 – 345).

ii) R. Grinder and R. MacMichael compared resistance to temptation and guilt feelings among two culturally different groups: Samoans of Hawaii and Caucasians from the United States mainland. The subjects were 19 (12 boys and 7 girls) Samoans and 15 (4 boys and 11 girls) Caucasians, all sixth and seventh graders (12 to 13 years old) from a rural public school. Temptation resistance was assessed by a 'ray-gun game', and story completion tests tapped three aspects (remorse, confession and restitution) of post-transgressional feelings.

The findings of this study offer a partial support for a positive relationship between

guilt and temptation resistance, i.e. remorse was seen to be positively and significantly related to temptation resistance (but confession and restitution did not show such a relationship). Besides, though girls showed some tendency towards more guilt-proneness, sex differences were not significant (R.Grinder and R.MacMichael, "Cultural Influence on Conscience Development: Resistance to Temptation and Guilt among Samoans and American Caucasians", in R.C.Johnson et alii (Eds), *Ibidem*, pp. 152 – 157).

iii) Making honest behaviour and success mutually exclusive by suggesting an impossible-to-achieve-standard of successful performance, S.M.Unger studied the relationship between guilt and transgression behaviour. In this situation, the occurrence of cheating vs. honest behaviour was considered to be dependent on predominant response strength associated with success on the one hand, and not engaging in guilt-inducing behaviour on the other.

Subjects were 313 sixth grade children (about 12 to 13 years old). The strength of the subjects' tendency to feel guilty after transgression was assessed through story completion tests, and this strength was taken as the measure of cheating avoidance response. From the findings of the story completion tests, 174 were classified as 'high-guilt' subjects and 139 as 'low-guilt' subjects.

It was found that 37. 4% (65/174) of the high-guilt subjects cheated as against 50. 4% (70/139) of the low-guilt subjects ($p < .03$). Relating success motivation and guilt reactivity jointly to the occurrence of cheating, it was found: 62. 9% of the high success motivation-low guilt reactivity subjects (44/70) cheated; 41. 2% of the high-high group (35/85) cheated; 33. 7% of the low success motivation- high guilt reactivity group (30/89) cheated; and 37. 7% of the low-low group (26/69) cheated ($p < .005$).

These findings suggest that guilt reactivity is positively and significantly related to temptation resistance or transgression avoidance (S.M.Unger, "On the Functioning of Guilt Potential in a Conflict Dilemma", *Psychological Reports*, 1962 (11), pp. 681 – 682).

iv) Finally, the findings of a rather early study of 'temptation resistance' of grown-ups, conducted by Mackinnon at Harvard, are relevant in this context. Mackinnon's subjects were 93 college graduates. Being left alone, the subjects had to solve 20 problems, of which the solutions were contained in an easily-referrable booklet given to them. But they were allowed to refer the booklet only for certain solutions; the behaviour of the subjects was observed through a one-way screen.

Of the 93 subjects, 50 (54%) abided by the regulations, while 43 (46%) violated the regulations "looking at one or more of the prohibited solutions". After about four weeks it was tested whether the violators would admit their violations: some completely denied, some partially admitted, and others completely admitted violations.

22 violators who admitted violation (partially or completely) were further asked whether they felt guilty about their behaviour: six of them admitted guilt feelings, while 16 denied. 10 violators who denied violation were asked whether they would have felt

If we try to compare the findings of these studies on an age-basis, we have the following:

One study with 4-year-olds (BURTON, MACCOBY and ALLINSMITH) found a negative relationship (table 61) ¹⁶¹ while another with same age-groups (SEARS, RAU and ALPERT) found a low positive relationship for boys, and a low negative one for girls. ¹⁶²

One study with 11 – 12-year olds (GRINDER) reports a positive relation-

guilty if they had violated: only 2 admitted, while 8 denied. On the contrary, of the 37 non-violators who were asked whether they would have felt guilty, 6 denied, while 31 admitted they would have definitely felt guilty. These findings show, adds Mackinnon, that violators of social prohibitions are "characteristically untroubled by any guilt feelings", while the compliant, non-violator is particularly inclined to guilt.

Regarding the subjects' attitude toward their parents, it was found that non-violators, in contrast to violators, showed greater fondness for their fathers: "only 26% of the violators as against 64% of the non-violators, were at least as fond of their fathers as of their mothers". As regards the disciplinary methods employed by the parents of violators and non-violators, Mackinnon had the following findings:

% of the reported forms of punishment.

	physical	psychological
Fathers of violators	78	22
Mothers of non-violators	62	38
Mothers of violators	58	42
Fathers of non-violators	48	52

As the table shows, physically aggressive discipline was used most by fathers of violators and least by fathers of non-violators; psych. discipline was most used by fathers of non-violators, and least by fathers of violators. Little difference was found in the mothers' use of the two methods. And regarding the general parent-child relationship Mackinnon comments ".... as children the non-violators tended to grant their fathers a favoured, respected and somewhat feared position. The violators showed no such tendency".

Thus, Mackinnon, with his adult subjects, found a positive association between the behavioural and emotional aspects of conscience, and support for the greater role of father-son relationship in the moral development of boys (Mackinnon D.W., "Violations of Prohibitions", in H. Murray (Ed.) *Explorations in Personality*, New York 1938, pp. 491 – 499).

¹⁶¹ Burton et alii, "Antecedents of Resistance...", p. 704

¹⁶² Sears, Alpert, and Rau, *Identification and Child Rearing*, p. 239.

Table 61
EVIDENCE OF CONSCIENCE RELATED TO RESISTANCE
TO TEMPTATION

	Boys		Girls	
	Noncheaters	Cheaters	Noncheaters	Cheaters
Evidence of conscience (Guilt)				
High	8	18	4	16
Low	7	7	8	9

Sexes combined: $\chi^2 = 3.12$ ($p < .10$)

ship between temptation resistance at the age of 11 – 12 and admission of deviation at 5 – 6 years of age (for boys), and confession of deviation at 5 – 6 years of age (for girls) (table 62). But it has not studied the relationship between the two aspects at the age of 11 – 12¹⁶³. However, REBELSKY ALLINSMITH and GRINDER found a positive relationship between temptation resistance and confession in 11-year-old girls (table 63). And, GRINDER and McMICHAEL, with their 12 – 13-year-olds found a positive, significant relationship between remorse and temptation resistance, but they did not

Table 62

COMPARISONS BY SEX BETWEEN INDICES OF CONSCIENCE DEVELOPMENT
AT AGE 5 OR 6 AND TEMPTATION BEHAVIOR AT AGE 11 OR 12

Index of Conscience Development	B O Y S			G I R L S		
	Resist	Yield	χ^2	Resist	Yield	χ^2
Does child tell about deviations (III-32)			.06			7.79*
High	6	16		13	9	
Moderate	5	16		6	10	
Low	6	17		4	18	
Does child admit deviations when asked (III-33)			11.40*			2.64
High	9	8		8	12	
Moderate	2	22		12	15	
Low	5	21		5	17	
Evidence of conscience development (III-34)			1.54			9.03*
High	6	11		12	8	
Moderate	6	21		8	16	
Low	5	21		4	20	

* Significant at or beyond .05 level, two-tail.

163. R. Grinder, "Parental Childrearing Practices....", p. 816.

Table 63

Differences between Various Groups in Number of Stories in Which They Portrayed Confession

Groups Compared*	Total Eight Stories			Four Pretest Stories			Four Posttest Stories		
	X^2	df	p	X^2	df	p	X^2	df	p
1. Boys / Girls†	32.27	8	.001	12.28	4	.02	10.30	4	.05
2. Cheaters / Noncheaters	19.75	8	.02	13.73	4	.01	12.17	4	.02
3. Boy cheaters / Boy noncheaters	11.72	8	.20	4.56	4	.40	6.05	4	.20
4. Girl cheaters / Girl noncheaters	10.86	8	.30	8.16	4	.10	10.17	4	.05
5. Boy cheaters / Girl cheaters	17.51	8	.05	6.48	4	.20	8.44	4	.10
6. Boy noncheaters / Girl noncheaters	17.59	8	.05	4.78	4	.50	5.91	4	.50
7. Combined X^2 (3 + 4): Cheat / Non-cheat (with sex control)	22.58	16	.20	12.72	8	.20	16.22	8	.05
8. Combined X^2 (5 + 6): Boys / Girls (with cheat control)	35.10	16	.01	11.26	8	.20	14.35	8	.10

Note: All tests are two-tailed.

* Groups:

Boy cheaters	N = 52	Total boys	N = 69
Boy noncheaters	N = 17	Total girls	N = 69
Girl cheaters	N = 44	Total cheaters	N = 96
Girl noncheaters	N = 25	Total noncheaters	N = 42

† The italicized groups confessed in more stories than did the nonitalicized ones.

find such an association of temptation resistance with confession and restitution. Again, UNGER with his 12 – 13-year-olds found a positive relationship between guilt and temptation resistance. But ALLINSMITH'S findings, whose subjects also were about 13 years old, do not support a positive relationship between temptation resistance and guilt feelings.¹⁶⁴

Finally, MACKINNON, with his adult subjects, found a positive relationship between these two dimensions of conscience.¹⁶⁵

These findings go to show that the relationship between guilt feelings and temptation resistance is rather complex. No consistent relationship is found among younger age-groups (e.g. 4 – 5-year groups). When some consistent, positive relationship is seen among older ones (e.g. 11 – 13-year groups), the related aspect of guilt (confession, remorse, restitution, etc.) varies. Sex differences also seem to have an impact at times.

However, on the whole, the findings seem to give more support for some

164. W. AllinSmith, "Learning of Moral Standards", p. 175.

165. D.W. Mackinnon, "Violations of Prohibitions", p. 495.

positive relationship between temptation resistance and guilt feelings (expressed in one form or another) than for a negative relationship or for no relationship at all. But they do not prove a close or necessary relationship (which the identification theory presumes) between guilt and temptation resistance. This also means that avoidance of guilt is not the only motive for resisting temptation.

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Summarizing the identification theory, we can say that conscience is an inner-control of the individual, which develops as a result of the child's internalizing parental values and standards through the process of identification. Because the basic motive for identification is the child's dependency on the parent, 'parental antecedents' (parent-child relationship, parental standards and training practices) play the most important role in the development of conscience.

In the light of the empirical findings, the following antecedents may be considered as important in fostering the development of the different dimensions of conscience:

	fostering temptation resistance	: Basic parental love and nurturance. : Disciplining the child with psych. (and phys.) methods.
Behavioural Dimension		: High standards of performance. : Father-son relationship. : Mother's disciplining the daughter. : Moderately strict disciplinary attitude.
	detering anti-social behaviour:	: Basic parental love and nurturance. : Consistent disciplining of the child, especially by psychological methods.
Conscience		: Discipline should not be harsh or high-anxiety arousing.

Emotional

Dimension: fostering 'guilt feelings'

: Warm and nurturant parent-child relationship.
: Psychological discipline, especially induction.

4. A Study of Moral Character

R. PECK and R. J. HAVIGHURST made a study¹⁶⁶ of moral behaviour based on moral character. Everyone's behaviour, say the authors, springs from his character, which defines or 'characterizes' a human individual.¹⁶⁷ Moral character is described as a "persisting pattern of attitudes and motives which produce a rather predictable kind and quality of moral behaviour".¹⁶⁸ It is thus considered as a "special aspect of personality" having a rather stable influence on moral behaviour. This therefore implies a close relationship between personality, moral character and moral behaviour. Commenting on this point W. KAY says: "Without needing to become involved in depth psychology or psychoanalysis one can say that human behaviour is related to individual personality. Our conduct follows naturally from the kind of people that we are.... The motivation for our behaviour springs from our nature".¹⁶⁹

a) Types of Moral Character

In their study PECK and HAVIGHURST distinguish five types of character, each of which, as a rule, may be ascribed to a certain period in the "psycho-social development of the individual".¹⁷⁰ These types with their corres-

166. R. Peck and R. T. Havighurst, *The Psychology of Character Development*, New York 1960.

We have included this study in this chapter not because it directly falls under the identification theory of conscience, but mainly because of the emphasis it gives to 'parental antecedents' in the development of moral character.

167. Peck and Havighurst, *ibidem*, p. 1.

168. *Ibidem*, p. 166.

169. W. Kay, *Moral Development*, p. 191.

170. In defining these character types, the authors have given primary consideration

ponding periods are the following:

Amoral	—	Infancy
Expedient	—	Early Childhood
Conforming	—	Late Childhood
Irrational-Conscientious	—	
Rational-Altruistic	—	Adolescence and Adulthood. ¹⁷¹

Amoral

The person with amoral character "follows his whims and impulses" without consideration for others. For him, he is the centre of everything, and other people are means for his self-gratification. He has no internalized principles, no conscience or superego. He is like an infant in the first year.¹⁷²

Expedient

He is primarily self-centred. He may consider others' welfare just to attain his own goals. He may act morally for reputation's sake; he may conform to social requirements for a short term in order to gain long-term advantages. He knows well how to get the things he wants. He also does not seem to possess any internalized moral principles or conscience.¹⁷³

Conforming

The conforming type has "one general internalized principle: to do what others do, and what they say one "should" do". Not conforming makes him anxious about others' disapproval. He has no abstract moral principles, but

to the question: why a person behaves as he does?, that is, the motivation behind each type of character. Hence their theory is sometimes called "motivational theory of character" and morality (Peck and Havighurst, *Ibidem*, p. 82).

171. It may be noted, as the authors themselves acknowledge, that this classification of character types with their corresponding periods of development was very much influenced by the Freudian developmental stages: oral, anal, phallic and genital (*Ibidem*, pp. 10 – 11, 98 – 99).

172. *Ibidem*, p. 5.

173. *Ibidem*, p. 6.

behaves 'morally' towards certain people and on certain occasions. This is typical of middle childhood.¹⁷⁴

Irrational-Conscientious

He has a code of internalized moral principles, according to which he judges right and wrong. But he is extremely rigid in the application of his principles. A very rigid 'superego' may be said to be at work in him, without having gained the "awareness that rules are man-made".¹⁷⁵

Rational-Altruistic

He has the "highest level of moral maturity", with a "stable set of moral principles by which he judges and directs his own action". He is rational because he realistically evaluates each action and its situation, and altruistic because he is concerned about others as well as himself. He has a firm conscience he is mature, well adjusted and using his constructive capacities to the full.¹⁷⁶

It is within the above described theoretical frame-work that PECK and HAVIGHURST make their study. They studied the character types of 34 children from the Prairie City, U.S.A. As the authors observe, the "universe of subjects from which our research sample was drawn consisted of all the children born in 1933 and living in Prairie City in 1943". There were 120 such children. From their tenth year the children "were tested and rated on a variety of ways" (intelligence tests, achievement tests, attitude and moral ideology tests, emotional response tests, character ratings by teachers and peers etc.). Out of these 120 children, 34 (17 boys and 17 girls) children, including upper and lower classes, were selected in 1946 for a more intense study of their "motives, attitudes, and inner personality characteristics." This study lasted upto 1950 – a longitudinal study from the 10th to the 17th year of the subjects.¹⁷⁷ This is therefore a "high-powered analysis of a complex mass of data about a very small number of subjects".¹⁷⁸

Each character type is defined on a 10 point scale, and rated mainly on

174. *Ibidem*, p. 7.

175. *Ibidem*, pp. 7 – 8.

176. *Ibidem*, pp. 8 – 9.

177. *Ibidem*, p. 28.

178. N. Williams and S. Williams, *The Moral Development of Children*, London 1970, p. 78.

eight variables supposed to be relevant to moral behaviour. These variables are: *Impulse control, conformity to group patterns, overt conformity to moral code, range of moral horizon* (range of one's sense of obligation to others in behaving morally), *locus of concern* (egocentric vs. sociocentric orientation), *internalized principle, capacity for guilt and/or shame, and rationality* (among other things, this refers to "realism of judgment" and effectiveness of choice). A point was given to a subject on a given type only if there is "evidence of behaviourally effective motivation of the kind described for that type"¹⁷⁹.

As table 64 shows, each subject in every type-group has point (or points) on all character types. This indicates that each one's motive for moral behaviour was a combination of different character types. Again, as the table shows, the 34 subjects of this study did not fit into the five main character types defined by the authors; there emerged three more 'subtypes' (CEA, IAE, and Near-R), which are strong combinations of two or more main types.

In accordance with this character-type rating, each character was "ranked on an ascending scale" for *maturity of character*, amoral character (the least mature) scoring one, and rational-altruistic (the most mature) scoring eight, the others being ranked in between (table 64).¹⁸⁰ (Each subject is classified in the table according to his dominant character type).

b) Character, Personality and Conscience

In order to study the relationship between personality and character, the authors first correlated the *maturity of character* scores with the following six personality vectors: (i) *Moral stability*. This refers to the "tendency to follow established moral code, willingly and with satisfaction", (ii) *Ego-strength*, which indicates a "complex of capacities to react to events with accurate perceptions, appropriate emotions, and insightful, rational judgment". All this indicates a well integrated personality. (iii) *Superego strength*, which refers to the "degree to which behaviour is directed by, or in accord with, a set of internalized moral principles — a conscience". (iv) *Spontaneity*, which implies the tendency "to express feelings and wishes directly in action", especially positive and empathic feelings towards others. (v) *Friendliness*, "a

Table 64

THE CHARACTER-TYPE PROFILES

Type Group	Case Number	Maturity of Character	Character-Type Rating				
			A	E	C	I	R
A	T-78	1	8	7	2	6	1
	T-25	1	7	5	5	4	1
	T-89	1	8	7	1	3	1
	T-42	1	7	5	3	5	1
	T-99	1	7	4	7	2	1
CEA	T-95	2	6	6	6	2	1
	T-55	2	4	5	6	3	1
	T-64	2	4	5	6	3	1
E	T-08	3	5	7	5	4	1
	T-52	3	4	10	5	3	2
	T-22	3	3	10	4	3	1
	T-76	3	6	7	5	2	1
IAE	T-16	4	5	5	2	7	1
	T-37	4	6	6	3	7	2
C	T-11	5	2	3	6	5	1
	T-17	5	2	3	7	7	1
	T-04	5	4	3	7	2	1
	T-57	5	1	1	8	6	3
	T-34	5	1	5	9	4	1
	T-88	5	1	3	9	6	1
	T-39	5	1	4	9	6	2
	T-49	5	1	4	7	6	1
	T-79	6	1	3	6	9	1
I	T-83	6	1	6	4	10	1
	T-28	6	2	3	5	10	2
Near-R	T-40	7	7	4	2	3	8
	T-60	7	4	7	6	3	6
	T-86	7	3	8	3	2	7
	T-50	7	1	8	4	6	6
	T-53	7	3	3	5	8	5
R	T-47	8	2	6	3	4	7
	T-51	8	1	5	1	2	9
	T-03	8	1	7	4	3	8
	T-06	8	1	6	3	1	9

179. Peck and Havighurst, *Ibidem*, pp. 82, 221 — 222, 228.

180. *Ibidem*, p. 85.

generalized attitude of warm liking for other people", and (vi) *Hostility-guilt complex*, "a complex of intense feelings of hostility, linked with strong feelings of guilt about inner impulses".¹⁸¹

The table below (table 65) gives the correlations between these personality vectors and maturity of character for the whole group. It also gives the correlations of personality vectors with overall moral reputation (from adults and peers) for the group as a whole, at the age of 17.

Table 65. Correlations of Personality, Character and Moral Reputation¹⁸²

Personality Vector	Maturity of Character	Adult Reputation	Peer Reputation
Moral Stability	.84	.74	.63
Ego Strength	.77	.55	.69
Superego Strength	.68	.63	.53
Spontaneity	.24	.05	.16
Friendliness	.57	.13	.04
Hostility-Guilt	-.33	-.25	-.07

Levels of Significance: .44 < .01; .54 < .001

The findings show a high correlation (.84) between character maturity and moral stability. This means that the consistency and stability of overt behaviour becomes more assured according as the maturity of character increases. Thus, an irrational-conscientious or conforming type may show a good deal of stability in overt moral behaviour, but neither of them possesses so much of inner consistency and integration as the rational altruistic type, which is more mature.¹⁸³ Similarly, the high correlation (.77) of egostrength with maturity of character also indicates that character maturity requires "rational judgment, emotional maturity and psychological integration", all of which are aspects of egostrength.¹⁸⁴ Superego strength, or a body of internalized principles guiding behaviour, is the next factor highly correlated (.68) with

character maturity. Similarly, an attitude of friendly interest in others was seen to be part of genuine morality (correlation being .57). Spontaneity showed low correlation; hostility and guilt complex was negatively related. The negative correlation with hostility and guilt complex indicates that dissatisfaction and inner hostility with oneself undermines one's moral character.¹⁸⁵

Besides the correlations between character maturity and personality vectors for the group as a whole, each subject's scores on each of the six personality vectors are also reported, and this makes clearer the relationship between character maturity and personality. (Table 66 presents these scores).

As the table (table 66) shows, the development from amoral to rational-altruistic type implies a sequence of "increasing egostrength, including all the characteristics of rational, emotionally mature, integrated behaviour."¹⁸⁶ This development is closely associated also with an "increasing superego strength", or better with an increasingly firm, integrated body of moral principles, called conscience.¹⁸⁷ So the nature of this conscience is different for the different types (or different stages of development) of character.

PECK and HAVIGHURST distinguish *four kinds (or stages) of conscience* within this sequence.¹⁸⁸ The *first kind* is an "internally inconsistent and 'behaviourally ineffectual 'conscience' ". Far from being an integral part of the personality, it resembles a collection of harsh, punitive parental prohibitions, which, however, is inefficient in controlling behaviour. It is typically found in the amoral and expedient characters.¹⁸⁹

The "*second kind of conscience* is a matter of rule conformity". Here the principles are not internalized, but it readily does what the society or the 'respected others' demand, and hence very much externally oriented. It produces a "passive morality" with little initiative and little dependability in a morally critical situation.¹⁹⁰

The "*third type of conscience* consists of moral rules which are deeply

185. Ibidem, p. 88

186. Ibidem, p. 100.

187. Ibidem.

188. Ibidem.

189. Ibidem.

190. Ibidem.

181. Ibidem, p. 86.

182. Ibidem, p. 87.

183. Ibidem, pp. 86, 87

184. Ibidem, p. 87.

Table 66

SCORE PATTERNS OF THE CHARACTER-TYPE GROUPS
ON THE PERSONALITY VECTORS *

Type Group	Case Number	Moral Stability	Ego Strength	Superego Strength	Spontaneity	Friendliness	Hostility-Guilt†
A	T-78	- - -	- -	-	-	- - -	- - -
	T-25	- - -	- -	-	-	- - -	- - -
	T-89	- - -	- -	- - -	+ + +	- - -	- - -
	T-42	- - -	-	-	+ +	-	- - -
	T-99	- - -	- -	- - -	+ +	+	+ + +
CEA	T-95	- - -	- -	- - -	+ + +	-	+
	T-55	- - -	- -	- - -	-	-	+
	T-64	- - -	- -	- - -	-	-	+ + +
E	T-08	- - -	-	+	- - -	- - -	- - -
	T-52	- - -	-	-	- - -	- - -	-
	T-22	-	-	-	- - -	-	+ +
	T-76	-	-	- - -	+	+ +	+ +
IAE	T-16	- - -	- - -	+	- - -	- - -	- - -
	T-37	-	-	+	+	- - -	- - -
C	T-11	- - -	- - -	-	- - -	-	- - -
	T-17	- - -	- -	+	- - -	-	- - -
	T-04	- - -	- - -	- - -	+	- - -	- - -
	T-57	+ +	-	+	-	+ + +	+ + +
	T-34	+ +	-	-	-	+ + +	+ + +
	T-88	+ +	-	+	-	+	+ +
	T-39	+ +	-	+ +	- - -	+ + +	-
	T-49	+ + +	+ +	+ +	-	- - -	- - -
I	T-79	+ +	-	+ + +	- - -	- - -	- - -
	T-83	+ +	-	+ + +	-	- - -	+
	T-28	+ +	+	+ + +	-	-	+
High Secondary R	T-40	-	+ +	-	+ + +	+ + +	-
	T-60	+	+ + +	-	+ + +	+ + +	+ + +
	T-86	+	+ + +	-	+ +	+ +	+ + +
	T-50	+ + +	+ + +	+ + +	-	-	- - -
R	T-53	+ + +	+ + +	+ + +	+	-	+
	T-47	+ + +	+ + +	+	+ + +	+ +	+
	T-51	+ + +	+ + +	+ + +	+ + +	+ + +	+ + +
	T-03	+ + +	+ + +	+	+ +	+ + +	+ + +
	T-06	+	+ + +	+ + +	+ +	+ +	+ +

* Symbol system—Standard score of less than 1.99: - - -; 2.00-2.49: - -; 2.50-2.99: -; 3.00-3.49: +; 3.50-3.99: + +; 4.00 or more: + + +. Mean = 3; sigma = 0.5.

† Scale reversed: minus sign represents more than average Hostility-Guilt; plus sign, less than average.

internalized and rigidly adhered to".¹⁹¹ It is however not open to a rational criticism of oneself; hence it produces an "unvarying, rather stereotyped behaviour", largely uninfluenced by the ego. Though well-internalized, the lack of rational flexibility and openness shows that this is not a mature form of conscience.¹⁹²

The *fourth type of conscience* consists "of firmly internalized moral principles", which are so well integrated with the ego, that it is wrong to consider it as something (i.e. superego) "distinct and cut off from the ego".¹⁹³ Being an integration of all the moral principles, which the individual has incorporated or developed, this type of conscience is an effective guide of behaviour. Here the principles of conduct are open to rational criticism and realistic experience, and thus found to be conducive to one's own well-being and that of others. Because of its rationality and realism it is well equipped to interact smoothly and 'freely with the functions of the ego' and with "impulse life".¹⁹⁴

c) Factors Affecting the Development of Personality and Moral Character

The important factors influencing the development of personality and moral character investigated in this study may be classified into two categories: (i) *Family influences*, and (ii) *Peer influences*.

(i) Family Influences

In order to find the influence of family data on personality, "four dimensions of family dynamics" were related to each of the six personality vectors described above (i.e. moral stability, egostrength, etc.). The four family dimensions were: *Consistency*: includes regularity in the home life, consistency in the control of children, etc. *Democracy vs. Autocracy*, which refers to the 'degree of sharing in family plans' and the like; *Mutual Trust and Approval*

191. Ibidem.

192. The authors add that this type of conscience may form what was called 'neurotic superego' by Freud (cfr. ibidem, pp. 100, 171)

193. Ibidem, pp. 100, 101

194. Ibidem, pp. 100, 171.

among parents and children; *Severity vs. Leniency* in the use of discipline.¹⁹⁵ The following table (table 67) gives these correlations.¹⁹⁶

Table 67. Correlations of Family and Personality Vectors

Variable	F2	F3	F4	P1	P2	P3	P4	P5	P6
F1, Consistency	-.01	.66	.37	.53	.56	.50	.05	.19	-.10
F2, Democracy		.53	-.65	.16	.43	-.07	.36	.33	-.40
F3, Mutual Trust			-.22	.60	.74	.33	.27	.44	-.40
F4, Severity				-.08	-.16	.26	-.38	-.38	.40
P1, Moral Stability					.73	.66	.11	.48	-.37
P2, Ego Strength						.48	.56	.43	-.33
P3, Superego Strength							-.24	.02	-.23
P4, Spontaneity								.39	-.28
P5, Friendliness									-.75
P6, Hostility-Guilt									

Levels of significance: .36 < .05; .44 < .01.

The table shows that the development of *egostrength* depends very much on mutual trust (.74) and consistency (.56). Mutual trust and consistency have a great role also in the development of *moral stability* (.60 and .53 respectively). Consistency (.50) and to a small extent mutual trust (.33) seem to foster *superego strength*. Again, democracy (.36), to a certain extent mutual trust (.27) and a lack of severity (-.38) produce *spontaneity*. Contributors to *friendliness* seem to be mutual trust (.44) and democracy (.33). Finally, severity (.40) together with a lack of trust and approval (-.40) and of democracy (-.40) give rise to *hostility-guilt complex*.¹⁹⁷

It follows that mutual trust and consistency (which correlate .66) are the important factors in the family life which mainly account for the development of moral stability, egostrength, and superego strength (considered as a body of internalized principles effectively guiding behaviour). Democratic attitude and leniency in discipline are additional factors, and they foster especially friendliness and spontaneity. The authors conclude from their find-

195. Ibidem, pp. 103, 256 – 257.

196. Ibidem, p. 104.

197. Ibidem.

ings: "The child's emotional maturity, personality integration, autonomy, rationality of behaviour" and adjustment to the expectations of the society seem to be closely related to the "degree of consistency, mutual trust and approval he experiences within his family".¹⁹⁸

The close positive relationship between maturity of character and personality dimensions (except, of course, guilt-hostility complex) which has been found, suggests that these family dimensions should be closely related also to maturity of character.¹⁹⁹ And the following table (table 68) shows the results of correlating the subjects' maturity of character scores with their families' scores on the four family dimensions.

Table 68. Correlations of the Family Characteristics with the Maturity of Character Scale²⁰⁰

Family Vector	Child's Maturity of Character
F1, Consistency	.58
F2, Democracy-Autocracy	.26
F3, Mutual Trust and Approval	.64
F4, Leniency-Severity	-.16

Level of Significance: .44 < .01

The findings show, taking the group as a whole, that maturity of character is highly significantly related to mutual trust and approval in the home. Therefore, different aspects like "parental trust and faith in the child, the child's readiness to share confidences..., parental approval of the child and of his peer activities, and good interparental relations", all of which together constitute mutual trust and approval in the family, are major contributing factors to the development of mature character.²⁰¹ Consistency, which includes "consistency of parental control, regularity in the home, and common participation in activities by parents and children", is another important factor fostering mature character.²⁰² In other words, conclude the authors, "love and

198. Ibidem, pp. 104 – 105.

199. Ibidem, p. 106.

200. Ibidem.

201. Ibidem, p. 106.

202. Ibidem. Democratic attitudes and leniency, though did not show significant influences by themselves, have more bearing when taken together with the other two factors, observe the authors.

discipline" are "the essential joint determinants of good character". Thus for the development of good, mature character the child should be provided with a "combination of mature love, permissive, but consistently guiding discipline".²⁰³

(ii) Peer Group Influences

According to the findings here, an important way in which peer group²⁰⁴ influences the development of character, say the authors, is by means of rewards and punishments. The group accepts, approves and admires (rewards) those who are "honest, responsible, loyal, kind," etc. On the contrary, those who are dishonest, disloyal, selfish, etc., will be criticized, condemned and rejected (punishments).²⁰⁵ Thus, as a rule, peers tend to choose as their

203. Ibidem, p. 125.

Here we may note two observations the authors make from their findings. (i) The first one concerns the stabilization of moral character. About this the authors say that an individual's character is "largely laid down by age ten and changed little thereafter". This is based on their findings about the consistency in the development of 'conscience and moral values' between the ages of 10 and 16 in their subjects. With regard to the development of 'conscience and moral values', a correlation of .78 was obtained between the ages of 10 and 16; between 10 and 13 years of age, a correlation of .80; and between 13 and 16, a correlation of .98. This high correlation suggests a highly consistent moral development during this period, especially after 13. After this period growth simply makes one more and more that kind of person which one already is. Thus, for example, an amoral child (whether one begins to develop as amoral or as another type depends, according to the findings here, primarily on family experiences) will become, as he grows, a "bigger and stronger amoral person", though he might learn "a few more socialized, superficial adaptations". By this the authors do not exclude the possibility of later influences (e.g. peer-group influences) and consequent change of character; but they add, "prolonged, and deep-going influences" which are necessary to effect a change in this consistent pattern of character do not usually happen "in the average person's life".

(ii) The second observation concerns the effect of the sex of the parent (whether father or mother) from whom the child receives his/her values, or with whom he/she primarily identifies, upon character type. About this the authors found no significant differences (Ibidem, pp. 155 – 158, 121 – 123).

204. Peer group is described as a group of "children of roughly the same age and same school grade who feel and act together" (Ibidem, p. 126).

205. Ibidem, p. 139.

friends, leaders and object of admiration those among them who are thought to be of mature character.

The authors found support for this in the close relationship obtained between maturity of character and peer ratings on six 'socio-moral traits'. These socio-moral traits, of which the measures were obtained from children's descriptions of one another, are: *Warmth*, liking to be with other people, having many friends, being usually happy and cheerful. *Participation*, sticking to groups, working hard for the group, keeping secrets. *Dominance*, liking to run things, guiding others, being chosen as leaders. *Impulsivity*, daring, not afraid of taking chances. *Emotional stability*, control of temper, keeping calm "even when things go wrong", finishing unpleasant jobs, if it is important. *Moral courage*, tells the truth irrespective of consequences, can't be persuaded by friends to act against his convictions, etc.²⁰⁶. The following table (table 69) gives these correlations.²⁰⁷

Table 69. Maturity of Character and Peer Reputation

Peer Rating	Maturity of Character
Warmth	.57
Participation	.51
Dominance	.44
Impulsivity	.13
Emotional Stability	.61
Moral Courage	.67

Significance level: .44 < .01.

As the table shows, peer ratings on five out of six traits correlate with maturity of character beyond the one percent significance level. This reflects, note the authors, two things: the adolescents' choice of friends is based on good moral character, thus fostering the development of such characters; and their ability in assessing good moral characters among their peers.²⁰⁸

The influence of peer group is made still clearer if we look at table 70, which gives each subject's scores on the six socio-moral traits. As the table

206. Ibidem, pp.131 – 133.

207. Ibidem, p. 134.

208. Ibidem.

Table 70

CHARACTER STRUCTURE AND PEER SOCIAL REPUTATION

Character Type	Case No.	Warmth (Age 13)	Participation (Age 13)	Dominance (Age 14)	Impulsivity (Age 14)	Emotional Stability (Age 13)	Moral Courage (Age 13)
A	T-78	+	-	-	+	+	-
	T-25	-	-	-	-	-	-
	T-89	-	-	-	-	-	-
	T-42	-	-	-	+	+	-
	T-99	+	+	+	+	-	-
CEA	T-95	-	-	-	+	-	-
	T-55	-	-	-	-	-	-
	T-64	-	-	-	-	-	-
E	T-08	-	-	-	-	-	-
	T-52	+	+	+	+	+	+
	T-22	+	+	+	+	+	+
	T-76	+	+	+	+	+	+
IAE	T-16	-	-	-	+	-	-
	T-37	+	+	+	+	+	+
C	T-11	-	-	-	+	+	-
	T-17	-	+	-	-	-	+
	T-04	-	-	-	+	-	-
	T-57	-	-	-	-	+	-
	T-34	+	+	+	-	+	+
	T-88	-	-	-	+	-	-
	T-39	+	+	+	-	+	+
	T-49	+	+	+	-	+	+
I	T-79	-	-	-	-	-	-
	T-83	+	-	+	-	+	+
	T-28	-	-	+	-	-	+
High Secondary R	T-40	+	+	+	+	+	+
	T-60	+	+	+	+	+	+
	T-86	+	+	+	+	+	+
	T-50	+	+	+	+	+	+
R	T-53	+	+	+	+	+	+
	T-47	+	+	+	-	+	+
	T-51	+	+	-	-	+	+
	T-03	+	+	+	+	+	+
	T-06	+	+	+	+	+	+

Score of 1.0-2.0: - - -; 2.1-3.0: - -; 3.1-4.0: -; 4.1-5.0: +; 5.1-6.0: + +; 6.1-7.0: + + +.

shows, those from the least mature types (i.e. A, CEA groups) have (except in few isolated cases) low or very low scores on all traits, thus showing that none of them "was seen by his peers as a consistent or dependable person...."²⁰⁹ The picture changes as one approaches the mature characters, espe-

209. Ibidem, p. 134 ff.

cially the 'R' and 'High secondary R' characters, where practically all have high scores on the traits. Hence the importance of peer group influence for the development of moral character.

Further, the authors have found that the six socio-moral traits were themselves very much shaped by family experiences. The following table (table 71) shows the correlations between the four family dimensions and the six socio-moral traits.²¹⁰

Table 71
Relationship of Family Characteristics to Adolescent Social Adjustment ²¹⁰

Family dimensions.	Peer-ratings					
	Warmth	Participation	Dominance	Impulsivity	E. S.	M. C.
Consistency	.42	.36	.42	-.08	.37	.36
Democracy	.47	.49	.54	.50	.44	.51
Mutual trust and approval	.69	.68	.68	.21	.60	.82
Severity	-.35	-.44	-.32	-.29	-.28	-.49

(Levels of significance: .36 < .05; .44 < .01).

As the results show, these socio-moral traits have a rather close, positive relationship (though in varying degrees) to mutual trust, democratic attitude, and consistency in family life, thereby indicating that early family experiences lie at the basis of any social interaction and character development. Thus, the influence of peer group, the authors mean to say, on shaping (or reshaping) moral character is secondary to and dependent on family experiences.²¹¹

210. Ibidem, p. 128.

211. Ibidem, p. 129.

Though the influence of the peer-group, in this sense, is secondary to basic family experiences, the authors note that peer-group has a special role in shaping the child's larger "social loyalties" (like loyalty to the nation, to one's community, professional group, etc.) because it is the "first social group which the child meets outside of his family". Hence, a positive and rewarding experience in the peer-group would lead to positive and healthy attitudes to larger social groups.

Besides, a specific way in which the peer-group may help the development of a ma-

Briefly summarizing PECK and HAVIGHURST'S findings, we may say that moral conduct is rooted in one's character. Mature morality therefore supposes mature character and well-integrated personality. As for factors which shape mature character, family experiences of the child are very important: especially, mutual trust and approval, consistency and democratic attitude in family life. Peer group is another factor which influences the development of character, especially through its acceptance of good characters.

5. The 'Components' of Conscience

In a study G.M. STEPHENSON²¹² investigated the components of internal-control or conscience, and the factors that affect their development. He started from a general assumption prevalent among psychologists and sociologists²¹³ that there are three factors which explain conscience. They are a 'desire to be good', guilt, and shame. These factors "are directly concerned with personal evaluation and direction of conduct, and are relevant to the moral conduct of adults."²¹⁴ To denote the above three factors, STEPHENSON uses the terms *conscience-motive*, *intropunitive-guilt*, and *other-directed anxiety*.

Conscience-motive refers to the "positive aspect of conscience" and implies "an active concern for the welfare of others". *Intro-punitive guilt* denotes the "self inflicted remorse and unhappiness which may follow wrongdoing". *Other-directed anxiety* "refers to the individual's susceptibility to external moral sanctions reflected in the tendency to anticipate and avoid disapproval".²¹⁵ In other words, these three factors correspond to altruism, guilt and shame.

The study consisted in investigating how these components of conscience

ture character is by fostering a 'rational and altruistic' outlook. The peer-group prompts the child to see others' points of view, to compare and evaluate different points of view and to make reasonable modifications. Thus it may contribute to the development of a rational-altruistic character. Hence, conclude the authors, peer-group may be said to be "a laboratory for the learning of moral behaviour... where the learning experience is concrete and heavily reinforced by the rewards and punishments the peer-group dispenses" (ibidem, pp. 139 - 140).

212. G.M. Stephenson, *The Development of Conscience*, London 1966.

213. Ibidem, pp. 2 - 4.

214. Ibidem, p. 4.

215. Ibidem.

were present in his subjects. The subjects were 100 boys (fourth year students of 2 grammar schools and 2 secondary modern schools in a suburban area of England) whose average age was 15.3 (age-range 14.10 - 15.10). All were generally from stable families, and their parents were rated as "loving, tolerant and moderately permissive". The subjects included both middle and working classes.

The three components of conscience were assessed from subjects' responses to a questionnaire, accompanied by interview. Below are a few sample questions for each component:-

Conscience motive: "Some people say it ought to be every man for himself in this world. Do you agree?" - "... What you think is the worst thing a person can do" - "Why do you generally keep the law?" - What is your idea of good parents? - Is lying wrong?

Intropunitive guilt: How does it affect you personally when you have done something wrong? - How do you feel after hurting or humiliating loved ones? - "Can you tell deliberate lies without looking guilty?"

Other-directed anxiety: Have you any bad (or undesirable) habits? - Do you worry about what other people might think? - If someone wrongs you, what is your feeling?

Each of these questions was, of course, followed by further probe-questions which sought to understand the reasons and motives behind the responses the subjects gave²¹⁶.

a) Eight Types of Conscience

The findings of the study showed that some subjects had high measures in all three components of conscience, while others had high measures in one or two, and still others were low in all three measures.

By successive combination (high or low) of the three components, STEPHENSON obtained *eight types of conscience*. They are the following:²¹⁷

216. Ibidem, pp. 66, 67, 75.

217. Ibidem, p. 83 (n refers to the number of subjects falling into each category in Stephenson's study).

	Conscience motive	Intropuni. guilt	Other direct. anxiety	n.
Susceptible Conscience	High	High	High	22
Prescriptive- intropunitive Conscience	High	High	Low	11
Prescriptive Conscience	High	Low	Low	7
Prescriptive- other-directed Conscience	High	Low	High	10
Intropunitive- other-directed Conscience	Low	High	High	9
Intropunitive Conscience	Low	High	Low	8
Other-directed Conscience	Low	Low	High	9
'Psychopathic' Conscience	Low	Low	Low	24
				100

Susceptible Conscience

This is high on all three attributes. One with such a conscience is "highly altruistic, self-accusing and easily ashamed".²¹⁸ A few sample responses of such a conscience to some of the above questions are: Everyone "should look after himself....his children and wife....and everybody should help everybody else..." to help those in trouble gives you a feeling of satisfaction. After doing something wrong he will feel guilty...won't be able to look anybody connected with it in the face. After hurting a loved one his feelings are terrible and tries to make him happy afterwards.²¹⁹

Prescriptive-Intropunitive Conscience

This type of conscience is above average in altruistic considerations and guilt feelings, but low in being guided by shame. Such a one responds: "...you should be bothered about other people"....and then you yourselves will be happier. After doing others wrong he feels bad; he feels he has wronged himself by wronging others. But he is not concerned about what others think of himnot bothered about their opinions.²²⁰

218. Ibidem.

219. Ibidem, pp. 86 – 88.

220. Ibidem, pp. 91 – 92.

Prescriptive Conscience

This is really concerned about others or socially aware, but the feelings of shame and guilt are low. One says, for example: One should keep the laws... "so that there will be a better world"....so that all can live happily together. But after doing something wrong his 'pangs of conscience' do not last long... he can tell even serious lies without looking guilty.²²¹

Prescriptive-Other Directed Conscience

It is low in guilt feelings, but is really concerned about others, and very much susceptible to feelings of shame. One of this type says: He wouldn't say anything to hurt a friend, but he wouldn't mind hurting people he did not know...He is very much self-conscious and always concerned about "what others think of him".²²²

Intropunitive-Other Directed Conscience

This type of conscience feels "little positive sense of obligation", but are highly sensitive to the feelings of others. And it tries to appear to be good in front of others. One says: Lying is not quite right because "it does not get you anywhere really...just leads you on to bigger lies..." But after doing something wrong he feels very bad. He confesses to somebody to get relief. Bad habits worry him; he tries to correct them to make himself "look better in the eyes" of others.²²³

Intropunitive Conscience

It is high in guilt feelings, but low in the other measures. One responds: "They should help each other out a bit, but not too much". You ought to keep the law so that you may not get into trouble... He is not worried about his bad habits, and not concerned about the opinions of others. But after doing wrong, he feels bad... wishes he hadn't done it, and confesses to someone to "get it off your mind"; he often apologizes, not to make impression upon others, but to 'make himself feel better'.²²⁴

221. Ibidem, p. 94.

222. Ibidem, pp. 92 – 93.

223. Ibidem, pp. 93 – 94.

224. Ibidem, pp. 95 – 96.

Otherdirected Conscience

It is high only in its susceptibility to feelings of shame. One says, he would be worried about his bad habits, and try to stop them because others might come to know of them. He wouldn't hurt others' feelings, because they won't like him any more.²²⁵

Psychopathic Conscience

This is low in all three attributes of conscience. A few responses are illustrative. One says: He has to look after "his own interest first, after which he may have a little consideration for others". He usually does not keep the law, because most of them are ridiculous. Others keep the law because "they are afraid of the consequences if they are caught"... Lying is worth trying if you can succeed. After doing wrong he is not worried, he gets away with it. He has bad habits, but he is not concerned about them. Nor is he bothered about what others might say because "everybody is entitled to their own opinion"²²⁶. This shows that low measures in all three attributes indicate a conspicuous lack of conscience.

*

*

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Besides, a further test also showed that there is a likely increase in anti-social behaviour if the scores on all the three components are low. For this a "Delinquency Prediction" test was run for 65 of the above 100 subjects. The headmasters of three schools completed the questionnaire of the "Stott's delinquency prediction instrument" for those subjects. The questionnaire has 6 items, of which the first two are (i) Is he a nuisance, or does he take correction badly?, (ii) Does he choose as companions children who might lead him into such?

Usually "if a boy receives a check against any one of these items, he is regarded as a possible delinquent." Of the 65 subjects, 15 were checked against one or more items, and 50 were unchecked. They were distributed over four conscience types: (a) Those with no attribute high (psychopathic), (b) those with one attribute high (prescriptive, intropunitive, other-directed),

²²⁵. Ibidem, pp. 96 – 97.

²²⁶. Ibidem, pp. 84 – 86. — We should not identify this 'psychopathic conscience' with the 'conscience of the psychopath'. As we shall shortly see, the conscience of a proper psychopath is conspicuously low in all three attributes of conscience. The subjects of this study, however, were not considered as psychopaths.

(c) those with two attributes high (prescriptive-intropunitive, prescr. other-directed, intro. other-directed), (d) those with all three attributes high (susceptible). The distribution yielded the following results: (table 72)²²⁷

Table 72

Types of Conscience and Delinquent Maladjustment

	Conscience Types				Totals
	A N %age	B N %age	C N %age	D N %age	
'Delinquent'	5 (42)	4 (31)	4 (17)	2 (11)	15
'Non-delinquent'	7 (58)	7 (64)	19 (83)	17 (89)	50
Totals	12	11	23	19	65

The table shows that "as the number of high conscience variables increases," the possibility of delinquency decreases. Combining the groups (a and b, c and d), a chi square analysis showed that the correlation between the 'number of high conscience variables' and the decrease of 'possible delinquency' was significant at the level of one per cent (one tail test).²²⁸ However, STEPHENSON observes that none of the conscience variables was "by itself significantly associated with possible delinquency", but "the more attributes of conscience in which a person is deficient", the more likelihood there is of his becoming a delinquent.²²⁹ These findings indicate that altruistic concern, guilt-feelings and shame are important components of the internal controlling force called conscience.²³⁰

²²⁷. Ibidem, pp. 97, 98.

²²⁸. Ibidem, p. 98.

²²⁹. Ibidem.

²³⁰. It may be noted that in an investigation into the nature of psychopathic conscience, reported in the same book, Stephenson found that psychopaths, in comparison to normal subjects, had highly significantly low scores in all three components of conscience. It was, in fact, against the background of his findings about the conscience of the psychopaths that Stephenson conducted the study of the 100 normal subjects described above. As he observes: "It is with the psychopath that this study of conscience begins".

The subjects of his study of psychopaths consisted of an experimental group of 20 psychopaths, (age-range: 17 – 28) diagnosed as psychopaths by one or more psychiatrists, and were patients in psychiatric hospitals; and of a control group of 20 normal

b) Factors Affecting Conscience Development

In relation to the development of the three components of conscience, the following variables were assessed: *Age, intelligence, social class, and parental attitudes.*

Table 73

	Scores of Normal and Psychopathic Groups					
	Psychopaths			Normals		
	Mean	Range	S.D.	Mean	Range	S.D.
<i>Conscience Motive</i>						
Interviewer:	11.40	3-17	3.31	19.65	9-32	2.83
Independent:	11.65	2-23	5.10	19.05	6-32	6.98
<i>Intropunitiv Guilt</i>						
Interviewer:	2.10	0-6	1.58	6.75	0-17	4.20
Independent:	4.00	0-12	3.61	8.30	3-17	3.06
<i>Other-directed Anxiety</i>						
Interviewer:	3.00	1-6	1.18	6.60	1-15	3.75
Independent:	4.50	1-12	3.43	9.20	2-17	4.26

subjects (age-range: 16 - 25) living and working within the city of Nottingham. Both the groups were matching in age, social class and I.Q.

The three attributes of conscience were assessed by practically the same questions as mentioned in the study of the above 100 subjects. The assessments were made from recorded interviews by the interviewer as well as by two independent assessors. Table 73 shows the "mean total scores, ranges and standard deviations for the two groups of subjects".

As the table shows, the mean scores of the psychopaths are lower than those of the normal subjects in all cases, the differences between the two groups being significant at the .001 level. Hence the psychopath, who, by definition, has a very defective conscience, is very low in altruism, guilt-feelings and shame (ibidem, pp. 6, 21 - 2).

The comments of W.McCord and J. McCord, who have made extensive study of psychopaths, also confirm the above findings. The McCords say... "Psychopath is asocial... driven by primitive desires and an exaggerated craving for excitement. He is a man for whom the moment is a segment of time detached from all others... He has learned few socialized ways of coping with frustration. Psychopath feels little, if any, guilt. He can commit the most appalling acts, yet view them without remorse. The psychopath has a warped capacity for love.... These last two traits, guiltlessness and lovelessness, conspicuously mark the psychopath as different from other men". (W.McCord and J.McCord, *The Psychopath*, New York 1964, pp. 16 - 17).

Age, Intelligence and Social Class

It was found that conscience motive and other directed anxiety increase, while guilt feelings decrease, with *age* (all non-significantly). Greater rationality of the growing child, growing independence and sense of obligation are the factors which, according to STEPHENSON, explain the growth of conscience motive with age. Increase in other-directed anxiety should be due to the growing child's increasing affiliation with the peer-group. Hence his growing concern for the opinion of others (e.g. peers). A partial explanation for the decrease of guilt feelings, notes the author, is the growing child's independence from parental ties; less dependence on them means less remorse at hurting them.²³¹

A certain level of *intelligence* is found to be necessary for fostering conscience motive, though "a high level of intelligence" does not necessarily mean a well-developed conscience because there are highly intelligent psychopaths.²³²

Social class differences were found to have a significant effect on conscience motive, and a not-so-significant influence on other-directed anxiety; but it had no bearing on guilt feelings. Middle class subjects showed significantly (at the .01 level) more altruism than the lower class children.²³³ The greater social security, better opportunities and educational advantages which the middle class children enjoy, make them more outgoing and altruistic than the lower class children in whose experience these altruistic ideals might appear to be impractical.²³⁴ As regards the positive relationship between middle class and other-directed anxiety, it is observed that the greater social mobility of the middle class appears to make them more insecure and consequently make them "search for approval from ever changing peers".²³⁵

Parental Attitudes

Several aspects of parent-child relationship like parental acceptance (in-

231. Stephenson, *Ibidem*, p. 100.

232. *Ibidem*, p. 101.

233. *Ibidem*.

234. *Ibidem*, p. 123.

235. *Ibidem*, p. 103.

cluding 'emotional support', 'sharing plans', 'equalitarianism', etc.), control by guilt feelings (i.e. psychological discipline), severity, suppression of aggression, etc., were assessed by 'Parent Behaviour Inventory'. The main findings were the following (see also table 74).

Table 74

Significant Relationships ($p < 0.01$) Found for One parent only		
	Mother	Father
Conscience Motive:	Emotional Support	Control by Guilt Feelings (sig. higher than maternal)
Intropunitive Guilt:	Punishment (-ve) Acceptance Sharing Plans Neglect (-ve)	Suppression of Aggression
Other-directed Anxiety:	Acceptance Equalitarianism Control—in Accepting mothers.	Control by Guilt Feelings

As regards conscience motive, it was found that *acceptance* by both the parents (especially in the form of emotional support from the mother) was highly significantly (at the .001 level) related to it. STEPHENSON adds, "consideration for others may be viewed as a return for love received".²³⁶ Hence the child who has received unconditional love and acceptance from his parents will show unselfish concern for others. Another variable found to foster conscience motive is the *father's use of psychological punishments* (control by guilt feelings), while such discipline from the part of the mother had a negative (non-significant) effect on conscience motive.²³⁷

With regard to guilt feelings, *parental acceptance*, especially in the form of emotional support and 'sharing plans' from the part of the mother, was significantly (at the .01 level) related to it. The child who is loved and supported by the parents feels himself hurt when he hurts his parents. And guilt feelings originate at this feeling of having hurt the loved and needed ones. *Controlling the child's aggressive behaviour* by the father was also significantly related to guilt feelings.²³⁸

236. Ibidem, p. 105.

237. Ibidem, p. 111.

238. Ibidem, pp. 106, 111.

As for other-directed anxiety, *parental acceptance*, i.e. equalitarianism from the part of the mother, and the use of *psychological punishments* by the father were significant.²³⁹

These findings on parental attitudes, on the whole, show that positive accepting attitudes (which includes different aspects like emotional support, equalitarianism, etc.) of the parents are very important in the development of all three aspects of conscience. Though acceptance from both the parents is important, that of the mother (emotional support) seems to have a greater role. As for discipline, father's role was seen to be of greater importance than that of the mother.

STEPHENSON'S findings on the antecedents of the three attributes of conscience may be summarized as follows:

Conscience attribute	Fostering antecedents
Conscience Motive	Age
	Intelligence
	Higher social class
	Parental acceptance (especially maternal emotional support)
Intropunitive-Guilt	Psychol. punishment by the father
	Non-working mothers (for lower class)
	Maternal emotional support
	Control of aggression by the father
Other-directed Anxiety	First-borns with siblings (for middle class)
	Only children
	Non-working mothers (for lower class)
	Age
	Higher social class
Other-directed Anxiety	Maternal equalitarianism
	Psychol. punishment by the father
	Non-working mothers (for lower class)

239. Ibidem, p. 108.

Table 75

Ordinal Position and Intrapunitive Guilt			
	1st-borns (N=62)	2nd-borns (N=22)	later-borns (N=16)
Total Group			
Mean scores	4.419	4.045	2.625
Working-class			
Mean scores	1st-born 3.970 (N=33)		later-born 2.632 (N=19)
Middle-class			
Mean scores	4.931 (N=29)		4.263 (N=19)

Table 76

Intrapunitive Guilt scores of 'Only Children' and '1st-borns with siblings'			
	Only Children (N=12)	Middle-class 1st-born with siblings (N=17)	Working-class 1st-born with siblings (N=24)
Means	4.000	5.588	4.000
Means	(N=9) 3.889		

Besides, Stephenson reports the following findings also: First-borns in the family tend to show more guilt feelings than the later-borns. The first-borns' longer, exclusive relationship with the parents seems to be one reason for this. A comparison of the total mean scores for guilt feelings shows that the difference between the first-borns and the later-borns is significant at the .01 level; between the second- and later-borns significant at the .05 level (table 75). Taken class-wise, however, only the working class subjects showed a significant difference in guilt feelings between the first- and later-borns, the trend being similar, but non-significant, for the middle class. For this non-significant difference in the middle class Stephenson suggests "...middle class, with smaller families and closer-knit family groups, the treatment of children is more equal".

Similarly, first-born-with-siblings seemed to show more guilt feelings than 'only children', the reason being that the first-born-with-siblings' added obligation to set good example for the siblings increases their sense of responsibility. However, the difference was significant (at the .05 level) only for the middle class children (table 76). Hence it appears that middle class families demand more good example from their older children than do lower class families.

In order to assess the effect of working and non-working mothers on the development of their children's conscience, the sons of working and non-working mothers were compared (separately for middle class and working class) on conscience attributes. The

Table 77

Working Mothers and Conscience							
C.M. I.G. O-d.A.	Working Class				Middle Class		
	Mother employed		Not employed		Mother employed		Not employed
	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.	Mean
	6.52	2.59	8.23	2.63	10.41	3.38	10.45
	2.95	1.74	3.83	2.34	4.88	2.47	4.55
	3.24	1.66	4.63	1.82	4.65	1.91	4.77
	N=21		N=30		N=17		N=31

results show that children of non-working lower class mothers were, in comparison to the working mothers' children, significantly higher in conscience motive, guilt (both at the .05 level) and other-directed anxiety (at the .01 level). The difference between children of the working and non-working mothers of the middle class was not significant (table 77). And about this Stephenson remarks: Middle class mothers may provide substitute care to compensate for their absence. Besides, more middle class mothers have part-time jobs (teachers, secretaries, etc.) which enable them to have more time for their children than the lower class working mothers, who usually have arduous full-time jobs (factory works, etc.).

Finally, Stephenson assessed the influence of 'religious practice' on the development of conscience. For this, the subjects were divided into three groups: Religious: those who 'were sent to Sunday School or Church as children and attended still'. Once-religious: those who were once attending Church or Sunday School, but no longer do so. Non-religious: those who rarely or never attended Church or Sunday School. Analysis of conscience ratings for the three groups showed little difference in middle class subjects. In the lower class subjects, however, the 'religious group' scored higher than the other two, though the difference was not significant. Besides, Stephenson adds that virtually in all cases, the religious group scored highest, followed by the non-religious group, the once-religious being the lowest. As far as these findings go, public religious practice is not necessarily associated with the "strength or type of conscience" (ibidem, pp. 113 - 117).

The Learning-Theory Approaches To Conscience

The *cognitive-developmental* approaches have studied the phenomenon of conscience from the point of view of *moral thinking and judgment*. The intellectual maturity and the 'progressing' social relationships or social experiences of the growing child are the key factors of conscience development according to these approaches.

The *identification theory* has explained conscience — especially its *behavioural* and *emotional* aspects — through parental identification. Different aspects of the early parent-child interaction are, therefore, the key factors of conscience development according to the identification theory.

In this chapter we shall see how different types of *learning-theory*¹, "which is probably the most advanced part of psychology"², explains the phenomenon of conscience. As K.FOPPA observes, learning-theories "are not concerned exclusively with the explanation and systematic representation of the learning processes, but are more or less general *theories of behavior*, which merely happen to start from the common assumption that the environmental influences operative in learning processes are of major importance for our understanding of the ways in which the individual adapts to his environment"³.

Of the different types of learning-theories, the following three attempt to explain conscience according to their principles: *classical conditioning theory*, *instrumental learning theory*, and *observational learning theory*.

1. It may be noted that 'learning theory' is not a uniform one. There are different patterns of learning, of which the principles, though to a certain extent mutually inclusive, are not the same. Hence, there are different types or forms of learning-theories. Research in the field of learning, especially with infra-human subjects (mice, dogs, etc.) is much advanced, though this does not mean that all the 'mechanisms' involved in learning are well established. For a general view of 'learning-theory' see chapter VIII.

2. H.J.Eysenck, "The Development of Moral Values in Children", *British Journal of Educational Psychology*, 1960, p. 11.

3. K. Foppa, "Learning Theory", in H.J.Eysenck et alii (Eds), *Encyclopedia of Psychology*, London 1972, Vol. II, p. 193.

A. Conscience and Classical Conditioning

According to *classical conditioning*, if a neutral stimulus is immediately (e.g. half-a-second) followed by a natural or unconditioned stimulus (U.S.), by repeated pairing of the two stimuli for a sufficient number of times, the neutral stimulus will elicit from the organism a response similar to the one elicited by the natural stimulus (U.S.). The originally neutral stimulus becomes now a conditioned stimulus (C.S.). Thus, for example, a dog will pull back its leg if it is given an electric shock at the paw — a natural and spontaneous response to the shock. But, if the giving of the shock is immediately preceded by a buzzer, and if this practice is repeated for a number of times, the dog will pull back its leg at the buzzer, without the electric shock following. What reinforces this response is the electric shock (U.S.) which has been paired to the buzzer. Thus, in classical conditioning, the reinforcement precedes the response. What is important here, therefore, is the contiguity of the stimuli, that is, the U.S. should closely follow the C.S.⁴ The dog's pulling back its leg at the electric shock is supposed to be a reflex action due to the automatic nervous system. By repeated pairing of the stimuli, the dog's response becomes conditioned to the buzzer. Hence, this latter response is a conditioned response or reflex.

H.J.EYSENCK explains the phenomenon of conscience in terms of such a conditioning theory.

1. Conscience: A Conditioned Reflex

Just as an infrahuman organism can be conditioned to respond to a variety of stimuli, EYSENCK observes, conditioned responses can be produced also in human subjects; and anxiety is such an easily conditionable response. It is "a conditioned fear response attached to a previously neutral stimulus"⁵. J.B.WATSON'S and P.RAYNOR'S experiment with the one-year-old boy, Albert, says EYSENCK, shows how easily fear can be conditioned in human

4. W.I.Smith and J.W.Moore, *Conditioning and Instrumental Learning*, New York 1966, pp. 18, 31.

5. Eysenck, "The Development of Moral Values" p. 13.

beings, especially in young children. The WATSON-RAYNOR experiment was the following:

Albert was a one-year-old infant. His mother was a wet nurse in a Home for invalid children. Therefore, he was reared almost from birth in an hospital environment. He was described as an unusually healthy and unemotional child First of all, he was shown an array of more or less furry objects: a white rat, a rabbit, a dog, a monkey, masks with and without hair, cotton wool, burning news papers,... etc. At no time did Albert show fear of these objects...

The experimenters' plan was to use the white rat as a 'conditioned stimulus' and see "if it could be made to elicit signs of fear by associating it with the noise produced by striking a steel bar a sharp blow".

On the first conditioning trial, the white rat was suddenly taken from the basket and presented to Albert. "He began to reach for rat with left hand. Just as his hand touched the animal the bar was struck immediately beyond his head. The infant jumped violently and fell forward, burying his face in the mattress. He did not cry, however." On the second trial, the bar was struck as the child touched the rat with his right hand.... signs of fear similar to the first trial occurred. One week later five more similar trials were conducted, and on the eighth trial "the rat alone was presented" without the bar-stricking.

"The instant the rat was shown the baby began to cry. Almost instantly he turned sharply to the left, fell on left side, raised himself on all fours and began to crawl away..."

"Five days later the boy was tested for generalization of fear to other objects. Wooden blocks were accepted and manipulated as usual. But then the rabbit was suddenly placed on the mattress before him". Pronounced reactions of fear occurred at once....

"Less marked but definite evidences of fear generalization were likewise observed in the little boy's reactions to a dog, a fur coat, cotton wool, and a Santa Claus mask..."

There is thus clear cut evidence for conditioned fear response, and its transfer to similar objects (toy dog, fur coat), but not to dissimilar objects (wooden blocks).⁶

In a similar way, anxiety is conditioned in young children in the process of socialization, says EYSENCK.

6. For the findings of the Watson-Raynor experiment (J.B.Watson and P.Raynor, "Conditioned Emotional Reactions", *Journal of Experimental Psychology*, 1920 (3), pp. 1 - 14) we depend on O.H.Mowrer, *Learning Theory and Behaviour*, New York 1960, pp. 392,393.

The young child behaves in a "socially undesirable manner", i.e. he spoils things, goes about unclean, he may cheat, tell lies, become aggressive, or behave "in whatever way antisocial behaviour is defined in a society"⁷. However, when the child behaves in an undesirable manner, the parent "will immediately give him a smack, or stand him in the corner..." or inflict anyone of the many customary punishments upon him. Thus a socially undesirable activity of the child is "immediately followed by a strong, pain-producing stimulus". This produces the response of "pain and fear" in the young child. By the process of conditioning, that is, by pairing the child's undesirable activity and punishment, the punished activity will come to elicit a 'conditioned fear response' or anxiety in the child, which was originally elicited by punishment. "After a few repetitions this fear response should be sufficiently strong to keep the child from indulging in that type of activity again, just as little Albert was prevented from indulging in his customary play with white rats"⁸.

The fear conditioned in the child by the punishment of particular activities is generalized to similar activities — this process is called 'stimulus generalization' — just as in the case of little Albert, where the conditioned fear of the white rat was generalized to similar objects like rabbits, furry animals etc.⁹ Stimulus generalization is facilitated by what is called 'labelling', which parents often do. Whenever the child misbehaves, besides punishing, the parent labels his misbehaviour with a term of disapproval like 'bad', 'naughty', 'wicked', etc. The child groups together all such 'labelled behaviour' as "potentially dangerous" and "punishment producing". Consequently, the conditioned anxiety is generalized to a "wide set of different behaviour patterns" which are labelled or disapproved by parents. And, according to EYSENCK, what is called *conscience* is this "conditioned anxiety response to certain types of situations and actions", namely, to those situations and actions which were labelled and punished by parents, and to which, consequently, fear is conditioned.¹⁰

7. Eysenck, "The Development of Moral Values", p. 14.

8. H. J. Eysenck, *Crime and Personality*, London 1964, p. 107.

9. Eysenck, "The Development of Moral Values", p. 14.

10. Eysenck, "The Development of Moral Values", p. 13.

Once this anxiety is conditioned, whenever the child is tempted to do something forbidden, there arises in the child "strong upsurge of conditioned emotional reaction, fear or anxiety which has become conditioned to his approach" to such things in the past. In such temptation situations the individual will resist temptation or, as EYSENCK says, "conscience will win the day" if the conditioning of anxiety has been strong enough.¹¹

2. Factors in Conscience-Development

Since "conscience is the combination and culmination of a long process of conditioning"¹², factors affecting conditioning similarly affect conscience also. Two such important factors are the *conditionability* of the individual and the *process of conditioning*.

Conditionability refers to the ease with which an individual can be conditioned, and in this regard all people are not equal. EYSENCK observes that conditionability is related to the 'introversion-extroversion' trait of personality: introverts are easily conditionable while extroverts are not easily conditionable.¹³




Figure 10

11. Ibidem, p. 14.

12. Eysenck, *Crime and Personality*, p. 120.

13. Ibidem, p. 121.

(Figure 10 shows the difference between introverts and extroverts in conditionability). It is based on a study of introverts and extroverts, using 'eye-blink' as the conditioned response. The unconditional stimulus was a "puff of air delivered to the cornea of the eye" which causes a reflex closure of the eyelid. This 'puff of air' was paired with an 'auditory stimulus' (conditioned stimulus) transmitted through earphones. The subjects became conditioned to the auditory stimulus, but there was a remarkable difference between the introvert and extrovert subjects. The "introverts show about twice as many conditioned responses as do the extroverts"¹⁴, as the figure indicates.

Of course, people are not purely extroverts or introverts; they are rather distributed on a continuum where most people fall between the two extremes of introversion and extroversion.¹⁵ Hence, according to EYSENCK, conscience or 'conditioned anxiety response' is easily developed in those who are more introverted, and it is developed with more difficulty in those who are more extroverted.

Besides conditionability, the development of conscience supposes the *process of conditioning*, that is, pairing of the conditioned and unconditioned stimuli. It is this pairing that takes place in the process of socialization, where the child's asocial and anti-social behaviour is paired with punishment so that on subsequent occasions the child's approach to such behaviour arouses the disagreeable feelings of anxiety, which prompt the child to inhibit the behaviour. Hence EYSENCK calls socialization "conditioning in the right direction".¹⁶

If the anxiety generated and conditioned through the process of socialization is strong enough, conscience also will be strong. In this context EYSENCK stresses the importance of the time-factor in punishing the child's misbehaviour. In order to be effective, punishment should *immediately* follow the misdeed.¹⁷ Thus, if the child's "misdemeanour is immediately followed by a slap, withdrawal of love or some other punishment" it should be much more conducive (than a delayed punishment) to the development of conscience.

14. Ibidem, pp. 69, 81.

15. Eysenck, "The Development of Moral Values", p. 15.

16. Eysenck, *Crime and Personality*, p. 137.

17. H. J. Eysenck, "A Note on Some Criticisms of the Mowrer/Eysenck Conditioning Theory of Conscience", *British Journal of Psychology*, 1965, p. 305.

Thus, according to the conditioning theory, conscience is a 'conditioned anxiety response' developed in the process of socialization. Hence the conditionability of the individual and the process of socialization are the main factors which affect its development.

B. Conscience and Instrumental Learning

While according to the classical conditioning theory, conscience is a conditioned reflex, according to *instrumental learning* theory, conscience is a phenomenon learned through the instrumentality of rewards and punishments. There are however different patterns of instrumental learning, based on different kinds of reinforcements.

Thus, for example, a hungry rat (to take an infrahuman subject) can be taught to press a bar and obtain food, by rewarding (positive reinforcement) its appropriate responses. Or, a rat can be taught to 'turn off' a switch and avoid shock if the appropriate responses are reinforced by the removal of the aversive stimuli (negative reinforcement). Through the removal of aversive stimuli, the animal can be taught also to avoid or inhibit certain behavior patterns (for further illustration, see chapter VIII).

These responses of the animal, which were strengthened by external rewards and punishments in the process of learning, become, once learned, independent of these external factors, i.e. they become internalized. And these internalized responses show a good deal of permanence or resistance to extinction.

As an animal learns to do or not to do certain things through direct rewards and punishments, the child also learns to do or not to do certain things, based on his experience of rewards and punishments. This pattern of learning, hold the instrumental learning theorists, plays the key role in the process of socialization and in the development of the inner control called conscience.¹⁸

18. W.F.Hill, "Learning Theory and the Acquisition of Values". in R.C.Johnson et alii (Eds), *Conscience, Contract and Social Reality*, p. 262.

1. Conscience as Internalized Control

How socialization is effected through the process of instrumental learning is succinctly explained by J. ARONFREED as follows:

"A great part of socialization takes place through the reinforcing and suppressive effects of outcomes of the child's overt behaviour. These outcomes occur in the onset, termination, or modulation of various socially transmitted stimuli which have a positive or aversive value for the child. The requirements of this form of learning are that the child must emit some overt behaviour, and that a contingency be established between the behaviour and its outcome. The outcome can be effective only if it follows the behaviour within a relatively short span of time. However, the time over which the outcome can be effective can be extended if gap is bridged by the child's cognitive representation of the act. Behaviour becomes internalized when its elicitation, under control of appropriate cues, shows some independence of its external outcomes. When an act and its outcomes have been paired on a sufficient number of occasions the affective changes that is induced in the child by the outcomes may be directly attached (conditioned) to the intrinsic behavioural cues or cognitive representation which are associated with the act. Components of this affectivity may then be evoked by the intrinsic correlates of the act even in the subsequent absence of any external consequences".¹⁹

This means that, in the context of socialization, the child's behaviour brings with it some consequences, either rewards (for good behaviour) or punishments (for bad behaviour), and that in the beginning the child's behaviour is controlled by these rewards and punishments. These outcomes, however, produce in the child a corresponding affect: rewards produce a pleasurable affect, and punishments, an aversive or painful one. By repeated pairing of a particular act with its consequences (reward or punishment according to the nature of the act), the corresponding affective state becomes conditioned to the cues of that act. Once the affect is so conditioned, on subsequent occasions when the child perceives the cues of an act, there arises in him the corresponding affect, pleasurable or aversive according to the nature of the act. Consequently, his behaviour will be controlled by these internal affective states, irrespective of the actual occurrence of the consequences. Thus the child's behaviour becomes internally controlled or internalized.

19. J. Aronfreed, *Conduct and Conscience*, New York 1968, p. 49.

In the case of the child (unlike in the case of infrahuman subjects) this internalization is facilitated by the child's cognitive capacity. This capacity enables the child to represent to himself abstractly the consequences of his act. It also enables him for a better perception, discrimination and generalization of the cues of an act, which are usually verbally communicated to him by socializing agents. And the internal affective states are aroused by the child's cognitive representations of the cues and the outcomes of an act.²⁰ Thus, the acquisition and function of internalized control implies cognitive and affective processes. And, *conscience* refers to an internalized control over conduct, which consists of cognitive, evaluative and affective processes.²¹

Here it should be noted that according to some theorists (e.g. ARONFREED), internalized control as such is not identical with conscience, because internalized control can be effected also by anxiety which may not imply any cognitive evaluation of one's behaviour.²² Conscience in the proper sense refers to that internalized control which is effected by the affective states involving *cognitive evaluation* of one's behaviour. It, therefore, implies evaluation of one's behaviour in the light of one's (moral) values, especially in the light of its consequences for others.²³

In its theoretical discussion and empirical investigation of conscience, the instrumental learning theory focuses mainly on the *control of behaviour* (behavioural dimension) and on *post-transgressional reactions* (emotional dimension).

2. The Control of Behaviour

By *control of behaviour*, we mean learning to *perform* those behaviours

20. Aronfreed, *Ibidem*, pp. 68, 69, 183.

21. Aronfreed, *Ibidem*, pp. 5, 6.

22. However, certain others do not make such distinctions, or, at least, the distinction is not so explicitly stated. These theorists equate conscience with internalized control, without specially stressing the role of cognitive-evaluation in this control (cfr. W.F.Hill, "Learning Theory and the Acquisition of Values", in R.C.Johnson et alii (Eds), *Conscience, Contract and Social Reality*, pp. 266 – 270).

23. Cfr. Aronfreed, *ibidem*, p. 54.

that are *socially acceptable*, and to *inhibit* those that are *socially unacceptable*.

a) Learning the Control of Behaviour

Socially acceptable behaviour is learned primarily through positive rewards. As already explained, rewarded behaviour arouses 'pleasurable affective state' irrespective of external outcomes. Once it is thus internalized, the act becomes self-reinforcing. Consequently, not only its actual performance but also its contemplation comes to be associated with pleasurable affect. Thus the child is motivated to behave in a socially acceptable manner. The learning of socially approved behaviour (i.e. rewarded behaviour) may be facilitated also by the frustration (non-reward) which the child may have experienced on occasion when he chose behaviours contrary to the rewarded ones.²⁴

Inhibition of *socially unacceptable* behaviour (or 'resistance to temptation') is learned primarily through punishment or 'aversive controls'. Punished behaviour arouses an 'aversive affective state', which may be called anxiety. This anxiety motivates the child to inhibit the punished behaviour, and inhibition, in its turn, reduces the aroused anxiety. This anxiety-reduction, which is contingent on the inhibition of socially unacceptable behaviour, reinforces this response. Thus the child learns to resist temptation. Besides motivating the child to inhibit the unacceptable behaviour, the aroused anxiety may motivate the child also to choose alternative forms of behaviour, i.e. socially acceptable ones.²⁵

Different aspects of punishment are considered to affect its efficacy in effecting behavioural suppression. The important ones among these are the following:²⁶

24. Aronfreed, *Ibidem*, p. 54.

25. Aronfreed, *Ibidem*, p. 55.

26. Cfr. Aronfreed, *Ibidem*, pp. 171, 183, 193 ff; also, R. D. Parke and R. H. Walters, "Some Factors Influencing the Efficacy of Punishment Training for Inducing Response Inhibition", *Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development*, Serial no. 109, 1967 (32/1).

Timing of punishment: Punishment at the commencement of a misdeed is supposed to be more effective in inducing inhibition of behaviour or resistance to temptation. Such a schedule of punishment, it is argued, serves better to arouse the child's anxiety already at his approach to a forbidden behaviour, and thus motivates him to resist temptation better (than if punishment is administered after the completion of a misdeed; this latter schedule of punishment is supposed to foster the learning of post-transgressional reactions.)

Intensity of punishment: Intense or severe punishment arouses intense anxiety in the child, which, in turn, motivates the child for a stronger inhibition of the punished behaviour.

Ease of discrimination: Easy discrimination between the nature and circumstances of the punishable and the non-punishable behaviours will facilitate the child's task of choosing the unpunishable ones and inhibiting the punishable ones. The child can be helped very much in this task through appropriate parental instruction in the context of administering punishments and rewards.

Besides, *frequency* and *consistency* of punishment, *warm relationship* between the punishing agent and the recipient of punishment, etc., are also considered to be factors affecting the efficacy of punishment.

b) Empirical Findings about the Control of Behaviour

Though the learning of positive control is considered to be effected through positive rewards, very little empirical study has been done on this point. Comparatively more research has been done into the role of punishment in the learning of behaviour inhibition. Of the following studies, the first one investigates the role of positive reinforcement in the learning of altruism; the others investigate various aspects affecting the efficacy of punishment in the learning of resistance to deviation (or resistance to temptation).

i) The Learning of Altruistic Behaviour

D. J. DOLAND and K. ADELBERG²⁷ studied the effect of positive reinforcement

27. D. J. Doland and K. Adelberg, "The Learning of Sharing Behaviour", *Child Development*, 1967 (38), pp. 695 – 700.

upon children's learning of sharing behaviour. The subjects of the study were two groups of preschool age (mean age: 4 1/2 years) children: one group consisted of 20 (10 boys and 10 girls) white children from a nursery school, and the other, of 16 (9 boys and 7 girls) children (majority Negro) from a child welfare centre.

Each child was provided with an opportunity to share either spontaneously or following learning trials. The learning trials consisted of a specially devised game, in which the subject was encouraged to share with a confederate (who was of about the same age as the subject) of the E some of the drawings which had been given to him (or her). In fact, the subject was expected to share those pictures which were not matching with his set, but were matching with the confederate's set. If a subject did not share in the first 'trial-game', he took part in a second one, in which the confederate was supposed to share. The confederate, upon previous instruction by the E, readily shared some of his pictures with the subject. And this behaviour of the confederate was highly approved and profusely praised by the E. Following this, another sharing-test was conducted, in which the subject had the opportunity to share.²⁸

The findings showed the significant effect of positive approval and praise upon the subjects' learning of sharing behaviour. The difference between the groups in sharing was very large before the learning trials: 10 out of the 20 nursery school children shared, but only 2 of the 16 welfare centre children shared (difference is significant at the .05 level). Welfare centre children's sharing was very low because, say the authors, in comparison to the nursery children, they are both "less responsive to social reinforcement and less frequently exposed to appropriate learning situations".²⁹

After the learning trials, all 10 initial non-sharers from the nursery school shared, and 9 of the 14 initial non-sharers from the welfare centre also shared. This increase in sharing behaviour effected by social reinforcement and observation of model was significant at the .05 level.³⁰

ii) Timing of Punishment and Temptation Resistance

J. ARONFREED and A. REBER³¹ (henceforth reference only to ARON-

development, 1967 (38), pp. 695 – 700.

28. Ibidem, pp. 695 – 696.

29. Ibidem, p. 696.

30. Ibidem.

31. J. Aronfreed and A. Reber, "Internalized Behavioural Suppression and the Timing

FREED) tested the effectiveness of different timings of punishment upon learning internalized suppression of punished behaviour. The subjects of this study were 88 fourth and fifth grade boys (between the ages of about 10 and 12) from a public school in Philadelphia. They were divided into two experimental groups of 34 each, and a control group of 20.

First there were nine training trials in which each subject was to choose between an attractive toy and an unattractive one, and to describe its function for him if asked to do so by the E. The experimental groups were told in advance that some of the toys were meant for older boys, and the control group was told that the attractive toys were for older boys. During the training trials, however, whenever the subjects from the *first experimental group* approached for the attractive toy, the E firmly rebuked him saying, "that is for the older boys"; besides, he was not asked to describe its function. But when the child approached for the unattractive toy, he was permitted to take and describe it. The procedure for the *second experimental group* was the same, except that the experimenter's rebuke came 2 or 3 seconds *after* the child had taken the toy. Therefore, the difference between the experimental groups consisted in the *timing* of punishment: the first group was punished *before* the 'misdeed' (called 'punishment at initiation' group) occurred; the second group was punished *after* the 'misdeed' occurred (called 'punishment at completion' group). The control group children were not rebuked for their choice of the attractive toys; they were not asked to describe them either.

After the training trials, there was a test-trial, in which each subject was to choose between a still more attractive toy and a very unattractive one, while the E was absent. By a special arrangement the child's choice was noted down. Upon return, the E asked the subject about his choice in order to see his reactions.³²

It was found at the test trial that punishment at the initiation of a misdeed was more effective in learning internalized suppression of a behaviour. (table 78).³³ This finding confirms, adds ARONFREED, that the suppression of a punished behaviour is a "positive function of the intensity of the anxiety, which is mobilized at the onset of a transgression". This anxiety, in turn, "is a function of the original temporal relationship between this locus and the occurrence of punishment".³⁴ Besides, the effect of punishment on the

of Social Punishment", *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 1965 (1), pp. 3 - 16.

32. Ibidem, pp. 6 - 8.

33. Ibidem, p. 9.

34. Ibidem, p. 11.

Table 78
FREQUENCY OF TEST TRANSGRESSION AND
NONTRANSGRESSION FOLLOWING EACH OF
THREE TRAINING PARADIGMS

Behavior during test situation	Training paradigms		
	Punishment at Initiation (N = 34)	Punishment at Completion (N = 34)	Control (N = 20)
Transgression	9	24	16
Nontransgression	25	10	4

Note: Chi square values for the 2x2 contingency tables comparing each two of the three training conditions, with respect to frequencies of transgression and non-transgression during the test:

Punishment at initiation vs. punishment at completion: $\chi^2 = 11.54$, $p < .001$

Punishment at initiation vs. control: $\chi^2 = 12.44$, $p < .001$

Punishment at completion vs. control: $\chi^2 = .19$, ns

(All values shown here are for one-tailed tests and incorporate a correction for continuity).

suppression of behaviour, observe the authors, was clear during the very training trials. During the training trials, the non-punished subjects (the control group) tended to choose persistently the attractive toys (though they had been told once that they were for older boys). On the contrary, the punished subjects chose the attractive toy once, twice, or thrice; but afterwards fairly consistently they chose the unattractive one. Further, during the training trials, those punished at the initiation "exposed themselves to punishment less frequently than did those punished at completion (table 79).³⁵

ARONFREED observes also the difference between those punished at initiation and those punished at completion in their admission of transgression. Of the 9 transgressors of the punishment at initiation group only 4 admitted transgression, while 16 of the 24 transgressors of the punishment at completion group admitted transgression. This notable difference, argue the authors, is on account of a 'reaction of anxiety' following transgression in the second group. This also indicates that punishment at completion fosters post-

35. Ibidem, p. 9.

Table 79
FREQUENCY OF TRANSGRESSION AND PUNISHMENT DURING TRAINING AMONG
TEST TRANSGRESSORS AND NONTRANSGRESSORS TRAINED UNDER
EACH OF TWO VARIATIONS IN TIMING OF PUNISHMENT

Experimental group	Frequency of punishment during training							
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Punishment at Initiation								
Transgressors	1	3	2	2		1		
Nontransgressors	1	11	7	5		1		
Both test groups	2	14	9	7		2		
Punishment at Completion								
Transgressors	1	5	10	4	1	2		1
Nontransgressors		2	3	3		1		
Both test groups	1	7	13	7	1	3	1	1

Note: The two total training groups (punishment at initiation vs. punishment at completion) are significantly different from each other ($\chi^2 = 3.16, p < .05$) if the number of children who received less than two punishments are compared with those who received two or more punishments.

transgressional reactions, while punishment at initiation fosters resistance to temptation.³⁶

36. Ibidem, pp. 10 – 11.

Relevant findings from other related studies are noted below.

(i) In a similar study, using 44 kindergarten children of a public school in Toronto, R. Walters and L. Demkow had findings which supported the hypothesis that early punishment is more conducive to learning temptation resistance (R. Walters and L. Demkow, "Timing of Punishment as a Determinant of Response Inhibition", *Child Development*, 1963, (34), pp. 207 – 214).

(ii) Empirical verification of learning theory principles, as already noted, is based largely on experiments with animals. In this context, it is quite in place to have a closer look at one of a series of experiments regarding 'temptation resistance' and 'guilt' in young dogs, which had much influence on investigation into children's temptation resistance and post-transgressional reactions.

R.L. Solomon (and his collaborators) first trained six-months-old puppies to forgo tasty horse meat and to eat untasty commercial dog chow. The hungry puppies were first exposed to both kinds of meat. But if they approached the tabooed horse meat they were swatted by the E as soon as they touched the meat. This training continued until the puppies learned to avoid (consecutively for 12 times) the horse meat. Then followed a testing situation in the absence of the E, in which these starved puppies were exposed to both the kinds of meat for half-an-hour each day. After this half-an-hour of testing, they would be moved to the cage, but would not be fed there, but would be exposed to

iii) Some Factors Affecting the Efficacy of Punishment for Learning Temptation Resistance

In this study³⁷ R. PARKE and R.H. WALTERS studied how the *relationship* (nurturance) between the punishing agent and the punished one, the

the testing situation again the next day. It was observed whether, and how long, the puppies would avoid the horse meat in spite of starvation (it may be noted that the amount of untasty meat available in the testing situation was so little that it alone could not satiate the starved puppies). Solomon reports: "All puppies gobbled up the three pellets (unforbidden meat) with a short reaction time and then went through various antics in relation to the large dish of horse meat. Some puppies walked around the room with their eyes toward the wall, not looking at the dish. Other puppies got down on their bellies and slowly crawled forward barking and whining. There was a large range of variability in the emotional behaviour of the puppies in the presence of the tabooed horsemeat".

Solomon found a very great range of resistance to temptation (not eating the horse meat) in these puppies during the test in the absence of the experimenter. Some could not hold out more than six minutes, while others resisted temptation for sixteen days, after which the experiment was terminated because the puppies could not stand starvation any longer.

Discussing his findings, Solomon says that punishing the puppies as they approach the tabooed meat was more effective in producing resistance to temptation than punishing them after they have eaten it. This latter schedule of punishment fosters "emotional disturbances following the crime" rather than temptation resistance.

Applying these findings to child socialization and conscience, the author observes that these two schedules of punishment "represent two major types of socialization techniques used by parents. In one case the parent traps the child into the commission of a tabooed act so that the child can be effectively punished, the hope being that this will prevent the child from performing the act again. The other technique is to watch the child closely and to try to anticipate when the child intends to do something wrong and punish the child during the incipient stages. Each of these techniques, according to our observations with the puppies, should lead to a very different outcome with regard to the components of 'conscience', that is, the first schedule fosters the development of post-transgressional reactions, while the second fosters temptation-resistance. Therefore, adds Solomon, these two components of 'conscience' are "partially independent", and by "appropriate training procedures" (schedules of punishment) the strength of these components of conscience can be varied (R. L. Solomon, "Preliminary Report on Temptation and Guilt in Young Dogs", in R. C. Johnson et alii (Eds), *Conscience, Contract and Social Reality*, pp. 277 – 281).

37. R. Parke and R.H. Walters, "Some Factors Influencing the Efficacy of Punishment Training for Inducing Response Inhibition", pp. 6 – 19.

intensity (high or low) and *timing* (early or late) of punishment will affect the learning of resistance to temptation.

The subjects were 80 first- and second-grade-boys (average age 7 years). They were assigned to the following eight experimental conditions (10 per group): (i) high nurturance-high intensity-early punishment, (ii) high nurturance-high intensity-late punishment, (iii) high nurturance-low intensity-early punishment, (iv) high nurturance-low intensity-late punishment, (v) low nurturance-high intensity-early punishment, (vi) low nurturance-high intensity-late punishment, (vii) low nurturance-low intensity-early punishment, and (viii) low nurturance-low intensity-late punishment.

High nurturance situation consisted in warm and friendly interactions (twice, for 10 minutes each) between the subject and the E, in which the subject was also given attractive toys, etc., for playing and drawing. With the low nurturance group, the E was cool and impersonal; and the subjects were given only unattractive toys and drawing materials. After the two sessions of interaction with the E, the subject underwent a 'punishment training' of 9 trials, in which the subject had to choose between an attractive and an unattractive toy (This procedure was similar to that described in the ARONFREED and REBER study). Punishment (for the choice of attractive toy) consisted of verbal rebuke ('No, that's for the other boy') and an aversive tone coming from a generator. Intensity of punishment was varied by varying the loudness of the tone. For the early punished group, the punishment was administered as the subject's hand neared the attractive toy; for the late punished group, the punishment was given after the subjects had picked up the attractive toy and held it for about two seconds. Upon completion of the punishment training, the subject's resistance to deviation was tested in a situation, in which he was left alone with some attractive toys (identical with the prohibited toys used in the punishment training) for 15 minutes. In this test the subject was given no command or instruction.

The following five measures of temptation resistance were obtained from this study: (a) the latency of the subject's first deviation, (b) the number of times he deviated, (c) total time for which he deviated, (d) weighted number of deviations, and (e) weighted duration of deviation. Weighted deviation scores were calculated in the following manner: "A deviation involving one of the three most accessible toys (those in the front row) was scored 1; a deviation involving one of the toys in the second row was scored 2; touching a toy in the third row was scored 3. A weighted number-of-deviations and a weighted duration score were then obtained by multiplying the number of times the child touched toys in each class, and the amount of time for which he handled them, by appropriate weights".³⁸

38. Ibidem, pp. 6 - 10.

The findings showed that "children receiving *high intensity* punishment deviated less quickly, less often, and for shorter periods of time than children receiving *low intensity* punishment". Another factor which was seen to foster the efficacy of punishment was the *nurturant relationship*. "Children experiencing the high nurturance treatment deviated less often and for briefer periods, but not less frequently, than children experiencing the low nurturance treatment". However, differences in the *timing of punishment* did not show any notable effect on temptation resistance in this study (tables 80 and 81).³⁹ We may also refer table 82 which gives a summary of the analyses of variance. Besides the effect of nurturance, intensity and timing of punishment, the table presents also the findings concerning the effects of frequency of punishment and of various interactions upon the five measures of temptation resistance.⁴⁰

(iv) Timing and Intensity of Punishment in Relation to Temptation Resistance

In another study⁴¹ (which was a continuation of the above described one) PARKE and WALTERS tested the effect of *timing of punishment* (which did not show a significant difference in the above study) and of *intensity of punishment* on resistance to temptation.

The subjects were 49 boys (mean age: 6 years and 11 months). They were assigned to 4 experimental groups involving 2 different timings (early vs. late) and 2 levels of intensity (high vs. low) of punishment. The high intensity-early group had 13 subjects, the others, 12 each. The procedure was the same as that described in the previous study, except for a slight modification introduced in order to provide a better control over the 'timing of punishment' manipulation. As in the previous study, five measures of resistance to deviation were obtained.⁴²

The findings showed some significant effects of *timing of punishment* upon temptation resistance. "Early punished subjects deviated significantly ($p < .05$) less frequently" than those "punished only after the completion of the deviant response sequence". This difference in the frequency of deviation between early and late punishment was obtained for weighted and un-

39. Ibidem, p. 11.

40. Ibidem, p. 19.

41. Ibidem, pp. 19 - 24.

42. Ibidem, pp. 19 - 21.

Table 80

GROUP MEANS, SD's, AND MEDIANS FOR FIVE INDICES OF RESPONSE INHIBITION

	HIGH NURTURANCE											
	High Intensity						Low Intensity					
	Early Punishment			Late Punishment			Early Punishment			Late Punishment		
	Mean	SD	Median	Mean	SD	Median	Mean	SD	Median	Mean	SD	Median
Latency (seconds).....	387.4	320.33	245.0	309.8	320.77	166.0	191.9	336.58	23.5	322.0	346.95	212.5
Number of deviations....	3.8	3.46	3.0	7.7	5.80	7.5	10.6	6.86	13.0	5.5	6.39	1.5
Weighted number.....	4.0	3.95	3.0	8.2	6.29	8.5	12.5	8.55	14.5	5.7	6.66	1.5
Duration of deviations (seconds).....	20.2	38.19	3.0	76.6	101.40	43.5	125.3	114.78	104.0	89.6	150.44	3.5
Weighted duration.....	21.1	40.81	3.0	78.7	102.17	50.0	132.9	140.72	76.0	92.7	153.25	3.5

LOW NURTURANCE												
Latency (seconds).....	278.3	365.14	64.5	299.8	333.72	166.0	41.7	65.97	13.0	146.0	265.88	26.0
Number of deviations....	7.8	5.36	8.5	8.7	12.55	2.5	15.6	8.34	17.5	13.4	7.76	13.5
Weighted number.....	8.6	6.10	9.5	8.8	15.52	2.5	20.1	13.19	21.0	17.3	11.34	16.0
Duration of deviations (seconds).....	232.5	286.80	99.5	58.4	124.26	8.0	312.9	254.44	335.0	350.2	334.04	153.5
Weighted duration.....	242.2	293.42	111.5	58.7	125.14	8.0	372.5	323.40	410.0	439.8	458.89	154.0

Note.—N = 10 in each group.

Table 81

RESULTS OF THE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR FIVE INDICES OF RESPONSE INHIBITION

	F	p
Latency:		
Timing.....	<1	n.s.
Intensity.....	3.90	<.05
Nurturance.....	2.35	n.s.
Number of deviations:		
Timing.....	<1	n.s.
Intensity.....	5.82	<.05
Nurturance.....	6.38	<.05
Weighted number of deviations:		
Timing.....	<1	n.s.
Intensity.....	9.00	<.01
Nurturance.....	7.93	<.01
Duration of deviation:		
Timing.....	<1	n.s.
Intensity.....	6.82	<.05
Nurturance.....	11.71	<.01
Weighted duration of deviation:		
Timing.....	<1	n.s.
Intensity.....	7.96	<.01
Nurturance.....	11.57	<.01

Note.—No interaction effects reached significance at the .05 level.
* 1 and 72 df.

Table 82

SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF DATA

SOURCE	MEASURES									
	Latency		Number		Weighted Number		Duration		Weighted Duration	
	F	p	F	p	F	p	F	p	F	p
Nurturance (A).....	1.08	n.s.	7.65	<.01	10.89	<.01	22.33	<.001	21.99	<.001
Intensity (B).....	3.38	<.10	7.99	<.01	12.53	<.001	11.63	<.01	10.81	<.01
Timing (C).....	<1	n.s.	<1	n.s.	<1	n.s.	<1	n.s.	1.24	n.s.
Number of punishments (D).....	<1	n.s.	<1	n.s.	<1	n.s.	<1	n.s.	<1	n.s.
A × B.....	1.31	n.s.	2.16	n.s.	4.66	<.05	4.62	<.05	4.91	<.05
A × C.....	<1	n.s.	<1	n.s.	<1	n.s.	<1	n.s.	1.19	n.s.
A × D.....	1.76	n.s.	2.87	<.10	2.20	n.s.	4.45	<.05	2.58	n.s.
B × C.....	1.17	n.s.	2.89	<.10	2.95	<.10	<1	n.s.	<1	n.s.
B × D.....	<1	n.s.	<1	n.s.	<1	n.s.	2.21	n.s.	2.38	n.s.
C × D.....	2.40	n.s.	<1	n.s.	<1	n.s.	2.25	n.s.	3.75	<.10
A × B × C.....	<1	n.s.	<1	n.s.	<1	n.s.	2.49	n.s.	1.86	n.s.
A × B × D.....	2.60	n.s.	3.60	<.10	3.51	<.10	7.89	<.01	6.85	<.05
A × C × D.....	2.13	n.s.	2.57	n.s.	4.12	<.05	7.50	<.01	8.00	<.01
B × C × D.....	<1	n.s.	<1	n.s.	1.48	n.s.	3.78	<.10	3.21	<.10
A × B × C × D.....	1.95	n.s.	1.38	n.s.	2.41	n.s.	4.67	<.05	3.72	<.10

Note.—1 and 92 df.

weighted measures of frequency.⁴³

As regards the effect of timing of punishment upon latency and period of deviation, the findings were in the predicted direction, but not significant: The early punished subjects had longer latency and shorter deviation duration than the late punished subjects.⁴⁴

But in this study, unlike in the previous one, the *intensity of punishment* did not show a significant, positive relationship with temptation resistance⁴⁵. In the light of the findings of this study and of the previous one on the effect of *intensity* and *timing* of punishment upon resistance to temptation the authors remark that "simultaneous variations in timing and intensity of punishment may obscure the effects of either or both variables".⁴⁶

43. Ibidem, p. 22.

44. Ibidem.

45. Ibidem, pp. 22, 23.

46. Ibidem, p. 33.

Here we shall note also the findings of other relevant research into factors that affect the efficacy of punishment.

(i) That intense punishment is more effective than mild one in effecting behavioural suppression in human and animal subjects has been shown by several other studies (Cfr. Aronfreed, Conduct and Conscience, p. 196 ff.).

(ii) Another factor which contributes to the efficacy of punishment is the ease with which discrimination can be made between punishable and non-punishable behaviour. To this effect Aronfreed reports a study conducted by him in collaboration with R. Leff.

Six- and seven-year-old boys were exposed to either mild or intense punishment in paradigms which required discriminations of varying complexity. Two groups (N = 36 per group) had to make relatively simple discrimination between red and yellow toys in order to avoid punishment. But two other groups (N = 43 per group) had to make more complex discriminations. The 'simple' and 'complex' groups were further divided into two groups of different levels (high vs. low) of intensity of punishment for incorrect choices.

After 10 training trials it was found that out of the 72 children in the simple discrimination groups, under either high or low intensity of punishment, 42 had successfully suppressed incorrect choices; but only 25 of the 86 children in the complex discrimination groups attained a successful inhibition of their punished behaviour. Hence, intensity of punishment did not affect the speed of learning.

However, in a subsequent test of the internalization of behavioural suppression, it was found that children of the simple discrimination group were to show complete suppression if they had been exposed to intense punishment: only 15 out of the 36 who

* * *

The findings of the above reviewed studies based on the instrumental learning theory indicate that the efficacy of punishment for inducing response inhibition (temptation resistance) is affected by various factors. The nature of *relationship, intensity* of punishment, *ease of discrimination* and *timing* of punishment seem to be important among them:

Punishment is more effective if it is administered by *nurturant* agents.

Intense punishment is more conducive (than mild one) to fostering temp-

were exposed to intense punishment transgressed, while 27 of the 36 exposed to mild punishment transgressed. The result was reversed for the complex discrimination group: only 18 of the 43 children, who were exposed to mild punishment, transgressed, whereas 31 of the 43 exposed to severe punishment transgressed.

Hence Aronfreed observes that the greater efficacy of severe punishment in effecting inhibition of behaviour obtains only when the child is able to discriminate between the punished and non-punished forms of behaviour. If learning involves a discrimination which the child cannot cope with or if his discriminative capacity is disrupted by excessive anxiety, etc., the intensity of punishment may not attain its expected effect (Aronfreed, *Conduct and Conscience*, pp. 191 — 193).

(iii) Another finding about the efficacy of intense vs. mild punishment (based on 'dissonance' theory) comes from E. Aronson and M. Carlsmith.

In an experiment with 27 preschool children, some of them were severely threatened and some were mildly threatened for playing with attractive toys. And it was found that mild threat was more effective (than severe threat) in prompting the child to devalue (and consequently inhibit) the preferred behaviour or object.

Aronson and Carlsmith (and other dissonance theorists) interpret this finding in terms of 'cognitive dissonance'. Dissonance occurs when an individual holds two incompatible cognitions. For example, the cognition that one is not performing an action is dissonant with one's cognition that that act is desirable or worth performing. And dissonance is an unpleasant drive-state, which has to be reduced. However, a severe punishment, by itself, provides sufficient cognition consonant with ceasing or inhibiting the action. When punishment is severe, therefore, there is little or no dissonance. But when punishment is mild, dissonance is high. One way of reducing the dissonance is to convince oneself that the desired action is no longer desirable, that is, the derogation of the act. Consequently, the action will be suppressed. Hence, the greater efficacy of milder punishment for the learning of behavioural suppression. Further, this finding (and the theory) indicates also the important role of evaluative cognition in the control of behaviour (E. Aronson and M. Carlsmith, "Effect of Severity of Threat on the Devaluation of Forbidden Behaviour", *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1963 (66) pp. 584 — 588).

tation resistance.

But *ease of discrimination* is a factor, which co-determines the efficacy of intense punishment. The child's discriminative capacity should not be disrupted (e.g. by excessive anxiety) if the child is to learn appropriate response inhibition.

Early punishment is a better promoter of resistance to temptation than is late punishment.

3. Post-Transgressional Reactions

Post-transgressional reactions include both the aversive *affective states* and individual experiences after transgression and the various *responses* which are motivated by these affective experiences. First we shall analyse the aversive affective states or experiences and then the responses.

a) The Aversive Affective States

ARONFREED observes that there is a general, unspecified, aversive affective state that follows a transgression, and this affective state is called *anxiety*. It is a 'conditioned state' associated with the child's early experience of punishment. It requires little or no cognitive evaluation for its elicitation.

But this general aversive affective state may be further specified by different cognitive evaluations. There are *three* such specific aversive affective experiences that may follow a transgression. They are *fear, shame, and guilt*.⁴⁷

Fear

Fear is a post-transgressional aversive affective experience which is "determined by a cognitive orientation toward an external source of aversive consequences for the transgressor".⁴⁸ Thus, the generalized aversive affective

47. Aronfreed, *Conduct and Conscience*, p. 243.

48. Aronfreed, *Ibidem*, p. 244.

state of anxiety becomes fear through a cognitive specification which is concerned with the bad consequences (e.g. punishment) the actor himself may incur. Though the source of fear is initially external (e.g. agents of punishment), it later becomes internalized because the child can cognitively represent to himself the consequences of his action for himself. Consequently, fear may be aroused after transgression even in the absence of an actual threat or risk of punishment.⁴⁹

Shame

The aversive experience of shame is qualified as an "experience determined by a cognitive orientation towards the visibility of the transgression. The essence of shame is a cognitive focus on the appearance or display of that which ought not to show".⁵⁰ Yet, as common self-observation shows, shame is experienced even when some of our actions are not known to others, but only to us. This occurs because these actions "expose us to what we feel ought not to be visible". Therefore, shame is internalized in as far as it is experienced by the visibility of our transgressions "either to ourselves or to imagined significant others".⁵¹

Guilt

The third aversive affective experience that may follow a transgression is guilt. This experience is "determined by moral evaluation of the transgression", and moral evaluation, adds ARONFREED, refers to a cognitive evaluation of the consequences of the transgression for others.⁵² Guilt, therefore, is an aversive affective experience which follows from the evaluation of the consequences of the transgression for others. Of the three experiences, guilt is usually the most internalized one in as far as it is more independent of external sources than is fear or shame.

However, these three affective states are not necessarily mutually exclusive; on the contrary, one affect may coexist with the others. Thus, one may feel guilt because of the bad consequences of his transgression for others; he

may also at the same time feel ashamed because others will come to know of it; and he may also be afraid of the bad consequences for himself.⁵³ Thus, there can be a 'complementarity' among these affective states, though they cannot be reduced to a single state.

The *development* of these post-transgressional affective states in the child, adds ARONFREED, depends mainly on the cognitive orientation provided during socialization. If it was primarily oriented towards the 'bad consequences for the child himself', the prevailing affective state which develops would be fear; if cognitive orientation was oriented towards 'the opinion of

53. Aronfreed, *Ibidem*, pp. 246, 247.

In this context, we may note D. Ausubel's analysis of guilt and shame based on anthropological studies. He describes guilt as a "special kind of negative self-evaluation which occurs when the individual acknowledges that his behaviour is at variance with a given moral value to which he feels obliged to conform. It is a self-reaction to an injured conscience, if by conscience is meant an abstract referring to a feeling of obligation to abide by all internalized moral values. The injury consists in a self-perceived violation of this obligation". According to Ausubel, the capacity for guilt feeling is "basically human and fundamental", and is present in every culture, though "culture may make a difference in the form which this behaviour takes and the specific kinds of stimuli which instigate it".

Shame is defined as "an unpleasant emotional reaction by an individual to an actual or presumed negative judgment of himself by others resulting in self-depreciation vis-à-vis the group". Shame is however further distinguished into non-moral shame and moral shame: non-moral shame results from breaches of propriety and etiquette; moral shame results from the "negative moral judgment of others". Moral shame is further divided into non-internalized and internalized: non-internalized moral shame refers to the reaction resulting from the moral condemnation of others, but the subject himself does not subscribe to the value involved (for example, one may feel ashamed if caught for stealing, though he himself may not be convinced of the wrongness of stealing in a particular context). Here therefore, external witness is needed for feeling shame. In internalized shame the subject is convinced of the value involved, and here shame results from a presumed or fantasied reproach of others, without the need of actual witness. Such an internalized shame implies a sense of moral obligation, and is called "the shame of guilt" i.e. "shame accompanying awareness of violated moral obligation".

Ausubel's analysis shows that the distinction between shame and guilt — merely based on external and internal orientation — is not so realistic. Guilt may be experienced even in what may be usually called 'shame' (D. Ausubel, "Relationship between Shame and Guilt in the Socializing Process", in R.C. Johnson et alii (Eds), *Conscience, Contract and Social Reality*, pp. 186, 189, 190, 194).

49. *Ibidem*.

50. Aronfreed, *Ibidem*, p. 249.

51. *Ibidem*.

52. Aronfreed, *Ibidem*, p. 245.

others', the prevailing affective state would be shame; if it was oriented towards 'the bad consequences for others', guilt would be the predominant affective experience.⁵⁴

b) Post-Transgressional Responses

These refer to the various forms of behavior which an individual elicits after transgression in order to reduce one or more of the above described aversive affective states. These responses are therefore motivated by the reduction of these aversive experiences.⁵⁵ ARONFREED distinguishes four main types of such responses: *self-criticism*, *reparation*, *confession*, and *punishment-seeking*.

Self-Criticism

This refers to the 'critical responses' the child passes on himself after transgression. According to ARONFREED it has mainly an anxiety reducing function.

After a child has been punished a few times for a transgression, on subsequent occasions he will feel anticipatory anxiety during the interval between commission of that act and termination of punishment. In other words, anxiety terminates only with the termination of punishment. But the child has also experienced that certain components of punishment act as signals of the termination of punishment. Consequently, by association, these components of punishment themselves become anxiety-reducing because of their sign-value as indicators of the termination of punishment. On subsequent occasions the child will administer to himself, as far as he can, some of the components of punishment in order to reduce the interval anxiety. These responses become self-reinforcing because of their anxiety-reducing value.

Though any component of punishment may thus acquire an anxiety-reducing value, an important and common component which the child can easily reproduce is the 'critical remarks' parents often use in the context of

punishment. The child applies to himself these critical remarks after transgression, and this reduces his anticipatory anxiety. Thus the child learns what is called 'self-criticism'.⁵⁶ The child's learning of self-criticism will be fostered, says ARONFREED, if parents, in the process of socialization, administer 'critical remarks' at the termination of punishment. In this case, these critical remarks become definite signals of the termination of punishment and of anxiety. This 'definite-signal value' is more conducive to its learning.⁵⁷

ARONFREED emphasizes that the common-sense identification of self-criticism and guilt is not right, because self-criticism is often a mechanism employed to reduce anxiety, without necessarily implying any evaluation of the consequences of the transgression for others.⁵⁸

Reparation

This is a response which has a characteristic of self-correction and restitution from the part of the transgressor. These features of self-correction and restitution imply an evaluation of the consequences of the transgression for others. Reparation therefore is a response that is more motivated by guilt feelings⁵⁹ (than by the other affective states). However, reparation also can be a behaviour pattern internalized by its anxiety-reducing value, without implying a concern for others, especially in the case of young children.⁶⁰

Confession

This is essentially "a verbal report to another person on one's own wrong doing".⁶¹ One factor which prompts young children to make 'confession' may be the child's 'natural tendency' to report to the parents whenever he is in distress, just as he cries when he is hungry.⁶² However, the internalization of confession-response implies other motivational forces. This motivation is

54. Aronfreed, *Conduct and Conscience*, p. 244.

55. Aronfreed, *Ibidem*, p. 212.

56. Aronfreed, *Ibidem*, pp. 217, 218.

57. Aronfreed, *Ibidem*, p. 222.

58. Aronfreed, *Ibidem*, p. 248.

59. Aronfreed, *Ibidem*, p. 254.

60. Aronfreed, *Ibidem*, pp. 227, 228.

61. Aronfreed, *Ibidem*, p. 235.

62. *Ibidem*.

again the avoidance or attenuation of punishment and anxiety. Parents usually regard highly the child's "self-initiated recognition and report (confession, apology, etc.) of wrong doing." Therefore, when children make such responses parents usually do not punish (or give milder punishment) the child's transgression. Thus, these responses become effective in reducing the fear of punishment and anxiety, and this anxiety-reduction reinforces the response. Besides, these self-initiated responses of the child may receive positive recommendation and praise of parents, which give additional reinforcement.⁶³

Punishment-Seeking

Seeking punishment (e.g. from parents) after transgression is also learned because of its anxiety-reducing value (in this regard this response is similar to self-criticism). Punishment-seeking, adds ARONFREED, should be the result of a socialization experience, where the child's behaviour was under strict control, and transgressions were almost always punished.⁶⁴ Consequently, the child's anxiety after transgression will not be reduced unless he seeks out punishment.

The above analysis shows that the learning of post transgressional responses is motivated to a great extent by the reduction of the aversive affective states that follow transgression. Therefore, learning theorists add that the time of punishing a misdeed in the process of socialization is very important for the learning of these responses. According to the theory, punishment of a misdeed *after its completion* is more effective for the learning of these responses. The rationale implied is that during the interval between the completion of the misdeed and the termination of punishment the child is prompted to employ these anxiety reducing mechanisms in order to reduce the anticipatory anxiety; and the consequent anxiety re-

63. Aronfreed, Ibidem, p. 236.

64. Aronfreed, Ibidem, p. 238.

Similarly, avoiding punishing agents, hiding the misdeed, etc., also usually are responses motivated by the fear of punishment. These responses would be reinforced if the child had been successful at avoiding punishment through these mechanisms (Ibidem, pp. 242).

duction reinforces the particular response the child elicits.⁶⁵ The other important factors supposed to affect the learning of these responses are intensity of punishment, cognitive instruction (ease of discrimination), the nature of the relationship between the agent of punishment and the recipient of punishment, etc. (see p. 216).

c) Empirical Findings on Post-Transgressional Responses

Empirical research in this area attempts to investigate into the complexity of post-transgressional responses and into the aspects of punishment (especially timing of punishment) which foster their acquisition.

(i) Timing of Punishment and Self-Criticism

Employing 89 girls of about 9 – 10 years of age (fourth and fifth graders from two public schools) ARONFREED⁶⁶ tested the acquisition of self-critical responses, and related it to specific punishment patterns. The children were divided into three experimental groups and one control group. Each child of the experimental groups was to operate a machine by pressing a num-

65. In this context the learning theory usually does not make a critical distinction between the effectiveness of materialistic and love-oriented methods of discipline. According to learning theorists, the apparent greater effectiveness of the love-oriented methods in fostering post-transgressional responses is not due to the specific factor of love and nurturance involved therein, but due to the 'timing of punishment' implied in the love-oriented techniques.

It is argued that materialistic punishments (spanking, scolding, etc.) usually have a sudden onset and termination, irrespective of the child's attempts for a 'symbolic renunciation' of the misdeed. Love-oriented techniques, on the other hand, usually terminate only when the child makes some kind of symbolic renunciation of the misdeed through apology, reparation, etc. Thus, here the termination of punishment is contingent upon the child's elicitation of one or the other of the responses; this contingency fosters better the learning of these responses. From this point of view, what is important for the development of post-transgressional reactions is the 'response contingency' of the disciplinary techniques rather than their 'love-orientation'. However, learning theorists add that an atmosphere of love and nurturance can give the child a stronger motivation to make 'symbolic renunciation' more quickly (W.F.Hill, "Learning Theory and the Acquisition of Values", pp. 270 – 271).

66. J. Aronfreed, "The Origin of Self-Criticism", Psychological Review, 1964 (71) pp. 193 – 218.

ber of levers at 10 training trials. But the pressing of a particular lever was always called 'blue' in a context of sharp disapproval and punishment (removal of tootsie rolls already given to the child) by the experimenter.

For the children of the first experimental group, the labelling 'blue' for the pressing of the 'particular lever' occurred at the *termination* of punishment (called LTP group). For the second group, the labelling occurred at the *onset* of punishment (called LOP group). The E was not specially affectionate in his dealings with these groups. But with the third experimental group, the E showed nurturant and affectionate demeanour, and labelling occurred at the onset of punishment (Nurturance LOP group). For the control group, the pressing of the 'particular lever' was labelled 'blue', but there was no punishment.

After the training trials there were three test trials (during which the pressing of the 'particular lever' occurred twice) in which the child's responses to the occurrence of the labelled behaviour (i.e. pressing of the 'particular lever') was observed.⁶⁷

It was found that "the paradigm that is singularly effective" in inducing self-criticism in the child was the one in which the critical label is used at the termination of punishment. This, argues ARONFREED, confirms "the view that the child's reproduction of a component of social punishment rests on its original external position with respect to the onset and attenuation of anxiety".⁶⁸ Therefore, anxiety-reduction is the important motive in the learning of self-critical responses. Besides, the very low use of 'labelling' by control children in the test trials shows that critical responses, in order to be adopted by the child, should be used in a punitive context by the socializing agents (tables 83 and 84).⁶⁹

The low use of the label by the nurturance group indicates that the child's reproduction of an aspect of parental punishment has no special relation to the nurturant or resource-mediating role of the parent.⁷⁰ However, ARONFREED adds that a basically nurturant parental attitude is necessary for the effectiveness of any social punishment. The punishment of the non-nurturant parent may not arouse sufficient anxiety in the child as to motivate him to elicit self-critical responses. Or, their punishment may be too severe and the

67. Ibidem, pp. 202 – 205.

68. Ibidem, pp. 205, 206.

69. Ibidem, p. 207.

70. Ibidem, p. 213.

child may try to avoid punishment altogether by avoiding parental presence.⁷¹

According to these findings, post-transgressional self-critical response has primarily a function of reducing the anxiety which was initially associated with the child's experience of punishment following transgression. This also indicates that self-criticism is not necessarily to be equated with guilt feelings, which imply an aversive affective state resulting from a moral self-evaluation.⁷²

Table 83
FREQUENCY OF LABELING AND NONLABELING RESPONSES ON THREE TEST TRIALS

Response	LTP ^a (N = 27)	LOP ^b (N = 24)	Nurturance (LOP) ^b (N = 26)	Control ^c (N = 12)
Trial 11				
Blue label used	19	5	5	3
Blue label not used	8	19	21	9
Trial 12				
Blue label used	19	6	6	3
Blue label not used	8	18	20	9
Trial 13				
Red label used	9	6	7	3
Red label not used	18	18	18	9

^a LTP = Labeling at termination of punishment.

^b LOP = Labeling at onset of punishment.

^c Control = Labeling without punishment.

Table 84
CHI-SQUARE VALUES FOR COMPARISONS AMONG FOUR EXPERIMENTAL SOCIALIZATION PARADIGMS OF THE FREQUENCY OF LABELING AND NONLABELING RESPONSES

Comparison	Trial 11 (Blue label)	Trial 12 (Blue label)	Trial 13 (Red label)
LTP versus LOP	10.61**	8.73**	0.12
LTP versus nurturance (LOP)	11.99**	10.07**	0.01
LTP versus control	5.23*	5.23*	0.02
LOP versus nurturance (LOP)	0.05	0.03	0.01
LOP versus control	0.02	0.16	0.16
Nurturance (LOP) versus control	0.00	0.10	0.04

Note: Chi square values for 2x2 contingency tables (with correction for continuity) based on frequencies in table 83:

* $p < .05$, one-tailed test.

** $p < .01$, one-tailed test.

71. Ibidem, p. 209.

72. Ibidem, p. 206.

Using a group of 30 additional subjects (from the same population as mentioned above) ARONFREED tested the maintenance (resistance to extinction) of self-critical response once it has been established. The 30 subjects, who acquired self-critical labelling 'blue' during 10 acquisition trials, were divided into three groups of 10, and subjected to three different processes of extinction: (i) making punishment follow the child's use of the label, (ii) removing the critical label from the context of punishment and anxiety reduction, and (iii) eliminating punishment that is incumbent on transgression.⁷³

It was found that only two children in each group showed extinction of the use of critical label that had been previously acquired through aversive learning. Hence, ARONFREED observes, post-transgressional response of self-criticism is highly resistant to extinction.⁷⁴

(ii) The Nature and Variety of Post-Transgressional Responses

ARONFREED⁷⁵ measured the post-transgressional responses of 122 (61 boys and 61 girls) 11 – 12-year-old (sixth graders in public schools) white children belonging to middle and working classes, and related these measures to social class, I.Q., and parental discipline.

The moral responses measured were the following five: (i) *Self-criticism*: this includes self-blame, explicit recognition of wrong doing, or any form of self-appraisal associated with guilt feelings. It may be noted that what is considered here primarily is not the mere anxiety-reducing self-criticism discussed in the previous experiment, but *self-evaluation* relating to guilt. (ii) *Correction of deviance*: this refers to attempts to return to the socially approved behaviour. These attempts may be expressed through confession, apology and reparation. (iii) *Degree of self-correctional activity*: to what degree (high, intermediate or low) the *child himself* initiated correctional responses without external instigation like the risk of punishment, etc. (iv) *External resolution*: post-transgressional response is called 'external resolution' if the child was mainly concerned with 'detection and punishment', or with unpleasant fortuitous consequences like accidents, casual sufferings, or if he shifts the responsibility to someone else. (v) *Externally oriented initiation and performance*: this aspect reveals how much the moral

responses like self-criticism, correctional responses, etc., are influenced by external social environment, by explicit demands of other people, etc.

The responses to transgression were tapped through story completion tests relating to aggression. For example, "a child is about to join friends at a playground and is angered at the slight delay occasioned by the mother's request to examine a rosebush and pick any bloom which may have appeared. Rather than take the time to return with the roses, the child takes them and throws them into a trash can at the playground". I.Q. was obtained from scores of a verbal intelligence test. Mother-interview provided information on discipline.

ARONFREED divides disciplinary techniques into two types: *induction* and *sensitization*. Induction includes, besides love-withdrawal techniques and reasoning with the child, techniques which induce the child to accept responsibility and make reparation. Sensitization includes "all forms of physical punishment and uncontrolled verbal assaults".⁷⁶

An obvious finding of this study is the *great variety* of moral responses to transgression. The same subject often responds in more than one way to the same transgression. The variety of responses includes not only one or more of the five main types of responses, but also those specific responses which fall under the main types (table 85).⁷⁷

However, the response of self-evaluation is not a very conspicuous one among them. 32 subjects (26.2%) did not show any evidence of self-evaluation. Although the other 90 subjects showed evidence of self-evaluation, it occurred only in 28% of the stories. Besides, the role of self-evaluation in the other responses is also limited, i.e. both subject-wise and story-wise the absence of self-evaluation in the other responses is more conspicuous than its presence: while 58 confession-responses showed evidence of self-evaluation, 94 confession-responses showed no evidence of self-evaluation; of the total 273 stories (transgressions) to which there occurred confession-responses, only 91 showed an accompanying self-evaluation, while 182 showed no accompanying self-evaluation. Such a limited role of self-evaluative responses is evidenced also in the other responses, the limitation being very conspicuous

76. Ibidem, pp. 226 – 228.

However, Aronfreed leaves out such forms of punishment like 'deprivation of privileges', "various forms of restriction" as not clearly belonging to any group (Ibidem, pp. 228 – 229).

77. Ibidem, p. 230.

73. Ibidem, p. 216.

74. Ibidem, p. 210.

75. J. Aronfreed, "The Nature, Variety, and Social Patterning of Moral Responses to Transgression", *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1961 (63), pp. 223 – 240.

in the case of apology (table 85).⁷⁸

These findings, says ARONFREED, show that the different moral responses that may follow a transgression need not necessarily presuppose "the operation of cognitive resources of moral judgment", that is, they do not necessarily indicate an underlying judgment of self-evaluation. On the con-

Table 85

FREQUENCY AND PERCENTAGE OF SUBJECTS AND STORIES SHOWING EACH CATEGORY OF CLASSIFICATION OF MORAL RESPONSES

Category of moral responses	Subjects		Stories	
	N	% ^a	N	% ^a
Self-criticism	90	73.8	171	28.0
Correction of deviance (any form)				
Self-criticism present	84	68.8	160	26.2
Self-criticism absent	113	92.6	325	53.3
Any instance	117	95.9	485	79.5
Confession				
Self-criticism present	58	47.5	91	14.9
Self-criticism absent	94	77.1	182	29.8
Any instance	106	88.5	273	44.7
Apology				
Self-criticism present	18	14.7	18	2.9
Self-criticism absent	46	37.7	55	9.0
Any instance	54	44.3	73	11.9
Reparation				
Self-criticism present	56	46.2	79	12.9
Self-criticism absent	99	81.1	165	27.1
Any instance	110	90.2	244	40.0
Modification of future behavior				
Self-criticism present	38	31.1	53	8.7
Self-criticism absent	56	46.2	89	14.6
Any instance	71	58.2	142	23.3
Degree of activity in self-correction				
Low	105	86.1	212	34.8
Intermediate	116	95.1	248	40.7
High	89	72.9	150	24.5
External resolution (any form)				
Self-criticism present	79	64.8	125	20.3
Self-criticism absent	96	78.7	168	27.5
Any instance	118	96.7	293	48.0
Discovery and punishment				
Self-criticism present	58	47.5	70	11.5
Self-criticism absent	84	68.8	122	20.0
Any instance	107	87.7	192	31.5
Unpleasant fortuitous consequences				
Self-criticism present	34	27.9	36	5.9
Self-criticism absent	33	27.1	38	6.2
Any instance	60	49.2	74	12.1
Focus on external responsibility				
Self-criticism present	43	35.2	52	8.5
Self-criticism absent	47	38.5	52	8.5
Any instance	75	61.5	104	17.0
Externally oriented initiation and performance (any form)				
External initiation	93	76.2	150	24.6
Display	35	28.5	75	12.3
Use of external resources	31	25.2	75	12.3
	43	35.2	46	7.5

^a Percentages based on Ns of 122 subjects and 610 stories.

78. Ibidem, pp. 231 — 232.

trary, these responses can be "used rather mechanically either because they have become instrumental in reducing what are simply unpleasant feelings (anxiety) or perhaps because they have been successful in avoiding anticipated external punishment"⁷⁹. These responses are therefore different sets of learned 'moral' reactions. ARONFREED refers to them collectively as 'moral consequences' in order to emphasize their common functional value of reducing anxiety that is consequent upon moral transgression. Hence these responses may not be considered simply as transformations of the experience of guilt, because guilt includes, besides anxiety, a moral self-evaluation.⁸⁰

With regard to the relation of moral responses to *social class* and *sex*, the following significant differences were found.

The middle class children of both sexes showed "more evidence of self-criticism" (self-evaluation) than working class children. Besides, in their responses, the middle class children were less oriented to "unpleasant fortuitous consequences" and to "external responsibility" than the working class children.

Taken sex-wise, boys of both social classes seemed to be less oriented to "external initiation" and "external responsibility" in their moral responses than girls. Girls of both social classes, however, showed a greater tendency to display publicly their moral responses than do boys (this difference was not significant) (tables 86 and 87).⁸¹

With regard to *maternal discipline* and *social class*, it was found that middle-class mothers use more induction techniques, while lower-class mothers use more sensitization techniques. Regarding the relationship of discipline to moral responses, the findings show that *induction* techniques significantly foster reparation responses and the child's acceptance of responsibility on his own initiation (activity in self-correction); *sensitization* techniques appear to foster moral responses based on external consequences, especially in the form of 'unpleasant fortuitous events' (tables 88 — 90).⁸²

As for *I.Q.*, it showed no relationship to the moral responses investi-

79. Ibidem, p. 231

80. Ibidem, pp. 233, 235, 238.

81. Ibidem, p. 233

82. Ibidem, pp. 236, 237.

Table 86

FREQUENCY BY SOCIAL CLASS AND SEX OF CHILDREN
SCORING HIGH IN EACH CATEGORY OF
CLASSIFICATION OF MORAL RESPONSES

Category of moral responses N =	Middle class		Working class	
	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls
	34	28	27	33
Self-criticism	16	18	6	13
Confession	15	19	10	11
Apology	12	16	9	18
Reparation	18	20	14	16
Modification of future behavior	19	18	15	22
Degree of activity in self-correction	19	16	13	17
Discovery and punishment	13	9	9	20
Unpleasant fortuitous consequences	13	7	18	24
Focus on external responsibility	12	17	18	29
External initiation	9	15	9	23
Display	13	18	7	15
Use of external resources	10	14	10	11

Note.—A subject's score on any category is the number of instances of that category occurring across the five story completions, where each category may be counted only once in a given story. The single exception is in the case of degree of activity in self-correction, where a subject's score is the summation of values assigned to the total pattern of moral responses in each of the five stories

Table 87

CHI SQUARE VALUES FOR SOCIAL CLASS AND SEX COMPARISONS OF CHILDREN SCORING HIGH IN
EACH CATEGORY OF CLASSIFICATION OF MORAL RESPONSES

Category of moral responses	Middle class vs. Working class			Boys vs. Girls		
	Boys	Girls	Total	Middle class	Working class	Total
Self-criticism	3.02*	2.83*	5.75**	1.21	1.31	2.14
Confession	0.09	5.91**	4.08*	2.60	0.00	0.53
Apology	0.01	0.00	0.03	2.14	1.91	4.77*
Reparation	0.03	2.42	1.15	0.14	0.00	0.33
Modification of future behavior	0.06	0.01	0.00	0.17	0.38	0.86
Degree of activity in self-correction	0.12	0.03	0.28	0.02	0.00	0.00
Discovery and punishment	0.02	3.85*	1.37	0.05	3.40*	1.21
Unpleasant fortuitous consequences	3.80*	11.96**	15.90**	0.70	0.05	0.03
Focus on external responsibility	4.74*	4.45*	12.91**	3.03*	2.79*	7.85**
External initiation	0.09	1.06	2.07	3.68*	6.30**	11.92**
Display	0.55	0.14	1.70	3.19*	1.67	4.80*
Use of external resources	0.13	1.12	0.06	1.94	0.00	0.56

Note. — Chi square values for 2 x 2 contingency tables (employing correction for continuity) based on the above table.

* $p < .05$, one-tailed test.

** $p < .01$, one-tailed test.

Table 88

FREQUENCY OF PREDOMINANT USE OF INDUCTION OR
SENSITIZATION TECHNIQUES BY MOTHERS OF CHILDREN
IN EACH SOCIAL CLASS AND SEX GROUP

Predominant maternal discipline	Middle class		Working class	
	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls
Induction	21	20	9	14
Sensitization	13	7	18	18

Note.—Total N = 120. Adequate interview data on discipline not available for two girls.

Table 89

CHI SQUARE VALUES FOR SOCIAL CLASS AND SEX OF
CHILD COMPARISONS OF PREDOMINANT
MATERNAL DISCIPLINE
(Induction vs. Sensitization)

Comparison	Chi square value
Middle class vs. Working class	
Boys	3.80*
Girls	4.34*
Both sexes	8.50**
Boys vs. Girls	
Middle class	0.55
Working class	0.30
Both classes	0.55

Note: Chi square values for 2x2 contingency tables (with correction for continuity) based on frequencies in table 88:

* $p < .05$, one-tailed test.

** $p < .01$, one-tailed test.

Table 90

COMPARISON OF SCORES ON CATEGORIES OF MORAL RESPONSES OF CHILDREN WHOSE MOTHERS USE
PREDOMINANTLY EACH OF THE TWO TYPES OF MATERNAL DISCIPLINE
(Induction vs. Sensitization)

(I = Induction; S = Sensitization)

Category of moral responses	Middle class			Working class			Boys			Girls			Total sample		
	I	S	p^a	I	S	p^a	I	S	p^a	I	S	p^a	I	S	p^a
Reparation															
High															
Low	30	8	*	14	16	ns	19	13	ns	25	11	*	44	24	**
Degree of activity in self-correction															
High	11	12	*	9	20	**	11	18	**	9	14	*	20	32	**
Low	27	7		17	13		21	11		23	9		44	20	
Unpleasant fortuitous consequences															
High	14	13	*	6	23	*	9	20	*	11	16	**	20	36	**
Low	10	10		12	29		11	20		11	19		22	39	
High	31	10		11	7		19	11		23	6		42	17	

Note.—Only those categories of moral responses are shown for which the association with maternal discipline was statistically significant when taken over the total sample.

p^a values for chi square tests (employing correction for continuity).

* $p < .05$, one-tailed test.

** $p < .01$, one-tailed test.

gated in this study.⁸³

According to the findings of this study, post-transgressional responses or 'moral consequences' are different forms of learned reactions which cannot be reduced to what is usually called 'guilt'. Middle class children, who are disciplined more by induction methods, seem to be more self-initiating in their moral responses, while lower class children, subjected to more sensitization methods, appear to be oriented to external consequences of their moral responses.

(iii) Verbal Instruction and Nurturance in Relation to Self-Criticism

J. ARONFREED, R.A.CUTICK and S.A.FAGEN⁸⁴ measured children's self-critical responses and related it to the factors of cognitive structure and nurturance. Cognitive structure refers to the verbal instruction given by the E to the subject as to how he should behave. Nurturance refers to the affectionate way in which the E dealt with the subject. The subjects were 60 boys from fourth to sixth grades (about 10 – 12 years old) from a public school. They were equally divided (15 per group) into four paradigms:

High cognitive structure – High nurturance.

High cognitive structure – Low nurturance.

Low cognitive structure – High nurturance.

Low cognitive structure – Low nurturance.

Cognitive structure was varied by varying the clarity and explicitness of the experimenter's instruction. For example, "...in doing this work you must be very careful and gentle" was a high cognitive structure. Nurturance was varied by changing the E's way of dealing (warm and solicitous vs. cool and formal) with the subject.

Each subject was to push down a doll (that of a nurse) which was surrounded by other dolls (those of soldiers). But in pushing down the nurse, only a minimum number of soldiers might fall down; if several fell down, the child was punished through the removal of some tootsie rolls which had been to him. After 10 training trials there was a test trial in which apparently the nurse-doll broke. It was then observed whether the child criticized his own behaviour of pushing the doll in such a way that it 'broke'.⁸⁵

83. Ibidem, p. 236.

84. J. Aronfreed, R.A.Cutick and S.A.Fagan, "Cognitive Structure, Punishment, and Nurturance in the Experimental Induction of Self-Criticism, *Child Development*, 1963 (34), pp. 281 – 294.

85. Ibidem, pp. 286 – 288, 293.

It was found that "self-critical responses occurred significantly ($p < .05$) more frequently when explicit standards of evaluation" (high cognitive structure) had been provided during training". But variation in nurturance seemed to have no direct effect on self-criticism.

From this the authors conclude that the acquisition of post-transgressional self-criticism requires only that punishment be followed by "sufficient verbal or cognitive labeling"; further, its acquisition is not dependent on the nurturant context of punishment.⁸⁶

86. Ibidem, p. 293.

However, in a similar study J.Grusec found that high-rewardingness from the part of the model fostered self-criticism. Her subjects were 80 (40 girls and 40 boys) children from a kindergarten in California. The subjects were assigned to the following 8 groups.

In the first phase of the experiment, half of the subjects were exposed to a high-rewarding (HR) model, who was very friendly, and dispensed cookies, etc., and the other half were exposed to a low-rewarding (LR) model, who was cool and not dispensing cookies. In the second phase, the subjects took part individually in a game, in which the model could punish them for wrong way of playing. For half of the subjects of both HR and LR groups, the punishment consisted in the withdrawal of love (WOL), and for the other half, in the withdrawal of material rewards (WOMR). Each of the above four groups were further divided into two new groups: for one, the cessation of punishment (i.e. return of material things or of love) was contingent on the subject's application to himself of a self-critical response ("I am a hurter") which the model had made about the subject earlier (C); for the other, the cessation of punishment was not so contingent (NC).

For the initial occurrence of self-criticism the mean scores were the following: HR-WOMR, 2.05; HR-WOL, 1.70; LR-WOMR, 1.10, and LR-WOL, .85. According to these data, the effect of model-rewardingness upon the initial occurrence of self-criticism was significant at the .01 level. And the method of punishment did not show any difference. As regards the development of self-criticism, the sources of variance were model-rewardingness (HR) and reinforcement contingency (C). This, however, was affected also by the method of discipline, i.e. psychological methods fostered self-criticism. Thus, what contributed most to the development of self-criticism were model-rewardingness (HR), reinforcement contingency (C) and love-withdrawal punishment (WOL).

Discussing her findings, Grusec says: "Although Aronfreed has clearly shown that the timing of punishment can be of great importance for the acquisition of self-critical labels, the present data reveal that the characteristics of the critical model are of more than tangential importance for this acquisition" (J.Grusec, "Some Antecedents of Self-Criticism", *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 1966 (4/3), pp. 244 – 252).

* * *

The above reviewed findings on post-transgressional responses indicate the great variety of responses (self-criticism, confession, apology, reparation, etc.) that may follow a transgression. They are motivated by the reduction of the various aversive affective states, especially anxiety and fear of punishment. Therefore, the learning of these responses is fostered if, in the process of socialization, punishment is meted out after the commission of a misdeed. The cognitive instruction provided by the parents is also important for the learning of these responses. Besides, the nurturant behaviour of the punishing agent also seems to be a contributing factor.

And, because these responses are motivated by different affective states, implying different cognitive structure or evaluation, they all cannot be considered as manifestations of any single affective state (e.g. of guilt, which is only one of the affective states motivating post-transgressional responses).

C. Observational Learning and Conscience

Though *observational learning* implies several principles of classical conditioning and instrumental learning, it stresses a new aspect of social learning, namely, the role of *'modeling'* influence.

1. The Influence of Models on Moral Learning

While classical conditioning and instrumental learning suppose the subject's direct experience of rewards and punishments (direct reinforcements), observational learning implies a process of learning which does not necessarily require direct reinforcement, but the subject's observation of models. It is thus a form of learning by observing others (models). Thus, a child who sees a model behaving in a particular way in a specific situation, and the model's behaviour reinforced, will learn to behave in a similar way in such a situation. If the model's behaviour is punished, the child will learn to inhibit that form of behaviour.⁸⁷

87. A. Bandura and R. H. Walters, *Social Learning and Personality Development*,

This type of learning, called also 'imitation of modeling', is "an essential aspect of social learning".⁸⁸ And, all the functions usually attributed to self-control or conscience, like inhibition of disapproved behaviour, self-evaluative and critical responses, and moral judgments can be learned through observational learning or imitation of models.⁸⁹

2. Empirical Findings on the Influence of Models

Empirical research based on the observational learning theory of conscience investigates the effect of observation of models upon the acquisition and modification of various moral responses.

a) The Influence of Modeling upon Moral Judgment

In an experiment A. BANDURA and F. McDONALD⁹⁰ (henceforth reference only to BANDURA) measured the role of modeling and reinforcement in the learning of moral judgments. The subjects were 84 children ranging in age between 5 and 11 years, from a Jewish religious school and a public school. All were from middle class families. The subjects' moral orientations (subjective or objective according to Piagetian category) were ascertained

New York, 1963, p. 220.

It may be noted that 'observational learning' is not exclusive of instrumental learning or classical conditioning, though it does not require direct reinforcement. Aronfreed remarks that in this "very common paradigm of socialization (i.e. observational learning) the affective value that controls the learning process will often reside entirely in the child's observation of the outcomes of another person's behaviour or in its observation of the contingency between behaviour and outcomes..." (Cfr. Aronfreed, *Conduct and Conscience*, p. 78; also, Bandura and Walters, *Social Learning and Personality Development*, p. 275).

88. A. Bandura and F. McDonald, "Influence of Social Reinforcement and the Behaviour of Models in Shaping Children's Moral Judgments", *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1963 (67), p. 275.

89. Bandura and Walters, *Social Learning and Personality Development*, p. 172.

90. Bandura and McDonald, "Influence of Social Reinforcement and the Behaviour of Models in Shaping Children's Moral Judgments", pp. 274 - 281.

ed through a pretest. Accordingly, there were 48 'subjective' children and 36 'objective' children. The subjective children were equally divided (16 per group) into 3 groups in such a way that they matched in sex and age. The objective children were also similarly divided (12 per group) into 3 groups.

Two groups of children from both the categories (subjective and objective) were exposed to models. University students acted as models in this experiment. Both, the subjects and models were given 12 'hypothetical moral problems' which they had to judge; the model received and answered the first problem in each set, and the subject, the second one. The problems were almost identical with those used by PIAGET (e.g. that of the broken cups). But the model always expressed judgments that ran counter to the predominant orientation of the subject, that is, the models passed objective judgments in the presence of subjective children, and subjective judgments in the presence of objective children. Such exposure to models took place under two conditions: in the first condition — *model and reinforcement condition* — the model's responses were reinforced by the experimenter with verbal approval like 'very good', 'that's fine', etc.; and the child's responses were also similarly reinforced whenever he adopted the model's class of responses. In the second condition — *model condition* — the model was reinforced as above, but the child was not reinforced. In a third condition — *reinforcement condition* — there was no model present; but the child was reinforced as above whenever he made responses that were counter to his own predominant moral orientation.


After the above described treatment procedure, a post-test was run in order to study the "generality and stability of changes in judgmental responses in the absence of models and social reinforcement."⁹¹

It was found that increase in the subjectivity of moral orientation was positively associated with age (figure 11). However, it was also found that young children were capable of exercising subjective judgments", and similarly, older children "exhibited varying degrees of objective morality".⁹² Therefore BANDURA observes that *objective and subjective judgments are coexisting* rather than follow successive developmental stages.

As regards the influence of social reinforcement and model, it was found that subjective children's exposure to objective model-responses (both under model-reinforcement condition and model condition) was highly effective in modifying their moral orientation towards objectivity, and also in

91. Ibidem, pp. 276 — 278.

92. Ibidem, pp. 278 — 279.



inculcating in them a stable objective orientation as it was revealed in their posttests. But the third condition — the reinforcement condition — did not show a similar effectiveness in changing subjective children's moral orientation. Similarly, objective children's exposure to subjective models (under model reinforcement condition and model condition) was also rather highly effective in changing their orientation towards a subjective morality, while the reinforcement condition was not so effective (table 91).⁹³

On the basis of these findings BANDURA points out the importance of 'modeling' where the subject (observer) need not be directly rewarded or punished, but learns by observing the model's behaviour and its consequences.⁹⁴

93. Ibidem, pp. 279 — 280.

94. That moral judgment is influenced and modified through exposure to models has been demonstrated also by other studies.

(i) Using 77 children (about equal number of boys and girls) between the ages of about 5 and 12, P.A. Cowan and collaborators investigated the effect of modeling upon moral judgment.

The subjects' moral maturity level was first assessed through Piagetian-type stories, and then they were exposed to model judgments. Subjects of low maturity were exposed to 'high-maturity models' and subjects of high maturity were exposed to 'low-maturity models'. Then they were tested for any possible modification in their moral judgment maturity. (Half of the subjects were post-tested immediately after exposure to models, and the other half, two weeks later.)

The findings of this study confirmed Bandura's findings: Moral judgment matures

b) Modeling Influence upon Self-Control and Self-Criticism

Table 91

COMPARISON OF PAIRS OF MEANS ACROSS EXPERIMENTAL PHASES AND BETWEEN TREATMENT CONDITIONS

Source	Base Test versus Experimental Phase	Base Test versus Posttest	Experimental Phase versus Posttest
	t	t	t
Within conditions			
Objective treatment			
Model and Reinforcement	5.31***	5.74***	<1
Model	5.84***	5.74***	<1
Reinforcement	<1	1.52	<1
Subjective treatment			
Model and Reinforcement	3.12***	3.09**	<1
Model	4.10***	2.69*	1.87
Reinforcement	2.04	<1	1.99
	Model + Reinforcement versus Model	Model + Reinforcement versus Reinforcement	Model versus Reinforcement
Between conditions			
Objective treatment			
Experimental phase	<1	2.81**	3.34***
Posttest	<1	2.68**	2.61**
Subjective treatment			
Experimental phase	<1	1.11	1.13
Posttest	<1	2.81**	2.15*

* $p < .05$,
 ** $p < .02$,
 *** $p < .01$,
 **** $p < .001$.

with age, and children's moral orientation can be modified in either developmental direction by exposure to adult models. However, it was found that modeling effects were much more pronounced on subjects exposed to 'upward models' than those exposed to 'downward models' — an indication "that change is more likely to be maintained in the natural direction of development". Hence the authors add: "It would be well for the social learning theory to pay more attention to the developmental level of subjects as a moderator variable which may affect the influence of adult models on children's responses" (P.A.Cowan, J.Langer, J. Heavenrich and M. Nathanson, "Social Learning and Piaget's Cognitive Theory of Moral Development", *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 1969 (11), pp. 261 — 274).

(ii) Findings about the influence of modeling come also from an investigation conducted by Le Furgy and G. W. Woloshin.

Their subjects were 53 (27 boys and 26 girls) seventh- and eighth-grade students (mean age: 13 years 6 months) from a junior high school in New Jersey. The subjects' moral orientation (realistic vs. relativistic) was first assessed through Piagetian-type moral problems. Then they were exposed to model judgments (which were in fact the pre-recorded responses of a group of confederates of the same age and sex as the subjects) which were consistently contrary to the subjects' initial orientation. Then three post-tests were run: immediately after, one-week later and 100 days later.

According to the findings of the immediate and one-week later post-tests both realistic and relativistic children shifted significantly in the direction of the applied social influence. Hence, the authors remark: "Adolescents of both sexes and moral orientations will respond to immediate face-to-face peer pressures with dynamic shifts away from

In this study⁹⁵ of the effect of modeling upon children's self-control and self-critical responses the subjects were 80 boys and 80 girls between 7 and 9 years of age, from six public schools in Los Angeles area. The models were an adult male and a female (adult models) and 2 nine-year old children (peer models), none of whom were the subjects' acquaintance. The children "were divided into male and female groups and then randomly assigned to 16 experimental groups of 8 subjects each, and a control group consisting of 16 boys and 16 girls. Half the experimental children observed adult models and half were exposed to peer models. In addition, half the children in both adult and peer model conditions observed same-sex models, while the remaining children in each group witnessed models of the opposite sex. The control children had no prior exposure to the models and were tested only on the self-reinforcement task".

The experiment consisted in a 'bowling game' to be played by the models and the subjects using a bowling apparatus.....with three target markers. All could play a number of games, with three bowlings per game. Hitting the central marker scored 10 points and others, 5 each. (However, the points could be controlled by the E without the subject's knowledge). The subjects always watched the performance of the models, and were encouraged to help themselves to the lavishly available candy whenever they wished.

In one experimental condition (called 'high standard for self-reinforcement' model) the model rewarded himself with candy and positive self-evaluative remarks like "that is great", "it deserves candy-treat", etc., only when he obtained 20 or more scores. When he obtained less than 20 scores he passed self-critical remarks like "no candies for that", "it deserves no candy treat", etc. In the other condition (called 'low standard for self-reinforcement' model), the criterion score was 10; otherwise the model's behaviour their initial orientations?

But the effects of model influence appeared to be different for the two (those exposed to 'upward models' and those exposed to 'downward models') groups by the final post-test 100 days later: The influence of 'upward' modeling was notably more strong than that of 'downward' modeling. Hence, modeling appears to have long term effect only if it is in the upward or developmental direction (W. Le Furgy and G. W. Woloshin, "Immediate and Long-Term Effects of Experimentally Induced Social Influence in the Modification of Adolescents' Moral Judgments", *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 1969 (12), pp. 104 — 110).

95. A. Bandura and C. Kupers, "Transmission of Patterns of Self-Reinforcement through Modeling", *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1964 (69), pp. 1 — 9.

was as in the first condition. After the model had taken 10 trials (games), with three bowlings per game, the subjects took 15 similar trials. By a pre-arranged contrivance, however, on half the number of trials their scores were controlled to be 10 to 15. This was controlled because frequently obtaining very low (5) or very high (20 – 30) scores would make the influence of model's behaviour upon the subjects less critical.⁹⁶

With regard to the influence of models on children's self-reinforcement, it was found that children who were exposed to *adult models* (whether high standard or low standard) rarely rewarded themselves with candies when they did not obtain the criterion score set by the model (i.e. 10 – 15 for low criterion, and 20 – 30 for high). Thus children from these experimental groups rewarded themselves very infrequently when they obtained 5 scores, whereas relatively high proportion of control subjects rewarded themselves at obtaining 5 scores (tables 92, 93 and figure 12). Again, at the intermediate level of performance (10 – 15 scores) most of the children in the control and low standard (criterion 10 – 15) groups rewarded themselves whereas children from the high standard groups (criterion 20 – 30) rewarded themselves very infrequently at this level. However, the high standard children "engaged in an exceedingly high proportion of self-reward relative to the controls and to the low-criterion model groups" when they obtained the high level of performance (tables 92, 93 and figure 12).⁹⁷

As for the subjects exposed *peer models*, the findings were same as above, except that children who were exposed to high standard peer-model (criterion 20 – 30) showed a slightly greater tendency (in contrast to the high standard adult-model group) to reward themselves when they obtained only 10 – 15 scores (table 93; figure 13). Therefore, BANDURA says, children match more precisely the performance of their adult-models than that of their peer-models.⁹⁸

Regarding the subjects' imitation of the models' self-approving or self-critical responses, it was found that "twenty seven percent of the experimental children produced precisely the models' self-approving or self-critical verbalization in response to their own performance", whereas "not a single

96. Ibidem, pp. 2 – 4.

97. Ibidem, p. 6.

98. Ibidem.

Table 92

DISTRIBUTION OF MEAN PERCENTAGE OF SELF-REINFORCEMENT AS A FUNCTION OF SEX OF SUBJECTS, SEX AND AGE OF MODELS, AND THE SELF-REINFORCEMENT CRITERIA EXHIBITED BY THE MODELS

Experimental treatment	Performance level					
	Adult models			Peer models		
	5	10-15	20-30	5	10-15	20-30
High criterion						
Male model						
Boys	0	0	100	0	11	89
Girls	0	13	87	8	25	67
Female model						
Boys	0	8	92	0	23	77
Girls	0	5	95	6	16	78
Total	0	7	93	4	19	77
Low criterion						
Male model						
Boys	3	59	38	7	57	36
Girls	0	67	33	2	58	40
Female model						
Boys	0	75	25	3	67	30
Girls	0	60	40	7	60	33
Total	1	66	33	5	61	34
No model control	24	47	28			
Programmed distribution	14	33	33			

Table 93

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DIFFERENCES IN SELF-REINFORCING RESPONSES BETWEEN CHILDREN IN THE MODELING CONDITIONS AND THOSE IN THE CONTROL GROUP

Performance level	Adult-model condition	Peer-model condition
	χ^2	χ^2
5 points	36.50*	15.79*
10-15 points	63.21*	33.33*
20-30 points	49.95*	40.53*

* $p < .001$.

child in the control group expressed any positive or negative self-evaluative statements imitative or otherwise", this difference between the experimental and the control groups being significant beyond the .01 level.⁹⁹ With regard to the imitation of critical responses, "the sex, age-status or the criterion level of the models" did not seem to make any notable difference.¹⁰⁰


According to these findings, children can acquire patterns of self-reinforcement and learn self-control and self-critical responses by observing models,

99. Ibidem, pp. 6, 7.

100. Ibidem, p. 6.


without the need of "direct differential reinforcement" from external agents.

Figure 12



The distribution of self-reinforcement as a function of performance level by control children and those exposed to adult models adopting high and low criteria for self-reinforcement.

Figure 13



The distribution of self-reinforcement as a function of performance level by control children and those exposed to peer models adopting high and low criteria for self-reinforcement.

The findings based on observational learning theory suggest that learning through imitation of models has a role in the acquisition of the various aspects of conscience, namely, moral judgment, self-control and self-critical responses. And, because this form of learning does not require 'direct reinforcement', it explains more easily the learning of the conscience-related phenomena even in situations where no direct reinforcement is given. ¹⁰¹

We may summarize the main contribution of the three learning theories to the phenomenon of conscience as follows:

Theory	Concept of Conscience	Factors Fostering Conscience Development
Classical Conditioning	A conditioned anxiety response	(i) Conditionability (i.e. Introversion) (ii) Socialization process
Instrumental Learning	Internalized control of behaviour, consisting of cognitive and affective processes	(i) Direct rewards (ii) Direct punishments : Early punishment (for resistance to temptation) : Late punishment (post-transgression responses) : Intensity of punishment : Ease of discrimination : Verbal instructions : Nurturant relationship : Frequency and consistency of punishment
Observational Learning	Internalized self-control	Observation of models' (rewarded or punished) moral responses

101. Bandura and McDonald, "Influence of Social Reinforcement", pp. 280 - 281.

A Comparative View of the Empirical Theories of Conscience

In the preceding three chapters we have analysed the three theories of conscience in empirical psychology. A variety of empirical data made available by research has also been reviewed. We have found different theoretical interpretations and even contradictory empirical findings in certain instances. However, there are also similarities and agreements among the theories.

Here therefore we shall attempt at a comparison of the three theories. This shall be done, at the risk of some repetition, by briefly recalling the basic position of each theory and then indicating the main points of agreement and difference among them.

A. J. Piaget's Theory — L. Kohlberg's Theory

According to J. PIAGET the child's moral development is age-related, and it takes place in *two* more or less distinct *stages*, which are qualitatively different. The average age of the first stage (heteronomous) is 7 and that of the second (autonomous) is 9. The causal factors of the first stage are *adult constraint* and the child's *egocentric* way of *thinking* which is related to the stage of his maturation. The causal factors of the second stage are further *intellectual development* (age-related) and *peer-group cooperation*.

According to L. KOHLBERG also the child's moral development is age-related, and takes place in *six* qualitatively different *stages*, extending between the ages of 7 and 17. Here, however, the stages of self-accepted moral principles (autonomous stage) develop between the ages of 13 and 17. The factors causing the development are *maturation*, *intellectual development* and *social experiences* (both of which are age-related).

Comparing the theories of PIAGET and KOHLBERG we find the following points of agreement:

Both theories are *stage theories*, that is, moral development takes place in stages which are related to *age-growth*. Thus both of them propose a 'natural'

and universal pattern of moral development. Besides, both of them stress the importance of *intellectual development* or cognitive growth. (Hence both are cognitive developmental theories).

Further, both PIAGET and KOHLBERG propose an *interactional theory* of moral development, where moral development implies an interaction between maturational factors and (socio-moral) environmental factors.

However, there are notable *differences* too between the two theories:

While PIAGET, with his subjects ranging in age between 6 and 12, proposes *two stages* of development, KOHLBERG, the age-range of whose subjects was between 7 and 17, proposes *six stages* of development, the first two of which correspond to PIAGET'S two stages. Thus PIAGET'S subjects attain moral 'autonomy' around the age of 9, while KOHLBERG'S subjects attain 'autonomy' only between the ages of 13 and 17.

Another difference, related to the above one, concerns the role of *reciprocity and peer-orientation* in moral development. According to PIAGET, this factor increases with age, and fosters and characterizes the autonomous stage. According to KOHLBERG'S findings, however, reciprocity and peer-orientation increases between the ages of 6 and 9, but stands still or decreases afterwards. Hence KOHLBERG says that reciprocity and peer-cooperation is not a genuine developmental dimension (i.e. it does not steadily grow with age), but a dimension of social interaction specific to a period (between 6 and 9 years of age) of development.¹

Hence, the *moral autonomy* which PIAGET attributes to his 'autonomous stage' is not the same as the autonomy which KOHLBERG attributes to his stages of self-accepted moral principles, but a 'naive autonomy' which, while showing an increased liberation from adult authority, implies a great deal of conformity to peer-group, characteristic of the stage. Thus KOHLBERG'S analysis of moral development seems to be much more complete than that of PIAGET, who stops short on the way. Besides, according to PIAGET, the non-attainment of moral autonomy appears to be rare,² while according to

1. L. Kohlberg, "Moral Development and Identification", in H.W. Stevenson (Ed.), *Child Psychology* (62nd Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education, University of Chicago Press) 1963, p. 319.

2. For according to Piaget, the usual peer cooperation among children, coupled with intellectual development, brings about moral autonomy. And moral realism persists only

KOHLBERG'S findings in every culture only a minority reaches the final stages (autonomous stages) of moral development.

Finally, PIAGET emphasizes the role of *specific social relationships* (adult constraint or peer cooperation) in moral development, while KOHLBERG conceives them as components of a *general social environment* providing general role-taking opportunities broadly corresponding to the age of the growing child.³

B. Identification Theory – Cogn.-Developmental Theory

According to the *identification theory* conscience is an inner control acquired through *identification* with the parents, in which the child internalizes parental values. According to the theory, conscience is usually well established in childhood, especially around the age of six. After this age, the growth of conscience consists primarily in the increase of the content of control, and not in its strength or quality. The basic motive for identification is the child's *dependency* on the parent. This dependency may be expressed as anxiety over the loss of love and / or of the coveted resources which the parents control (and consume). Hence *early parent-child relationship and training practices* are the important factors which foster identification, and thus promote also the development of conscience in all its dimensions.

Comparing *identification and cognitive-developmental theories*, the following *common points* can be noted:

PIAGET'S theory and the identification theory are in agreement about the rather *early development* of an autonomous conscience or an 'adult conscience'. According to PIAGET this takes place around the age of 9, and according to the identification theory this takes place before the age of 10, especially around the age of 6, a critical time for the development of conscience, which determines the strength and 'quality' of one's conscience for the

in those societies where the "social constraint of the group as a whole" (e.g. the so-called primitive societies) prevails (Cfr. Piaget, *The Moral Judgment of the Child*, pp. 181 – 182).

3. Kohlberg, "Stage and Sequence" in D.A. Goslin (Ed.), *Handbook of Socialization Theory and Research*, Chicago 1969, p. 399.

rest of one's life.

Identification theory and cognitive-developmental theory agree in proposing, each in its own way, a theory of moral development claiming *universal validity and natural application*. Thus, according to the identification theory, identification is a natural and universal phenomenon, and given the favourable parent-child interaction, the development of conscience takes place naturally. Similarly, according to the cognitive-developmental theories, age-trend development of conscience is universal, and it takes place naturally provided the age-related cognitive growth and social interactions are available.

Besides, a *positive relationship* among the three dimensions of conscience (generality of conscience) is postulated by both the theories. For the identification theory (which postulates a very close relationship between the emotional and the behavioural dimensions) this relationship is based on the idea that conscience is a rather 'uniform entity' or structure within the personality⁴, which accounts for all the moral responses of the individual. For the cognitive-developmental theory (which does not postulate such a close relationship) it is based on an effective organization of all moral responses under the direction of mature moral thinking and judgment.⁵

Among the *differences* between the theories, the following may be noted:

PIAGET implies (and KOHLBERG too) a *qualitative difference* between the two stages of morality. The identification theory, however, does not suppose such a qualitative difference in conscience after it has been established or developed around the age of 10. According to the identification theory, therefore, the strength or 'quality' of an individual's conscience at 10 years and afterwards (e.g. at 25 years) appears to be the same. KOHLBERG, however, differs from both PIAGET and the identification theory when he proposes that conscience development reaches mature, autonomous stages rather late, not before 13 years of age.

As regards *the antecedents of conscience*, the all important factor according to the identification theory is the early parent-child relationship, while

4. Cfr. A. Bandura and R.H. Walters, *Social Learning and Personality Development*, p. 206.

5. Kohlberg, "Stage and Sequence", pp. 323 – 324.

cognitive factors do not appear to be important. And the cognitive-developmental theory, though recognizes the importance of early family participation, does not attribute a primary role to it.⁶

Finally, a key difference between the two theories, which concerns the very process of conscience development, may be noted. According to the identification theory, conscience development is basically a process of internalization or incorporation of parental and cultural values. Hence, *moralization is acculturation*. According to the cognitive-developmental theory, conscience development implies basically a gradual transformation of socio-moral concepts and attitudes from the part of the individual as a result of his interaction with the environment. Hence, *moralization is a specific developmental process*.

C. Learning-Theory Approaches — Identification and Cogn. Developmental Theories

Of the three learning theory approaches, the classical conditioning theory considers conscience as a "conditioned anxiety response", acquired through socialization process in which misbehaviour is paired with punishment. Easy conditionability (introversion) fosters the acquisition of conscience.

According to the instrumental learning theory, conscience is an "internalized control of behaviour". It is acquired through reward and punishment schedules or direct reinforcements. Hence different aspects of reward and punishment are important for the acquisition of conscience. Specifically, resistance to temptation is fostered by punishment before the misdeed, while post-transgressional responses are fostered by punishment after the misdeed.

According to the observational learning theory, the key factor in the acquisition of self-control (or conscience) is the child's imitation of models. The role of direct reinforcement (needed in instrumental learning) is assigned here to the subject's observation of the behaviour of models and its consequences.

6. Piaget's theory implies that a liberal, equality-oriented parent-child relationship fosters the development of the autonomous stage.

Comparing the learning theory approaches with the other two theories, we shall first note the differences:

Learning theory is characteristically *non-developmental*, that is, the principles of learning are applicable to all age-groups. Hence, theoretically, moral responses and conscience can be acquired (and lost) at any time provided the necessary conditions (e.g. reinforcements) are available.⁷ In this point it differs from the other two theories which hold a general developmental pattern, especially from the cognitive-developmental theory, which holds invariant sequence of moral stages according to age-growth.

Another difference between learning theory and the other two theories (especially identification theory) concerns the nature of conscience. The identification theory conceives conscience as a 'unitary phenomenon', acquired through a single identificatory process, while, according to learning theory, conscience is a *complex phenomenon* acquired through different patterns of learning. Consequently, learning theory, unlike the identification theory, does not postulate a necessary, positive relationship among the various dimensions of conscience.

Again, while the identification theory stresses the importance of love-withdrawal discipline, learning theory emphasizes the time factor (i.e. response-contingency) of punishment, whether punishment is psychological or physical. Thus the first is centred on *anxiety about the loss of love*, while the second is centred on *anxiety of punishment*, whatever be the nature of this punishment.

A final difference among the theories concerns the nature of *guilt* and other post-transgressional reactions.

According to the cognitive-developmental theory, true guilt is a "moral self-judgment" which supposes the ability to make mature moral judgment, and it is to be distinguished from other forms of emotional responses which are shown at the earlier stages of development. Such responses are fear of punishment, approval-seeking confession, and shame.⁸

7. Cfr. A. Bandura and F. McDonald, "Influence of Social Reinforcement and the Behaviour of Models in Shaping Children's Moral Judgments", *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1963, p. 274.

8. Kohlberg, "Development of Moral Character and Ideology" in M.L. and L.W. Hoffman (Eds), *Review of Child Development Research*, New York 1964, 410 — 411.

Theories of Conscience	Conscience	
	Description	Dimensions
Cognit. Developmental Theory	'A Self-judging and Guiding Function'	Cognitive: moral thinking judgment ideology, etc. Behavioural ¹ (temptation-resistance, altruistic behaviour) Emotional ¹ (fear, shame, confession, guilt)
Identification Theory	Inner Control	Cognitive ¹ (self-instruction) Behavioural: temptation-resistance prosocial behaviour Emotional: Guilt (internal orientation) confession, reparation, acknowledgement of misdeed punishment seeking Shame (external orientation)
Learning Theory	Conditioned Anxiety Response (Conditioning Theory) Internalized Control over Behaviour (Instrumental and Observational Learning Theories)	Cognitive ¹ Behavioural: temptation-resistance prosocial behaviour Emotional: Affective States: fear (and anxiety) shame guilt Responses: self-criticism, confession reparation, punishment seeking

Table 94: The table presents the important dimensions, antecedents, correlates, and descriptions of conscience according to the three theories, together with the general characteristics of the theories.

1. Dimensions which are little subjected to empirical investigation by a particular theory.

2. Antecedent variables whose role is less clearly established or little subjected to empirical study.

Antecedents	General Characteristic of the Theories of Conscience
Cognitive: age-growth, intell. growth social relations and experiences intelligence quotient, high social class, sex-differences ² religious practice ² Behavioural (ego-strength-factors) Emotional (mainly the same as those for the 'cognitive' dimension)	Universal and natural develop. Early maturity (Piaget) Late maturity (Kohlberg) Emphasis on the intellectual and maturational factors Qualitative differences betw. stages of development; Moralization: A specific process
Behavioural: Love and Nurturance Discipline: physical (for young children) psychological consistent and non-harsh Childhood Training: high standards of performance, early weaning ² , severe sex-and-toilet training ² ; father-son relationship, mother-daughter relationship Emotional: love and nurturance, psycho. discipline (esp. induction)	Universal and natural develop. Unitary concept of conscience Early development Emphasis on emotional and early rearing factors No qualitative differences between child and adult conscience Moralization: Acculturation
Cognitive: model judgments Behavioural: Prosocial: positive rewards verbal instruction Temptation-Resistance: conditioning and conditionability, punishment before the misdeed; intensity of punishment verbal instruction, nurturant relationship, observation of model's behaviour Emotional: punishment after the misdeed cognitive orientation nurturant relationship, observation of model's emotional reactions	Non-developmental Non-unitary (complex) concept of conscience Emphasis on reinforcement schedules and the process of learning Moralization: Acculturation

According to the identification theory, guilt is the remorse resulting from application to oneself of parental disapproval, and the various post-transgressional responses like confession, reparation, etc., are considered to be expressions of guilt. Fear responses (e.g. hiding the misdeed), on the other hand, are said to reflect the absence or weak development of conscience. And shame is considered to be the expression of an externally oriented conscience.

According to learning theory, guilt is due to the awareness of bad consequences of one's actions for others; shame is centred on others' disapproval; and fear, on bad consequences for oneself. All these reactions, says ARON-FREED, are components of the emotional dimension of conscience, and therefore coexist in the same conscience.⁹ Further, responses like confession, self-criticism, etc., are more anxiety reducing mechanisms than guilt symptoms. Thus, learning theory proposes a more complex concept of post-transgressional reactions.

As for *points of agreement*, learning theory and the identification theory conceive moral development and conscience as *products of internalizing* parental and cultural norms and values, though the two theories invoke different mechanisms to explain this internalization. However, by emphasizing conscious learning processes, learning theory assigns a role to cognitive processes in the development of conscience, while such a role is not assigned by the identification theory which emphasizes the (unconscious) process of identification.

(The above table — table 94 — gives a synoptic view of the three theories of conscience).

9. J. Aronfreed, *Conduct and Conscience*, p. 243.

PART II

THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE EMPIRICAL APPROACHES TO CONSCIENCE

The various empirical approaches to conscience we analysed in the preceding chapters are not isolated attempts to explain the phenomenon of conscience, but are integral parts of broader psychological (and sociological) theories of child development and personality, of which the development of morality and conscience is an aspect. Therefore, for a better understanding and evaluation of these approaches they should be seen within the framework of those general psychological theories.

Hence, in the following three chapters we shall briefly discuss the general concepts, principles and assumptions of the cognitive-developmental, identification, and learning theories in so far as they help place the corresponding approaches to conscience in the proper perspective.

The Cognitive-Developmental Theory

It is not one specific theory that comes under the label of 'cognitive-developmental', but several theories of social and cognitive development, which share certain general assumptions, fall under this title. Thus, for example, the psychological theory of J. M. BALDWIN¹ as well that of G. MEAD² are considered to be cognitive-developmental just as the theory of PIAGET, though there are specific differences among them.³

In this chapter therefore we shall see first the *general assumptions* of the cognitive-developmental theory and then specifically the *basic features of intellectual development* according to PIAGET'S theory.

A. The General Assumptions of the Cognitive-Developmental Theory

L. KOHLBERG suggests the following assumptions as proper to all cognitive-developmental theories, distinguishing them from psychoanalytic and behaviouristic theories:

1. Basic development involves transformations of cognitive structures, which shape and pattern behaviour.
2. Cognitive structures develop as a result of processes of interaction between the structure of the organism and the environment.
3. The development of cognitive structures always tends to greater equilibrium in the process organism-environment interaction, that is, towards greater balance or reciprocity between the action of the organism upon the object

1. J.M. Baldwin, *Social and Ethical Interpretations of Mental Development*, New York 1906.

2. G.H. Mead, *Mind, Self and Society*, Chicago 1934.

3. Cfr. L. Kohlberg, "Stage and Sequence: The Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Socialization" in D.A. Goslin (Ed.), *Handbook of Socialization Theory and Research*, Chicago 1969, p. 347.

and that of the object upon the organism.

4. Development, which takes place through interaction process, progresses in stages as the child grows, that is, there are developmental stages related to age-growth.

5. Developmental stages bring about qualitative differences in the child's modes of thinking or solving problems at different stages. But the modes of thinking at a given stage reflects an 'organizational whole' that the child's way of dealing with different problems shows a similarity characteristic of that stage of development.

6. The stages form an invariant sequence or succession in individual development. In the process of development the lower stages are integrated into the higher ones so that the stages may be said to be hierarchical integrations.⁴

These assumptions, says KOHLBERG, are applicable to cognitive-development in general, i.e. to the development of ways of thinking about both physical and social objects. To these he adds a few further assumptions which hold good specifically for moral (socio-emotional) development:

7. Affective and cognitive developments go hand in hand in as far as they have a common structural base. And cognitive development is a basic factor in the development of social and affective spheres because they always entail cognitive dimensions.

8. There is a basic unity of personality organization and ego development underlying various spheres of development.

9. Social development is essentially a restructuring of the concept of self in relationship to the concepts of other people, conceived as being in a common social world with social standards. This development involves role-taking, i.e. the awareness that other selves are somehow like one's self, and mutually responding in a system of complementary expectations.

10. The social development tends towards an equilibrium or reciprocity between actions of the self and actions of others towards the self. This equilibrium is the definer of morality, usually expressed as principles of justice.⁵

From the above assumptions of the cognitive-developmental theory it follows that the development of the individual in various spheres (social,

4. Kohlberg, "Stage and Sequence", pp. 348, 352 – 353.

5. Kohlberg, *Ibidem*, p. 349.

moral, etc.) supposes a transformation of the underlying cognitive structures. Transformation of structures is effected through processes of interaction between the existing structure and the environment, physical and social. And this interaction process is directed toward establishing an equilibrium between the individual and his environment.

With this synoptic view of the general principles of cognitive-developmental theory, we shall pass on specifically to PIAGET'S theory of intellectual development, which is the central theme of Piagetian developmental psychology, and is important for a proper understanding of his theory of 'moral judgment'.

It may also be noted that, as far as intellectual development is concerned, KOHLBERG basically accepts Piagetian theory. Hence an elucidation of the Piagetian theory of intellectual development contributes also towards a better understanding of KOHLBERG'S theory of moral development.⁶

B. Features of Intellectual Development according to Piaget's Theory

PIAGET⁷ was a biologist and epistemologist ever before he turned out to

6. Cfr. Kohlberg, 'The Development of Children's Orientations towards a Moral Order', *Vita Humana*, 1963 (6), p. 29.

7. Piaget's theory of intellectual development, admittedly complex and difficult, is scattered over several of his works. For our purpose, the following English titles may be specially mentioned:

J. Piaget, *The Language and Thought of the Child*, New York 1926
Judgment and Reasoning in the Child, New York 1928
The Child's Conception of the World, New York 1929
The Child's Conception of Physical Causality, London, 1930

These four books, together with the fifth one in the series, *The Moral Judgment of the Child*, constitute Piaget's early observations and experiments on developmental changes. The following works may be considered more as theoretical elaborations based on these and later experimental findings.

J. Piaget, *The Psychology of Intelligence*, New York 1950
Play, Dreams and Imitation in Childhood, New York 1951
The Origins of Intelligence in Children, New York 1952

be a psychologist. It is his epistemological interest that brought him to the field of developmental psychology. PIAGET himself admits in his forward to J.H. FLAVELL'S book: "Naturalist and biologist by training, interested in epistemological problems, without ever having undertaken formal study in psychology, my most central concern has always been to determine the contributions of the person's activities and the limiting aspects of the object in the process of acquiring knowledge"⁸

PIAGET'S biological background reflects very much in his theory of intellectual development. As FLAVELL notes, "For Piaget, the one-time biologist, intelligence can be meaningfully considered only as an extension of certain fundamental biological characteristics, fundamental in the sense that they obtain wherever life obtains"... Thus "intellectual functions is a special form of biological activity, and as such possesses important attributes in common with the parent activities from which it derives"⁹.

It is common knowledge in biology that living organisms develop to fit their surroundings, that is, biological structures adapt themselves to the environment. This adaptation is a complex process involving assimilation and accommodation. Thus a plant assimilates nurturance from its environment and at the same time accommodates itself to the environment in order to assimilate nurturance.

1. Adaptation and Schema in Intellectual Development

In a similar biological vein, PIAGET speaks about the intellect. *Adaptation* and *schema* are key features of intellectual development according to his theory.

The Construction of Reality in the Child, New York 1954
Logic and Psychology, Manchester 1953

"Genetic Psychology and Epistemology", *Diogenes* 1953, pp. 49 – 63.

It may, however, be noted that for our exposition of Piaget's theory here we depend on those authors who have given a systematic presentation of Piaget, especially, A. L. Baldwin, *Theories of Child Development*, New York 1967, pp. 171 – 300; J. H. Flavell, *The Developmental Psychology of Jean Piaget*, New York 1963.

8. J. H. Flavell, *The Developmental Psychology of Jean Piaget*, p. vii

9. Flavell, *Ibidem*, pp. 41 – 42.

a) Adaptation

According to PIAGET, adaptation is the basic function of the intellect, and it has two aspects: *assimilation* and *accommodation*.

Every cognitive encounter of the subject with the environmental object "involves some kind of cognitive structuring of the object in accordance with the nature of the organism's existing intellectual organization"¹⁰. This process of moulding or shaping the reality to suit the structure of the organism and thus receiving it into the organism is called *assimilation*.

However, there is not only assimilation in the cognitive act; there is also a moulding of the structure of the organism to fit the reality. This process of moulding the structure to the reality is called *accommodation*.¹¹ Even in the most simple and elementary form of knowledge the subject has to come to grips with the special properties of the object. And the "essence of accommodation is precisely this process of adapting oneself to the variegated requirements or demands which the world of objects imposes upon one".¹²

Assimilation and accommodation, which are two facets of adaptation, constitute, in PIAGET'S theory, "the most fundamental ingredients of intellectual functioning", and any intellectual act, of whatever type and developmental level, includes both these ingredients. Hence they are known as the 'functional invariants' of the intellect.¹³ This indicates that assimilation and accommodation are phenomena simultaneously and indissociably operating in cognition. Thus, from the perspective of the Piagetian theory, an assimilating and accommodating mouth and digestive system is not really different in principle from an assimilating and accommodating cognitive system.¹⁴

b) Schema

PIAGET does not give a precise and exhaustive definition of the term *sche-*

10. Flavell, *Ibidem*, p. 48

11. *Ibidem*,

12. *Ibidem*,

13. Flavell, *Ibidem*, p. 58

14. Flavell, *Ibidem*, p. 48.

ma, though he makes prolific use of it. Put very simply, a schema is a cognitive system, which changes and adapts to reality, and thus corresponds to a 'biological structure' which assimilates and accommodates to the environment.¹⁵ According to a more systematic definition of FLAVELL, a schema is "a cognitive structure which has reference to a class of action sequences, these sequences being of necessity strong bounded totalities in which the constituent behavioural elements are tightly interrelated".¹⁶

Schemas are usually named after the action sequences to which they refer. Thus, for example, a series of actions relating to the 'sucking behaviour' of the young child (e.g. turning the head, sucking, swallowing the milk, etc.) is named 'sucking schema'. Hence 'schema' is a general concept, which stands for a variety of related action sequences in so many different circumstances. Thus schemas come in all possible sizes and shapes, range from the "brief and simple sucking sequence of the neonate....to the complex problem-solving strategies of a bright adult".¹⁷

Though widely different and complex behaviour sequences can come under the rubric of schema, in order to be qualified as a schema a behaviour sequence should be an *organized totality referring to a class of similar action sequences*, i.e. a given behaviour sequence should possess a certain cohesiveness, and must be identifiable as a quasi-stable and repeatable unit.¹⁸ Another feature of a schema is its *dynamism and plasticity*. Precisely because schemas, being cognitive structures, do adapt to reality they are dynamic and flexible.¹⁹

What has been said above illustrates what a schema is and its qualities. Besides this, schemas can be considered in their *developmental process*. This development is effected through their very functioning.

Schemas have a natural tendency to apply themselves repeatedly to available objects. In this process of repeated application schemas extend themselves to new objects (called 'generalization of schemas'), and this in

15. A.L. Baldwin, *Theories of Child Development*, p. 174.

16. Flavell, *Ibidem*, pp. 52 – 53.

17. Flavell, *Ibidem*, p. 53.

18. Flavell, *Ibidem*, p. 54.

19. Flavell, *Ibidem*, p. 55.

turn fosters the differentiation of schemas. Thus, for example, the young child sucks (applies his sucking schema to) any object that comes within his reach, and thus learns that a variety of objects like cloths, fingers, etc., can be sucked. In this process of generalization the child also learns to differentiate, that is, he gradually learns that all objects are not to be sucked in the same way; that all suckable objects do not satiate hunger, etc., and thus comes to differentiate the one from the other.²⁰ Thus schemas develop through their functioning. FLAVELL summarizes the developmental process of cognitive schemas as follows: "Repetition consolidates and stabilizes it, as well as providing the necessary condition for change. Generalization enlarges it extending its domain of application. And differentiation has the consequence of dividing the originally global schemas into several new schemas, each with a sharper, more discriminating focus on reality".²¹

2. Equilibration

Another important feature of the Piagetian theory of intellectual development is *equilibrium*. The whole intellectual functioning is ordained towards maintaining an equilibrium between the subject and the environment, more precisely between the assimilative and accommodative functions of the cognitive system.

A system is considered to be in equilibrium when it possesses some kind of balance or stability with regard to the forces acting upon it. No system can endure a disequilibrium for long. Therefore, when the equilibrium is threatened, the system mobilizes its forces in order to maintain the 'status quo', or it undergoes a change adapting itself to the new situation and thus establishing a new equilibrium.²² This process is called *equilibration*.

In the cognitive realm, equilibration may be described as the "process of bringing assimilation and accommodation into balanced coordination" and consequently establishing a balanced system of relations between subject and

20. Flavell, *Ibidem*, pp. 55 – 56.

21. Flavell, *Ibidem*, p. 57.

22. Flavell, *Ibidem*, p. 241.

object.²³ Thus, for example, the young child's ideas are unorganized. He is, besides, exposed to novel ideas and thinking in his environment, both physical and social. These unorganized ideas cause conflict in the child's thinking (called 'cognitive conflict'), and consequently force "is set up to harmonize the child's ideas with one another" and thus establish an equilibrium.²⁴

An equilibrium-state is not a static one. The system is constantly exposed to further novel and unintegrated ideas and problems which cause further conflict in the system. And force is again mobilized to bring about a new equilibrium. Thus equilibration is a process which pervades the whole intellectual development. In fact, the very process of intellectual development is conceived "as succession of structures coming into equilibrium" as a result of continuous intellectual function of assimilating reality and accommodating to reality.²⁵

And further, PIAGET would emphasize that cognitive organs, like any other organ, have a natural and intrinsic need to perpetuate themselves by continuous functioning.²⁶ Hence, intellectual functioning and maintenance of equilibrium in the process of interaction with the environment is propelled by a natural and innate tendency of the intellect.

3. The Developmental Periods

We have seen that the same process of equilibration underlies the whole intellectual development. But the development itself takes place in *different periods* from birth to maturity, each period showing a more balanced subject-object relationship and thus a maturer form of cognition than the preceding period. And one of PIAGET'S major contributions is his theory of developmental periods. He distinguishes *four periods* in the child's intellectual development: *Sensori-motor period*, *preoperational period*, *concrete operational period* and *formal operational period*

23. Flavell, *Ibidem*, p. 239.

24. Baldwin, *Theories of Child Development*, p. 296.

25. Flavell, *Ibidem*, p. 244.

26. Flavell, *Ibidem*, p. 78.

a) Sensori-motor period

This period covers the first two years of life. The important feature of this period is that the child acquires skills and adaptations in the realm of sensori-motor behaviour.²⁷

The neonate, who begins his life with innate reflexes, attains a relatively coherent organization of his sensorimotor activities. Thus, coordinating and integrating information from various sensory organs, he can, for example, look at what he is listening to, can guide his movements according to the auditory, tactual or visual cues. Besides, by the end of the second year the child already exhibits goal-directed behaviour; for example, he can pursue a series of actions with a view to attaining a particular goal.²⁸

Despite these achievements, the child's activity in the first two years is evidently very limited and imperfect. It is primarily limited to the sensorimotor level. The child still lacks conceptual representations or schemas corresponding to his sensorimotor behaviour patterns.²⁹

b) Preoperational Period

The preoperational³⁰ period extends from 2 to about 7 years of age. During this period the child's intelligent functions, which in the previous period were limited to sensorimotor behaviour, become capable of "inner

27. Baldwin, *Theories of Child Development*, p. 190.

28. Baldwin, *Ibidem*, pp. 190 — 191.

29. Baldwin, *Ibidem*, p. 191; cfr. also, D. Berlyne, "Recent Developments in Piaget's Work", *British Journal of Educational Psychology*, 1957 (27), p. 2.

30. In Piaget's terminology, any cognitive activity is an action; e.g. the child brings his hand to his mouth. This is an external action. But as cognitive activities attain conceptual level, are internally organized and become reversible, they are called 'operations' (e.g. adding, subtracting and any number of similar operations). Hence, the labelling of the last three periods as 'operational' means that the cognitive activities in these periods are capable of conceptual, internally organized thinking. However, the modes of thinking or cognitive operation in these three periods, as we shall see, differ among themselves, and accordingly they are called 'pre-', concrete-, and formal-operational periods (cfr. Flavell, *The Developmental Psychology of J. Piaget*, pp. 165 — 166).

symbolic manipulation of reality" or the child is said to be capable of symbolic schemas.³¹

This capacity for symbolic function enables the child to grasp separate events in an internal representative act and to "recall the past, represent the present and anticipate the future in one temporarily brief, organized act".³² Besides, representational thought, on account of its potentiality to transcend the immediate present, is capable of eventually extending its scope beyond the actual, concrete environment. With these achievements the child in the preoperational period has attained a cognitive capacity far beyond that of the sensorimotor period.³³

Yet the intellectual activity of the preoperational child has its limitations. The following are among the major limitations of this period: *Egocentrism*, *centration*, *irreversibility*, *realism*, *animism*, and *artificialism*.³⁴

Egocentrism

This denotes "a cognitive state in which the cognizer sees the world from a single point of view only — his own — but without the knowledge of the existence of view points or perspectives, and a fortiori, without awareness that he is the prisoner of his own".³⁵ Hence the child is not aware of his own egocentrism. As a result of this egocentrism, which amounts to an inability to see the view point of another and take his role, the preoperational child does not feel the necessity to justify his own reasonings nor does he try to find the contradictions implied in his reasonings.³⁶

31. Baldwin, *Theories of Child Development*, p. 230; Flavell, *Ibidem*, p. 151.

32. Flavell, *Ibidem*, p. 152..

33. *Ibidem*.

34. From the several characteristics of the preoperational thought, which Piaget points out, we have chosen primarily those which are more alluded to in his work on moral judgment as contributing to the child's moral realism.

It should however be noted that the various limiting characteristics of this period are so closely related to each other that they can be considered as multiple expressions of one basic characteristic. They seem to follow one another so closely that, as Flavell notes, almost any one of them may serve as a unifying concept for all. And Piaget himself prefers to consider 'egocentrism' as the basic, unifying concept (cfr. Flavell, *Ibidem*, pp. 161 — 162).

35. Flavell, *Ibidem*, p. 60.

36. Srampickal, *Conscience*

What liberates intellectual activity from this egocentrism are interpersonal interactions, and this is a strong tenet of PIAGET.³⁷ It is repeated interpersonal interactions, which involve arguments, disagreements and conflicts, which give repeated impetus to the child to see the view point of the other and take his role. However, the preoperational child has not yet undergone these wholesome interactions, for which he is only getting prepared.³⁸

Centration

This refers to that characteristic of preoperational thought by which the child tends to center his attention on a single striking aspect of the object of consideration to the neglect of other important aspects. This tendency distorts the child's reasoning and makes him unable to grasp reality properly.³⁹

Irreversibility

This feature refers to the child's inability to pursue a series of reasonings and then to make the same reasoning in the reverse direction. Related to this is the child's inability to think the contrary of what he is thinking, and to think about his own thinking. Consequently, the child easily falls into contradictions of which he is not aware.⁴⁰

Because the child is unable to differentiate between the self and the world (on account of egocentrism), he confuses between the physical and the psychological. Consequently, psychological events (thoughts, wishes, experiences, etc.) are given a physical status and considered as physical things. This tendency is called *realism*. Conversely, the child may also endow physical realities (wind, sun, etc.) with life and consciousness, and attribute to them a psychobiological status. This is called *animism*. Related to realism and animism is the child's tendency to consider physical phenomena as the products of human creation. In fact the child thinks that men have made all things in the world

36. Flavell, Ibidem, p. 156.

37. Ibidem.

38. Flavell, Ibidem, pp. 156 – 157.

39. Flavell, Ibidem, p. 157; and Baldwin, Theories of Child Development, p. 247.

40. Flavell, Ibidem, p. 159.

with specific purposes and for special uses. This mode of thinking is called *artificialism*.⁴¹

c) Period of Concrete Operations

This covers the period between 7 and 11 years of age. Intellectual operations involving logical classes and relations, which PIAGET calls *Groupings*, are the main attainments of this period.⁴²

A Grouping describes a cognitive structure, and may be considered as a model of intellectual activity in the concrete operational period. Thus, for example, the child at this period understands that if $A = B$ and $B = C$, then $A = C$. Recognizing the equivalence relationship between the given elements (A, B, C) the child reasons from any one element to any other on the basis of this equivalence relationship. In the Piagetian system this simple type of intellectual operation is called 'Preliminary Grouping of Equalities'.⁴³

The ability to understand simple hierarchies of classes is another attainment of concrete operational thought, and it forms another grouping called "Grouping I: Primary Addition of Classes". Operations like the following come under this grouping: $A + A^1 = B$, then $A = B - A^1$; $B + B^1 = C$ or $A + A^1 + B^1 = C$, etc. This capacity for addition enables the child to ascend (and descend) a hierarchy "by successively combining elementary classes into superordinate classes".⁴⁴

41. Flavell, Ibidem, pp. 280 – 281.

42. Flavell, Ibidem, pp. 164, 167; Baldwin, Theories of Child Development, p. 186.

43. Flavell, Ibidem, p. 171; Baldwin, Ibidem, 251 – 252.

44. Flavell, Ibidem, pp. 173, 191.

It may be noted that Piaget distinguishes 9 basic groupings (including the two already mentioned) of logical classes and relations, which are models of logical operations in the concrete operational period. Since a detailed description of those groupings is beyond our scope, suffice it to mention these nine groupings:

	Preliminary Grouping of Equalities
Grouping I:	Primary Addition of Classes
Grouping II:	Secondary Addition of Classes
Grouping III:	Bi-univocal Multiplication of Classes
Grouping IV:	Co-univocal Multiplication of Classes

What these types of operations show is that the child in the concrete operational period has attained an intellectual maturity which was not available in the preoperational period. The concrete operational child's capacity for ordering, classifying and organizing reveals that he is very much liberated from the grips of egocentrism, centration and irreversibility which are characteristics of the preoperational thought.⁴⁵

Despite these achievements, the operations of this period are, to a good extent, still concrete, that is, their ordering and structuring is oriented towards concrete things and events in the present. They are not sufficiently detached from the concrete subject matter to be capable of dealing with possibilities and abstractions.⁴⁶ Besides, though the concrete operational child is capable of various logical operations (i.e. various groupings), these operations exist in him as more or less separate systems, and not as an integrated system. Consequently, he is not able to simultaneously apply the different logical operations to a single problem, of which the solution may require a coordinated application of different operations.⁴⁷

d) Period of Formal Operations

The development of formal operations extends from 11 to 15 years of age. The most important feature of formal operational thought is its ability to deal with possibilities and abstractions.⁴⁸

While the concrete operational child organizes the knowledge of concrete objects and understands actual relationships that exist among them, the formal operational adolescent can think of the various possible relationships that

- Grouping V: Addition of Asymmetrical Relations
- Grouping VI: Addition of Symmetrical Relations
- Grouping VII: Bi-univocal Multiplication of Relations
- Grouping VIII: Co-univocal Multiplication of Relations.

(cfr. Flavell, *Ibidem*, pp. 173 – 187; Baldwin, *Ibidem*, 251 – 261)

45. Flavell, *Ibidem*, p. 191 ff.

46. Flavell, *Ibidem*, pp. 203 – 204.

47. Flavell, *Ibidem*, p. 204.

48. *Ibidem*.

may exist among objects and events, and work on the basis of these possible relationships. Since he no more needs concrete objects to support his thinking he can now work with formal propositions. So he is enabled for hypothetico-deductive thinking, for example, in the following form: "Well, it is clear from the data that A might be necessary and sufficient condition for X, or that B might be, or that both together might be needed, etc. My job is to test these possibilities in turn to see which one or ones really hold true in this problem".⁴⁹ Then he can systematically analyse the variables and find out the valid hypothesis. These attainments show that the formal operational child has taken the final steps towards complete decentration and reversibility, i.e. freedom from egocentrism.⁵⁰ Thus it is in the formal operational period that 'adult thinking' and proper scientific reasoning begin to emerge.⁵¹

49. Flavell, *Ibidem*, p. 205; also Baldwin, *Ibidem*, p. 274.

50. D. E. Berlyne, "Recent Developments in Piaget's Work", *British J. Educ. Psych.*, 1957, p. 8.

51. Flavell, *Ibidem*, p. 208.

It may be noted that Piaget's theory of moral development was influenced, besides by his own theory of intellectual development, by several other psychological and sociological theories, notably by those of M. P. Fauconnet, E. Durkheim, P. Bovet and J. M. Baldwin.

M. P. Fauconnet (*La Responsabilité, Etude de Sociologie*, Alcan 1920) also propounded two types of moral responsibility – objective and subjective – and this was appealing to Piaget. However, Fauconnet held that the invariable element in any type of responsibility was punishability. Piaget disagrees with this latter tenet of Fauconnet and says that in mature morality the concept of responsibility is increasingly freed from the concept of punishment (Piaget, *The Moral Judgment of the Child*, pp. 327 – 339).

E. Durkheim, (*Moral Education*, New York 1960; first published as *L'éducation Morale*, Alcan 1925). according to whom morality is basically founded on society and social life, distinguishes two types of morality: of constraint and of solidarity (or cooperation). However, according to Durkheim there is no essential difference between these two types of morality because, whether through constraint or through cooperation, laws and rules are adhered to in both the types. Hence there is a functional identity between the two moralities.

While accepting Durkheim's two types of morality, Piaget strongly criticizes him for denying the essentially qualitative difference between the two moralities. Hence Piaget observes: "The fundamental difficulty of Durkheimism seems to us to be the illegal identification of constraint and cooperation" (Piaget, *Ibidem*, pp. 342 – 355).

P. Bovet (*Les Conditions de l'Obligation de la Conscience*), *Année Psychologique*,

1912), however, was interested in clarifying the origin of the sense of obligation. According to him the sense of obligation had its origin in the child's relationship with the adults, especially in his strong respect for them. And this theory, we saw, has been propounded by Piaget also. Bovet's theory had such an influence on Piaget that he considers 'Bovetian ideas as the begetter of his own results'.

However, Piaget disagrees with Bovet when it comes to the factors that lead the child to moral autonomy. According to Bovet, autonomization is a work of the maturing reason amidst a clash of rules which the child receives from various sources. Here Piaget criticizes Bovet for ignoring the role of peer-cooperation in moral autonomization (Piaget, *Ibidem*, pp. 377 — 388).

J. M. Baldwin (*Social and Ethical Interpretations in Mental Development*, New York 1906) was interested in the development of moral consciousness. He held that moral consciousness had its origin in social pressure, but it became autonomus through the influence of intellectual development. Consequently, Piaget's criticism of Baldwin is levelled against the latter's silence about the role of peer-cooperation in intellectual and moral development (Piaget, *Ibidem*, pp. 394 — 400).

Chapter VII

Theories of Identification

The concept of *identification* has its origin in the writings of S. FREUD¹, and in his writings it underwent continuous modifications.²

After the time of FREUD, 'identification' has been variously interpreted, invoked as a mechanism of learning different behaviour patterns (thus trying to understand it in the light of learning-principles) and different theories have been built around it.³ Consequently, the concept of identification remains still very imprecise and flexible. Therefore, it is practically impossible to give a general structure of 'identification theory'.

However, the identification theory of conscience, which we discussed in chapter III, is based on an attempt to understand and explain identification in the light of learning theory principles. As A. L. BALDWIN notes, a group of researchers at Yale University (mainly students and colleagues of C. L. HULL, who included N. MILLER, O. H. MOWRER, R. R. SEARS and others) "attempted to build a theory of child development on the basis of both S — R theory and psychoanalytic theory. Couched in the language of S — R, their theories depend on learning and reinforcement as explanatory principles, but many of the hypotheses have been inspired by the writing of FREUD. This view has been labeled *social learning theory*".⁴ And SEARS, who has done a

1. J. Kagan, "The Concept of Identification", *Psychological Review*, 1958, p. 297.

2. U. Bronfenbrenner, "Freudian Theories of Identification and Their Derivatives", *Child Development*, 1960, p. 15.

3. Cfr. A. Bandura and R. H. Walters, *Social Learning and Personality Development*, pp. 89 ff.

4. A. L. Baldwin, *Theories of Child Development*, p. 437.

It should, however, be noted that different theoretical positions come under 'social learning'. Thus, for example, R. R. Sears' theory, which ascribes an important role to identification, conceived as a general process of role-taking, more in tune with the Freudian view, as well as A. Bandura's theory, which attempts to explain identification in terms of observational learning, are called 'social learning theories' (Cfr. Baldwin, *Theories of Child Development*, p. 438). Therefore, we have used (e.g. in our discussion

good deal of research on the basis of this theory, says that the body of research "must not be viewed as an attempted verification of psychoanalytic concepts, therefore, but as a testing of a behavioural theory that was suggested by psychoanalytic observations and was then constructed within the frame-work of an entirely different theoretical structure".⁵ From this point of view, identification theory is a form of social-learning theory inspired by psychoanalytic theory.

In order to be able to place the identification theory of conscience in a broader perspective⁶, we shall briefly discuss (A) the *Freudian theory of identification* and (B) *Post-Freudian theories of identification*.

A. The Freudian Theory of Identification

As we already mentioned, FREUD'S thinking on identification⁷ showed changes. However, there is a permanent feature discernible in the Freudian concept of identification, namely, the identifying subject's 'emotional tie' or relationship with an object, typically the parent. Yet the exact nature of this relationship was shifting in the course of FREUD'S writings.⁸

FREUD'S first implicit (without explicitly naming it) reference to identification occurs in his essay "On Narcissism".⁹ Here he deals, for the first time, with the notion of a presexual or asexual attachment to another person. This attachment is based on a "dependency relationship with the mother

in chapter III) the term 'identification theory' to indicate that form of social learning, which understands identification in terms of a general role-taking process.

5. Sears, Rau and Alpert, *Identification and Child Rearing*, Tavistock 1966, p. 242.

6. The 'principles of learning theory' implied in the identification theory shall be discussed in the next chapter.

7. Freud's view on identification is scattered over several of his works, which shall be indicated in the course of our exposition. However, for our exposition here we depend more on others who have given a systematic presentation of the Freudian concept of identification, especially, U. Bronfenbrenner, "Freudian Theories of Identification and Their Derivatives", *Child Development*, 1960, pp. 15 – 40.

8. Bronfenbrenner, *Ibidem*, p. 16.

9. S. Freud, "On Narcissism, an Introduction", *Collected Papers*, Vol. IV, London 1925, pp. 30 – 59.

or the person having to do with the feeding, care and protection of the child" and this type of attachment is called 'anaclitic object choice'.¹⁰

The first explicit treatment of identification appears in his essay "Mourning and Melancholia"¹¹, where he attempts to explain the feelings of extreme guilt and self-depreciation in certain patients who had lost a beloved person. To explain the development of such feelings, FREUD invoked a three-phase process.

The first phase, which occurs in childhood, is a form of relationship in which "ego and object are fused in a single undifferentiated pattern". This is considered to be a preliminary form of identification. Out of this object-ego fusion, there develops an object-choice, that is, the libido becomes attached to a person (object), usually the parent. And in the final phase, owing to the loss of the loved person and the relationship, the libido is withdrawn into the ego, and there it serves "simply to establish an identification of the ego with the abandoned object".¹² Here identification implies a relationship with a lost object, i.e. an emotional tie resulting from a frustration.

FREUD'S extended discussion of identification occurs in his work *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*¹³. Here, for the first time, the process of identification is described explicitly as a mechanism for resolving the *Oedipus Complex*.¹⁴

The child begins with an emotional relationship with both the parents. But then the boy develops a sexual desire towards the mother and realizes that his father is a hindrance to his possessing the mother. Hence he comes to hate the father. Thus there arises a conflict or ambivalence (of love and hatred) in the boy's attitude towards the father.

However, the boy's hostile feelings against his father arouse in him the fear of being punished, i.e. of being castrated, by the powerful father. This fear of the punishing father brings about the resolution of the Oedipus complex, and prompts the boy to identify with the father. In this context identification means an endeavour "to mould a person's own ego after the fashion

10. Bronfenbrenner, *Ibidem*, p. 16.

11. Freud, "Mourning and Melancholia", *Collected Papers*, Vol. IV, pp. 152 – 170.

12. Bronfenbrenner, *Ibidem*, pp. 16 – 17.

13. Freud, *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, London 1948.

14. Bronfenbrenner, *Ibidem*, p. 17.

of one that has been taken as a model".¹⁵ Here therefore identification means a 'modeling' motivated by fear of punishment or aggression.

The resolution of the Oedipus complex and the consequent identification has a necessary consequence: the birth of the *super-ego* or conscience.¹⁶ This is so because through identification the child incorporates into himself the model's ideals and standards, which become the foundation of the child's moral consciousness.¹⁷ Thus according to FREUD, morality and conscience are product of introjecting parental, hence also cultural, values.¹⁸

Summarizing the Freudian notion of identification we may say that FREUD makes two distinct uses of the term: identification as *process* and identification as *product*.

As *process*, identification refers to the mechanism by which the child adopts the characteristics of the model (e.g. the parent). This may be motivated by an asexual love-relationship (called *anacletic identification*) or by fear arising out of the Oedipus situation (called *aggressive identification*).

As *product*, identification refers to the similarity between the child and the model resulting from the identification process. This similarity may be manifested in the child's overt behaviour, in his internal motives and especially in his ideals and standards (i.e. *superego*) for action, all of which can be the

15. Bronfenbrenner, *Ibidem*, pp. 17 – 18.

Freud's subsequent discussions on identification, notes Bronfenbrenner, do not show any specially new elements, except explicating its different effects on the *superego* formation of the two sexes, which shall be indicated below.

16. Cfr. J. Seidl, *Darstellung und Kritik der Gwissenslehre Sigmund Freuds*, unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Salzburg, 1972, pp. 60, 64.

It may be noted that Freud's theory about the boy's castration anxiety, consequent identification and conscience development has no relevant application for the girl, who cannot be threatened, as Freud himself notes, with castration. Hence, according to the theory, *superego* development is weaker in girls than in boys. However, in order to explain *superego* formation in the female, Freud resorts to identification based on the fear of loss of love, i.e. *anacletic identification* (Cfr. Bronfenbrenner, *Ibidem*, pp. 18 – 19).

17. Cfr. A. Resch, "Das Moralische Urteil bei Sigmund Freud", *Studia Moralia*, Roma 1974, p. 167.

18. For an extensive treatment of the Freudian theory of morality, see C. Kottayarakil, *Sigmund Freud on Religion and Morality, A challenge to Christianity*. Doctoral dissertation, Academia Alfonsiana, Rome 1972. (In press)

object of emulation.¹⁹

Besides, notes BRONFENBRENNER, FREUD'S concept of identification has two features which are not fully brought out by common learning theories:

(i) It implies a tendency on the part of the child "to take on not merely discrete elements of the parental model but a *total pattern*".

And (ii) this taking on of parental model is effected "with an *emotional intensity* which reflected the operation of motivational forces of considerable power".²⁰

Hence, taking on the 'model as a whole' and doing it with 'strong emotion' or motivation is characteristic of the Freudian notion of identification.

B. Post-Freudian Theories of Identification

In order to see the trends in the evolution of the concept of identification we shall briefly discuss two important post-Freudian theories of identification: (1) *developmental* and *defensive* identification and (2) *identification* and *introjection*.²¹

1. Developmental and Defensive Identification

O.H. MOWRER proposes two types of identification: *developmental* and *defensive*.²²

19. Bronfenbrenner, *Ibidem*, p. 22.

20. Bronfenbrenner, *Ibidem*, p. 27.

21. Besides these, the concept of identification has been elaborated by A. Freud (*Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence*, New York 1946) more in line with psychoanalysis; and by T. Parsons and others from a sociological point of view (T. Parsons, *The Social System*, Glencoe 1951; T. Parsons and R.F. Bales, *Family, Socialization and Interaction Process*, Glencoe 1955).

22. O.H. Mowrer, "Identification: A Link between Learning Theory and Psychotherapy", in *Learning Theory and Personality Dynamics*, New York 1950, pp. 573 – 616, especially p. 590.

Developmental Identification

According to MOWRER, this form of identification is "powered mainly by biologically given drives"²³, for example, the fear of loss of love. The process is explained as follows.

The parent (usually the mother) administers to the child such primary rewards as food, drink, etc. Because of these satisfactions associated with the person of the parent, all the stimuli associated with the parent — her presence, gesture, voice, etc., — acquire a positive sign value, sign of drive-reduction. Thus the person of the parent takes on a secondary reward value for the child. All this occurs through contiguity learning.²⁴

Once the person of the parent has thus taken on a secondary reward value, the child will try to reproduce, as far as he can, the stimuli or behaviour patterns of the parent, especially when she is absent. These reproductions are self-reinforcing because of their reward value. Thus, developmental identification represents "an attempt on the part of the infant to reproduce bits of the beloved and longed for parent".²⁵ What is implied in this second stage of developmental identification is reward-learning or instrumental learning.²⁶

Defensive Identification

This type of identification is powered by socially inflicted discomforts, for example, fear of punishment.²⁷

As the child grows, he is liable, on account of organically and emotionally based needs, to engage in socially disapproved behaviour. And the parent, who is concerned about the character formation of the child, punishes him. This arouses in the child a conflict: he likes the parent because of the 'rewards' he receives from the parent; he dislikes the parent because of her disciplinary and punishing actions. The child resolves the conflict by identifying with the parent, and through this identification the basic character structure

23. Mowrer, *Ibidem*, p. 592.

24. Mowrer, *Ibidem*, p. 580.

25. Mowrer, *Ibidem*, pp. 581, 615.

26. Mowrer, *Ibidem*, pp. 580, 581.

According to Mowrer, developmental identification is very similar to 'imitation', and contributes to the acquisition of several social skills (e.g. the development of speech).

27. Mowrer, *Ibidem*, p. 592.

of the child is established.²⁸

Thus, according to MOWRER, identification is the mechanism by which the child attempts to master a frustrating situation. In developmental identification, this frustration arises from a sense of helplessness and loneliness, while in defensive identification it arises from parental interference and punishment.²⁹

2. Identification and Introjection

In N. SANFORD'S view³⁰, *identification* is a concept which has come to mean a variety of phenomena and processes. It does not seem to be an explanatory concept, but a descriptive one too vague to be useful.³¹ In an attempt to get the term 'identification' back into its place, he distinguishes between *identification* and *introjection*.³²

Identification

Identification in the proper sense is a mechanism by which an individual responds "to the behaviour of other people or objects by initiating in fantasy or in reality the same behaviour himself".³³

The important feature of identification is its attempt at 'identicalness', that is, the identifying subject strives to behave altogether or in some aspect exactly like the object with which it identifies. Hence the resultant behaviour will tend to be mechanic, inflexible and similar to "those reactions which are switched in when, in a critical situation, the limits of the individual's soundly economic modes of adjustment are surpassed".³⁴

The dynamic force which motivates the individual to identify is a threaten-

28. Mowrer, *Ibidem*, pp. 592 — 595.

29. Mowrer, *Ibidem*, p. 592.

30. N. Sanford, "The Dynamics of Identification", *Psychological Review*, 1955, pp. 106 — 118.

31. Sanford, *Ibidem*, pp. 106 — 107.

32. Sanford, *Ibidem*, pp. 108 — 109.

33. Sanford, *Ibidem*, p. 109.

34. *Ibidem*.

ing situation, where the individual's self-esteem, integrity or existence is at stake. Thus, for example, an insecure little boy may very earnestly play the role of his father. In such situations of threat, the individual behaves as if he cannot be the person that he is, "as if he cannot tolerate the sense of weakness or smallness or danger which he feels goes with that role, but must hurry and be, or act as if he were, something different".³⁵

Thus, identification is a mechanism by which the individual takes on the behaviour of another in order to 'master' a critical situation involving the self, which otherwise seems unmasterable.

Introjection

Introjection refers to a mechanism of incorporating or taking into oneself a loved or highly desired object, whose continued possession or enjoyment is threatened.³⁶

SANFORD goes on to say that when an object of love or desire is withdrawn, lost or about to be lost, the subject may imaginatively set it up within his personality, where he may cling on to it. As is clear, the motive for introjection is also the solution of a crisis: the crisis of losing a loved object. Since such crises are more frequent and frustrating in infancy and childhood, introjection is likely to be more frequent and strong in that period.³⁷ This shows that introjection is also an infantile mechanism.

Further, according to SANFORD, though introjection (and identification) may cause the incorporation into the subject of some of the attributes and standards of the object, being mechanisms employed for the solution of frustrating and critical situations, they do not account for the normal acquisition of values and the formation of character. For this, he emphasizes the role of common forms of learning: "We should consider that normal character development can be largely explained, without benefit of either identification or introjection, on the basis of common forms of learning..."³⁸

As our brief analysis shows, SANFORD pins down 'identification' to a

mechanism of self-defence in critical situations. The subject resorts to this mechanism only when other ordinary means of mastering the situation have been ineffective. And, introjection is a mechanism resorted to by the subject in a situation involving the loss or withdrawal of a loved or desired object. However, none of these mechanisms explain the normal development of values and character.

* * *

Our exposition of identification theories indicates their diversity as well as basic unity.

FREUD spoke of two types of identification: anacletic and aggressive. The first one is a function of fear of loss of love, and is invoked to explain the formation of the superego in girls. The second one, a function of fear of the aggressor, is invoked to explain the formation of the superego in boys.

MOWRER speaks of developmental and defensive identification. The first, (which he considers to be similar to imitation), motivated by fear of loss of love, contributes to the development of certain social skills. The second one, motivated by fear of punishment, fosters character formation in both the sexes.

SANFORD describes identification as a pure defence mechanism in the face of aggression or threat to the ego; and introjection is the term used to indicate the mechanism of taking on the attributes of a loved-object, lost or about to be lost. Neither mechanism explains the normal development of values and character.

However, all the three agree that identification implies a tendency on the part of the subject (e.g. the child) to take on the attributes (as a whole or in part) of the model (e.g. the parent). Besides, all agree that this modeling may be motivated by two different factors: fear of loss of love and fear of aggression. But what is their respective role in the development of morality and conscience (or in the acquisition of values and character formation) remains a question without a clear answer.

Seen against this, the theory of identification proposed by SEARS and others (which we discussed in chapter III, and on which much of the empirical research within the frame-work of the identification of conscience is based) takes a broader view: it emphasizes the role of what is called deve-

35. Sanford, *Ibidem*, p. 110.

36. Sanford, *Ibidem*, p. 115.

37. Sanford, *Ibidem*, pp. 115 – 116.

38. Sanford, *Ibidem*, pp. 116 – 117.

lopmental or anaclitic identification, and sees it as a form of learning through role-taking. This learning — basically motivated by the child's dependency — fosters the acquisition of the model's qualities, role-behaviours, demands and standards (see p. 110 ff.).

Chapter VIII

The Principles of Learning Theory

As we have already indicated in chapter IV, *Learning Theory* is not a uniform theory, but a group of related but distinct theories. Discussing various 'Theories of Learning', E.R.HILGARD and G.H.BOWER¹ treats about 14 different theories including those of FREUD and PIAGET. The theories of FREUD and PIAGET belong in a survey of learning theories, observe the authors, in so far as they provide "a large context in which to view the acquisition of knowledge and competence as a consequence of growth and interaction with the physical and social environment".² This means that every psychological theory may be called a 'learning theory' in so far it comes to tackle directly or indirectly the important problem of 'learning' in human behaviour.

However, what are more commonly called 'learning theories' are the behaviouristic theories which were initially inspired by the empiricist and associationist trends of thinking.³ In the empiricist view, experience, especially sense experience, is the source of knowledge. Our concepts of things are either direct copies of sense impressions (called simple ideas) or combination of several simple ideas (called complex ideas). And knowledge of things is acquired through association of these ideas or sensory impressions.⁴

The above said trend of thought was introduced into the field of psychology by J.B.WATSON⁵ around the year 1910. WATSON contended that only

1. E.R.Hilgard and G.H.Bower, *Theories of Learning*, New Jersey 1975 (fourth edit.).

2. Hilgard and Bower, *Ibidem*, p. 318.

3. Among the (philosophical) thinkers who have influenced 'behaviourism', we may note a few: J.Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, London 1690. G.Berkely, *An Essay towards a New Theory of Vision*, Dublin 1709.

J.S.Mill, *A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, Being a Connected View of the Principles of Evidence, and the Methods of Scientific Investigation*, London 1843.

4. Hilgard and Bower, *Ibidem*, p. 3.

5. J.B.Watson, *Psychology as the Behaviourist Views It*, *Psychological Review*, 1913 (20), pp. 158 — 177.

observable behaviour belonged to psychology (thus discarding the concepts of consciousness, goal, etc., as irrelevant to psychology) and that all behaviour is explainable through observable stimuli and responses.⁶

However, learning theory has not remained static. Basing itself on experimental investigation and keeping an openness to new findings, it has developed into different branches, mainly on account of differences in emphasis and interpretation. As HILGARD and BOWER observe, "Learning is one of those loose 'open-textured' concepts that include a variety of very different species".⁷ We can say that the present-day learning theory received much of its initial influence from experimental investigations conducted mainly in the fields of (i) *physiology* (especially through the works of I.P. PAVLOV⁸, W.M. BECHTEREW⁹, etc.) and (ii) *behaviourism* (especially through the works of J.B. WATSON¹⁰, E.L. THORNDIKE¹¹, and C.L. HULL¹²).

For our purpose here, the treatment of 'learning theory' shall be limited to (A) *the concept of learning*, (B) *certain basic concepts related to learning*, and (C) *learning procedures*.

A. The Concept of Learning

'Learning' refers to acquisition and modification of behaviour. But beha-

Idem, *Behaviour, An Introduction to Comparative Psychology*, New York 1914.

Idem, *Behaviourism*, New York 1924.

6. Hilgard and Bower, *Ibidem*, p. 7.

7. Hilgard and Bower, *Ibidem*, p. 21.

8. I.P. Pavlov, *Conditioned Reflexes*, London 1927.

Idem, *Lectures on Conditioned Reflexes*, New York 1928.

9. W.M. Bechterew, *Objektive Psychologie*, Leipzig/Berlin 1913.

Idem, *Reflexologie*, Leipzig 1926.

10. Cfr. above.

11. E.L. Thorndike, *Animal Intelligence*, New York 1911.

Idem, *The Psychology of Learning*, New York 1913.

12. C.L. Hull, *Principles of Behaviour*, New York 1943.

Idem, *A Behaviour System*, New Haven 1952.

Idem, *The Conflicting Psychologies of Learning — A Way Out*, *Psychological Review*, 1935 (42), pp. 491 — 516.

viour can be acquired and modified also through processes which are not considered as learning. Hence it is not easy to give a satisfactory definition of learning, delineating the boundaries. We shall see how it is generally defined, distinguishing it from certain non-learned behaviour modifications.

1. Definition

W.S. VERPLANCK defines to 'learn' as follows: "to exhibit a change in behaviour between two successive exposures to the same environment that cannot be attributed to manipulation of drive operations, alterations in the environment, sensory adaptation, disease, surgical influence, physical trauma or growth — although the propriety of these exclusions may be questioned".¹³ For our purpose, we shall follow the definition given by HILGARD and BOWER: "Learning refers to the change in a subject's behaviour to a given situation brought about by his repeated experiences in that situation, provided that change cannot be explained on the basis of native response tendencies, maturation, or temporary states of the subject (e.g. fatigue, drugs, etc.)".¹⁴

The above definitions show that learning involves a relatively permanent change in behaviour primarily due to experience and training, and which cannot be explained on the basis of innate tendencies, maturation or physiological states.

2. Non-Learned Behaviour Change

(i) Instances of non-learned behaviour change are had in *reflexes* (e.g. pupillary constriction to light), *tropisms* (e.g. moth's dashing into flame), and *instincts* (e.g. bird's nest building).¹⁵

13. W.S. Verplanck, "A Glossary of Some Terms Used in the Objective Science of Behaviour", *Psychological Review* (Suppl.), 1957 (64), p. 20.

14. Hilgard and Bower, *Theories of Learning*, p. 17.

15. Hilgard and Bower, *Ibidem*, p. 18.

It may, however, be noted that the distinction between learned responses and innate responses is not so clear cut because there are several so-called instinctive behaviour pa-

(ii) Another major factor which brings about behaviour changes, but is to be distinguished from learning, is *maturation* or *growth*. "Growth is learning's chief competitor as a modifier of behaviour".¹⁶ Behaviour sequences which mature through regular developmental changes, irrespective of training and practice, come under maturational behaviour changes. Rather clear examples of such behaviour changes would be the walking of children, the flying of birds, etc.¹⁷

(iii) Two other factors which may cause change in behaviour, but are not learning, are *fatigue* and *habituation*. When motor activity is repeated in rapid succession for sometime, gradually the organism becomes weakened, its activity weaker and slower, and finally it refuses to function. This change in behaviour, which is temporary, is said to be due to *fatigue*, and the efficiency of the organism can be regained after a time of rest. In a more or less similar fashion, if a stimulus is repeatedly presented to an organism in a monotonous series, the reaction of the organism will gradually decline until it becomes almost undetectable. Here the organism is said to have habituated or got used to the stimulus. This is *habituation*.¹⁸

tterns, whose expression and development depend very much on variations of learning and experience. For example, the development and expression of maternal behaviour (supposed to be instinctive) in monkeys depends very much on the young one's having normal contacts with their mothers and normal play opportunities with age-mates (cfr. Hilgard and Bower, *Ibidem*, p. 18).

16. Hilgard and Bower, *Ibidem*, p. 19.

17. Again, it is not easy to draw a clear line between the role of maturation and that of learning because many activities show a close interplay of both. A good example is the development of language in the child. The child cannot speak until he is old enough, but "that development depends critically upon appropriate stimulation from his verbal community at the critical times" (Hilgard and Bower, *Ibidem*, p. 20).

18. Hilgard and Bower, *Ibidem*, pp. 19 – 20.

Though the distinction between habituation and learning is an accepted one, habituation has several properties of learning and extinction. Hilgard and Bower observe that habituation to complex stimulus, which requires higher brain centres for its discrimination, may be labelled as learning. Hence, "habituation is one of those cases that straddle the boundaries of the semantic domain of this loose concept of 'learning' (Hilgard and Bower, *Ibidem*, p. 20).

B. Basic Concepts Related to Learning

A clarification of certain basic concepts is very important for an understanding of the phenomenon of learning and of learning theories.

1. Motivation

A motive refers to that which prompts (motivates) an organism to make a response, and the subjective state of being so prompted (motivated) may be called *motivation*.¹⁹ The role of motivation may be illustrated by a simple example. If two dogs – one hungry and the other satiated (but other conditions being identical) – are exposed to food, the hungry one will start consuming the food, while the other one may not react at all. The eating response of the first dog is attributed to 'hunger drive', or it is said to be motivated by hunger, which will be reduced by eating, and thus it will come to a satiated state like the other dog. Hence motivation is closely related to such concepts as drive, need, goal, etc.²⁰

Primary and Secondary

Motives are usually divided into *primary* and *secondary*.

Primary motives refer to the basic (not learned) biological needs like hunger, thirst, pain, etc. These have a biological basis involving the self-regulatory systems of the organism.²¹

However, not all behaviour of an organism is motivated by the primary biological drives. Examples for such behaviour are various activities in the social, technical and artistic fields. In order to explain these behaviours, several *secondary* or acquired motives are postulated. Affiliation, power, fear, anxiety, frustration, stress, etc., are examples for this.²²

19. Cfr. J. Nuttin, "Motivation" in H.J. Eysenck et alii (Eds), *Encyclopedia of Psychology*, London 1972, Vol. 2, p. 287.

20. Nuttin, *Ibidem*, pp. 286 – 287.

21. Nuttin, *Ibidem*, pp. 287 – 288.

22. Cfr. M. Argyle, *Psychology and Social Problems*, London 1965, pp. 21 – 22.

2. Reinforcement

Reinforcement refers to any stimulus which increases the probability of a response.²³ Thus, for example, a food-pellet received by a mouse for pressing a lever is likely to prompt the mouse to press the lever on the next occasion. If it does so, the food-pellet (reward) is said to have been a reinforcement.

a) Types of Reinforcement

Positive and Negative

One division of reinforcements is into *positive* and *negative*.

A *positive* reinforcement is one whose *presentation* strengthens the probability of a response. Anything that serves to satisfy a need (e.g. food for a hungry rat) may be an example for a positive reinforcement.

A *negative* reinforcement is one whose *removal* strengthens the probability of a response. Aversive stimuli like pain, fear, etc., are examples of negative reinforcements.²⁴

Primary, Secondary, and Vicarious

A further division of reinforcements is into *primary*, *secondary*, and *vicarious*.

A stimulus which has a natural capacity to satisfy a need is a *primary* reinforcement (e.g. food for a hungry rat).

However, other stimuli which do not have such a natural capacity, but, because of their constant association with primary reinforcements, come to acquire a reinforcing power are called *secondary* (conditioned) reinforcements.

Food dishes, water receptacles, etc., are good examples for secondary reinforcements in laboratory experiments.²⁵

Primary and secondary reinforcements are administered directly to the subjects.

23. Hilgard and Bower, *Theories of Learning*, p. 213.

24. Ibidem.

25. H. Rachlin, *Introduction to Modern Behaviourism*, San Francisco 1970, pp. 122, 129.

But learning can be effected also by observing the reinforcements given to other people. Here the subject is said to vicariously experience the reinforcement of others. This is called *vicarious* reinforcement.²⁶

b) Schedules of Reinforcement

Continuous and Partial

If reinforcement is given for every correct response, it is called *continuous* or constant.

If reinforcement is given only 'at times' (not for every correct response), it is called *partial*.²⁷

Partial reinforcement is further divided into:

Fixed-Interval and Variable-Interval

Reinforcement given at fixed intervals (e.g. once in every minute), irrespective of the number of correct responses, is called *fixed interval* schedule.

Variable interval schedule refers to reinforcement given at varying (e.g. some times after one minute, sometimes after 30 seconds, etc) intervals.

Fixed-Ratio and Variable-Ratio

When reinforcement is given after a fixed number of responses (e.g. after every fourth correct response), irrespective of duration, it is called *fixed-ratio* schedule.

If the number of responses for reinforcement is varying, it is called *variable-ratio* schedule.

In administering reinforcement, some of the above schedules (e.g. fixed-ratio and fixed-interval) can be combined. Then it is called *combined* schedule.²⁸

26. A. Bandura and R.H. Walters, *Social Learning and Personality Development*, New York 1963, p. 4.

27. Rachlin, *Introduction to Modern Behaviourism*, p. 119.

28. Rachlin, *Ibidem*, pp. 113 – 119.

Delay of Reinforcement

Delayed reinforcement will slow down the speed of learning. But it contributes to the 'strength' of response by making it difficult to eradicate.²⁹

3. Punishment

Punishment refers to presentation of an aversive stimulus in such a way that it is contingent upon a designated response.³⁰ Punishment tends to diminish the occurrence of a response.

There are two types of punishment training.

Escape

Escape refers to organism's attempt to 'get out' of an aversive stimulus; hence it is a response strengthened by the removal of aversive stimuli. Thus escape is synonymous with negative reinforcement.³¹

Avoidance

Avoidance refers to the response of avoiding an aversive stimulus, whose imminent occurrence is signaled by a preceding cue.³²

4. Generalization and Discrimination

Generalization means learning to respond similarly to various stimuli which are similar to the original stimulus. Thus, for example, an infant who has learned to respond with smiling to the verbal stimulus 'pretty' might also smile to the verbal stimulus 'silly' without particular training. The closer the similarity between the stimuli, the greater the generalization.

Discrimination refers to reliable differences in behaviour in the pre-

29. Rachlin, *Ibidem*, p. 137.

30. Hilgard and Bower, *Theories of Learning*, p. 213.

31. Rachlin, *Introduction to Modern Behaviourism*, p. 145.

32. Rachlin, *Ibidem*, p. 147.

sence of one or two (similar) stimuli.³³ In the example of the child given above, for instance, availing himself of the cues provided (e.g. the reaction of those around him) he will come to differentiate between 'pretty' and 'silly', and respond with smile only to 'pretty'.

5. Extinction and Recovery

Extinction refers to extinguishing a learned response, and this is effected by withdrawal of reinforcements.³⁴ Thus, a rat's bar-pressing response, which has been reinforced through food-pellets, will weaken and disappear if the giving of food-pellets is stopped.

However, such an extinction is not often complete. If the stimulus is presented after a period of rest — e.g. a day after the first occurrence of extinction — the organism will make the original response again, though it may not be of the same strength as before. The response seems to have recovered on its own, and this phenomenon is called *spontaneous recovery*.

It may, however, be noted that a response can be completely extinguished through repeated extinction paradigms.

C. Learning Procedures

Acquisition or modification of behaviour is effected through different *learning procedures* or types of learning. The two well known procedures are *classical conditioning* and *operant conditioning* (or instrumental learning). Another type of learning (which of course includes several aspects of the above said procedures) is *observational learning*.

33. Rachlin, *Ibidem*, pp. 199 — 200.

34. Rachlin, *Ibidem*, p. 200.

38 Srampickal, *Conscience*

1. Classical Conditioning

Classical conditioning refers to the pairing in fixed temporal relation of a neutral stimulus (e.g. a bell) with a stimulus which is naturally related – and hence also called unconditioned stimulus (US) – (e.g. food powder) to a response – a reflex (e.g. salivation). An organism exposed to such repeated pairings usually come to respond to the originally neutral stimulus – and now conditioned stimulus (CS) – as it did to the natural or unconditioned stimulus (US).³⁵

a) Instance of Classical Conditioning

We shall give very briefly the experiment of I.P. PAVLOV (see p. 290), who was the pioneer of classical conditioning procedure.

In PAVLOV'S experiment, a dog is strapped into a harness, in which it is used to standing. A tube is attached to the dog's salivary glands to collect any saliva secreted, which is then exactly recorded on a revolving drum. The dog can be fed by remote control.

In this experiment, when the dog was presented with food (meat powder), it salivated. Then the experimenter began to sound a bell just before the food was presented. After pairing the bell and food for a few times, it was found that the dog salivated at the sound of the bell, without the food being presented. In other words, through classical conditioning an association is established (learned) between an external stimulus and a response, while previously no such association existed between that specific stimulus and response.³⁶

b) Features of Classical Conditioning

Classical conditioning has certain features of its own.

35. Rachlin, *Ibidem*, p. 198.

36. Cfr. Rachlin, *Ibidem*, p. 60. ff.

Established Reflex

Classical conditioning supposes an established reflex, or an unlearned response which is elicited by an US and then conditioned to a neutral stimulus. (The reflex elicited by the US is said to be controlled more by the autonomic nervous system).³⁷

Contiguity of Stimuli

In classical conditioning, the US closely follows the neutral stimulus. Besides, in this learning procedure reinforcement (US) always precedes the response; thus, the salivation of the dog occurs after the meat powder is introduced.³⁸

Extinction and Inhibitory Force

A conditioned response can be extinguished by presenting the CS for a number of times without the US following.

After such an extinction procedure, if the CS is suddenly presented, the organism responds. Hence, extinction does not 'wipe away' the response, but gives the organism an *inhibitory force* (as PAVLOV called it).³⁹

2. Operant Conditioning

Operant Conditioning refers to establishment of a correlation between some aspect of behaviour and reinforcement or punishment. An organism is considered to be operantly conditioned when its behaviour changes so as to obtain (or retain) the reward or avoid (or escape from) the punishment.⁴⁰

There are four kinds of operant conditioning:

- (i). *Presentation of Rewards*: This increases the probability of the occurrence of a response.
- (ii) *Removal of Rewards*: This tends to decrease the probability of the oc-

37. Rachlin, *Ibidem*, p. 63.

38. Cfr. Rachlin, *Ibidem*, p. 80.

39. Rachlin, *Ibidem*, pp. 66 ff.

40. Rachlin, *Ibidem*, p. 201.

currence of a response.

(iii) *Presentation of Aversive Stimuli*: This decreases the probability of the occurrence of a response.

(iv) *Removal of Aversive Stimulus*: This increases the probability of escape response.⁴¹

a) Instance of Operant Conditioning

If an hungry rat is placed in an experimental box (i.e. a Skinner Box, called after B.F.SKINNER⁴², who is a prominent researcher in the field of operant conditioning), it will begin to make irrelevant responses like running about, climbing the walls, etc. Amidst all these hectic activities the animal may, by chance, press the lever, and automatically a food-pellet will be dropped, which the animal will eventually find out and consume. Having eaten the food-pellet, the rat will probably continue its activities as before, will press the lever again and receive another food-pellet. Soon the rat will learn that pressing the lever gives food. Consequently, the rate of lever-pressing will considerably increase.⁴³

b) Features of Operant Conditioning

Operant conditioning too has certain features of its own.

Emitted Response

Operant conditioning supposes a response that is first emitted by the organism. (This response is considered to be controlled more by the central nervous system).⁴⁴

41. Rachlin, Ibidem, p. 79.

42. B.F.Skinner, *The Behaviour of Organisms: An Experimental Analysis*, New York 1938. Idem, *Science and Human Behaviour*, New York 1953.

43. Smith and Moore, *Conditioning and Instrumental Learning*, pp. 67 – 68

It may be noted that this is an instance of operant conditioning through 'presentation of rewards'(see p. 299).

44. Rachlin, *Introduction to Modern Behaviourism*, p. 89.

Response Contingency

In operant conditioning, reinforcement follows and is contingent upon correct response. For example, the rat gets a food-pellet only if it presses the lever (or whatever response the experimenter chooses).⁴⁵

Successive Approximation

A response emitted by the organism can be modified by *successive approximation*, that is, by initially reinforcing some remotely related response, and then by successive reinforcements of only those responses which bring the organism closer and closer to the terminal response.⁴⁶

3. Observational Learning

Several learning theorists now hold that social learning or acquisition of social skills is so complex that it can not be explained on the basis of conditioning and instrumental learning alone. As A.BANDURA observes, "In fact it would be difficult to imagine a socialization process in which the language, mores, vocational and avocational patterns, the familial customs of a culture, and its educational, social, and political practices were shaped in each new member by selective reinforcement without the accumulated cultural repertoires in their own behaviour. To the extent that people often successfully match the behaviour of appropriate social models, the social-learning process can be greatly accelerated and the development of response patterns by differential reinforcement can be short-circuited".⁴⁷ Thus, BANDURA and colleagues have rather recently developed a theory of *observational learning* or *imitation of social models*, which is considered to have a very important role in social learning.⁴⁸

"Observational learning", notes A.L.BALDWIN, "describes the fact that people can learn behaviour patterns merely by watching other people per-

45. Rachlin, Ibidem, p. 80.

46. Rachlin, Ibidem, pp. 78, 80 – 81.

47. A. Bandura, "Social Learning Theory of Identificatory Processes", in D.A.Goslin (Ed.), *Handbook of Socialization Theory and Research*, Chicago 1969, p. 213.

48. Cfr. Hilgard and Bower, *Theories of Learning*, pp. 599 – 600.

form them, that their own acts can be reinforced or inhibited by observing reinforcements and punishments to other people, and that they can acquire conditioned emotional responses to stimuli which accompany a painful stimulus to another person".⁴⁹

Thus, one can learn from social models by watching their behaviour and its consequences. This form of learning, therefore, is strengthened not by direct reinforcement of the subject, but by the subject's observation of models and his vicarious experience of the reinforcements received by the models. It is not only overt behaviour that can be so learned, but also internal responses (e.g. emotional reactions).

a) Instance of Observational Learning

The effects of modeling have been demonstrated in a series of studies by BANDURA and his associates.⁵⁰ A sample study may be briefly noted (see also p. 245 ff.)

A group of nursery school children were exposed to aggressive adult models who exhibited unusual forms of physical and verbal aggression towards a large plastic doll. Another group was exposed to non-aggressive models who sat quietly, ignoring the doll and the instruments of aggression placed at their disposal. Half the children in each condition were exposed to same-sex models and the remaining, to opposite-sex models.

Later tests in the absence of the models showed a great number of precisely imitative responses, while such responses were rarely seen in the group exposed to non-aggressive models. Similarly, children in the non-aggressive-model group showed, to a greater extent, inhibiting responses typical of their non-aggressive models.⁵¹ Thus, *simple observation* of models can considerably influence the observer's behaviour.

49. A.L. Baldwin, *Theories of Child Development*, p. 428.

50. Cfr. Bandura, "Social Learning through Imitation", in M.R. Jones (Ed.), *Nebraska Symposium on Motivation*, Lincoln 1962, pp. 211 — 269.

51. Bandura and Walters, *Social Learning and Personality Development*, p. 61.

b) Features of Observational Learning

Here we shall briefly discuss the *processes* and *variables* affecting observational learning and the performance of the learned responses.

(i) Processes in Observational Learning

Analysing observational learning, BANDURA distinguishes *four* interrelated processes: *attentional, retentional, motor-reproductive, and incentive*.⁵²

Attentional Processes

It is important that the subject attend to the model's behaviour so that he can recognize and differentiate its distinctive features. From this point of view, factors like frequency, duration, saliency....and complexity of modeling cues are variables affecting observational learning. Relatively complex behaviour patterns can be acquired observationally provided high occurrence of observing responses and adequate discriminative cues are given.⁵³

Retentional Processes

Model's behaviour must be coded, symbolically repeated and retained as a stimulus if it is to influence the observer's behaviour at a later period. In human subjects imaginal representation and verbal representation are the important factors which help retention of observed events in memory.⁵⁴

Motor-Reproductive Processes

Reproduction of observationally learned behaviour consists, at the motor level, of several component responses. Thus, for example, ballet-dancing, auto-driving, etc., which can be observationally learned, cannot be properly reproduced without appropriate motor skills. Hence, the role of motor and physical skills and processes in actual behaviour.⁵⁵

52. Bandura, "Social Learning Theory of Identificatory Process", p. 222 ff.

53. Bandura, *Ibidem*, p. 222.

54. Bandura, *Ibidem*, pp. 222 — 223.

55. Bandura, *Ibidem*, p. 223 ff.

Incentive Processes

Evidently, attention, retention, and motor skills may not prompt an observer to perform a behaviour which he has learned. Incentive conditions or motivational factors are necessary so that learned behaviour emerge into action. Thus, motivational factors influence very much the actual performance of a learned behaviour.⁵⁶

(ii) Variables Affecting Imitation of Models

Investigating variables that affect observational learning and performance, observational learning theorists have isolated several factors like properties of the model, types of behaviour exhibited by the model, etc. A summary view of the important variables is given below.

Properties of the model. It has been found that models of *high status* were more imitated than those of low status. It has been also found that model's *similarity* to the subject and relation to *real-life situation* were two other factors which fostered imitation. Thus, real persons exerted more influence than models in a movie, etc.

Types of behaviour exemplified. The more *complex* the behaviour of the model, the poorer its imitation by the subject. Its imitation can be improved by repeated observations.

It was, however, found that *hostile or aggressive behaviour* is imitated to a high degree. The model's *standards of good and bad* as well as forms of self-reward and punishment corresponding to those standards are easily adopted by the subject.

Consequences of the model's behaviour. Rewarded behaviour is more imitated, while punished behaviour may be inhibited.

Motivating instructions. Instructions given to the subject *before* the observation of models will induce high motivation in the subject for learning a particular behaviour (learning effected under minimal instruction is called 'incidental learning'). And, instructions given *after* the observation of models will motivate the subject for an exact performance of the behaviour he has learned incidently.⁵⁷

56. Bandura, Ibidem, p. 225.

57. For the above given summarized view of variables affecting observational

learning and performance we depend on Hilgard and Bower, Theories of Learning, p. 601.

It may be noted that the list of variables given is not exhaustive; however, it shows that a wide variety of factors affects the degree of observational learning and performance.

PART III

A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF THE EMPIRICAL STUDY OF CONSCIENCE

In the first part of our work we saw how empirical psychology approaches the phenomenon of conscience, and how different theories explain the development and functions of conscience. We also reviewed empirical findings corresponding to these theories of conscience.

In the second part we discussed, though briefly, the general concepts, principles, and assumptions, which serve as backgrounds to these different theories of conscience.

Here we shall take a critical look at the empirical study of conscience, trying to highlight its contributions as well as drawbacks. This shall be done in the light of general theoretical backgrounds and of empirical findings obtained from different theoretical standpoints.¹

¹. Our criticism is made in the light of these two points (theoretical backgrounds and empirical findings based on different theoretical orientations) for the obvious reason that each theory of conscience is greatly influenced by its general theoretical orientation. But, theories should be evaluated in the light of empirical findings, and empirical findings based on different theoretical approaches should help us correct the one-sidedness or over-emphasis given to one or another aspect of conscience by any one theory.

Chapter IX

Contributions and Drawbacks of the Empirical
Approaches to Conscience.

Before getting down to a criticism of the specific theories of conscience, we shall see the contributions and limitations of the empirical approach in general in its study of conscience. This shall be followed by a discussion of the three theories of conscience.

A. Contributions and Limitations of the Empirical Approach in General

1. Contributions

Empirical Evidence

As we already indicated earlier, empirical research into 'conscience' is rather recent. However, within this comparatively short period, a good deal of research has been done into conscience-related phenomena. This body of research should be credited with fostering a study of conscience, based on *empirically demonstrated evidence*. Much of what empirical investigation has unearthed may not contain anything surprisingly new; even then it has the merit of having empirically confirmed the common knowledge. And on certain points at least, as it shall be further clear from subsequent discussion, empirical findings have challenged us to take a new look at conscience.

Besides, these research-data, obtained largely from 'normal' population, should also help one take a critical view of the concept of conscience formulated on the assumptions of clinical psychology, whose findings are obtained largely from emotionally disturbed people.

Systematic Study of Variables

Though the available data do not answer all the questions related to conscience, certain consistent findings and reliable evidence obtained through empirical research have contributed much towards a *systematic understanding of the variables* affecting the development and function of conscience.

Here, however, we do not wish to elaborate upon the important contri-

bution these investigations make towards a better understanding of the factors involved in child-socialization, moral education and the development of a healthy, creative personality.²

2. Limitations

Despite its contributions, empirical approach to conscience is not without its limitations. The following could be specifically pointed out.

Methodical Insufficiency

Though researchers are aware of the importance of using appropriate and exact methods to measure the various aspects of conscience, the methods generally employed are not perfect or faultless. We shall note the important limitations of the generally used methods.

PIAGET'S *clinical method*, which has been fruitfully employed by several researchers to investigate moral thinking and judgment, is very liable to suggestion by the experimenter, a danger PIAGET himself admits and warns about. "It is so hard not to talk too much when questioning the child... it is hard not to be suggestive"³. Thus, even a highly skilled interviewer faces the temptation of leading and suggesting, and the danger of losing sight of the significance of important behaviour.⁴

Complaints may be made also against *experimental tests*, for example, of temptation-resistance. Capacity for temptation-resistance is measured in these tests by the subject's observance (or violation) of given orders. But many of these experimental tests are different from *real-life situations*. Hence, it is difficult to assume that their results truly correspond to the subject's temptation-resistance in real situations.

An important problem is of providing *adequate privacy* in an experimental situation, so that real 'internal control' can be measured. As D.E.HUNT notes, "It is very difficult to assume that we have an environmental condition

2. (see p. 260 - 261, 338 ff.)

3. Cfr. J.H.Flavell, *The Developmental Psychology of Jean Piaget*, p. 29.

4. Ibidem.

which is private in any sense of the word as long as the child is in the school building" (where such experiments are usually conducted).⁵

Further, it is admittedly difficult to control the *motivation* of the subjects in such experiments. Hence, observance or violation of given orders in these tests need not be the correct measures of temptation resistance or conscience strength. A subject, for example, might abstain from violating a rule because he was least motivated to obtain the promised reward, or he had other means of obtaining it, rather than because strong values of honesty were operative in him. Under such conditions, experimental tests may not be presenting a real temptation to such a subject.⁶

Similarly, it may be questioned whether *projective tests* (e.g. story completion tests) do fully reflect what the individual would really do when actually confronted with a situation described in those stories.⁷ Even the child's 'guilt feeling' expressed in story completions do not seem to fully correspond to his feelings after an actual violation, because emotional reactions arising from actual, personal violations would be different in personal involvement and intensity from those projected in to a story-situation. Besides, projective tests may be criticized also for subjectivity in interpreting the data.⁸

Dissatisfaction may be expressed also about such methods as *parent-interview*, *peer-report*, etc. For example, though parent-interviews can give valuable information about children's behaviour in 'natural situations', they are not entirely reliable because parents are not ordinarily objective observers and reporters of their own children's behaviour and their own training practices. Such reports are likely to be biased and partial because parents' "accounts of

5. D.E.Hunt et alii, "Discussion: The Cognitive and the Affective in Moral Action", in C.M.Beck et alii (Eds), *Moral Education: Interdisciplinary Approaches*, New York 1971, p. 376.

6. Cfr. also M.L.Hoffman, "Child Rearing Practices and Moral Development: Generalizations from Empirical Research", *Child Development*, 1963, pp. 308 - 309.

Here we do not forget the ethical implications of psychological experiments. It would be objectionable to induce children into any kind of temptation situation for the purpose of study. Since researchers have to reckon with such moral implications they cannot go beyond certain limits in such experiments.

7. Cfr. D.McCarthy, "The Development of Normal Conscience", in C.E.Nelson (Ed.), *Conscience: Theological and Psychological Perspectives*, New York 1973, p. 276.

8. Cfr. D.Rapaport et alii, *Diagnostic Psychological Testing*, London 1970, p. 227.

their own practices and attitudes will be edited by selective remembering, by guilt feelings and by the desire to appear 'good' parents".⁹

Generalization

One has to be careful in generalizing from empirical findings. For generalization, strictly speaking, the sample must be representative of the population to which the findings are generalized.¹⁰ Regarding research on conscience we may note two points here:

(i) These investigations are done with subjects belonging to different cultural backgrounds; however, the bulk of it comes from the U.S.A. It may be questioned whether findings from these studies can be really generalized to subjects from all cultures. Putting the problem more concretely, D.WRIGHT seems to give a balanced answer: "Can we conclude that results of an experiment on middle-class American children will apply to Chinese, or even English children? There is no easy or general answer to this because it depends on the nature of the study and the nature of the cultural differences. All that can be said in general terms is that the further a generalization is extended beyond the population sampled in the original study the weaker the confidence we can have in it. But unless we know of a cultural difference that would invalidate it, and until the necessary cross-cultural checks have been made, it is not unreasonable to make such generalizations provided we are cautious and tentative".¹¹

(ii) Another point which, however, is more influenced by the theoretical orientation of each approach, concerns the age of research subjects. Much of the empirical research is done with young children and preadolescents, while relatively less is done with adolescents, and still less with adult subjects. The preoccupation with investigating developmental variables and the assumption (which of course varies according to theories) that conscience develops in the early years and stabilizes in preadolescence lie behind this research practice.

Though conscience begins to develop early in life and stabilizes as the indi-

9. D.Wright, *The Psychology of Moral Behaviour*, p. 63.

10. Cfr. F.J.McGuigan, *Experimental Psychology: A Methodological Approach*, New Jersey 1968, pp. 76 - 77.

11. D.Wright, *The Psychology of Moral Behaviour*, p. 20.

vidual grows, it may be questioned whether findings based largely on young subjects give a true picture of adult conscience, especially its functioning. More research with adolescent and adult population might show how maturity, changing socio-cultural values, social reinforcements, etc., influence their values and standards, and cause changes in the childhood mechanisms of self-control or 'conscience'.

Need of More Research

Upto now research has focussed mainly on factors that affect the development (antecedents) of conscience, with an apparent concentration on 'negative' aspects like resistance to temptation and reactions after transgression. More research should be done to clarify several other factors: variables of positive aspects like prosocial behaviour and altruistic behaviour, the interrelation between different dimensions (e.g. between altruistic behaviour and guilt feelings, between immature judgment and delinquency, between ego-factors, temptation resistance and guilt), the role of conflicting values and motives in the function of conscience.¹²

With these general comments on empirical study of conscience, which should not prompt one to underestimate the empirical contribution but to critically evaluate the theories and their findings, we shall pass on to a discussion of the contributions and drawbacks of the three theories of conscience.

B. The Cognitive-Developmental Theory of Conscience

The *cognitive-developmental theory*, which explains psychological development basically in terms of changes in the underlying cognitive structures, is an influential theory making a notable contribution towards understanding different aspects of psychological development.¹³

12. Cf.: M.L.Hoffman, "Child Rearing Practices and Moral Development", p. 306.

13. Cf. L.Kohlberg, "Stage and Sequence: The Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Socialization", in D.A.Goslin (Ed.), *Handbook of Socialization Theory and Research*, Chicago 1969, p. 347; also, P.H.Mussen et alii, *Child Development and Personality*, New York 1974 (fourth edition), pp. 38, 403.

As we saw in chapter II, the application of the cognitive developmental approaches to the development of morality and conscience has a good deal of empirical data to its claim. However, this theory of conscience has its weak-points too. First we shall discuss the contributions and drawbacks of PIAGET'S theory, and then those of KOHLBERG'S.

1. J. Piaget's Theory

a). Contributions

About PIAGET'S theory D.BERLYNE notes: "...Piaget is without doubt, one of the outstanding figures in contemporary psychology, and his contributions will eventually have to be reckoned with much more than they are both in the management of children and in many areas which may not seem directly connected with child psychology".¹⁴ As regards his theory of moral development we may note the following points.

Pioneer Research

Though research into the development of moral judgment began around the turn of the century¹⁵, a new era of research began with the work of PIAGET. No early study occasioned such a wide range of subsequent research as that of PIAGET. The fruitful and very adaptive method he introduced, together with the challenging conclusions (e.g. two stages of moral development, the role of adult-constraint and peer cooperation, etc.) he drew from his findings, gave a general impetus and frame-work for research in this field.

The Two Types of Morality

PIAGET has shed more light, in a scientific manner, on a fact that had always been accepted by common experience, namely, the existence of *two types of morality*: heteronomous and autonomous. While qualifying hete-

14. D.Berlyne, "Recent Developments in Piaget's Work", *British Journal of Educational Psychology*, 1957, p. 11.

15. R.C.Johnson, "Early Studies of Children's Moral Judgments", *Child Development* 1962, p. 603.

ronomy as the immature predecessor of mature morality, PIAGET has emphasized the features of that mature morality: *autonomy, rationality, mutuality and egalitarianism*, and has attempted to show how they develop and function in the moral judgment of the child.

It should also be noted that PIAGET analyses the development of such basic moral concepts as responsibility, law, punishment, justice, etc., a task rarely undertaken by other empirical studies of morality.

A Maturation-Interactional Theory

PIAGET is one of the few original empirical researchers who have succeeded in grounding moral development in the *processes and conditions of human development*. As J. ANTHONY observes, "In Piaget's world nothing was ready-made, everything grew".¹⁶ In this regard, we may note *four salient features* of his theory:

(i) *Morality and maturation*. Morality matures as the child matures. The absolute, authority-based morality of the young child changes into a flexible, subjective morality as he grows. Thus, *growth* brings about a maturer attitude in the child's moral thinking.

(ii) *Morality and intellectual development*. PIAGET has shown that ego-centric thinking contributes to moral realism, concrete operational thought fosters a morality of cooperation and mutuality, and formal operational thinking prepares the individual for an egalitarian morality, that is, a truly altruistic morality. Thus, PIAGET offers a theory of morality and conscience development, which is solidly based on *general intellectual development*.

(iii) *Morality and social relations*. Moral development requires social relations. While child-adult relationships based on constraint and unilateral respect foster heteronomous morality, peer-group relationships based on cooperation and mutual respect foster autonomous morality. Thus, the nature of social relationships to which the individual is exposed has a great role in moulding one's moral thinking, that is, *social interaction* is an integral part of morality and moral development.

(iv) *Morality and social equilibrium*. Like all other developmental processes

16. J. Anthony, "Symposium on the Contribution of Current Theories to an Understanding of Child Development: iv. The System Makers: Piaget and Freud", *British Journal of Medical Psychology*, 1957, p. 265.

in the Piagetian system, moral development is also a *process of equilibration*. That is, the child attempts to *actively* cope with his social environment and brings about a state of equilibrium in his social interaction.

Hence, once the individual has reached the required stage of development (i.e. the autonomous stage), moral responsibility and obligation are not simply imposed from without, but *actively evolved from within* in the process of interacting with and adapting to the mutual demands and obligations of the group. Consequently, moral norms, especially the norm of justice, which is basic to all other norms, take on a function of governing the equilibrium of social interaction.

b). Drawbacks

Commenting on PIAGET'S theory of moral development, R.S. PETERS says: "Piaget can be criticized both for what he did do and for what he did not do".¹⁷ It means that complaints can be made against what he actually did, and that he can be accused of not having done certain things he should have in evolving his theory of moral development. Here we shall point out the important drawbacks of his theory and research.

Piaget's Method

In his book *The Moral Judgment of the Child* (as in several others of his) PIAGET hardly ever gives adequate information about his sample, procedure etc.¹⁸ Though PIAGET is known for his skill and experience as an observer and experimenter¹⁹, the lack of conventional methods is a drawback as far as scientific rigour is concerned.

Intellectualism

Though evolving a theory of moral development based on intellectual

17. S. Peters, "The Development of Moral Values in Children: viii. Freud's Theory of Moral Development in Relation to that of Piaget", *British Journal of Educational Psychology*, 1960, p. 251.

18. Cfr. L. Bloom, "A Reappraisal of Piaget's Theory of Moral Judgment", *Journal of Genetic Psychology*, 1959, p. 7.

19. Flavell, *The Developmental Psychology of J. Piaget*, p. 31.

development stands to PIAGET'S credit, his theory smacks of a *one-sided intellectualism*.

PIAGET'S primary interest in and preoccupation with the problem of intellectual development is evidently at work here. This seems to force him to place intellectual development at the basis of moral development, and even to make *both the spheres of development strictly parallel, attributing both to the same causal factors*. "It is clear that the mechanism which Piaget holds responsible for the development of a rational morality is exactly the same as that which he thinks engenders rationality in general....Both morality and logic are fired in the crucible of the spontaneous give and take, the interplay of thought and action, which takes place in peer-peer interactions".²⁰ Such a *strict intellectual-moral parallelism*, as subsequent research shows, is unwarranted.

Ignoral of Emotional Factors

One of the biggest criticisms that is made about PIAGET'S theory of moral development is that it *ignores emotional and motivational* factors.

The child's moral development is very much affected by his emotional development (cfr. the role of satisfactory emotional relationships discussed in chapter III). Several factors other than intellectual ones (e.g. the example of an adult, one's own experience of rewards and punishments, etc.) may prompt the child to make a particular judgment in a given situation. Due emphasis on emotional factors would have made PIAGET'S brilliant cognitive theory of morality more lively and appealing.²¹

Ignoral of Intervening Variables

Besides for not taking motivational-emotional factors into account, PIAGET may be criticized also for not sufficiently attending to the role of other variables like social class, sex differences, etc.

Subsequent researchers have shown, as we saw, that these variables do affect moral development. What contributed to the different responses of PIAGET'S subjects were probably not only the usual adult constraint, peer

20. Flavell, *Ibidem*, p. 296.

21. Cfr. Anthony, "Symposium on the Contribution...", p. 264.

cooperation and maturational differences, but also the working class conditions of the poor families (from which his subjects were drawn), differences in their intelligence abilities, sex differences, etc. Though PIAGET does not insist on strict age-stage correspondence, he does not seem to be interested in inquiring why sometimes (as his own study shows) two children of the same age give two different responses (i.e. one of autonomy and the other of heteronomy) to the same problem, or why a child of six gives an autonomous response, while a child of nine gives an heteronomous response.²² By not attending to these facts and their causes PIAGET *ignores individual differences* in moral development.

An Outgrown Theory

PIAGET is not only a psychologist, but also a trained and experienced biologist, logician and mathematician, "who has never been handicapped by small ideas and limited aims".²³ But more than that he is a rigorous systematizer²⁴, who appears to be preoccupied with making out of his findings a clean theory which fits well into his tidy system. This preoccupation is however evident in his work on moral judgment, which very well begins with empirical investigations, but after a process of interpretation and theorizing ends in a rather speculative theory highly sociological and outgrown of facts. D.W. HARDING aptly comments: "In the early part of his book, PIAGET works as a psychologist, his experimental method far from impeccable, but basically sound, revealing something of the behaviour, thinking and sentiments of actual children in particular situations. In the latter part, he turns to sociological theory, very abstract, very generalized, very dependent on the meaning attached to certain concepts...."²⁵ Thus, after a good beginning, PIAGET gets involved in too much theorizing which is not supported by his empirical data.

22. Piaget, *The Moral Judgment of the Child*, pp. 124 - 126.

23. Anthony, "Symposium on the Contribution...", p. 259.

24. Anthony, *Ibidem*, p. 255.

25. Quoted by J.F. Morris in "The Development of Adolescent Value-Judgments", *British Journal of Educational Psychology*, 1958 (28), p. 3.

Other Issues

Besides the above criticisms, several other explicit or implicit assumptions of PIAGET'S theory can be questioned, and are in fact questioned by later researchers. The following points may be noted.

(i) PIAGET'S view that constraint, i.e. the imposition of rules and regulations by adults, leads only to heteronomy and cannot serve the cause of autonomy²⁶, which develops solely out of cooperation, is difficult to understand. Even when the responses of his subjects indicated the influence of adult commands and instructions in the interiorization of moral rules, PIAGET typically brushes them aside as "adult sermons", "meaningless formulae," etc.²⁷

Other researchers (e.g. BULL) have findings which indicate that autonomy develops out of heteronomy, that is, moral concepts developed and practised in autonomy have their origin in heteronomy.²⁸

(ii) PIAGET stresses very much the role of peer-cooperation in fostering moral autonomy. This, however, seems to result from two of his initial assumptions (under the influence of E.DURKHEIM): that morality is a set of rules, and that individuals come to respect these rules because of society or social pressure. At the same time PIAGET is convinced of the autonomy of mature morality.²⁹ Therefore, in order to explain the development and function of autonomous morality and still keep the role of social pressure, PIAGET resorted to a type of 'freely accepted social pressure', i.e. peer cooperation. And this explanation was also quite fitting with his theory of intellectual development.

Within the frame-work of Piagetian theory it is difficult to understand how a child not belonging to, or not accepted by, or even going against, the group can become morally autonomous.³⁰

Besides, other researchers (e.g. KOHLBERG, DURKIN; cfr. chap. II) have questioned this all important role of peer-cooperation on the basis of their

findings.

(iii) Another point, which seems to require more empirical verification, is PIAGET'S theory of the relationship between theoretical and practical morality.³¹

According to PIAGET, we have seen, theoretical morality is the conscious realization of the practical morality, and the latter precedes the former. This means that the child's practical morality moulds his theoretical morality, but not vice-versa. Consequently, moral instruction and theorizing given by adults (i.e. adult's theoretical morality) does not influence the child's practical morality, but only his theoretical morality, either retarding it (i.e. if adult theorizing is objectivistic, authoritarian, etc.) or fostering its development (i.e. if adult theorizing accelerates the child's awareness of his own practical morality)³². This sounds a little paradoxical.

* * *

Concluding our comments on PIAGET'S study, we can say that it points to the importance of *intellectual development* and *social interaction* inspired by *reciprocity* in moral development. PIAGET shows that a mature morality is not imposed from without, but evolved from 'within' through free and equality-based social interaction.

2. L. Kohlberg's Theory

a) Contributions

Working in the tradition of cognitive-developmental approach, KOHLBERG has given an elaborate theory of moral development and conscience. Unlike PIAGET, he employs more satisfactory procedures and subjects his data to thorough analysis. The following features may be noted as salient.

Study of Basic Moral Concepts.

KOHLBERG'S study has contributed much towards understanding moral concepts, which undergo strict developmental changes and are basic to moral

26. Piaget, *The Moral Judgment of the Child*, pp. 194, 196.

27. Cfr. Piaget, *Ibidem*, pp. 166 – 167.

28. Bull, *Moral Judgment from Childhood to Adolescence*, London 1969, pp. 12, 16.

29. Piaget, *Moral Judgment of the Child*, p. 345.

30. Bloom, "A Reappraisal....", p. 7.

31. Piaget, *The Moral Judgment of the Child*, pp. 113, 115.

32. Wright, *The Psychology of Moral Behaviour*, p. 160.

thinking. Thus, he proposes about 25 basic aspects of moral thought. This really provides a *basic and general background* for the study and understanding of moral development in any society.

In his analysis, it is to be noted, KOHLBERG gives special attention to the development of the child's moral values and motives. He indicates how these two basic aspects of morality develop through the *six stages*, and how they influence children's evaluation of a given moral situation. By investigating the development of *moral values* KOHLBERG has concentrated on a task often overlooked by others.

A Broadly-Based Theory

Under this title we should like to point out several related features:

By studying subjects of a wide age-range and of different cultural and social backgrounds, it has been shown that *moral growth is a long process*, and that attainment of mature morality requires a corresponding maturation, related intellectual development and social experience.

Though moral development, based on age-growth, shows an upward sequence in any culture, encountering specific (stage-related) moral concepts, reasonings and experiences is shown to be necessary for stimulating this growth. Hence also the importance of *moral education and experience* for moral development.

By conceiving development basically as changes of the underlying structures, KOHLBERG goes deeper into the problems of moral development than other theories (e.g. identification and learning theories) do.

Thus, according to KOHLBERG, moral development is understood primarily as a process of *active, internal transformation* of socio-moral concepts and attitudes as a result of interaction with a socio-moral world.³³

A Cognitively-Based Theory of Conscience

Though KOHLBERG'S study is primarily concerned with the cognitive aspects of conscience, he extends his theory also to other dimensions (behavioural and emotional) of conscience. According to him, the development of moral behaviour and emotion is parallel (based on the underlying struc-

ture) to the development of moral thinking and judgment.³⁴ This amounts to saying that the development of conscience can be primarily understood in terms of the development of moral judgment.

Thus, he conceives *moral behaviour* in terms of *ego-strength*, in which judgment and reasoning play an important role. Similarly, the prevailing component of mature *moral emotion* (guilt) is *self-judgment* for having violated one's principles. Thus, KOHLBERG attempts to give a theory of moral development and conscience, according to which there is a *growing integration* (within the frame-work of the developing structure), with maturation, of all kinds of moral responses under the control of thought and reason.³⁵

b) Drawbacks

KOHLBERG'S theory is comparatively recent, and therefore research into specific assumptions are still to be made. However, the following observations are pertinent.

Deemphasization of Affective Factors

Evidently, moral judgment is that aspect of human morality which deals with its cognitive aspect, and hence essentially dependent on intellectual development. Even then, moral judgment is not simply the application of general moral principles to a situation. It is done with a good deal of *emotional involvement*. As W.KAY notes, moral judgments "extend beyond the realm of detached and objective logical considerations and become inextricably involved with human feelings".³⁶ And no stage of moral development, however mature, seems to be immune from such emotional involvement. Thus, for example, even a mature subject may give 'fear of punishment' as reason for not doing an action (e.g. not 'stealing' the drug in the case given by KOHLBERG) which he should have done. Discussing this problem, KOHL-

34. This, of course, does not mean, as we already indicated, that according to Kohlberg the behavioural and the emotional dimensions are simply functions of moral judgment.

35. Cfr. also, Wright, *The Psychology of Moral Behaviour*, p. 173.

36. W.Kay, *Moral Development*, p. 144.

33. Kohlberg, "Moral Development and Identification", pp. 313 - 314.

BERG says, "The mature individual is making a psychological statement about himself in saying that he fears punishment but does not view this as a morally legitimate reason for deciding not to steal the drug".³⁷ It seems to us that KOHLBERG'S distinction between the subject's 'psychological statement about himself' and his 'morally legitimate reason for a decision', though conceptually valid, suggests an unfair dichotomy between the cognitive and the affective in moral judgment.

The role of affective factors is to be specially stressed in applying KOHLBERG'S theory to the other dimensions (behavioural and emotional) of conscience, because these dimensions are more under the influence of affective and motivational factors than is moral judgment.

The Diminished Role of Family Interaction

According to KOHLBERG'S theory, social environment like family, peer-group, etc., are important for moral development as providers of general role-taking opportunities. But none of them is critically necessary. Thus, against the critical need of family interaction, love, and warmth, KOHLBERG argues that highly warm families do not specially foster moral development. Nor is the critical need of family interaction proved by the fact that 'bad families' lead to moral pathology. Besides, according to KOHLBERG, healthy moral development of 'kibbutz children' also argues against the critical need of family participation.³⁸

Here it should be remarked that while contrasting the effects of two extreme types of family interactions (highly warm families and bad families) KOHLBERG passes over the role of *moderately warm and disciplining families*. Other researchers (cfr. chapter III) have shown that a moderate degree of warmth, nurturance and interaction in the family is essential for moral development, and its absence can arrest or seriously distort the child's capacity and readiness for further role-taking.

It seems to us that the importance and significance of family as the natural and 'normal' milieu of primary social participation is not disproved by

37. Kohlberg et alii, "Discussion: Developmental Stages in Moral Judgment", C.M. Beck et alii (Eds), *Moral Education: Interdisciplinary Approaches*, p. 362.

38. Kohlberg, "Stage and Sequence", p. 399.

trying to show that it is not critical in the sense that it can be sometimes substituted for by other institutions (e.g. care-homes, kibbutz, etc.).³⁹

Strict Sequentiality of Stages

According to KOHLBERG (and cognitive-developmental theory), the development of moral stages is strictly sequential. Among other things (see p. 38), it means that development takes place in ascending sequence, and that one cannot skip stages. Of course, there are certain empirical findings (cfr. TURIEL; REST and others; chapter II) suggesting a sequentiality of developmental stages. These findings, however, do not conclusively show that there is absolute sequentiality of stages or that stages cannot be skipped at all.

Against the 'absolute unskippability' of stages, for example, it may be argued as follows. What is needed, for instance, for advancing to the sixth stage is formal operational capacity at the intellectual level, and moral concepts, reasonings and experiences based on universal principles of justice. Why cannot then a fourth stager (on average thirteen years old and already possessing formal operational thinking) skip the fifth stage and advance to the sixth, if he encounters moral concepts and experiences (role-taking) of the sixth stage.

Hence *absolute unskippability* of stages seems to be rather a logical assumption than an empirically verified fact. Besides, findings from other studies (e.g. BANDURA, see chapter IV) have shown that development is very much subject to the variable influence of social learning.

* * *

Concluding our comments it can be said that KOHLBERG'S theory, which proposes development through *structural changes*, involving a *long process of*

39. It should be noted that the far reaching consequences of kibbutz rearing are not yet clear. Its findings, in course of time, may throw more light on the specific factors of early experience required for the healthy development of personality.

However, it should also be noted that children in the kibbutz are not completely cut off from their parents. Scheduled visits of parents are part of early life in the kibbutz (Cfr. B. Bettelheim, "Personality Formation in the Kibbutz", in C.E. Nelson (Ed.), *Conscience: Theological and Psychological Perspectives*, pp. 312 - 319).

growth, intellectual development, and a variety of *socio-moral experiences* takes account of the variety and complexity of the factors involved in moral development. It should, however, give due emphasis to the role of affective factors in moral judgment and evaluation. Besides, some of its specific assumptions (e.g. strict sequentiality of stages) invite further empirical study.

C. The Identification Theory of Conscience

As our survey in chapter VII showed, the concept of identification is very imprecise and flexible. Owing to the lack of conceptual clarity and emphasis on broadly assumed unconscious processes, empirical verifiability of the identification theory has always been disputed.⁴⁰

Despite this accusation, *identification theory* makes a point. It calls attention to a (rather unconscious) tendency or *generalized motive* on the part of one person (e.g. the child) to become like another person (e.g. the parent).⁴¹ This underlying tendency and the consequent identification (or role-taking) play a role in the child's psychological development.⁴²

And, as we saw in chapter III, research based on the identification theory has found empirical support for some of its assumptions, and has thus thrown light on certain factors affecting the development of conscience. Among its contributions and drawbacks the following may be specially noted.

1. Contributions

The Role of Parental Love and Nurturance

Empirical findings have shown that *satisfying emotional relationship* between the child and the parent is closely related to moral- and conscience development. Unless the young child experiences a basic security and love

40. Cfr. W.E.Martin, "Learning Theory and Identification: iii. The Development of Values in Children", *The Journal of Genetic Psychology*, 1954, p. 214.

41. U.Bronfenbrenner, "Freudian Theories of Identification and Their Derivatives", *Child Development*, 1960, p. 29.

42. Cfr. P.H.Mussen et alii, *Child Development and Personality*, p. 395.

through warm and nurturant parent-child interaction, his own capacity for establishing similar relationships with others will be seriously impaired or distorted. In this respect, the theory has shed light on a basic requisite for conscience development, which is not duly emphasized by other theories.

The Role of Discipline

Research has shown that it is parental warmth and nurturance, in conjunction with *discipline*, that promotes conscience development.

It has also been shown that *psychological discipline* is more conducive to the development of conscience. In this context, *induction* or instructing the child with regard to the consequences of his actions for others appeared to be very important. It was also found that discipline should be *consistent* and *reasonable*.

In contrast to psychological discipline, physical discipline (especially, if harsh and given by non-nurturant parent) is seen to foster aggression, fear, delinquent-behaviour, etc.

These findings about the role of discipline and the differential effects of different types of discipline are notable contribution of the identification theory.

Parental Values and Standards.

Another factor identification theory has made clear is the importance of *parental values and standards*. Since the child takes on parental values through the process of identification, it is highly important for good conscience development that parents possess and exhibit appropriate values and standards. Child's conscience development will not be properly promoted in the absence of such values and standards even if he is brought up in an atmosphere of love and acceptance.

2) Drawbacks

Its valuable contributions notwithstanding, identification theory of conscience has invited a number of valid criticisms. These criticisms seem to flow mainly from its claim of being a general theory assuming to explain the phe-

nomenon of conscience through the *single process* of identification.

Presumed Relationship between Guilt and Temptation Resistance

Identification theory presumes a close relationship between guilt and temptation resistance because avoidance of guilt is said to be the motive for resisting temptation. Such a view sees temptation resistance only in a negative perspective, ignoring the positive, altruistic motives that prompt the inhibition of asocial behaviour.

Though anticipated guilt may act as a strong deterrent of violation, one resists temptation also on the ground of *positive influence* of moral values like justice, altruism, etc. It seems to us that the positive influence of values in guiding behaviour will be clearer as the individual matures (cfr. KOHLBERG'S findings, Chapter II).

Besides, the empirical findings we reviewed (chapter III) supported no consistent, positive relationship between temptation resistance and guilt, thus showing that factors other than guilt-feelings do influence resistance to temptation.

Simplified Concept of 'Guilt'

According to the identification theory, guilt is the self-blame following violation of internalized standards. And, the various post-transgression responses (i.e. confession, reparation, punishment-seeking) are taken to be the expressions of guilt.

In the light of empirical findings (cfr. instrumental learning theory, chap. IV) this is a very simplified concept of guilt because it has been shown that these responses can be motivated not only by guilt, but also by anxiety, fear, and shame. These findings have also shown that all these affective states (guilt, shame and fear) as well as the responses motivated by them may co-exist in the same individual, even with regard to the same transgression. This indicates the complexity of the affective state following a transgression, its acquisition being very much dependent on previous learning and reinforcement experiences, including the cognitive orientations provided by socializing agents.

Ignoral of Cognitive Aspects

In explaining the development of conscience, the theory *bypasses* the role of the child's growing *intellectual activity* and the conscious processes of acquiring values.

And by limiting the development of conscience primarily to the first ten years, the theory ignores the importance of maturing moral judgment for the growth of mature conscience, which has been demonstrated by other researchers (e.g. KOHLBERG)

Conscience-Development as Acculturation

Identification theory understands conscience development as a process of incorporating into oneself parental and cultural values and standards. Hence, a process of adopting the values and standards suggested or imposed from without, i.e. a *process of acculturation*. Such a view, however, does not take into account the evidence provided by other researchers (e.g. KOHLBERG) indicating that moral development involves basically a process of transforming from within concepts and attitudes, which culminates in conceiving moral order as a realm of mutual human relationships based on equality and justice.

Within the frame-work of identification theory it is difficult to understand the development of mature moral persons and great moral reformists, who go against the conventional values of their culture and society.

* * *

Concluding our comments, it may be said that the identification theory clarifies the importance of early *emotional relationship* and *disciplinary practices* for the proper development of conscience. But it ignores the role of intellectual and *cognitive factors*. Besides, invoking identification as the overall process of conscience development, the theory bypasses the complex mechanisms involved in the development of the various dimensions of conscience.

D. Learning Theory Approaches to Conscience

Learning theory is specially noted for its *experimental anchorage* and

objectivity⁴³. As the general theory of acquisition and modification of behaviour, its principles help us understand the development and function of conscience. We shall discuss the contributions and drawbacks of the three learning theories as far as they are applied to conscience.

1. The Classical Conditioning Theory of Conscience

a) Contribution

H.J.EYSENCK'S 'conditioning theory of conscience' is probably the simplest among the theories of conscience; but this simplicity, as we shall see, is also its great weakness.

However, the theory calls attention to a factor which is involved in the development and function of conscience. This factor is the *conditioning of anxiety*. Anxiety is easily conditionable, especially so in children. Hence a certain anxiety may always follow violations of prohibitions. Besides, strong anxiety may be conditioned, for example, through severe and repeated punishment of a misdeed, and such a conditioned anxiety may serve as a strong deterrent of violation, and may also give rise to disproportionate emotional reactions in case of violation. And, such a conditioned anxiety, as EYSENCK shows, could be more easily conditioned in introverted subjects. These findings of the conditioning theory are not to be lost sight of in discussing the phenomenon of conscience.

b) Drawbacks

By reducing the acquisition of moral values to a process of conditioning, and conscience to 'a conditioned anxiety response', the theory exposes itself to severe criticism.

43. Cfr. A.L. Baldwin, *Theories of Child Development*, p. 474.

Conscience: A Negative Automaton

As EYSENCK himself admits⁴⁴, conditioned responses are due to the reflex reactions of the autonomic nervous system, which is beyond the conscious and deliberate control of the subject. Thus, reducing conscience and morality to an automatic realm, the theory deprives them of rationality and autonomy which are two of the hallmarks of mature morality and conscience⁴⁵. It is difficult to see how a 'morality' deprived of rationality and freedom deserves that name.

Besides, people are not only negatively (anxiety-based) moral; their behaviour is also positively motivated by altruistic values. And the development of these values depends, to a great extent, on maturation, intellectual development, social reinforcements and experiences (cfr. the findings of PIAGET, KOHLBERG, ARONFREED, BANDURA, chapters II, IV). But conditioning theory ignores the role of these factors in moral development.

Simplified Concept of Punishment

In order that the conditioning of anxiety be effective, punishment should closely follow the misdeed, according to the requirement of classical conditioning. But it may very well be questioned whether (and EYSENCK has not shown either) this condition is fulfilled in child rearing practices and, consequently, whether consciences are formed through conditioning process.

In fact, the problem of punishment is more complex. A child may be punished before or after a misdeed. As other findings have shown (e.g. ARONFREED, chapter IV), the former fosters temptation resistance, while the latter contributes towards emotional reactions after violation.⁴⁶ The complexity of punishment is increased when one takes into consideration the

44. Eysenck, *Crime and Personality*, London 1964, p. 104.

45. Cfr. W.Kay, *Moral Development*, pp. 170, 210, 143.

46. Eysenck makes a reference to this complexity of punishment when he mentions Solomon's experiment with puppies (which dealt with the effects of different timings of punishment) without elaborating upon it (Cfr. Eysenck, *Crime and Personality*, p. 116). In this context it may be noted that in a later article Eysenck observes that in his conditioning theory of conscience "...the possible influence of operant conditioning ...has been overlooked very much", thus somewhat lessening the role of conditioning in conscience development (Eysenck, "A Note on Some Criticisms of the Mowrer/Eysenck Conditioning Theory of Conscience", *British Journal of Psychology*, 1965, p. 307).

42. Srampickal, *Conscience*

diverse effects of psychological and physical punishments, demonstrated by the identification theory. Conditioning theory, however, bypasses these complex factors related to punishment and their varied effects on conscience development.

Concluding our comments it may be said that the conditioning theory indicates the role of *conditionability of fear* in the development and function of conscience. But by identifying conscience with a conditioned anxiety response, the theory seeks to give a "reductive explanation of complex phenomena in terms of familiar and elementary processes"⁴⁷. Consequently, the concept of conscience the theory gives is akin to the 'fear reactions' of an animal or a young child, a far cry from a mature adult's conscience.

2. Instrumental Learning Theory of Conscience

a) Contributions

Importance of Rewards and Punishments.

Instrumental learning theory demonstrates the effect of rewards and punishments in learning a behaviour. Hence the importance of *rewarding* a good behaviour and *punishing* a misdeed for the proper development of conscience. The need of giving the child appropriate *cognitive instructions*, which will enable him to better discriminate different situations and act accordingly, is also stressed by the findings of the theory.

Complexity of Conscience

An important contribution of the instrumental learning theory is to have brought to light the complex processes implied in the development and functions of conscience. Its findings suggest:

- (i) Positive rewards foster primarily prosocial behaviour.
- (ii) Punishments foster the inhibition of anti-social (punished) behaviour:

47. M. Argyle, "Eysenck's Theory of Conscience: A Reply", *British Journal of Psychology*, 1965, p. 309).

- (iii) Punishment before a misdeed fosters resistance to temptation.
 - (iv) Punishment following a misdeed fosters post-transgressional anxiety.
 - (v) Post-transgressional anxiety may take the form of guilt, shame or fear, depending to a great extent on the cognitive orientations provided in the context of punishment. All these affective states may be felt with regard to a single violation.
 - (vi) These affective states motivate the individual for different responses (confession, reparation, self-criticism, punishment-seeking, flight...) which are learned because of their instrumental value in reducing the one or other of the aversive affective states.
- These different patterns of learning influencing the acquisition of responses relating to conscience point also to the complexity of conscience.

b) Drawbacks

Despite its contribution towards understanding the complexity of conscience, instrumental learning theory has several drawbacks as a theory of conscience.

Deemphasis of Developmental Factors

Conscience development is not accounted for by a process of administering appropriate rewards and punishments, and by the resulting internal affective states (which are said to control the various responses of conscience). As other researchers (e.g. PIAGET, KOHLBERG, see chapter II) have shown, it involves a basic developmental process, which is a function of maturation, social interaction, etc. But, by emphasizing that conscience is primarily a self-control mechanism or a set of internalized standards, learned through direct reinforcements, the theory bypasses the above said developmental factors related to conscience.

As learning theorists do hold, behaviour learned through operant conditioning is first emitted by the subject, which is then strengthened or shaped by appropriate reinforcements. But a behaviour emitted by an organism normally corresponds to its stage of development (Cfr. PIAGET, KOHLBERG, chapter II). Hence the importance of developmental factors.

Cognition and Affect in Moral Response

The failure of the instrumental learning theory to give due importance to the role of moral judgment, and to integrate it into moral development is another weak point.

Besides, the view that much of behaviour control and several of the post-transgressional responses are effected by internal affects conditioned through punishment-experiences, and not by cognitive evaluation, seems to ignore the fact that there is an element of *cognitive evaluation* even in such affects conditioned by punishments. Punishment by its nature imparts to the child a cognitive evaluation of the (badness of the) act. And, when a punished act arouses fear or anxiety at the next occasion, this fear (or anxiety) already implies a cognitive evaluation of the badness of the act imparted through punishment. Without such an evaluative element it is difficult to distinguish punishment from merely aggressive acts.⁴⁸

Hence, the affective states of anxiety, fear, and shame, in as far as they include a consciousness of the wrongness of the act or a sense of moral violation, are moral feelings.

Further, reducing these responses primarily to a function of affects conditioned by punishments undermines the importance of the child's *empathy potential* which is found to have a significant role in the motivation of moral responses (cfr. HOFFMAN, chapter III).

Deemphasis of the Role of Parent-Child Interaction

Another factor which has not received due emphasis within the framework of the instrumental learning theory of conscience is the role of a warm and nurturant parent-child relationship.

Consequently, according to the theory, the differential effects of punishment are primarily related to the time of its administration, and not to the quality of the relationship existing between the punishing agent and the punished one, and the methods of discipline (psychological or physical) employed. The timing of punishment is shown to play a role; but, in the light of other (e.g. SEARS and others, see chapter III) findings, the importance of the type of discipline employed and the quality of the parent-child relation-

ship should be duly emphasized.

Because of the ignoral of these affective factors, post-transgressional reactions are reduced to mere anxiety (which can be differentiated into fear, shame, and guilt) associated with punishment. Thus, these emotional states lack the 'affect' resulting from 'wounding a love' and fear of loss of love. As is clear from other studies (cfr. identification theory, chapter III), these love-based affects are significant components of post-transgressional emotional reactions.

Bypassing Intervening Variables

Another point that may be raised against the instrumental learning theory is its ignoral of variables like sex-differences, social class differences, etc.

Because the role of moral judgment is not stressed, the possible influence (especially through moral judgment) of these variables upon moral development is bypassed.

And, finally, it may be argued that in real-life situations (e.g. home, school) administration of selective direct reinforcements is very limited in comparison to the pattern of conscience-related behaviour children acquire. Hence, it is reasonable to question whether all 'learning mechanisms' demonstrated in the laboratories are so verified in actual life.

* * *

By way of conclusion it may be said that the instrumental learning theory has shown the *complexity of the learning processes* that may affect the development of conscience; but it does not explain the whole phenomenon of conscience, which includes also factors of maturation, intellectual development, affective relationship, etc.

3. The Observational Learning Theory of Conscience

a) Contribution

Learning from Models

Observational learning theory attempts to extend the learning of moral responses beyond the frame-work of differential reinforcement, and places it in

48. Cfr. also, C.M.Beck et alii (Eds), *Moral Education*, p. 386 ff.

the context of broader social interaction, where one learns by *observing social models*, without the need of being directly reinforced.

In real life children are exposed to a variety of models (or 'significant others') in different situations: parents, teachers, social leaders, movie stars and characters as well as the changing social and religious customs, political ideologies, etc. The findings of the observational learning theory indicate that children learn the behaviour patterns of these models, especially so if models' behaviour is found to be socially successful, even if they (children) are not directly rewarded.

Hence the theory also implies that mature and consistent models are required for the proper development of conscience.

b) Drawbacks

Deemphasis of Developmental Factors

Conscience or self-control (as BANDURA seems to prefer to call it) is not simply a product of 'modeling'. It involves developmental factors. And by overemphasizing the role of observational learning, which is said to explain all functions usually attributed to self-control, the theory bypasses the importance of developmental factors.

Typically, after changing children's moral judgments (i.e. changing subjective children's judgments into objective and vice-versa) through the influence of model judgments, BANDURA argues "children's judgmental responses are readily modifiable, particularly through the utilization of adult modeling cues"⁴⁹, and then questions the validity of stage-developmental theories of moral judgment.

But BANDURA'S study, in which post-test closely followed the modeling situation (see p. 246), proves only a temporary modification of moral judgment under the influence of models, and not a structural or stage change of moral judgment.⁵⁰ Other researchers have shown that children's capacity for

49. A. Bandura and F. McDonald, "Influence of Social Reinforcement and the Behaviour of Models in Shaping Children's Moral Judgments", *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1963, p. 280.

50. Cfr. E. Turiel, "An Experimental Test of the Sequentiality of Developmental

learning from others is primarily determined by their developmental stage (cfr. TURIEL, REST, chap. II).

And, if the role of observational learning is so important and independent of developmental factors, it may be asked why young children, who observe mature adult models (e.g. their parents), make immature moral judgments.⁵¹ Evidently, BANDURA has shown the importance of modeling. But it does not disprove the role of developmental factors.

Moral Development: Internalization

Like other learning theories and identification theory, observational learning theory considers conscience as a self-control mechanism developed through the internalization of cultural standards, especially those held by accepted models.

Such an internalization theory does not explain the development of mature moral consciences, whose values and standards go against those of their culture and cultural models.

Concluding our comments it may be said that *observation and imitation of models* is an important factor affecting the growth of conscience. However, it is not the primary process involved in the development of morality and conscience. Hence, it should be seen in conjunction with, and as complementary to, basic developmental processes.

E. Towards a Synthetic View of the Concept of Conscience in Empirical Psychology

Our foregoing discussion has shown that each theory makes some contribution towards a better understanding of conscience, while none of the theories, on its own, can satisfactorily account for the phenomenon of conscience.

Changes in the Child's Moral Judgments" in R. C. Johnson et alii (Eds), *Conscience, Contract and Social Reality*, New York 1972, p. 316.

51. Cfr. Cowan, P. A. et alii, "Social Learning and Piaget's Cognitive Theory of Moral Development", *J. Ab. Soc. Psych.*, 1969, p. 263.

Therefore, in order to have a satisfactory (as far as possible) picture of conscience, we shall try to get 'synthetic view' based on the contribution of the different theories. This 'synthetic view' shall focus on (1) *the nature and function* of conscience, and (2) *the development* of conscience.

1. The Nature and Function of Conscience

In order to see the *nature and function* of conscience from the empirical point of view, we should see the various aspects bearing upon it.

Subjective Interiorization

Conscience, first of all, refers to *subjective interiorization*. This implies '*response from within*' which does not depend on external (real or imagined) sanctions. This implies further that this internal response is *centred on the moral values* (or norms and standards which are the embodiment of these values) the individual possesses, according to which he feels obliged to act.

The Dimensions of Conscience

The value-centred internal response has three dimensions or its functions in three realms: *thinking*, *acting*, and *feeling* (respectively the cognitive, behavioural and emotional dimensions).

The cognitive dimension judges and evaluates one's intentions, actions, conflict situations, etc., in the light of one's values.

The behavioural dimension urges one to behave in accordance with these evaluations.

The emotional dimension mobilizes 'aversive' feelings — fear (anxiety), shame, and guilt — and 'pleasant' feelings — satisfaction, joy, etc. — and motivates the individual to restore (or maintain) the integrity of his values. Hence these aversive feelings motivate the individual to various responses like confession, self-criticism, reparation, apology, etc.⁵²

The more interiorized (or maturer) the conscience, the more guilt-oriented

52. It may be noted that little investigation is done into the nature of positive feelings following the maintenance of one's moral values.

it is, and less guided by fear and shame, though these two affective states are also moral in as far as they include a sense of having violated one's values.

The Generality of Conscience

Neither within single dimensions nor across dimensions does the function of conscience show a high consistency.

Thus, in the behavioural dimension, an individual does not always act according to his value (e.g. honesty). Many times he may be honest, but at times he is dishonest. This inconsistency is due to situational, motivational and personality factors (see p. 144), all of which affect one's behaviour. Hence, the behavioural dimension seems to be the most inconsistent of all the three.

As for the emotional dimension, though 'normally' people are susceptible to aversive feelings after transgression (feelings of satisfaction at keeping one's values) and elicit different responses, the nature (guilt, shame or/and fear) and the intensity of these feelings, and the type of responses (confession, reparation, etc.) are not the same (see p. 172). Post-transgression reactions are often a combination of these feelings and responses. Hence, the emotional dimension of conscience may be said to be the most 'obscure' one among the three.

The reasons for this are diverse. Besides the nature of the value violated, the individual's emotional susceptibility (e.g. conditionability), the socialization techniques and learning experiences he had influence this dimension.

Similarly, in the cognitive dimension, an individual's thinking and evaluation of an aspect of morality (e.g. responsibility) or of conflict situations does not show a high consistency. However, in comparison to the other two dimensions, the cognitive dimension shows more consistency, and this may be attributed to the fact that this dimension is *relatively* independent of situational-motivational factors (see p. 104).

Consistency across dimensions is also low. Mature evaluation does not consistently produce mature behaviour; nor is self-control and susceptibility to aversive feelings necessarily related to each other, etc. (see p. 178). Hence the complexity of conscience.

This complexity does not deny a certain generality: evidently, there is a general factor of moral judgment, behaviour and feeling (see p. 104, 143, 171).

The generality of conscience appears to be dependent on two factors:

(i) the *developmental stage* of the individual, which is a basic factor in the psychic organization of the individual, and (ii) '*training and learning*' processes which, in accordance with the developmental stage, foster a *harmonious integration* of the child's value-oriented thinking, acting and feeling. This implies a well-integrated development of the individual. And in this sense we may say that the generality or consistency of conscience is a '*dynamic consistency*'.

The above synthesis (as well as all our fore-going discussion) indicates that the various and complex aspects related to conscience render a neat definition of it very difficult. What is more feasible is an empirical description of it. And in the light of our synthesis, we may describe *conscience* as patterns of moral-value-centred response which constitute a rather consistent, stable and identifiable dimension of the individual's psychic organization.

2. The Development of Conscience


The findings of empirical research clearly show that the most challenging feature of conscience is its *development*. Again, our foregoing analysis has amply shown that the exact role of the various factors and processes affecting the development of conscience cannot be clearly pinned down at the present state of our knowledge. However, in the light of empirical data, the following general *factors* and *learning processes* are found to be important. (Though we speak separately of 'factors' and 'processes', in reality they overlap and influence each other).

a) Factors Affecting Conscience Development

We may divide the main factors that affect the development of conscience broadly into two categories: factors '*internal*' to the individual and factors '*external*' to the individual⁵³.

53. This distinction between 'internal' and 'external' is not to be taken as clear-cut or exclusive, because these factors often influence each other. For example, intellectual development needs social stimulations.

Similarly, various factors within the same 'group' may also be interdependent.



Thus, for example, intellectual development supposes maturation. — However, these various factors, taken as single variables, do affect the development of conscience.

b) The Learning Processes in Conscience Development

The process of conscience development includes different learning processes. We may specify five such learning processes:

(i) *Cognitive-Learning*: This includes the learning of moral concepts, rules and values, etc., from the cognitive point of view. The developmental stage of the individual and the nature (consistency, clarity, frequency, etc.) of the stimulation (verbal instruction, opportunity for socio-moral role-taking, etc.) given are the important variables in this learning. Cognitive learning affects more the cognitive dimension of conscience.

(ii) *Identification*: Motivated by its emotional relationship with its parents, the child (rather unconsciously) takes on their norms and standards. This is done with a good deal of 'emotionality' that these standards have a strong motivating force, especially in childhood. Parental love and nurturance, appropriate disciplinary practices, etc., are important variables in this learning. The role of identificatory learning may be more in the emotional and behavioural dimensions of conscience.

(iii) *Classical Conditioning*: The individual undergoes a process of conditioning in the course of moralization. The intensity and frequency of punishment, the types of behaviour punished, the 'conditionability' of the individual, etc., are the important variables here. The role of conditioning will be more evident in post-transgressional reactions, especially in the form of anxiety and fear (which may be anticipated).

(iv) *Instrumental Learning*: The individual's moral response is shaped (strengthened, weakened, or corrected) to a great extent through rewards and punishments (which come in a variety of forms) he receives. The type of behaviour reinforced, the intensity, frequency and timing of reinforcement, verbal instruction provided, etc., are the important factors in this context. The impact of instrumental learning will be more in the behavioural dimension and in post-transgressional responses (confession, self-criticism, etc.).

(v) *Observational Learning*: Models or 'significant others' exert a good deal of influence on children, and children learn by observing their behaviour (and its consequences). The type of behaviour observed, frequency of observation, 'significance' of the model, etc., are the important factors in the imitation of models. This form of learning influences more the behavioural dimension of

conscience.

The above said learning processes indicate that the development of conscience is complex. Evidently, with increasing cognitive learning (which includes maturation, intellectual development, social role-taking, etc.) there comes about a better organization and interiorization of moral responses, based on one's developing value-conceptions. But cognitive learning is only one (though important) of the learning processes involved; there are other learning processes, and these affect the various dimensions of conscience differently. For example, if the child enjoys high love and nurturance, is given very high standards of performance and is frequently subjected to love-withdrawal discipline, he is likely to develop high 'guilt feelings' irrespective of his cognitive learning or moral judgment. Or, if the child is given clear moral concepts and rules, but contrary example and little or no training in self-control, he may make mature moral judgments but his behaviour will be a far cry from his judgments. Or again, if the child is rejected, harshly and unlovingly punished, etc., this will seriously endanger his sense of worth and significance and thus undermine the basis of a positive social attitude. (It is easy to multiply examples of such unwholesome combination). But all this goes to show that the development of a mature conscience — a conscience effectively and harmoniously guiding moral responses in accordance with one's principles — implies a balanced combination of the various learning processes. Hence, the challenge of conscience development and formation.

However, the study of conscience goes beyond the field of empirical psychology. Empirical investigation of conscience, we have seen, is concerned with studying it in as far as it can be assessed and measured through its functions. In this sense, we can say that empirical psychology is restricted to the 'phenomenological aspect' of conscience, which, of course, does not exhaust the whole reality of conscience.

Conscience is studied also from its transcendental and unmeasurable aspect, highlighting its ontologico-personal dimension. Evidently, such a study is not directly the task of Psychology,⁵⁴ but of Philosophy and Theology.

54. Though directly not concerned with these questions, researchers at times passingly refer to such problems, e.g. the nature of 'moral values'.

Thus L. Kohlberg conceives 'moral values' as universal values, that is, values binding

Therefore, we now pass on to such a view of conscience, namely, the concept of conscience in the documents of the Second Vatican Council.

PART IV

THE CONCEPT OF CONSCIENCE IN THE DOCUMENTS OF THE SECOND VATICAN COUNCIL

The Second Vatican Council was a pastoral council. Therefore, the council was not so much concerned with giving dogmatic treatises, as with gaining a renewed understanding of herself, of the world, of the situation and problems of the contemporary man, and with offering her solution to these problems. And as far as '*conscience*' is concerned, which is of interest to us, it was not subjected to any ex-professo study by the council. Therefore one should not expect a thorough treatment of it by the council. However, it was central to some of the problems (e.g. dignity of man, religious freedom) discussed in the council. Hence, in several places the council speaks about conscience by way of allusions, references and descriptions. These are the object of our study in the following chapter.

on all people; values that impose absolute obligation (Cfr. L.Kohlberg, "Development of Moral Character and Moral Ideology", in M.L. and L.W. Hoffman (Eds), *Review of Child Development Research*, New York 1964, p. 396).

J. Aronfreed describes as 'moral' those types of behaviour which have a consequence for others (J. Aronfreed, *Conduct and Conscience*, New York 1968, p. 253).

Others, with more empirical trend, will contend that values should be inferred from overt behaviour (Cfr. W.F. Hill, "Learning Theory and the Acquisition of Values", in R.C. Johnson et alii (Eds), *Conscience, Contract and Social Reality*, New York 1972, p. 263).

These conceptions of 'value', though not proposed as general definitions, influence each theorist's approach to the problem.

Chapter X

Descriptions and References Relating to Conscience in the
Documents of the Council

In studying the council documents, our purpose is not to trace the historical development of the doctrine of conscience contained in the documents, nor to elaborate upon that doctrine, but to draw out the idea of conscience contained in them. For this purpose we shall divide our study into three sections: First, citing the texts where the term '*conscientia*' occurs, we shall let the council documents speak for themselves about conscience. Then, we shall analyse the concept of conscience contained in these texts, and finally, we shall make a critical synthesis of the same.

A. The Term '*Conscientia*' as Occuring in the Documents

In all, the Latin term '*Conscientia*' (including its different cases) occurs 72 times in the original Latin version of the documents. Below are given all the 72 instances, together with the name of the document and article number. In order to understand the term in its context, brief citations (in English) from the relevant parts of the documents are also given, short Latin phrases or clauses being given within brackets.¹

1. The Latin phrases or clauses are taken from *Acta Apostolicae Sedis*, and the English citations from W. Abbot (Ed.) *The Documents of Vatican II*, London-Dublin 1966.

Document.	Article.	Text.
<i>Decree on the Instruments of Social Communication (Inter Mirifica)</i> ²	5.	"A special need exists for everybody concerned to develop an upright conscience (<i>rectam conscientiam</i>) on the use of these instruments".
	9.	"If those who use these media are to honour the moral law, they must not neglect to inform themselves in good time of the judgments made in these matters by competent authority. These judgments they should respect according to the requirements of a good conscience" (<i>secundum rectae conscientiae normas</i>).
		"By taking pains to guide and settle their conscience (<i>suam conscientiam ... dirigere ac instituere</i>) with appropriate help", one can counteract the damaging influences of these media.
	21.	"National offices ... for affairs of the press, motion pictures, radio and television ... will have the special obligation of helping the faithful to form a true conscience (<i>conscientia fidelium recte efformetur</i>) about the use of these media".
<i>Dogmatic Constitution on the Church (Lumen Gentium)</i> ³	16.	"Those also can attain to everlasting salvation who ... sincerely seek God and ... strive by their deeds to do His will as it is known to them through the dictates of conscience" (<i>per dictamen conscientiae</i>).
	36.	"Let them (the lay people) strive to harmonize the two (religious and secular spheres), remembering that in every temporal affair they must be guided by a christian conscience (<i>christiana conscientia duci debere</i>).

2. AAS, Annus LVI, Series III — vol. VI, 1964, pp. 144 — 157.

3. AAS, Annus et vol. LVII, 1965, pp. 5 — 71.

Document.	Article.	Text.
Decree on Ecumenism (<i>Unitatis Redintegratio</i>) ⁴	4.	The different christian "communions cooperate more closely in whatever projects a christian conscience demands for the common good" (<i>ad bonum commune ab omni conscientia christiana postulatis</i>).
Decree on Religious Life (<i>Perfectae Caritatis</i>) ⁵	14.	"Therefore he (the superior) must make a special point of leaving them (the subordinates) appropriately free with respect to the sacrament of penance and direction of conscience" (<i>conscientiae moderamen</i>).
Decree on Priestly Formation (<i>Optatum Totius</i>) ⁶	11.	"Let discipline be exercised, then, in a way which will develop in the students an internal attitude by which the authority of superiors will be accepted through an act of personal conviction, that is, conscientiously (<i>propter conscientiam</i>) and for supernatural reasons".
Declaration on Christian Education (<i>Gravissimum Educationis</i>) ⁷	1.	"This holy synod ... affirms that children and young people have a right to be encouraged to weigh moral values with an upright conscience (<i>in valoris moralibus recta conscientia aestimandis</i>) and to embrace them by personal choice ...".
	6.	The allotment of school subsidies by public authorities should be such that "when selecting schools for their children, parents are genuinely free to follow their consciences" (<i>secundum conscientiam suam ... libere selegere</i>).
	8.	The church has the "right freely to establish and to run schools of every kind and every level ... the

4. AAS, Ibidem, pp. 90 — 112.

5. AAS, Annus et vol. LVIII, 1966, pp. 702 — 712.

6. AAS, Ibidem, pp. 713 — 727.

7. AAS, Ibidem, pp. 728 — 739.

Document.	Art.	Text.
Declaration on Christian Education		exercise of this right makes a supreme contribution to freedom of conscience" (<i>libertati quoque conscientiae summopere conferre</i>)
Decree on Lay Apostolate (<i>Apostolicam Actuositatem</i>) ⁸	5.	In both orders (temporal and religious), the layman, being simultaneously a believer and a citizen, should be constantly led by the same christian conscience (<i>conscientia christiana duci debere</i>).
	12.	"As they (young persons) become more conscious of their own personality (<i>maturescente conscientia propriae personalitatis</i>), they are impelled by a zest for life and abounding energies to assume their own responsibility".
	13.	"To fulfill the mission of the church in the world the laity need a full awareness (<i>plena illa conscientia</i>) of their role in building up society".
	20.	"The immediate aim of apostolic organizations is to make the gospel known and men holy, and to form in them a christian conscience" (<i>conscientiam christiane efformandam</i>).
	30.	"Children must also be educated to transcend the family circle, and ... they should be so involved in the local community of the parish that they will acquire a consciousness of being living and active members of the people of God" (<i>ut ... conscientiam acquirant se ... populi Dei</i>).
Declaration on Religious Freedom (<i>Dignitatis Humanae</i>) ⁹	1	In our times "the demand is increasingly made that men should act on their own judgment, enjoying and making use of a responsible freedom, not driven by coercion but motivated by a sense of duty" (<i>officii conscientia ducti</i>).

8. AAS, Ibidem, pp. 837 — 864.

9. AAS, Ibidem, pp. 929 — 946.

Document.	Article.	Text.
Declaration on Religious Freedom		"This sacred synod...professes...that it is upon the human conscience that these obligations (the obligations to seek the truth about God, His Church etc.) fall and exert their binding force" (<i>hominum conscientiam tangere ac vincere</i>).
	2.	Religious freedom means...that in "matters religious no one is to be forced to act in a manner contrary to his beliefs. Nor is anyone to be restrained from acting in accordance with his own beliefs (<i>neque aliquis cogatur ad agendum contra suam conscientiam neque impediatur quominus juxta suam conscientiam agat</i>).
	3.	"Hence everyman has the duty, and therefore the right, to seek the truth in matters religious...form for himself right and true judgments of conscience" (<i>recta et vera conscientiae judicia</i>).
		"Man perceives and acknowledges the imperatives of the divine law through the mediation of conscience" (<i>mediante conscientia sua</i>). "In all his activity a man is bound to follow his conscience" (<i>... quam tenetur sequi</i>) ... "He is not to be forced to act ... contrary to his conscience (<i>contra suam conscientiam</i>) nor ... restrained from acting in accordance with his conscience" (<i>juxta suam conscientiam</i>).
	11.	"God calls men to serve Him in spirit and truth. Hence they are bound in conscience (<i>in conscientia vinciuntur</i>) but they stand under no compulsion". "... 'Everyone of us will render an account of himself to God' (Rom. 14 - 12), and for this reason is bound to obey his conscience" (<i>tenetur conscientiae suae obedire</i>).

Document.	Art.	Text.
Declaration on Religious Freedom	13.	"... The christian faithful, in common with other men, possess the civil right not to be hindered in leading their lives in accordance with their conscience (<i>juxta conscientiam agenda</i>).
	14.	"In the formation of their consciences (<i>in sua formanda conscientia</i>), the christian faithful ought carefully to attend to the sacred and certain doctrine of the church."
	15.	Everywhere "there is a growing consciousness of the personal responsibility (<i>conscientiam propriae responsibilitatis</i>) that weighs upon every man."
Decree on Missionary Activity (<i>Ad Gentes</i>) ¹⁰	35.	"... From a vivid consciousness of their own responsibility (<i>conscientiam propriae responsibilitatis</i>) for spreading the gospel, they (the people of God) will do their share in missionary work among nations".
	36.	"Therefore, all sons of the church should have a lively awareness of their responsibility (<i>suae responsibilitatis conscientiam</i>) to the world."
	39.	By bringing to light the missionary aspects contained in the different branches (dogmatic, biblical etc.) of theological studies "a missionary awareness (<i>conscientia missionaria</i>) can be formed in future priests."
Decree on Priestly Ministry (<i>Praesbiterorum Ordinis</i>) ¹¹	18.	The sacrament of penance "prepared by a daily examination of conscience (<i>cotidiana conscientiae discussione</i>) greatly fosters the necessary turning of the heart toward the love of the Father of mercies."

10. AAS. Annus et vol. LVIII, 1966, pp. 947 - 990.

11. AAS. Ibidem, pp. 991 - 1024.

Document.	Art.	Text.
<i>Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World</i> (<i>Gaudium et Spes</i>) ¹²	3.	"... The pivotal point of our total presentation will be man himself, whole and entire, body and soul, heart and conscience (<i>corde et conscientia</i>) mind and will."
	8.	"Indeed ... men are more conscious than ever of the inequalities in the world" (<i>ipsa discrepentiarum conscientia</i>)." "... An imbalance arises between a concern for practicality and efficiency, and the demands of a moral conscience (<i>exigentias conscientiae moralis</i>).
	9.	"... Very many persons are quite aggressively demanding those benefits of which with vivid awareness they judge (<i>vivida conscientia judicant</i>) themselves to be deprived either through injustice or unequal distribution."
	16.	(The whole article, cited below, speaks about "the dignity of the moral conscience" — <i>dignitas conscientiae moralis</i>). "In the depths of his conscience (<i>in imo conscientiae</i>), man detects a law which he does not impose upon himself, but which holds him to obedience. Always summoning him to love good and avoid evil, the voice of conscience (<i>cujus vox</i>) can when necessary speak to his heart more specifically: do this, shun that. For man has in his heart a law written by God. To obey it is the very dignity of man; according to it he will be judged." "Conscience is the most secret core and sanctuary (<i>conscientia est nucleus ... atque sacrarium hominis</i>) of a man. There he is alone with God, whose voice echoes in his depths. In a wonderful manner conscience (<i>conscientia modo mirabili</i>) reveals that

12. AAS. Ibidem, pp. 1025 — 1120.

Document.	Art.	Text.
<i>Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World</i>		law which is fulfilled by love of God and neighbour. In fidelity to conscience (<i>fidelitate erga conscientiam</i>), Christians are joined with the rest of men in the search for truth, and for the genuine solution to the numerous problems which arise in the life of individuals and from social relationships. Hence the more that a correct conscience holds sway, (<i>conscientia recta prevalet</i>), the more persons and groups turn aside from blind choice and strive to be guided by objective norms of morality". "Conscience frequently errs (<i>evenit conscientiam errare</i>) from invincible ignorance without losing its dignity. The same cannot be said of a man who cares but little for truth and goodness, or of a conscience which by degrees grows practically sightless as a result of habitual sin" (<i>conscientia obcaecatur</i>).
	19.	"Those who willfully shut out God from their hearts and try to dodge religious questions are not following the dictates of their conscience" (<i>dictamen conscientiae ... non secuti</i>).
	26.	"... There is a growing awareness of the exalted dignity proper to the human person" (<i>conscientia ... eximiae dignitatis</i>). "... There must be made available to all men everything necessary for leading a life truly human, such as food ... the right to activity in accordance with the upright norm of one's conscience" (<i>juxta rectam ... conscientiae normam</i>).
	27.	"In our times a special obligation binds us to make ourselves the neighbours of absolutely every person ... who disturbs our conscience (<i>conscientiam nostram interpellat</i>) by recalling the voice of the Lord "As long as you did it for one of these least

Document.	Art.	Text.
<i>Pastoral Const. on the Church in the Modern World</i>		... you did it for me."
	31	"In order for individual men to discharge with greater exactness the obligations of their conscience (<i>ut ... conscientiae officium ... impleant</i>) they must be carefully educated to a high degree of culture".
	41.	"The Gospel has a sacred reverence for the dignity of conscience and its freedom of choice (<i>dignitatem conscientiae ejusque liberam decisionem</i>).
	43.	"...It is generally the function of their (laymen's) well-formed christian conscience (<i>ad...conscientiam...formatam spectat</i>) to see that the divine law is inscribed in the life of the earthly city".
	47.	"All these situations" — that is, different factors like polygamy, divorce, the worship of pleasure... which undermine the dignity of marriage — "have produced anxious consciences" (<i>conscientiae anguntur</i>).
	50.	In making their own judgment about the procreation and education of children, parents "must always be governed according to a conscience dutifully conformed to the divine law itself (<i>conscientia...legi divinae conformanda</i>).
	52.	In order to promote the good of family and marriage ... "the moral consciences of men (<i>recta ... conscientia moralis</i>), and the wisdom and experience of persons versed in the sacred sciences will have much to contribute".

Also those versed in social and psychological sciences can render very much to the good of "marriage and the family, along with the peace of conscience" (*pacique conscientiarum inservire*) with

Document.	Art.	Text.
<i>Pastoral Const. on the Church in the Modern World</i>		regard to problems relating to birth control.
	57.	Advanced scientific research, "a sense of international solidarity, an ever clearer awareness of the responsibility (<i>conscientia vividior responsibilitatis</i>) of experts to aid men" are among the values of today's scientific and technical progress.
	61.	"It remains each man's duty to preserve a view of the whole human person, a view in which the values of intellect, will, conscience (<i>conscientiae...valores</i>) and fraternity are preeminent".
	63.	"Our contemporaries are coming to feel these inequalities (in socio-economic fields) with an ever sharper awareness" (<i>conscientia...vividior...persentiunt</i>).
	68.	"Through...orderly participation, joined with an ongoing formation in economic and social matters, all will grow...in the awareness of their own function and responsibility (<i>muneris onerisque conscientia</i>)
	73.	"From a keener awareness of human dignity (<i>vividior humanae dignitatis conscientia</i>) there arises in many parts of the world a desire to establish a politico-judicial order in which personal rights can gain better protection".
		"In many consciences (<i>in multorum conscientia</i>) there is a growing intent that the rights of national minorities be honoured..."
	74.	Political authority "must dispose the energies of the whole citizenry towards the common good, not mechanically or despotically, but primarily as a moral force which depends on freedom and the conscientious discharge (<i>officii onerisque conscientia</i>)

Document.	Art.	Text.
Pastoral Const. on the Church in the Modern World		<p>tia nititur) of the burdens of any office".</p> <p>When public authority is exercised for common good and within the limits of morality "citizens are conscience-bound to obey" (<i>ex conscientia obligantur</i>).</p> <p>75. "If conscientious cooperation between citizens (<i>civium cooperatio, cum officii conscientia conjuncta</i>) is to achieve its happy effect....a positive system of law is required".</p> <p>The vocation of christians "requires that they give conspicuous example of devotion to the sense of duty (<i>officii conscientia</i>) and of service to the advancement of the common good".</p> <p>76. "...The faithful...make a clear distinction between what a christian conscience leads them (<i>christiana conscientia ducti</i>) to do in their own name as citizens.... and what they do in the name of the church".</p> <p>79. "Man's conscience itself (<i>ipsa generis humani conscientia</i>) gives ever more emphatic voice to these principles" (i.e. the all-embracing principles of natural law about war).</p> <p>"...It seems right that laws make human provisions for the case of those who for reasons of conscience (<i>ex motivo conscientiae</i>) refuse to bear arms".</p> <p>87. "Since the judgment of the parents suppose a rightly formed conscience (<i>conscientiam recte formatam</i>), it is highly important that every one be given the opportunity to practise upright and truly human responsibility" with regard to the "inalienable right to marry and beget children".</p>

Document.	Art.	Text.
Pastoral Const. on the Church in the Modern World.	90.	International associations "help to form an awareness of genuine universal solidarity and responsibility" (<i>conscientiam vere universalis solidaritatis</i>).

As the English citations show, the Latin term 'Conscientia' can mean 'awareness' or 'consciousness' in the psychological sense as well as 'conscience' in the moral sense. In fact, out of the 72 instances where the Latin 'Conscientia' occurs,

- 15 are translated into English by 'awareness', 'consciousness' or their equivalents. Of these 15, 14 are translated by 'Bewußtsein' into German¹³, one exception (GS 9) being the use of 'Überzeugung'.
- 3 are translated by 'conscientious' into English. These are rendered into German: one (OT 11) by 'um Gewissenswillen', the other two (GS 74, GS 75/i) by 'Bewußtsein ... einer Verantwortung' and 'Verantwortungsbewußtsein' respectively.
- 2 are translated into English by 'sense of duty'. These (DH 1, GS 75/ii) are translated into German by 'Bewußtsein der Pflicht', and 'pflichtbewußt'.
- 2 are translated into English by 'beliefs'. Both of them (both in DH 2) are translated into German by 'Gewissen'.
- 50 are translated into English by 'conscience'. Of these 49 are rendered into German by 'Gewissen', one exception (GS 73/ii) being the use of 'im Bewußtsein'.

This all goes to show that the term 'conscientia' as found in the council documents has different shades of meaning in different contexts.

13. The German version is taken from LThK (Das Zweite Vatikanische Konzil), 3 vols. Freiburg 1966 - 1968. The English version, as already mentioned, is from W. Abbot (Edit.), The Documents of Vat. II., London/Dublin 1966.

B. Analysis of the Concept of Conscience in the Documents of the Council

As the citations from the council documents do show, only article 16 of the 'Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World' (*Gaudium et Spes*) formally treats about conscience. Other texts mostly invoke or allude to conscience in the context of explaining or vindicating certain teachings, without making conscience itself the subject of discussion. Therefore, our study also consists primarily in analysing the article 16 of *Gaudium et Spes*. We shall also give a systematic presentation of the concept of conscience contained in the other council texts.

1. The 'Article on Conscience' in the Pastoral Constitution

Ever since the need of a council document dealing with 'the Church and the World' was decisively felt by the Fathers in December 1962 until the promulgation of such a document on 7th December 1965, its text underwent several revisions by different conciliar commissions.¹⁴ Together with these revisions, the article dealing with conscience also underwent changes. Out of the above said several revisions or revised texts, the last four (the fourth one is the final, promulgated text) may be considered specially important in as far as they came for debate by the Council Fathers. In order to see the final text against its 'evolutionary history', we shall first briefly review its 'evolution' through the *three previous texts*. Our review here is restricted to the article concerning conscience, except for certain general remarks about the whole constitution.

a) The Three Previous Texts

In the *first text* (*T*¹) of the constitution, which began with the Latin words 'Gaudium et Luctus', consisting of a preface (art. 1 – 4), four chap-

14 Cfr., C. Moeller, "History of the Constitution" in H. Vorgrimler (Ed.), *Commentary on the Documents of Vatican II*, London / New York 1969, vol. 5, 10 ff.

ters (art. 5 – 25), a conclusion, and five appendices, there was only a reference to conscience in the first appendix, which was entitled "De Persona Humana in Societate". No. 3 of this appendix, entitled "De vocatione personali et communitaria hominis" opens as follows: "Quid est homo lumine Christi consideratus? Corpore positi in mundo, singuli homines sunt personae ornatæ intellectu, conscientia et libertate".¹⁵ Though no elaborate doctrine on conscience is given here, it is seen, together with intellect and freedom, as a constitutive element of the human personality. In this sense the text contains the nucleus of its own evolution, evidenced in the subsequent texts.¹⁶

*T*¹ of the Constitution was debated by the Fathers from 20th October to 10th November 1964. It was criticized on several points. Some found the text too admonitory, while others wanted more concern for and realistic treatment of such contemporary problems as atheism, marriage and family life, the role of culture, war and peace, etc. These criticisms called for a thorough revision of the text. Some Fathers, however, expressed the opinion that the appendices "contained more precise and better digested materials than the text of the 'conciliar constitution' ". Consequently, the material of the appendices (to which the 'treatment of conscience' had also been relegated) was integrated into the body of the constitution in the revised text.¹⁷

In the *second text* (*T*²), which began with the Latin words 'Gaudium et Spes' (which remained so in the subsequent texts), comprising a preface, introduction, two main parts, and a conclusion, running into 106 articles in all, one article (art. 14) was devoted to conscience, entitled "De Dignitate Conscientiae". This article was part of the first chapter, which bore the title "De Humanae Personae Vocatione".¹⁸

15. Acta Synodalia Sacrosancti Concilii Oecumenici Vaticani II, Vol. III, Pars V, Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis 1975, p. 148.

16. Cfr. D. Capone, "Antropologia, Coscienza e Personalità", in *Studia Moralia*, vol. IV (Commentaria in constitutionem pastoraalem Gaudium et Spes concilii vaticani II), Roma 1966, p. 94.

For a parallel presentation of the article on conscience, together with the immediately preceding and following articles, in each of the three subsequent texts (*T*¹, *T*², *T*³), see D. Capone, *ibidem*, pp. 94 – 100.

17. C. Moeller, "History of the Constitution", pp. 41 – 44.

18. *Constitutio Pastoralis De Ecclesia in Mundo Hujus Temporis*, Typis Poly. Vat. 1965, pp. 13 – 14.

The following may be indicated as the salient features of the concept of conscience contained in this article.

i) Conscience is seen as based on man's ontological consciousness, by which he realizes his transcendence over the material and social order, and in which he encounters God.

ii) In conscience man finds a law that is not self given — a law written in his heart — which he should obey, and according to which he will be judged.

iii) This law is the guide for Christians and others in their common endeavour to find solutions for so many moral problems today.

iv) However, this solution should conform to the norms and demands of true morality, so that men may progress in the practice of virtue.¹⁹

T² of the Constitution was debated by the Fathers from 21 September to 8 October 1965. It was criticized mainly for being too optimistic, for inadequate treatment of the reality of sin, of the theology of the cross, and of eschatology. However, it was accepted as a basic text, which had to be improved upon.²⁰ The revision, which was supposed to soften the excessive optimism, and take account of the reality of sin, etc., brought about changes also in the article concerning conscience.

In the *third text* (T³), comprising a preface, an introduction, 2 main parts and a conclusion, with a total of 93 articles, one article (this time art. 16) of the first chapter (which was entitled "De Humanae Personae Dignitate") was devoted to conscience. This article on conscience bore the title "De Dignitate Conscientiae Moralis"²¹. The features of conscience contained in this article

19. Ibidem, pp. 14 — 15.

In T², says Capone, conscience was rightly given an ontologico-religious dimension. In this context, conformity to the law and to the demands of true morality is seen as a dynamic task to be achieved in freedom (cfr. Capone, "Antropologia, Coscienza...", pp. 100 — 101).

20. C. Moeller, "History of the Constitution", pp. 59 — 60.

21. The 'Relator' made it clear that the word 'moralis' had been added to the title of the article 'to avoid confusion' (Schema Constitutionis Pastoralis De Ecclesia in Mundo Huius Temporis, Textus Recognitus et Relationes, Pars I, Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1965, p. 29).

The confusion to be avoided, notes Capone, appears to have been a confusion between moral conscience and ontological conscience understood as psychological consciousness: "Viene allora da pensare che la confusione del T² da evitare nel T³ era la

may be paraphrased as follows:²²

i) In conscience man finds a law²³, which is not self-given. Man is bound to obey this law, which calls him to do good and avoid evil. To obey this law — a law written by God in man's heart — is his dignity, and accordingly he will be judged.

ii) In the light of this law, which is fulfilled in the love of God and neighbour Christians are joined with others in the search for solution of moral problems.

iii) This solution should conform to the objective norms of morality, which are to be diligently sought for.

iv) Finally, conscience can err owing to ignorance of law; it can also be gradually blinded by the habit of sin.

T³ of the constitution was presented to the fathers on 12 — 13 November 1965, and was voted upon on 15 — 17 November. There were about 20,000 modi which were to be checked and integrated into the text within a short period of less than a month. The consequent modification brought about certain changes in the text, including the article on conscience,²⁴ thus giving

confusione tra la coscienza morale e coscienza ontologica intesa piuttosto come coscienza psicologica, ed intendendo come coscienza morale la coscienza della legge" (Capone, "Antropologia...", p. 103).

22. The original Latin version may be found in Schema Constitutionis Pastoralis De Ecclesia in Mundo Huius Temporis, Textus Rec. et Relationes, Pars I, pp. 21 — 22.

23. Thus T³ left out the whole paragraph (present in T²) speaking about man's ontologico-religious consciousness and showing it as the foundation of moral conscience. Though its material was integrated into art. 14 of T³ (dealing with 'de constitutione hominis'), its removal from the article dealing with conscience (i.e. art. 16) deprived conscience of its ontological dimension and dynamism, thus reducing it to a place of law. Commenting on this D. Capone says: "...è stato portato via tutto il capoverso che parlava tanto bene della coscienza ontologica e della opzione fondamentale dell'uomo nel suo incontro con Dio." And further, "...eliminato il capoverso sulla coscienza ontologica che non è lo stesso che la coscienza psicologica, emerge nel T³ come soggetto di tutto il n. 16 la legge naturale.... Sembra che così si celebri non la "dignità della coscienza morale", ma la dignità della legge e la debolezza della coscienza morale" (Capone, Antropologia, Coscienza..." pp. 103 — 104).

24. As regards the article on conscience, there came a 'modus', a rather long one, which occasioned some important changes in this article. As the 'Relator' made it clear, it is a modus, whose essential elements were accepted and integrated into the final text.

rise to the fourth text, which was finally voted upon and promulgated on the 7th of December 1965²⁵.

b) The Dignity of the Moral Conscience according to Art. 16 of GS

As we have already noted, this is the only text where the Council directly treats about conscience, and hence the most important text regarding the Council's teaching on conscience. In order to see the text in its context we shall begin with a general outline of the constitution.

Besides a preface, introduction (both together constitute the first 10 articles), and a conclusion (art. 91 – 93), *Gaudium et Spes* has two main parts. The first part (art. 11 – 45) deals with "The Church and Man's Calling", and the second part (art. 46 – 90) with "Some Problems of Special Urgency".

The first part has the following four chapters: (i) The Dignity of the Human Person (art. 12 – 22), (ii) The Community of Mankind (art. 23 – 32), (iii) Man's Activity throughout the World (art. 33 – 39), and (iv) The Role of

We give this 'modus' in its entirety below:

"In imo conscientiae homo detegit legem, quam ipse sibi non dat, sed cui subditum esse sentit, et cujus vox, semper ad bonum amandum et faciendum, malum autem vitandum eum advocat. Haec vox ubi oportet auribus cordis clare sonat: fac hoc, illud evita. Nam homo legem cordi suo inscriptam habet, cui parere ipsa sua dignitas est. Conscientia est "nucleus secretissimus" atque "sacrum hominis", in quo solus est cum Deo, cujus vox sonat in intimo ejus" (Pius XII, AAS 44, 271). Conscientia hominem simul ad suam ipsius integritatem et ad unionem cum Deo et proximo invitat et impellit. Conscientiae modo mirabili illa lex innotescit, atque in Dei et proximi dilectione adimpletur (Gal. 5, 14). Fidelitate erga conscientiam christiani ceterique homines conjunguntur ad veritatem inquirendam et tot problemata moralia, quae tam in vita singulorum quam in sociali consortione exsurgunt, in veritate solvenda. Quo magis ergo conscientia recta praevalet, eo magis personae et coetus a caeco arbitrio recedunt et normis objectivis moralitatis conformari satagunt. Non raro tamen evenit ex ignorantia invincibili conscientiam errare, quin exinde suam dignitatem amittat. Quod autem dici nequit cum homo de vero ac bono inquirendo parum curat, et conscientia ex peccato consuetudine paulatim obcaecatur et misere tabescit in malo" (Schema Constitutionis Pastoralis De Ecclesia in Mundo Hujus Temporis: Textus et Correctiones Admissae Necnon Expensio Modorum Partis Primae, Typis Polygl. Vaticanis 1965, pp. 164 – 165).

25. Cfr. C. Moeller, "History of the Constitution", pp. 67 – 71.

the Church in the Modern World (art. 40 – 45).

And, the first chapter of the first part, in which *conscience* is treated, has the following article-headings:

- Art. 12 Man as made in God's image.
- Art. 13 Sin.
- Art. 14 The make-up of man.
- Art. 15 The dignity of the mind; truth; wisdom.
- Art. 16 The dignity of the moral conscience.
- Art. 17 The excellence of liberty.
- Art. 18 The mystery of death.
- Art. 19 The forms and roots of atheism.
- Art. 20 Systematic atheism.
- Art. 21 The church's attitude towards atheism.
- Art. 22 Christ as the new man.

As it is clear from the above outline, it is while dealing with the dignity of the human person²⁶ that the constitution speaks about conscience.

Despite man's limitations and sinful inclinations²⁷, his inviolable dignity is to be acknowledged, defended and promoted, says the council.²⁸

This dignity is founded on man's being God's image.²⁹

The divine image in man has several aspects or dimensions to it. Thus, man, who is the master of all earthly creatures, is endowed with reason, which is capable of penetrating all things and coming to acknowledge his creator.³⁰ He possesses freedom, which enables him for self-determination and self-actualization.³¹ Man is also essentially a social being, tending to interpersonal com-

26. 'The dignity of the human person' is a theme which repeatedly occurs in the council documents (cfr. GS 21, 26, 31, 40; DH 1, 2; GE 1, etc.). It is, in fact, as the pastoral constitution shows, a key concept of the conciliar theology. (Cfr. also, S. O'Riordan, "The Second Vatican Council's Psychology of Personal and Social life", *Studia Moralia*, Vol. IV, Rome 1966, p. 177 ff.)

27. GS 10, 13.

28. GS 3, 11, 12.

29. GS 12.

30. GS 12, 14.

31. GS 17.

munion from the depth of his being.³² Through his interiority man realizes his transcendence over material and social order, and becomes aware of his own dignity.³³

The divine image in man is permeated and perfected by the life of grace restored to man by Christ, through which he is called to communion with the Triune God. This call to communion with God, says the council, is the noblest reason for the dignity of man.³⁴

In this context, conscience is seen as a 'component' of the human person and his dignity. An analysis of art. 16 yields the following features.

Conscience: The Core of Man and the Centre of Encounter with God

In what appears to be a descriptive definition,³⁵ the text defines conscience as '*man's most secret core and sanctuary*', where he is alone with God, whose voice echoes in his depths.³⁶ Thus, the text shows conscience as

32. GS 12.

33. GS 14.

34. GS 22.

35. The council does not intend to give any dogmatic definition, but gives only a "general outline of a christian doctrine of conscience". Therefore, we say a 'descriptive definition'. (Cfr. also, J. Ratzinger, "Part I", chapter I, Commentary on the Documents of Vat. II, Vol.V, p. 134).

36. "Conscientia est nucleus secretissimus atque sacrarium hominis, in quo solus est cum Deo, cujus vox resonat in intimo ejus" (GS 16).

This verse, which was added to the text in its final modification, is, in fact, taken from Pius XII's radio message of 23 March 1952, in which the Pontiff emphasized the importance of conscience formation. The relevant part of the original text reads: "La coscienza è come il nucleo più intimo e segreto dell'uomo. Là egli rifugia con le sue facoltà spirituali in assoluta solitudine: solo con se stesso, o meglio, solo con Dio — della cui voce la coscienza risuona — e con se stesso. Là egli si determina per il bene o per il male; là egli sceglie fra la strada della vittoria e quella della disfatta. Quando anche volesse, l'uomo non riuscirebbe mai a togliersela di dosso; con essa, o che approvi o che condanni, percorrerà tutto il cammino della vita, ed egualmente con essa, testimone veritiero ed incorruttibile, si presenterà al giudizio di Dio. La coscienza è quindi, per dirlo con una immagine tanto antica quanto degna, un ἄδυτον, un santuario, sulla cui soglia tutti debbono arrestarsi; anche, se si tratta di un fanciullo, il padre e la madre." ["Nuntius Radiophonicus" (de conscientia christiana in juvenibus recte efformanda), AAS, 1942, (44), p. 271].

that centre of man where he encounters God and engages in personal dialogue with him, that is, as the personal centre of communion with God, which is constitutive of the human person.³⁷

Conscience: The 'Revealer' of the Law of Love.

In conscience man finds a law — a law written by God in man's heart — which always calls him to love and do good, and to avoid evil; when necessary it speaks specifically: do this, shun that.³⁸ Thus, in conscience, where man encounters God, he finds also a law. It is written in his heart, in the depth of his being. It is the law of love — the law which always calls man to love and do good, and avoid evil. Commenting on this CAPONE says that the verse "bonum (est) amandum et faciendum" indicates that all our actions should flow from and be inspired by love.³⁹ Basing on this law of love, conscience admonishes one in concrete situations what to do and what to avoid. To obey this law is man's dignity because it is in accordance with his nature and call, and it will be the criterion of his judgment.

That this law is the law of love is confirmed by a subsequent verse that says: "In a wonderful manner conscience reveals that law which is fulfilled by the love of God and neighbour".⁴⁰ Hence, the fundamental law which re-

37. Thus, through the insertion of the above verse the final text on conscience regained an ontologico-personal dimension, which was present in T², but lost in T³ (Capone, "Antropologia ...", p. 108).

38. "In imo conscientiae legem homo detegit, quam ipse sibi non dat, sed cui oboedire debet, et cujus vox semper ad bonum amandum et faciendum ac malum vitandum eum advocans, ubi oportet, auribus cordis sonat: fac hoc, illud evita. Nam homo legem in corde suo a Deo inscriptam habet, cui parere ipsa dignitas ejus est et secundum quam ipse judicabitur" (GS 16).

39. In T³ there was only "bonum faciendum et malum vitandum ...". By adding "bonum (est) amandum et faciendum ..." T⁴ adds a personalistic dimension to this supreme principle of moral life (Capone, "Antropologia ...", p. 107).

40. "Conscientiae modo mirabili illa lex innotescit, quae in Dei et proximi dilectione adimpletur" (GS 16).

It may be noted that T³ also spoke of a law "quae in dilectione Dei et proximi adimpletur". But there, as we saw, the law of conscience was the natural law. In that perspective, says Capone, the word 'adimpletur' meant only a 'compliment', that is, the law of love was the compliment or culmination of the natural law, which reveals itself in

veals itself in conscience or *the fundamental law of conscience* is that law which consists in the *love of God and of neighbour*. And all other precepts of conscience are applications and concretizations of this fundamental law.⁴¹

Conscience: The Dynamic Guide for the Solution of Moral Problems

After speaking about conscience as the personal centre and indicating that its law is the law of love, the text goes on to speak about the role of conscience in meeting actual problems. "In fidelity to conscience Christians are joined with the rest of men in search for truth, and for the genuine solution to the numerous problems which arise in the life of individuals and from social relationships".⁴²

Christians should join with all others in searching for the truth and for the solution of actual problems. What should unite and guide them in this common endeavour is their fidelity to conscience, where man encounters God, and which invites man to the love of God and neighbour, that is, a conscience that is open to God and man.

Evidently, in the search for true solution to problems there is no place for arbitrariness. "Hence the more that a correct conscience holds sway, the more persons and groups turn aside from blind choice and strive to be guided by objective norms of morality".⁴³

conscience. But T⁴ explicitly says that conscience wonderfully discovers that law "quae in Dei et proximi dilectione adimpletur". In this new perspective, the word 'adimpletur' means 'consists in', that is, the law of conscience consists in the law of love. Of course, T⁴ does not exclude natural law. In its place it, however, mentions the 'Law of all laws', the law of love of God and neighbour (Capone, "Antropologia, ...", p. 108).

41. If the above reading of the text is correct (and it appears to be correct according to the 'modus' from which it originated, see above p. 362) 'la legge fondamentale della coscienza, che emerge in modo meraviglioso, è la legge dell'amore di Dio e del prossimo. Le altre leggi emergono nella coscienza e dicono che cosa bisogna fare, ma prima del fare sta la legge dell'amare. È il grande principio della interpersonalità del nostro tu a tu con Dio per la forza dell'essere partecipato, e del nostro tu a tu col prossimo per la forza dell'essere partecipato' (Capone, "Antropologia, ..." p. 109).

42. "Fidelitate erga conscientiam christiani cum ceteris hominibus conjunguntur ad veritatem inquirendam et tot problemata moralia, quae tam in vita singulorum quam in sociali consortione exurgunt, in veritate solvenda" (GS 16).

43. Quo magis ergo conscientia recta prevalet, eo magis personae et coetus a caeco arbitrio recedunt, et normis objectivis moralitatis conformari satagunt" (GS 16).

What should hold sway is a correct conscience. But 'correct conscience' is not a pre-given, static norm, but 'something' dynamic that can be realized more and more and is to be strived after. What therefore the correctness of conscience consists in is the strive for conformity to the objective norms of morality. What constitutes and defines the rectitude of conscience here is the strive or dynamic orientation towards objective truth.⁴⁴ Evidently, this strive is not a simple wish or a vague attitude, but a concrete, efficacious orientation — a personal commitment.⁴⁵

Conscience and Error

Conscience should orient itself towards truth; but it can and in fact does err. "Conscience frequently errs from invincible ignorance without losing its dignity. The same cannot be said of a man who cares but little for truth and goodness, or of a conscience which by degrees grows practically sightless as a result of habitual sin".⁴⁶

Because of human limitation conscience can err out of invincible ignorance. Here, however, conscience does not lose its dignity, because, in this case it is still subjectively oriented and committed to truth and goodness.

What deprives conscience of its dignity is man's unconcern and negligence with regard to truth and goodness, and allowing oneself to be blinded by habitual sin. Such unconcern, negligence and habitual sin evidently go against man's orientation and commitment to God and fellowmen, that is, they go against the dignity and values of the human person.⁴⁷ Hence the factors that undermine the dignity of conscience are the same as those which undermine the dignity and values of the human person.

44. "Nel T⁴ questo sforzo di tendenza alla verità oggettiva già costituisce e definisce la rettitudine di coscienza. Non è l'effettivo raggiungimento della verità oggettiva che costituisce la coscienza retta, ma è la coscienza retta che fa crescere lo sforzo verso la verità oggettiva; è dunque un valore della persona che caratterizza la coscienza e le rende più facile la conoscenza della natura con le sue leggi" (Capone, "Antropologia, ...", p. 111).

45. Cfr. Ibidem.

46. "Non raro tamen evenit ex ignorantia invincibili conscientiam errare, quin inde suam dignitatem amittat. Quod autem dici nequit cum homo de vero ac bono parum curat, et conscientia ex peccati consuetudine paulatim fere obcaecatur". (GS 16).

47. (see p. 363).

* * *

Summarizing our analysis of the concept of conscience contained in GS art. 16, we can say:-

◇ Conscience is a 'component' of the human person, who possesses an inviolable dignity and value, founded on his being God's image.

◇ Conscience is the personal centre where man encounters God and enters into personal communion with him.

◇ Conscience reveals to man the basic law of his conduct — to love and do good, and avoid evil (expressed in the law of love of God and neighbour) — which should inspire and guide all his actions. It also guides him in specific situations. Thus conscience is man's 'moral faculty'.

◇ Therefore, it is fidelity to conscience, which should guide all men in their search for truth and for the solution of moral problems.

This fidelity implies a sincere strive towards conformity to the objective norms of morality, which are expressions of the fundamental law of love.

◇ Conscience has an inviolable dignity (founded on the dignity of the human person) which is not lost as far as the person is oriented and committed to what is true and good. However, conscience is deprived of its dignity through unconcern and negligence for true human values.

2. Conscience in the Other Texts of the Council

As we already saw, references and allusions to conscience occur in the other council texts (i.e. all texts referring to conscience, except GS 16) in a variety of contexts, dealing with such diverse topics as social communication media, ecumenism, christian education, religious liberty, family and marriage, social justice, etc. Therefore, it is practically impossible to make any rigid classification of all these texts. However, for the purpose of our study, it seems to us that the texts can be brought under a few general headings, which will help us make a systematic presentation of them. Thus, the various texts may be brought under the following three headings: *The dignity and freedom of conscience, the function and obligation of conscience, and the formation of conscience.*

a) The Dignity and Freedom of Conscience

These two aspects — *dignity* and *freedom* — of conscience recur in various texts. The best guardian and guarantee of the dignity and freedom of man, says the council, is the Gospel of Christ, entrusted to the Church. And this "Gospel has a sacred reverence for the dignity of conscience and its freedom of choice"⁴⁸. The basis of this dignity and freedom is again the divine image in man, for "this gospel announces and proclaims the freedom of the sons of God", who are created to God's image and are ransomed from sin.⁴⁹

The dignity and freedom of conscience is not only to be theoretically proclaimed, but also to be realized in concrete social life. This realization is necessary for a truly human life just as the satisfaction of basic biological and social needs. Hence the council says "... there must be made available to all men everything necessary for leading a life truly human, such as food, clothing ..., the right to employment ... and to activity in accordance with the upright norms of one's conscience".⁵⁰

Then the council mentions a few specific 'areas' where this freedom and dignity is to be emphasized.

An area where this freedom is to be respected and guaranteed is that of religious belief and practice. "All men are to be immune from coercion on the part of individuals or social groups and of any human power in such wise that in matters religious no one is to be forced to act in a manner contrary to his beliefs. Nor is anyone to be restrained from acting in accordance with his own beliefs."⁵¹

The term *conscientia* used in the latin text here means ones religious beliefs and convictions according to which one feels obliged to act in matters re-

48. GS 41

49. GS 41.

50. GS 26; see also DH 13.

51. *Libertas religiosa in eo consistit, "quod omnes homines debent immunes esse a coercitione ex parte sive singulorum sive coetuum socialium et cujusvis potestatis humanae, et ita quidem ut in re religiosa neque aliquis cogatur ad agendum contra suam conscientiam neque impediatur, quominus juxta suam conscientiam agat privatim et publice, vel solus vel aliis consociatus, intra debitos limites"* (DH 2).

ligious.⁵² Such a use of the term 'conscience' brings into focus certain aspects of conscience already implied in art. 16 GS: conscience as the personal centre of dialogue and communion with God, one's obligation to act according to one's personal beliefs and convictions in this divino-human encounter, and the freedom to act in accordance with such beliefs and convictions.

This religious liberty is founded on the dignity of the human person who, endowed with reason and freedom, bears personal responsibility for searching for and adhering to truth, especially in religious matters.⁵³

Another 'area' where the council speaks about the freedom of conscience is that of education. Thus, the council reminds public authority of justly distributing public funds so that parents remain free to follow the dictates of their conscience in selecting schools for their children, that is, they would not be indirectly forced, for financial considerations, to act against their conscience in the education of their children.⁵⁴

Then the council states that the exercise of the church's right to run schools of every kind and level "makes a supreme contribution to freedom of conscience".⁵⁵ Thus the council affirms that church schools should and would respect the freedom of conscience of all those concerned.

The concern for the dignity and freedom of conscience is well borne out by what the council says about the right of children and young people in this matter. "This holy synod likewise affirms that children and young people

52. Cfr. P. Pavan, "Declaration on Religious Freedom", in H. Vorgrimler (Ed.), *Commentary on the Documents of Vat. II*, Vol. IV, p. 66.

53. DH 2. Hence religious liberty is not founded simply on the freedom of conscience which, the Fathers thought, might lead to pure subjectivism and disputations regarding individual's 'good faith' in religious matters (Cfr. also, R. Regan, "Conscience in the Documents of Vat. II", in W. Bier (Ed.), *Conscience: Its Freedom and Limitations*, New York 1971, p. 30).

However, in another place the council mentions the freedom of conscience as an argument for religious freedom: "...Man perceives and acknowledges the imperatives of the divine law through the mediation of conscience. In all his activity man is bound to follow his conscience faithfully, in order that he may come to God, for whom he was created. It follows that he is not to be forced to act in a manner contrary to his conscience. Nor, on the other hand, is he to be restrained from acting in accordance with his conscience, especially in matters religious". DH 3).

54. GE 6.

55. GE 8.

have a right to be encouraged to weigh moral values with an upright conscience and to embrace them by personal choice, and to know and love God more adequately".⁵⁶ The recognition and development of the personal dignity of children and young people requires that they should not be manipulated. On the contrary, personal moral evaluation and choice should be fostered.

Respect for the dignity and freedom of conscience is mentioned also in the following instances:

In the exercise of their office, religious superiors are reminded of the dignity and development of the personality of their subjects, and are advised to leave them appropriately free with regard to the sacrament of penance and direction of conscience.⁵⁷ Similarly, in the exercise of seminary discipline, says the council, internal conviction or conscientious obedience (*propter conscientiam*) to rules should be fostered.⁵⁸

Finally, attention is drawn to the right of conscientious objectors. "...It seems right that laws make humane provisions for the case of those who for reasons of conscience refuse to bear arms".⁵⁹ Irrespective of the correctness of the claims of such objectors, the council indicates the individual's right to follow his conscience, and hence appeals to governments "for tolerance of individuals caught up in conflict between the demands of their conscience on moral integrity and the coercive commands of government".⁶⁰

b) The Function and Obligation of Conscience

The *function* and *obligation* of conscience is alluded to in several texts. "Those also can attain to everlasting salvation who through no fault of

56. GE 1.

57. PC 14.

58. OT 11.

59. GS 79.

Evidently, in the case of conscientious objectors the refusal to bear arms is supposed to be based on serious moral convictions (e.g. immorality of any kind of violence) and not on egoistic motives like comfortable life, security, etc. (Cfr. Vorgrimler (Ed.), *Commentary of the Documents of Vat. II*, Vol. V, p. 353).

60. Regan, "Conscience in the Documents of Vatican II", p. 35.

their own do not know the gospel of Christ or His Church, yet sincerely seek God and, moved by grace, strive by their deeds to do His will as it is known to them through the dictates of conscience".⁶¹ And, "man perceives and acknowledges the imperatives of the divine law through the mediation of conscience".⁶²

It is thus the function of conscience to make the imperatives of the divine law known to man. This recalls what was said in GS art. 16, that is, conscience reveals to man the fundamental law written by God in his heart.⁶³ It is in and through conscience that man perceives the various precepts or requirements of this fundamental law. Because conscience is the 'perceiver' of the law, there follows man's inevitable duty to obey his conscience.

"In all his activity a man is bound to follow his conscience faithfully..."⁶⁴ And again, "They (the apostles) made it plain that 'every one of us will render an account of himself to God' (Rom. 14 - 12), and for that reason is bound to obey his conscience".⁶⁵ Hence, conscience is the subjective source of moral obligation for the individual.⁶⁶

Then the council specifically mentions certain duties of the christian conscience.

In harmonizing their work as members of the church and of the society, the faithful should be guided by a christian conscience.⁶⁷ Nay more, it is said that the function of laymen's well-formed christian conscience is to inscribe the divine law into the life of the earthly city,⁶⁸ that is, the laity has the obligation of bearing witness to God's law in the concrete situations of their life and work. The guiding role of the christian conscience is called for also in ecumenical enterprises⁶⁹, and in parents' judgment about the procreation and education of children.⁷⁰

61. LG 16.

62. DH 3.

63. (see p. 363).

64. DH 3.

65. DH 11.

66. (see p. 364).

67. LG 36; AA 5; GS 76.

68. GS 43.

69. UR 4.

70. GS 50.

c) The Formation of Conscience

The council is keenly aware of the great role of education in the harmonious development of the physical, intellectual, and moral endowments of the human person. The dignity of the human person demands such an education.⁷¹ And the importance of conscience formation is hinted at on several occasions, where the council speaks about 'upright conscience', 'formation of christian conscience', 'norms of upright conscience', and the like.⁷²

In certain places, however, the council mentions more concretely some factors relating to moral development and conscience formation. Thus, the council indicates the importance of taking sufficient account of the findings of behavioural sciences (e.g. psychology and sociology) in educating the faithful towards a mature practice of their faith and morality.⁷³

Speaking about the growth of the sense of responsibility and social participation the council says:

"A man can scarcely arrive at the needed sense of responsibility unless his living conditions allow him to become conscious of his dignity, and to rise to his destiny by spending himself for God and for others. But human freedom is often crippled when man falls into extreme poverty, just as it withers when he indulges in too many of life's comforts and imprisons himself in a kind of splendid isolation. Freedom acquires new strength, by contrast, when a man consents to the unavoidable requirements of social life, takes on the manifold demands of human partnership, and commits himself to the service of the human community".⁷⁴

This therefore indicates that a proper self-respect, social interaction and cultural education is important for the growth of a mature moral sense and for the conscientious fulfilment of one's obligations. It also indicates that non-satisfaction of man's basic needs can adversely affect his moral growth and choice. Further, the council emphasizes the key role of a loving family atmosphere in the development of an integral view of the human person, which includes also the values of conscience.⁷⁵

71. GE 1.

72. Cfr. IM 5, 9; AA 20; DH 3, 14; GS 26, 43, 87.

73. GS 62.

74. GS 31.

75. GS 61.

Then, speaking specifically about the formation of the christian's conscience, the council reminds him of the need to be guided by the teaching of the church.⁷⁶

Finally, as already mentioned in GS art. 16, the formation of conscience is a continuous process. It is a sincere and continuous attempt to find what is true and good in accordance with the dignity and values of the human person, and to realize this more and more in one's life⁷⁷.

C. Critical Synthesis of the Concept of Conscience in the Council Documents

Having analysed the concept of conscience in the documents of the council, here we shall attempt at a critical synthesis of the same.

1. The Nature and Function of Conscience

As our discussion in the preceding section reveals, the meaning of the term 'Conscience' as found in the different texts of the council is not identical. In different usages it has different (though closely related) meanings or connotations. Thus, it signifies 'personal centre of communion with God', 'revealer of God's law', 'seeker of God's law', 'beliefs and convictions', 'source of moral obligation', 'practical guide for conduct', etc.⁷⁸ The texts themselves do not explicitate these different meanings in their contexts. Hence, the meaning of the term is not clearly pinned down.

Therefore, we can say that the reality of conscience, as found in the documents of the council, has different dimensions. From our fore-going analysis, the following dimensions suggest themselves: a) *the ontologico-religious dimension*, b) *the moral dimension*, which may be distinguished into *fundamental* moral dimension, and *expressive* moral dimension.

76. DH 14.

77. DH 3., (see p. 365).

78. (see p. 369 ff.)

a) The Ontologico-Religious Dimension

Man, as a creature, has an ontological dependence on and relationship with God. He experiences this dependence and relationship in the depth of his being, called conscience.⁷⁹ Hence, conscience is the 'centre' of the human person,⁸⁰ where he encounters God and realizes his transcendental relation to Him. Thus, fundamentally conscience is an ontologico-religious reality.⁸¹ Therefore, it may not be reduced to the function of a single faculty — e.g. intellect or will — of man, but is to be understood as the 'centre' of the whole human person, who is the image of God. B. HÄRING sees conscience as founded in the dynamic unity of the intellect and the will in the depth of the soul, or better, in the divine image that is operative in this dynamic union.⁸² Through this dynamic interaction of the intellect (which is oriented to know what is true and good) and the will (which is oriented to the love of what is good) man, in the depth of his being, is oriented towards loving the known good.

b) The Moral Dimension

This flows from and is a consequence of the ontological dimension. We may, however, distinguish here a 'fundamental' and an 'expressive' dimension.

79. This view of conscience is evidently very much influenced by modern thought, especially the personalistic and holistic trends of thinking (Cfr. K. Golser, *Gewissen und Objektive Sittenordnung* (Zum Begriff des Gewissens in der neueren katholischen Moraltheologie), Wien 1975, pp. 112 — 122, 130).

80. J. Fuchs, "Berufung und Hoffnung", in Groner (Ed.), *Die Kirche im Wandel der Zeit*, Köln 1971, p. 281.

81. So says B. Häring: "Aber je tiefer die sittliche Schicht im Gewissen erschlossen ist, um so notwendiger kommt schließlich auch der religiöse Grund zum Klingen. Das Gewissen ist, von seiner Seinswurzel gesehen, ein religiöses Phänomen, seine letzte Erklärung liegt in der Gottebenbildlichkeit des Menschen". (B. Häring, "Gewissen — Stimme Gottes oder Produkt der Umgebung", in Schmaus M., and Läßle A. (Eds), *Wahrheit und Zeugnis*, Düsseldorf 1964, p. 382).

82. Häring, *Ibidem*, p. 383.

The Fundamental Moral Dimension

From man's dependence on and relationship with God there comes his call and obligation to live according to God's will, to follow God's law — the law written by God in man's heart, that is, a law that is at the same time transcendental (because it is God-given) and immanent (it is inscribed in man's being). It is in and through conscience that man perceives this fundamental law of human conduct; it is the law of conscience. This law tells man to love and do good, and avoid evil. Thus, conscience is man's basic 'moral faculty'. It further tells him in what this 'good' consists.⁸³ in the love of God and of neighbour.⁸⁴ Hence, in all his activity man must be guided by this law.

The Expressive Moral Dimension

Finally, conscience, guided by the fundamental law, indicates what one should and should not do in concrete situations. It is the expression and application of the fundamental law to actual situations. And man has the right and duty to follow these dictates. It is in this sense — as the subjective principle and norm of moral conduct — that conscience is usually understood. It is in this sense that the term is often found in the council texts, when they speak about conscience as the 'guide for one's behaviour', 'norms of conscience', etc.

* * *

Subsuming these three dimensions, we may describe conscience as the personal centre of man, which calls and urges him to communion with God and

83. Cfr. J. Fuchs, "Berufung und Hoffnung", p. 281.

84. In this context it should be remarked that the council texts — especially art. 16 of GS — do not sufficiently emphasize the social nature and social awareness of man in his basic experience of the fundamental law of conscience. Man experiences not only the relationship and dependence on God, but also his interrelationship and interdependence on his fellowmen, and this latter experience is an essential substratum of man's experience and awareness of the fundamental law. (Cfr. J. Rudin, "A Catholic View of Conscience", in C.E. Nelson (Ed.), *Conscience (theological and psychological perspectives)* New York 1973, p. 99). Though the council speaks about the 'essentially social nature' of man in several other places, the integration of this idea into the text on conscience would have made it richer and more appealing.

fellowmen. Conscience gives this invitation and urge through its fundamental law: the Law of Love. And it guides and obliges one in the light of the norms and requirements of this basic law.

2. Formation of Conscience

Formation of conscience is essential for the knowledge and acquisition of the genuine requirements of the basic law of conscience, that is, for the acquisition of values corresponding to this law. Without such formation the actual development and function of conscience will be seriously thwarted. It is in this sphere that one's education, social experience, cultural milieu, etc., as the council indicates, come to play their role. However, except for mentioning the importance of conscience formation and for referring to certain factors related to this formation⁸⁵ the council does not treat this aspect of the phenomenon of conscience.

3. The Dignity and Value of Conscience

The dignity and value of conscience is based on its being the personal centre of man, who is the image of God. It is thus founded on the dignity and value of the human person, considered in his relationship to God and fellowmen. Conscience therefore impels man to realize those values which are good for the human person and the community of persons.

While conscience has the duty to search for and realize these values, its freedom and dignity is to be respected, so that it functions in a manner worthy of man, who is the image of God.

85. (see p. 371).

PART V

THE CONCEPT OF CONSCIENCE IN TODAY'S EMPIRICAL PSYCHOLOGY AND IN THE DOCUMENTS OF THE SECOND VATICAN COUNCIL

In the preceding parts we have critically analysed the concept of conscience from the stand-point of *empirical psychology* and that of the *Second Vatican Council*. The first one adopts an empirical and 'phenomenological' approach, and the second, a speculative and theological one.

In the light of empirical psychology's findings, we have described conscience as patterns of moral-value oriented response which constitute a rather consistent, stable and identifiable dimension of the psychic organization of the individual (see p. 338). From the teachings of the Council, we have described conscience as the personal centre of man, which calls and urges him to communion with God and fellowmen. This invitation and urge is given by the law of love, which conscience tries to realize in actual life (see p. 374)

The long analysis and discussion (from the point of view of psychology and of the Council) that we have made reveals that both the conceptions (empirical as well as conciliar) contribute, each in its own way, much towards a better understanding of conscience, while individually they offer only a partial picture.

Therefore, for a better understanding of conscience, we shall try to gain a 'synthetic view' of the empirical and the conciliar concepts of conscience.

Chapter XI

The Empirical and the Conciliar Concepts of Conscience:
A Synthetic View

In order to gain a synthetic view, we shall first make a comparison of the two views of conscience, and then we shall make a synthesis.

A. Comparison

The 'two concepts' (that of the Council and of empirical psychology) of conscience can be compared for their understanding of the *dimensions* (nature and function), *development*, and *characteristics* of conscience.

1. Dimensions of Conscience

It may be recalled that we have distinguished two main dimensions in the Council's concept of conscience: ontologico-religious and moral. The latter has been further distinguished into fundamental and expressive. Within its field of study, empirical psychology distinguishes three dimensions or functional areas of conscience: cognitive, behavioural and emotional. We shall see how the two views correspond with regard to these various dimensions.

The Council

Empir. Psychology

The Ontologico-Religious Dimension

The ontologico-religious dimension of conscience as man's personal centre of communion with God and fellowmen is a fundamental dimen-

The ontologico-religious dimension, evidently, is not of direct concern and interest for empirical psychology. It does not, of course, deny the exi-

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Psychology

sion of conscience according to the Council. This transcendental dimension, says the Council, is constitutive of the human person who is the image of God.

stence or significance of such a dimension.

The Fundamental Moral Dimension

Immediately flowing from the ontological dimension is the fundamental moral dimension: Man's call to love and do good, and to avoid evil. Realizing this call, says the Council, is man's dignity and duty.

Again, an explicit treatment of this dimension is not within the scope or interest of empirical psychology. Though this dimension, therefore, is not directly met with in empirical studies, it is more or less reflected in the general psychological theories; and these theories have different emphases on this point:

The *cognitive-developmental* theory stresses more the 'innate' moral capacity of the individual, which develops and reaches maturity through maturation, cognitive development and social interaction.

The *identification theory* supposes a basic need or want on the part of the child to identify with the parents, and consequently to internalize their values.

From this point of view, the *learning theory* approach is more neutral. According to it, the young child is like a 'tabula rasa', but endowed with an immense capacity for learning — also moral learning. Hence morality

and conscience will be learned if appropriate conditions are provided.

The Expressive Moral Dimension

Here the conscience expresses itself in its actual function of realizing in concrete its fundamental call to love and do good, and to avoid evil, embodied in the commandment of love.

Though here the Council does not speak about these dimensions (cognitive, behavioural and emotional) in detail, they are presumed in accordance with the traditional teaching on 'conscientia antecedens' and 'conscientia consequens'.

2. Development of Conscience

The Council's idea of conscience focuses on the ontologico-religious and fundamental moral dimensions, with which every person is endowed.

At the same time the Council emphasizes the need and importance of conscience formation so that it (the expressive dimension) may be the genuine expression of the deeper dimensions. It also hints at certain factors (see p. 371) needed for a good formation of conscience.

It is on this dimension of conscience that empirical psychology has concentrated. And within this dimension empirical study distinguishes three further dimensions or realms of function: *cognitive, behavioural and emotional*. This shows that conscience expresses itself in all the spheres of human 'behaviour': thinking, acting and feeling.

Empirical psychology, of course, focuses on conscience as it is expressed in thinking, acting and feeling. And in fact its great contribution lies in investigating the complexity involved in the development and function of the different dimensions of conscience (see p.338 ff.).

However, as regards the variety and complexity of the factors and processes involved in the development and function of conscience (expressive dimension), the Council's idea is a simplified one.

3. Characteristics of Conscience

'Innate' versus 'Acquired'

Whether conscience is innate (inborn) or acquired is a question that can be asked, and in fact often asked.

The Council's idea of conscience includes both the characteristics.

In its ontologico-religious and fundamental dimensions, conscience is considered as an 'innate faculty' or 'component' of the human person.

But in its expressive dimension, conscience supposes learning and formation.

However, even here the predominant idea is that of 'shaping' or 'helping to grow' what is already there in bud. Hence, the idea of the 'innateness' of conscience is more prevalent in the Council than its 'acquiredness'.

Empirical psychology's concept of conscience also includes both the characteristics.

In as far as empirical psychology presupposes the deeper dimensions of conscience — at least in the form of man's basic orientation and capacity for moral learning — it attributes an 'innate characteristic' to conscience.

But the expressive dimension of conscience (where empirical psychology's main interest lies) is an acquired or learned phenomenon in the view of empirical psychology. The prevalent idea here is not that of 'shaping' or 'helping to grow' what is already there in bud, but of

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developing and acquiring values and learning to respond (in thinking, acting, and feeling) according to these values, for which man has the basic capacity and orientation.

'Unitary' versus 'Complex'

Emphasis on the 'complexity' of conscience is relatively less in the Council.

Though various dimensions can be distinguished in the Council's idea of conscience, the development and function of conscience (expressive dimension) is presumed to be more unitary than complex. Such a unitary conception is influenced by the idea that the expressive dimension is a spontaneous expression or natural growth of the deeper dimensions.

'Universality' and 'Diversity'

Another problem concerns the universality and diversity of conscience, that is, whether conscience is found in every one and everywhere, and whether it is the same.

According to the teaching of the Council, the ontological and fundamental moral dimensions of conscience, which is constitutive of the human person, is universal. As re-

Empirical psychology stresses the complexity of conscience.

It has shown that the development of the three dimensions of conscience (cognitive, behavioural and emotional) depends on a complex of factors and learning-processes; and that the function of conscience is not highly consistent within and between dimensions.

Since psychology is not directly concerned with the ontological and fundamental moral dimensions, we shall pass on to the 'expressive' dimension. On the basis of empirical findings

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regards the 'expressive' dimension also, conscience, according to the Council, is universal, that is, everyone (who has attained 'the age of reason') is presumed to possess a functioning conscience, which guides him according to his moral values. Thus man's basic moral orientation or call expresses itself concretely.

However, by indicating that conscience is very much subject to formation and influenced by social and cultural values, and hence stressing the need of proper formation of conscience, the council acknowledges also the diversity of conscience.

(making a reasonable generalization) we can say that conscience in its expressive dimension is a universal phenomenon. Every individual develops a conscience in the course of his (social) life; expressed more functionally, everyone will learn — through one learning process or another — to make at least some moral-value oriented responses (in thinking, or behaving or feeling, or probably in all the three to some extent). (Even the psychopath is not devoid of all moral responses).

But the consistency, maturity and effectiveness of this conscience is the problem. As we already saw, the process of conscience development is influenced by a variety of factors and processes. When all individual differences in these factors and processes are taken into account, no two consciences are likely to be identical. It should be impossible to find two people whose moral thinking, behaviour and emotional reactions are identical.

Thus, in spite of its universality, conscience implies a good deal of diversity.

'Maturity' of Conscience

The two concepts of conscience can be compared also for their views on the maturity of conscience or the nature of values a mature conscience should possess.

Council

The Council clearly indicates that the values of a mature conscience should correspond to man's fundamental call and orientation, expressed in the fundamental moral law: to love and do good, and avoid evil. The Council goes on to indicate that this 'good' consists in the fulfilment of the law of love: Love of God and of neighbour.

This shows that the values of a mature conscience (or by which a mature conscience is guided) should be those which foster the growth of the human person, who is called to communion with God and fellow men — who is the image of God.

And it is the duty of conscience to sincerely search for and act according to those values. In this sincere search and strive to conformity with those values that promote the dignity and growth of the human person (called to communion with God and fellow men) consists the 'uprightness' of conscience.

Psychology

From the psychological point of view, maturity of conscience implies, first of all, autonomy or being guided by one's interiorized values. To the question, 'what values should one learn' or 'a mature conscience should possess', the answer differs according to theories.

It follows from the identification theory and learning theory approaches that these values mainly correspond to the values of one's culture and society. But the cognitive-developmental theory implies that the values of a mature conscience are those deriving from the 'universal principles of justice'.

Conscience and the Human Person(ality)

Council

Evidently, conscience is a central dimension of the human person in the Council's view.

In its deeper-dimensions, it is constitutive of the human person, who is 'destined' to find his fulfilment by realizing his call to communion with God and fellowmen. And the expressive dimension is a constant attempt to realize this call in actuality. Thus, conscience, in its totality, is the principle of man's self-realization.

Psychology

Empirical psychology also considers conscience as a central dimension of the human personality.

As the 'self-guiding function' or 'inner control' of the individual, which makes him a 'socialized' member of the society, thus enabling him for constructive and effective social participation, conscience is of great importance for the development of the individual and that of the society.

Further, since the realization of one's moral values is an important aspect in the functioning of personality, and exerts a great deal of influence on man's life and behaviour in general — his impulses, preferences, aspirations and choices — (a harmoniously developed) conscience is of great significance for a healthy function and development of personality.

B. A Synthesis

Synthesizing the contribution of the Council and that of psychology we have the following 'synthetic' concept of conscience.

Conscience is a 'transcendental' and 'phenomenological' reality, in which we can distinguish three main dimensions: *ontological*, *fundamental moral*, and *expressive moral*.

Ontologically, conscience is founded on man's essential relationship with God, and his interrelationship with fellowmen. Thus, in the ontological dimension, conscience is man's 'personal centre' of communion with God and fellowmen.

Naturally flowing from the ontological dimension is the *fundamental moral dimension*, that is, man's basic moral orientation: the call to love and do good, and to avoid evil. This, however, is a basic principle and orientation which has to be realized in concrete.

This realization is effected through the *expressive dimension*: in thinking, acting and feeling. Therefore, the various moral responses like moral judgment, self control, altruistic behaviour, guilt feelings, etc., (which empirical psychology has investigated in detail) are not mere superficial responses, but realization of deeper realities: the realization of man's fundamental call or orientation to love and do good, and to avoid evil, in the way the individual has come to understand and experience this.

Therefore, intimately bound to the expressive dimension of conscience is the problem of conscience development and formation.

Though the ontological dimension of conscience is a constitutive element of every human person, and with that he is endowed with the basic moral orientation or a basic 'moral faculty', the growth of these dimensions into the expressive dimension is a 'developmental phenomenon'. It develops with the human personality; and hence its development is subject to the processes and vicissitudes of the development of the individual. In other words, though every person is endowed with the fundamental moral orientation and capacity — to love and do good, and avoid evil — *the transformation of this orientation and capacity into a properly functioning* (in thinking, behaving and feeling) *conscience* supposes a wholesome combination of several factors, internal and external to the individual (see p. 338 ff.). Hence, the importance of conscience development and formation.

As for its characteristics, conscience is '*innate*' in its ontological and fundamental moral dimensions; but it is '*acquired*' in its expressive dimension. Further, when considered in its ontological and fundamental moral dimensions, conscience is *universal*; it is universal also in its expressive dimension, but here it shows a good deal of *diversity*. Besides, conscience is '*unitary*' in its fundamental dimension, but more '*complex*' in its functioning or expressive

dimension.

From its fundamental dimensions it follows that a *mature* conscience should be guided by those values which foster the *growth of the human person* who is the image of God. Hence one should strive after those values.

Finally, as the personal centre of man and as the guide and principle of his constant strive to realize his call to communion with God and fellowmen, conscience, say the Council and empirical psychology, is of central significance to the human person, and has an inviolable dignity. Hence its *dignity* and *freedom* should be safe-guarded.

Conclusion

We have investigated into the concept of conscience from two points of view: that of *empirical psychology* and that of the *Second Vatican Council*.

From the part of *empirical psychology*, we have analysed mainly the three theories of conscience: the *cognitive-developmental*, *identification*, and *learning theories*.

Within the *cognitive-developmental* approach we have discussed the theories of J. PIAGET and L. KOHLBERG.

PIAGET proposes two stages of moral development — *heteronomous* and *autonomous*. The first one, according to him, is the product of the child's *egocentric thinking* (low level of intellectual development) and *adult constraint*. As a result of further *intellectual development* and especially of *peer interaction*, the child passes from the heteronomous to the autonomous stage, which constitutes a mature and rational morality in the Piagetian view.

After making an extensive study and analysis, KOHLBERG proposes six stages of moral development — ranging from *reward and punishment* orientation upto the stage of *self-accepted moral principles*. The six stages show a strict sequentiality according to KOHLBERG. The development of each stage requires a corresponding *maturation*, *intellectual development* and *socio-moral role-taking*. Reaching the mature stages of morality is thus a long process of growth, together with the corresponding cognitive development and socio-moral experience.

The *identification* theory conceives conscience as an *internal agency of self-control*, which develops as a result of the child's internalization of parental standards and norms through identification. The important factors that promote the development of conscience, according to the theory, are those factors that foster identification, namely, *parental love and nurturance*, *love-oriented discipline*, *high standards of performance*, etc.

Among the *theories of learning*, we have discussed *classical conditioning*, *instrumental learning* and *observational learning*.

According to the *classical conditioning* theory conscience is a *conditioned* (anxiety) *response*, effected by punishment. Hence what promotes the acquisition of conscience is *conditioning* (that is, pairing the child's misbehaviour with punishment) and *the individual's susceptibility* (introversion — extro-

version) to conditioning.

According to the *instrumental learning* theory, conscience is an *internalized control* over conduct, consisting of *cognitive and affective processes*. This control is learned through the instrumentality of rewards and punishments. The *timing* and *intensity* of punishment, the *cognitive instruction* provided in the context of socialization (and the nature of the relationship between the punishing agent and the punished one) are important variables affecting the acquisition of conscience according to this theory.

The *observational learning* theory holds *learning from models* or significant others as the important process implied in the learning of conscience or self-control. Therefore, the behaviour that models exhibit, their consequences, etc., are of importance for conscience development.

Evaluating the theories and their findings, we saw that each theory contributes towards a better understanding of one or another aspect of conscience. Hence, for a 'satisfactory' view of conscience, the contribution of all the relevant theories are to be taken into account.

In the light of the findings of the various theories we saw that the development and function of conscience is affected by a variety of factors and learning processes. These factors and processes variably affect conscience. Hence its complexity.

From the part of the *Second Vatican Council*, we saw that conscience is the '*personal centre*' of man, which calls and urges him to communion with God and fellowmen. Hence its basic law or call: *to love and do good, and avoid evil*, which consists in *the love of God and of neighbour*. Basing on this fundamental law, conscience guides the individual in his actual life. Thus we distinguished an *ontological* and a *moral* (fundamental and expressive) dimension in the Council's concept of conscience.

Conscience being one's moral guide, adds the Council, its dictates must be obeyed. Because it is subject to various influences, it has to be properly formed. And, as the '*personal centre*' of man, its *freedom* and *dignity* has to be respected.

Our comparison of the two concepts (psychological and conciliar) of conscience showed that they are *complementary*.

In its depth, says the Council, conscience is the core and centre of the human person, calling and urging him to his full development and realization

through communion with God and fellowmen. Hence, man is bound by the basic law of loving and doing good, and avoiding evil. These basic ontologico-moral dimensions, indicates psychology, come to expression and realization through the whole being of man: through his thinking, acting and feeling. Therefore, conscience, in its entirety, is the *principle of man's self-realization*. Thus, the two concepts (conciliar and psychological) clearly meet in the expressive dimension of conscience. This expression or concrete realization of the basic dimensions, adds psychology, implies a complex and delicate developmental process — *a process embedded in the process of personality development*.

Hence the 'paradox' of conscience — a 'paradox' implied in the very being of man: on the one hand, it is the central, transcendental dimension of man urging him to self-realization; on the other hand, its proper development and function is subject to the processes and vicissitudes of each one's development.

As the 'personal centre' of man and its expression, the *dignity and freedom* of conscience is always to be respected and promoted; but as a 'developmental phenomenon', conscience has to be *properly developed and formed* so that it functions in a manner corresponding to the call of man, who is the *Image of God*.

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