CYRIAC KOTTAYARIKIL

SIGMUND FREUD

ON

RELIGION AND MORALITY

A CHALLENGE TO CHRISTIANITY

1977

INNSBRUCK

Resch Verlag
TO MY MOTHER
PREFACE

Not least among the ideas which moulded the thought processes in this century are Sigmund Freud’s psychoanalytical considerations of individual and social life. His theory of the id, ego and superego, derived from experience and applied to everyday facts, has been brought to the attention of the world by the psychoanalytical movement. The power of his reflections has had and continues to have a significant bearing on peoples’ conceptions of life. In spite of the attempts of experimental psychologists to confine the scientific position of Freud and psychoanalysis to the area of psychological interpretation, there can be no doubt about the historical significance of his understanding and explanation of individual and social life. Such an influence is especially clear today in the different conceptions of religion and morality. Cognizant of this, Cyriac Kottayarikil has investigated the concepts of religion and morality in the Collected Works of Freud and compared them with the Christian view in the light of Vatican II. As a result of his in-depth studies, he has been able to demonstrate that the distance between psychoanalysis and the Christian way of life is not nearly as great as has sometimes been maintained in both these circles.

I look forward to a well-earned recognition for this critical study which has been accepted as a doctoral dissertation by the Alfonsian Academy in Rome.

Innsbruck, February 3, 1977

Andreas Resch
FOREWORD

My long years of involvement in Psycho-Analysis — both in theory and in practice, as well as in the related questions of this discipline and other existential problems of human life have brought to my attention the interesting book of Dr. Kottayarikil. It is, therefore, a pleasure for me to introduce the accurate research of Dr. Kottayarikil to the readers interested in this subject. This does not mean, however, that I agree with him completely on all points, not even on the most essential ones: he is a Catholic priest and an Indian, I am a psycho-analyst and a European. But exactly that makes for a stimulating and fruitful dialogue with the author.

The author has made a very exact analysis of Freud’s statements on religion and morality. He realizes how uncompromisingly the Great Atheist has fought against and thrown away everything that is compulsive and repressive. For Freud there was only one way to liberation: becoming aware of one’s own servitude. Certainly, he also had personal, so to speak, psycho-analytical reasons for his negative attitude towards a prohibitive religion. The author always tries to remain a fair commentator and wants to bring out the fundamental ethical values in Freud. In so doing, he comes to the conclusion that the Christian Agape is not far removed from the therapeutic Eros of Freud. The important thing is that he arrives at this conclusion always through the dialogical method and presents Freud to the reader from a completely legitimate viewpoint for further critical considerations and appraisals.

I wish his book the success it deserves.

University of Salzburg
January 5, 1977

Igor A. Caruso
SIGMUND FREUD concluded his autobiographical sketch with the following remarks:

"Looking back, then, over the patchwork of my life's labours, I can say that I have made many beginnings and thrown out many suggestions. Something will come of them in the future, though I cannot myself tell whether it will be much or little. I can, however, express a hope that I have opened up a pathway for an important advance in our knowledge."

(FREUD, An Autobiographical Study, 1925, GW XIV 96; SE XX 70).

Nobody doubts today that this "pathway" was an important break-through. The reactions thereafter to the "suggestions" of FREUD range from resentful rejection to immature enthronement. In his own age, both FREUD and his work suffered acute dissensions and bitter antagonism. Today, however, not only psychiatrists and philosophers but even theologians pay their tribute to FREUD.

In the Catholic Church of our immediate past the name FREUD was little less than a taboo. The "official" theologians could hardly perceive in him any more than a subverter of established moral values, which were foremost understood by them as "sexual mores". Because past Catholic theology was dominated by, if not equated with, Western thought — mostly inspired by Victorian Puritanism in the field of sexuality — the Church preached primarily a morality of resignation.

Western society has today not only outgrown puritanistic prudery, but it has, unfortunately, in its search for an unbridled liberalism, given an extremely pragmatic interpretation to Freudian Theories. FREUD now appears to be old-fashioned in the Western "playboy-subculture".

The Church in other parts of the world, especially in the developing countries, still holds on to the Victorian taboos left behind by the colonial powers. The emerging local Churches seem to be obsessively attached to those supposedly "sacred" traditions. In other words, a situation against which FREUD militantly fought in Europe at the dawn of this century dominates today in the field of morality in the afore-said countries.

An unbiased approach to FREUD and his theories will help not only to
heal the wounds of Western liberalism, but also mitigate the misgivings of "Eastern" (understood here "non-western") arch-conservatism. The Western Church must rediscover the FREUD it prematurely condemned, while the Eastern Churches must search for the FREUD they unwittingly missed. The Church is after all moving from the West back to the East, and the mistakes of the past must be a warning for the future. No universal neurosis shall hinder the curing-process of individual neuroses, nor shall individual neuroses conglomerate into a universal neurosis.

At any rate, the real FREUD is yet to be explored. The present work may help somehow in this search for the real FREUD. It is this hope that inspires us to publish it.

I take this opportunity to express my gratitude to those people whose interest and support have contributed to this book. Special thanks go to Prof. DDr. Andreas Resch whose encouraging suggestions and critical comments guided me through from the very initial stage of this book as my doctoral dissertation until today, all his collaborators in the Resch-Verlag, my benefactress Hilde Frumwald, all my Professors at the Alfonsian Academy in Rome, especially Prof. John O'Riordan and Prof. Andreas Sampers, my Professors of psychology Prof. Gottfried Griesel, Prof. Eduard Grünwald and Prof. Igor A. Caruso, whose foreword to this book is a great honour for me.

Athirampuzha, India
January 20, 1977

Cyriac Kottayarikil
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<td>AmIm</td>
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<tr>
<td>AmJPsA</td>
<td>American Journal of Psychoanalysis</td>
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<td>AmJPt</td>
<td>American Journal of Psychotherapy</td>
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<td>BAPA</td>
<td>Bulletin of the American Psychoanalytic Association</td>
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<td>BMC</td>
<td>Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic</td>
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<td>CD</td>
<td>Child Development</td>
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<td>FREUD</td>
<td>Sigmund Freud</td>
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<td>GS</td>
<td>&quot;Gaudium et Spes&quot;, Documents of Vatican II, W. M. Abbot (ed.) New York, 1966</td>
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<td>GW</td>
<td>Gesammelte Werke, Sigmund Freud, Bände I — XVIII mit Gesamtregister (London 1938 — 52). The Quotations are from the 4th edition 1968 — 69)</td>
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<td>Im</td>
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<td>IntJPsA</td>
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<td>IntJpty</td>
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<td>JAmPsaA</td>
<td>Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association</td>
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<td>JCP</td>
<td>Journal of Clinical Psychology</td>
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<td>JMD</td>
<td>Journal for Mental Disorders</td>
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<td>JMS</td>
<td>Journal of Medical Science</td>
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<td>JNMD</td>
<td>Journal of Nervous and Mental Diseases</td>
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<td>JR</td>
<td>The Journal of Religion</td>
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<td>JSP</td>
<td>Journal of Social Psychology</td>
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<td>JSSR</td>
<td>Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion</td>
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<td>LThK</td>
<td>Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche I — X; Das zweite Vatikanische Konzil I — III; J. Höfer / K. Rahner / H. Vorgrimler (Hrsg.) Herder 1957 — 68</td>
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<td>LWF</td>
<td>Life and Work of Sigmund Freud I — III, E. Jones</td>
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<td>RFPsa</td>
<td>Revue Francaise de Psychanalyse</td>
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<td>RGG</td>
<td>Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart: Handwörterbuch für Theologie und Religionswissenschaft I – VI</td>
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<td>YBPsa</td>
<td>The Yearbook of Psychoanalysis, S. Lorand (ed.) Int. Uni. Press 1945</td>
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INTRODUCTION

SIGMUND
FREUD

born on May 6, 1856 in Freiberg, Moravia
(now in Czechoslovakia)

lived (1860 – 1938) in Vienna, Austria

died on September 23, 1939 in England
SIGMUND FREUD is no doubt one of the important moulders of our culture. At the same time he is one of the most controversial figures history ever encountered. Although the great men of history perhaps remain controversial, they nevertheless are the people who restructure human evolution. There will always be disagreement about Marxian statements. But nobody will dare deny that KARL MARX has changed and still changes the face of the earth.

The case of FREUD is hardly different. Many of his speculations and suggestions, conclusions and warnings — once viewed with suspicion and in part rejected in arrogance — have recently found recognition and public support. In other words, his ideas and challenges re-emerge in the “social unconscious”, after having undergone the cultural repressions of the past.

While FREUD is again becoming influential, the Church cannot evade him any more. For truth is to be sought in a spirit of freedom, “carried on with the aid of teaching or instruction, communication and dialogue”. Within the Church today, dialogue has become a more common form of communication. We need today communication more than condemnation, completion more than correction, integration more than “conversion”. In this spirit we make here an attempt to understand the real FREUD.

This book as a whole concentrates upon three basic points:

1. The Freudian concepts of religion and morality — What did FREUD really say? — PART ONE, TWO and THREE.
2. The underlying reasons for his pessimistic outlook — Why did he say so? PART FOUR.
3. Our response to the Freudian enigma — What have we to say? — PART FIVE.

PART ONE begins with the Freudian concept of religion. The First Chapter sheds light upon the very use of the term "religion", including its frequency in the Gesammelte Werke. Chapter Two collects the principal texts dealing with religion. The next Chapter Three synthesizes the basic notions.

PART TWO, consisting of three Chapters, summarizes the Freudian concept of morality. Starting with the Freudian use of the term "morality" and his mode of approach (Chapter Four), we analyse moral norms in relation to the interior and the interiorized forces of man, and then morality as an inherited institution (Chapter Five). Chapter Six collects the positive ethical values as envisioned by Freud.

PART THREE deals with the metapsychological background presented by Freud (Chapter Seven). Here we find an evolution of his theories: a gradual transition from the topographic triad of the Conscious-Preconscious-Unconscious to the genetic structure of the Id-Ego-Super-ego. The super-ego was seen as the seat of cultural possessions, including religion and morality.

One perceives that Freud adopted, particularly on moral grounds, an ambivalent approach to the institution of religion. In his apparently socio-political crusade he stood in brazen contrast to the homogenized complacency of the existing institutions. All the same, he respected positive fundamental human values. In PART FOUR we try to pin-point the basic reasons underlying the Freudian pessimism towards the institutions of religion and morality. We find theoretical as well as practical reasons, and analyse them in Chapter Eight and Nine.

On both ontogenetic and phylogenetic levels, religion and morality are, according to Freud, inextricably intertwined in their origin, further developments and contemporary existence. The primitive wishes of man and the taboos on them, together with man's infantile helplessness, account for the origin of religion and morality. Here Freud concluded that our moral code is grounded on a very shaky foundation as long as it is dependent upon religion.

2. Freud originally in "The Interpretation of Dreams" (1900) used this term ("topisch") to denote the Unconscious-Preconscious-Conscious system. He used the same term later in "Two Encyclopedia Articles" (1923) in connection with the structural division of mind - Id-Ego-Super-ego. Hence arises a terminological confusion. In this context we use it in the original sense.
This basic tenet of FREUD's thought is the most important corner-stone of our study and, therefore, we emphasize it even at the risk of being repetitive.

FREUD's own personal problems, aroused mainly by his contemporary racial situation and social surroundings, also contributed to his uncompromising attack on the religio-moralistic civilization. The Christianity of his time was more a personal and social, rather than a religious problem for FREUD. That may be the reason why he could perceive neither a spiritual quest behind the emotional traits nor a mystic odour behind an ascetic simplicity. Convinced of having a prophetic mission to found a new secular "religion" for an elite, FREUD made it his duty to combat the prevalent and potent power of his time — the Catholic Church.

FREUD challenged the existing Weltanschauung and argued that "magic" must be replaced by materialism. But his conclusions somehow point out that a certain amount of "magic" is part of human life. Therefore, in PART FIVE we propose a Christian mode of encountering the Freudian conceptions of religion and morality.

Dialectics divulges positive as well as negative dimensions; thesis and antithesis converge into a synthesis. We therefore first put forward our points of dissent with FREUD (Chapter Ten). In our opinion, his warnings and challenges deserve more attention than his resentments and rejections. FREUD poses a number of questions to Christian theology. We epitomize them in Chapter Eleven.

In the last Chapter (Twelve) we present our impressions and suggestions. Disagreements on negative aspects do not destroy the possibility of a convergence in positive points. The Christian concept of Agape, which implies a constant growth in selflessness as well as a deeper interpersonal communion, and the Freudian concept of Eros which has necessarily a healing aspect ("Eros therapeuticos") share, in the final analysis, a common ground, responsible for one's personality development and socialization process, although in varying degrees. It is here that we inquire into the possibility of a dialogal synthesis between Christian theologies and the Freudian Psycho-Analysis. In our opinion, both may communicate and even complete each other in essentials, although at the risk of losing some accidentals.
We add a word about our method of procedure. Our discussion is restricted to FREUD's concepions of religion and morality, more precisely from the point of their interrelationship. We allow FREUD to speak for himself extensively before we formulate our comments. Nevertheless, this is more a theological investigation than a thoroughly psychological exploration. We are much more interested in a Christian understanding of FREUD than in FREUD's (mis)understandings about Christian religion and moral conceptions.

Throughout our dialogue with FREUD we have tried to avoid obscurities, but not to evade difficulties. We prefer to leave some intricate questions unanswered, rather than to give qualified answers. It is not so much the intention of this book to offer any new and radical solutions to the age-old riddles, but to raise issues and to stimulate further work. Nevertheless, it may challenge some old, but already long-established (mis)understandings.

We begin with the frequency of the term 'religion' in the Gesammelte Werke (Ch. One), and go through the important texts dealing with religion (Ch. Two) and finally, epitomize the basic conceptions in a synthesis (Ch. Three).

3. When we use the term "Freudian", it refers immediately to S. Freud and has very little to do with the "Freudian School".
PART ONE

THE FREUDIAN CONCEPT OF RELIGION

In this first part we inquire into what FREUD really did say about religion. Much has been written on this topic. As FREUD’s biographer ERNST JONES puts it, it is “a critical topic ... it has evoked more controversy and condemnation”. While there are people who say that the extensive writings of FREUD on religion “now appear to be largely irrelevant”, others would insist that FREUD, by questioning many of the religious phenomena, has ultimately rendered great service to theology.

There is no doubt that FREUD was deeply interested in matters of religion. But what makes the question more conspicuous, yet more complicated, is his approach to it. FREUD’s biographer qualifies him as “an unrepentant atheist”, “a natural atheist from the beginning to the end”, and “simply an


2. E. JONES, LWF III 374

3. H. L. PHILIP, Freud and Religious Belief, 125

4. J. SCHARFENBERG, Freud und seine Religionskritik, 11. Compare with J. BAMBERGER, “Religion as Illusion?”, op. cit., 73: “Freud, one of the makers of our Western culture ... brought psychology into touch with life, out of the laboratory into the clinic, into the highways and byways, into business world, the home and school”.

5. E. JONES, LWF I 29

6. Ibid. III 376
unbeliever".\textsuperscript{7} FREUD however preferred to present himself\textsuperscript{8} as "a hopeless pagan",\textsuperscript{9} "an infidel Jew"\textsuperscript{10} and as "a completely godless Jew".\textsuperscript{11}

FREUD was particularly interested in applying his analytical findings to religion. Actually he found religion the best field in which he could apply his hypotheses and conclusions. Justified or not, he took psycho-analysis as the key to unravel the intricate riddles of man and mankind.

\textsuperscript{7} Ibid. 381
\textsuperscript{8} Many people speak enthusiastically about the Freudian atheism. It is true that FREUD confessed it openly. But for us, the reason behind is more important than the fact itself, because it is the 'why' that often conditions the 'what'.
\textsuperscript{9} Letter to PFISTER (Oct. 16, 1927) FREUD / PFISTER, Psychoanalysis and Faith (London 1963) 110
\textsuperscript{10} FREUD, A religious Experience (1928) GW XIV 394; SE XXI 170
\textsuperscript{11} FREUD / PFISTER, Psychoanalysis and Faith, 63
Chapter One

FREQUENCY OF THE TERM RELIGION IN THE GW

Here we give first the frequency of the term ‘religion’ either as an adjective or as a noun in different works of FREUD. We gather it in a chronological order. This list has been made from the original German texts and we retain it here because there is the possibility of some changes in the translations, for example from a noun to an adjective and *vice versa*. Secondly, we collect those terms under a graphic structure and finally, we deduce some immediate conclusions from them.

A. Occurrence of the Term in Different Works

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>GW</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>Noun Adj.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1893</td>
<td>Charcot (I)</td>
<td>Charcot (III)</td>
<td>– 1</td>
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<tr>
<td>1896</td>
<td>Weitere Bemerkungen über die Abwehr-Neuro-Psychosen (I)</td>
<td>Further Remarks on the Neuro-Psychoses of Defence (III)</td>
<td>– 1</td>
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<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>Die Traumdeutung (II/III)</td>
<td>The Interpretation of dreams (IV)</td>
<td>1 1</td>
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<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>Zur Psychopathologie des Alltaglebens (IV)</td>
<td>The Psychopathology of Everyday Life (VI)</td>
<td>3 2</td>
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<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>Der Witz und seine Beziehung zum Unbewussten (IV)</td>
<td>Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious (IV)</td>
<td>3 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>Psychische Behandlung (Seelenbehandlung) (IV)</td>
<td>Psychical (or Mental) Treatment (VII)</td>
<td>– 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907</td>
<td>Zur sexuellen Aufklärung der Kinder (VII)</td>
<td>The Sexual Enlightenment of Children (IX)</td>
<td>– 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907</td>
<td>Der Wahn und die Träume in W. Jensens “Gradiva” (VII)</td>
<td>Delusions and Dreams in Jensens Gradiva (IX)</td>
<td>– 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907</td>
<td>Zwangshandlungen und Religionsübungen (VII)</td>
<td>Obsessive Actions and Religious Practices (IX)</td>
<td>16 8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. We have made this list with utmost care. Still some accidental omissions are not impossible.
1908 Die "kulturelle" Sexualmoral und die moderne Nervosität (VII)

1908 Charakter und Analerotik (VII)

1909 Bemerkungen über einen Fall von Zwangsneurose (VII)

1910 Die zukünftigen Chancen der psychoanalytischen Therapie (VIII)

1910 Über "wildes" Psychoanalyse (IX)

1910 Eine Kindheitserinnerung des Leonardo da Vinci (VIII)

1911 Formulierungen über zwei Principien des psychischen Geschehens (VIII)

1911 Psychoanalytische Bemerkungen über einen autobiographisch beschriebenen Fall von Paranoia (VIII)

1912 Über neurotische Erkrankungen (VIII)

1913 Das Interesse an der Psychoanalyse (VIII)

1913 Totem und Tabu (IX)

1914 Zur Geschichte der psychoanalytischen Bewegung (X)

1915 Zeitmaßige Über Krieg und Tod (X)

1916 Einige Charaktertypen aus der psychoanalytischen Arbeit (X)

1917 Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse (XI)

1917 Das Tabu der Virginität (XII)

1918 Das Unheimliche (XII)

1918 Vorrede zu „Probleme der Religionspsychologie“ von Dr. Theodor Reik (XII)

1920 Über die Psychoanalyse einiger Fälle des nightmares (XI)

1921 Massenpsychologie und Ich-Analyse (XI)

1921 Über die Psychoanalyse einige Fälle von melancholischen Depressionen (XI)

1922 Kritik an der psychoanalytischen Bewerfung der psychoanalytischen Ergebnisse (XI)
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Noun Adj.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>Das Ich und das Es (XIII)</td>
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<td>1923</td>
<td>&quot;Psychoanalyse&quot; und &quot;Libidotheorie&quot; (XIII)</td>
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<td>1923</td>
<td>Eine Teufelsneurose im siebzehnten Jahrhundert (XIII)</td>
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<td>1924</td>
<td>Die Widerstände gegen die Psychoanalyse (XIV)</td>
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<td>1925</td>
<td>&quot;Selbstdarstellung&quot; (XIV)</td>
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<td>1925</td>
<td>Brief an den Herausgeber der &quot;Jüdischen Pressezentrale Zürich&quot; (XIV)</td>
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<td>1926</td>
<td>Psycho-Analysis (XIV)</td>
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<td>1926</td>
<td>Die Frage der Laienanalyse (XIV)</td>
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<td>1927</td>
<td>Die Zukunft einer Illusion (XIV)</td>
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<td>1928</td>
<td>Ein religiöses Erlebnis (XIV)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>Das Unbehagen in der Kultur (XIV)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>Neue Folge der Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse (XV)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>Warum Krieg? (XVI)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>Vorrede zur hebräischen Ausgabe von &quot;Totem und Tabu&quot; (XVI)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>Nachschrift 1935 zur &quot;Selbstdarstellung&quot; (XVI)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>Der Mann Moses und die monotheistische Religion (XVI)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1892/</td>
<td>Schriften aus dem Nachlaß (XVII)</td>
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</table>

**B. Graphic Structure of the Frequency**
C. Conclusions

The enumeration of the term religion as used by FREUD in his GW unveils two fundamental facts: that FREUD was some way or other interested in matters of religion from the very beginning to the end of his life; secondly, there was an evolution in his conceptions, as the gap between the first and last periods point out.

Furthermore, at least on one occasion FREUD explicitly identified his conception of religion with its Western manifestation, or better, with the Western civilization as such.\(^2\)

The next Chapter collects the important texts which speak about religion.

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2. "We are here concerned with European Christian civilization". FREUD, The Future of an Illusion (1927) GW XIV 361; SE XXI 38; Compare with: New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis (1933) GW XV 182; SE XXII 168 – 69
Chapter Two

RELIGION AS PRESENTED IN THE WORKS OF FREUD

A. Early Writings: 1893 — 1912

1893
As early as eighteen-nineties, almost when FREUD began his career as a writer, he found that the religious terminology had to be replaced by a scientific one.¹

1896
FREUD explained how the self-reproaches of an obsessional neurotic could be easily converted into a "religious anxiety."²

1897
In a letter to his friend W. FLIESS, FREUD declared that faith in religious assertions as in immortality, providence and after-life is mere "thought illusion" or projections of mind.³ The same idea is almost repeated and further elucidated in his work The Psychopathology of Everyday Life:

"I assume that this conscious ignorance and unconscious knowledge of the motivation of accidental physical events is one of the physical roots of superstition. Because the superstitious person knows nothing of the motivation of his own chance actions, and because the fact of this motivation presses for a place in his field of recognition, he is forced to allocate it, by displacement, to the external world. If such a connection exists, it can hardly be limited to this single application. In point of fact I believe that a large part of the mythological view of the world, which extends a long way into the most modern religions, is nothing but psychology projected into the external world.... One could venture to explain in this way the myths of paradise and the fall of man, of God, of good and evil, of immor-

1. FREUD, Charcot, GW I 31; SE III 20
2. FREUD, Further Remarks on the Neuro-Psychoses of Defence, GW I 389; SE III 171.
3. FREUD, Aus den Anfängen der Psychoanalyse (London 1950) 252
tality and so on and to transform metaphysics into metapsychology."

Evidently this passage unveils an important step in the development of the Freudian concept of religion. According to E. JONES this was an "early expression of his naturalistic outlook on religion." Furthermore, FREUD believed that religions always cling to childish superstitions.6

FREUD's most important work on religion during this period is Obsessive Actions and Religious Practices (1907).7 Here he drew out a comparison between obsessive actions of neurotics or better the ritual acts of the obsessional neurotics and the ritualism in religious observances. He could pick out a number of resemblances between them, "in the qualms of conscience brought on their neglect, in their complete isolation from all other actions (shown in the prohibition against interruption) and in the conscientiousness with which they are carried out in every detail"8 Thus:

"The sense of guilt of obsessional neurotics finds its counterpart in the protestations of pious people that they know that at heart they are miserable sinners."9

Repression of instinctual impulses lies at bottom both in obsessional neurosis and in religion10. In the neurotic ceremonials there is a constant tendency for displacement from the thing actually important to an insignificant one which replaces it some way. A similar mechanism works also in the religious field.11 Finally:

"The character of compromise which obsessive actions possess in their capacity as neurotic symptoms is the character least easily detected in corresponding religious observances."12

4. FREUD, The Psychopathology of Everyday Life, GW IV 287 – 8; SE VI 258 – 9
5. E. JONES, LWF III 377
6. FREUD, Jansen's 'Grädiva'; GW VII 98; SE IX 71
8. Ibid. GW VII 131; SE IX 119
9. Ibid. GW VII 136; SE IX 123
10. Ibid. GW VII 136f.; SE IX 125
11. Ibid. GW VII 138; SE IX 126
12. Ibid.
In the light of these resemblances FREUD concluded:

"In view of these similarities and analogies one might venture to regard obsessional neurosis as a pathological counterpart of the formation of religion, and to describe that neurosis as an individual religiosity and religion as a universal neurosis. The most essential similarity would reside in the underlying renunciation of the actuation of instincts that are constitutionally present, and the chief difference would lie in the nature of those instincts, which in the neurosis are exclusively sexual in their origin, while in religion they spring from egoistic sources."\(^{13}\)

In a letter to S. FERENCZI on the New-Year-day, 1910 FREUD announced that the idea about the meaning of religion occurred to him: "its ultimate basis is the infantile helplessness of mankind."\(^{14}\) This idea was further developed by FREUD in one of his basic works of the same year. By this time he could say something more "definite" about God:

"Psycho-analysis has made us familiar with the intimate connection between the father-complex and belief in God; it has shown us that a personal God is, psychologically, nothing other than an exalted father... Thus we recognize that the roots of the need for religion are in the parental complex."\(^{15}\)

Thus, an all powerful and just God, FREUD continued, and a kindly nature are grand sublimations of father and mother or better "revivals and restorations of the young child's ideas of them". Hence biologically religiosity is to be traced back to the helplessness of man facing his fate and to the corresponding need for help.

In another work FREUD explained how the after-life-reward as a compensation for the renunciation of earthly pleasures which is an important target of religions all times, is nothing other than a mythological projection. Religions have always tried to shield this renunciation in the shroud of compensation in a better future life.\(^{16}\) This idea of projection in religion was corroborated by a case-study of a "religious paranoia".\(^{17}\)

13. Ibid. GW VII 138–9; SE IX 126–7
14. Quoted in E. JONES, LWF II 392
15. FREUD, Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of his Childhood, GW VIII 195; SE IX 123
16. FREUD, Two Principles of Mental Functioning, GW VIII 236; SE XII 223
17. FREUD, Notes on a Case of Paranoia, GW VIII 250; SE XII 78
B. Writings from 1912 to 1927

1. Totem and Taboo

In any discussion on the Freudian concept of religion this work obtains the central position. Integrating much of the findings of ethnology FREUD here tries to give an "historical axis" to his psycho-analysis of religion. One sees however FREUD here passing from ontogeny to phylogeny, from nature to culture, from the world of illusions to the world of realities.

*Totem and Taboo* inquires into the life of the savages of Australia. FREUD based his conclusions mainly on the works of J.G. FRAZER. He found that the whole social set up of those poor cannibals was aimed at "avoiding incestuous sexual relations". All their social relations were centred around Totemism and were regulated by Exogamy. A careful examination of the primitive races show that such prohibitions were present in almost all of them. FREUD called them in general taboos.

18. FREUD, Totem and Taboo, GW IX 1 — 207; SE XIII 1 — 162
20. FREUD, Totem and Taboo, GW IX 6; SE XIII 2.
21. FREUD adopts the definition given by FRAZER. "Totem is a class of material objects which a savage regards with superstitious respect, believing that there exists between him and every member of the clan an intimate and altogether special relation." FREUD, Totem and Taboo, GW IX 122, SE XIII 103. The relation to the totem was the basis of all social relations. Thus Totemism has a religious as well as social aspect, namely the relation of the individual to the totem and secondly mutual relations among the clansmen.
22. FREUD, Totem and Taboo, GW IX 13; SE XIII 7f. "Totemic exogamy, the prohibition of sexual intercourse between members of the same clan, appears to have been the appropriate means for preventing group incest." According to FREUD the prohibition in the Catholic Church of marriage between blood relations is a relic of this attitude. Cfr. Ibid. GW IX 15; SE XIII 9
23 "Taboo is a Polynesian word. It is difficult for us to find a translation for it." FREUD, Totem and Taboo, GW IX 26; SE XIII 18. "The word 'taboo' denotes everything, whether a person or a thing or a transitory condition, which is the vehicle or source of this mysterious attribute. It also denotes the prohibitions arising from the same attribute. And, finally, it has a connotation which includes alike 'sacred' and 'above the ordinary', as well as 'dangerous', 'unclean' and 'uncanny' (Ibid. GW IX 31; SE XIII 22)
According to FREUD such irrational prohibitions resemble neurotic taboos:

“Let us now summarize the points in which agreement between taboo usages and obsessional symptoms is most clearly shown: (1) the fact that the prohibitions lack any assignable motive; (2) the fact that they are maintained by an internal necessity; (3) the fact that they are easily displaceable and that there is a risk of infection from the prohibited object; and (4) the fact that they give rise to injunctions for the performance of ceremonial acts.”

This is all the more clear in cases of taboo observances. For example in a taboo upon the dead:

“...In this respect the taboo observances, like neurotic symptoms have a double sense. On the one hand, in their restrictive character, they are expressions of mourning; but on the other hand they clearly betray — what they seek to conceal — hostility against the dead disguised as self-defence.”

Furthermore, there is an intimate connection between totemism and exogamy:

“The most ancient and important taboo prohibitions are the two basic laws of totemism: not to kill the totem animal and to avoid sexual intercourse with members of the totem clan of the opposite sex. Then, these must be the oldest and most powerful of humain desires.”

In every prohibition there exists a polarisation between the forbidden and the desired: That is to say, an ambivalent relation is at the root of every taboo:

“Taboo is a primaeval prohibition forcibly imposed (by some authority) from outside and directed against the most powerful longings to which human beings are subject. The desire to violate it persists in their unconscious; those who obey the taboo have an ambivalent attitude to what the taboo prohibits.”

In Totem and Taboo FREUD further analyses the three systems of thought, the three great “Weltanschauungen” developed in the course of history, namely, animistic or mythological, religious and scientific. Animism itself
was not a religion but contained materials on which later religions were built. Magical practices were the hallmark of this epoch and the omnipotence of thought its principle.\(^{30}\)

Gradually Animism gave way to religion proper.\(^{31}\) Thus Totemism, replacing the major part of Animism came to existence as the early form of religion. For FREUD however, the totem, the object of worship in this religion was nothing but the "father surrogate", and he found it perfectly in agreement with his psycho-analytic conclusions.

Adopting the hypothesis of the Primal Horde from CHARLES DARWIN,\(^{32}\) FREUD constructed a theory of his own. Accordingly, a violent and jealous father, the actual leader of the clan, kept all the females for himself and drove away his sons as they grew up. But "one day the brothers who had been driven out came together, killed and devoured their father and so made an end of the patriarchal horde".\(^{33}\)

But this primal crime though victorious for the sons was in itself not a perfect solution. Even though the brother clan got rid of the cruel father and found satisfaction in its hatred of him, a deep sense of guilt came into play, in the form of remorse felt in the whole clan. Moreover, the original wish to take the father's place was not realized. A failure is far more propitiatory than a satisfaction. Thus the dead father became a stronger one and two basic taboo observances of totemism came into being which corresponded to the repressed Oedipus wishes:

"If the totem animal is the father, then the two principal ordinances of totemism, the two taboo prohibitions which constitute the core — not to kill the totem and not to have sexual relations with a woman of the same totem — coincide in their content with the two crimes of Oedipus..., as well as with the two primal wishes of children."\(^{34}\)

Thus the primitive parricide stands at the origin of cultural institutions as social organizations, moral restrictions and religion\(^{35}\). God is to be seen merely as a "father-surrogate".

\(^{30}\) Ibid. GW IX 106; SE XIII 85
\(^{31}\) Ibid. GW IX 112 – 3; SE XIII 91 – 2
\(^{32}\) Ibid. GW IX 171; SE XIII 142
\(^{33}\) Ibid. GW IX 171; SE XIII 141
\(^{34}\) Ibid. GW IX 160; SE XIII 132
\(^{35}\) Ibid. GW IX 172; SE XIII 142
"The psycho-analysis of individual beings, however, teaches us with quite special insistance that the God of each of them is formed in the likeness of his father, that his personal relation to God depends on his relation to his father in the flesh and oscillates and changes along with that relation, and that at bottom God is nothing other than an exalted father.\textsuperscript{36}

2. 1913 – 1919

In an essay of 1913 FREUD restated the conclusions of \textit{Totem and Taboo}:

"An investigation of primitive people shows mankind caught up, to begin with, in a childish belief in its own omnipotence.\textemdash \textit{Pari passu} with men’s progressive control over the world goes a development in their \textit{Weltanschauung}, their view of the universe as a whole. They turn away more and more from their original belief in their own omnipotence, rising from an animistic phase through a religious to a scientific one. Myths, religion and morality find their place in this scheme as attempts to seek a compensation for the lack of satisfaction of human wishes.\textsuperscript{37}

In a Letter dated July 8, 1915, among other things FREUD wrote as follows to Dr. PUTNAM, an intimate friend of him:

"I have the secret belief that if one possessed the means of studying the sublimations of instincts as thoroughly as the repressions of them, one might come across quite natural psychological explanations.\textsuperscript{38}

The fact of ambivalent feelings towards the father as an underlying factor in early religions was ratified later on by FREUD in a case study.\textsuperscript{39} According to him this ambivalence persists in all later forms of religion:

"It emerges further, that this crime of liberation and the reactions to it had as their result the appearance of the first social ties, the basic moral restrictions and the oldest form of religion, totemism. But later religions too have the same content, and on the one hand they are concerned with

\textsuperscript{36} Ibid. GW IX 177; SE XIII 147
\textsuperscript{37} FREUD, The claims of Psycho-Analysis to Scientific Interest, GW VIII 415; SE XIII 186
\textsuperscript{38} E. JONES, LWF I 463f.
\textsuperscript{39} FREUD, An infantile Neurosis, GW XII 96; SE XVII 65
obliterating the traces of that crime or with expiating it by bringing forward other solutions of the struggle between the father and sons, while on the other hand they cannot avoid repeating once more the elimination of the father.\(^{40}\)

By this time FREUD was almost convinced that the longing for the father was the nucleus of the formation of every religion:

"It is easy to show that the ego ideal answers to everything that is expected of the higher nature of man. As a substitute for a longing for the father, it contains the germ from which all religions have evolved."\(^{41}\)

C. Later Writings to the End

1. The Future of an Illusion (1927)

FREUD hailed this work as a "declaration of war".\(^{42}\) According to E. JONES this is a book that started "many acrimonious controversies which still continue."\(^{43}\) If Totem and Taboo concentrated more on the origin of religion or better on the original form of religions, this work under present consideration threw light upon the "nature and future of religion", "on the probable future of our civilization".\(^{44}\)

Religion is here above all considered as a cultural asset (''Kulturbesitz''). The principal task of culture or civilization\(^{45}\) is to defend man against nature. As the feeble human beings stood helpless before the majestic, cruel and inexorable powers of nature, civilization crept into under the pretext of a

40. FREUD, Prefatory Note to 'Problems of Religious Psychology' of Dr. T. Reik, GW XII 328; SE XVII 262
41. FREUD, The Ego and the Id, GW XIII 265; SE XIX 37
42. FREUD, Letter to O. Pfister, October 22, 1927, in FREUD & PFISTER, Psycho-
43. E. JONES, LWF III 146
44. Ibid. 381
45. FREUD, The Future of an Illusion, GW XIV 326; SE XXI 5.
46. "I scorn to distinguish between culture and civilization" FREUD, The Future of
an Illusion, GW XIV 326; SE XXI 6.
The situation of the individual is comparable to that of the whole mankind. In a child there is the infantile helplessness and a corresponding trust in the protection of the parents. One attributed the same paternal character to the powers of nature.

"In the same way, man makes the forces of nature not simply into persons with whom he can associate as he would with his equals — that would not do justice to the overpowering impression which those forces make on him — but gives them the character of a father. He turns them into gods, following in this, as I have tried to show, not only an infantile prototype but a phylogenetic one." 48

As helplessness is congenital to man, the longing for protecting gods always persists in him. These gods from their parts retain threefold tasks:

"They must exorcize the terrors of nature, they must reconcile men to the cruelty of Fate, particularly as it is shown in death, and they must compensate them for the sufferings and privations which a civilized life in common has imposed on them." 49

Moreover, the cultural precepts were declared to be of divine origin:

"And the more autonomous nature became and the more the gods withdrew from it, the more earnestly were all expectations directed to the third function of the gods — the more did morality become their true domain. It now became the task of the gods to even out the defects and evils of civilization, to attend to the sufferings which men inflict on one another in their life together and to watch over the fulfilment of the precepts of civilization which men obey so imperfectly. Those precepts themselves were credited with a divine origin; they were elevated beyond human society and were extended to nature and the universe." 50

A sequel to it, a number of ideas were projected, ideas born out of man's need to shield his helplessness and built upon the memories of helplessness of his own childhood. Life in this world was gradually considered as serving a "higher purpose." 51 These gods or the sacralized forces of nature finally converged into a single godly existence.

47. Ibid. GW XIV 337; SE XXI 16
48. Ibid. GW XIV 339; SE XXI 17
49. Ibid. GW XIV 339; SE XXI 17 — 8
50. Ibid. GW XIV 340; SE XXI 18
51. Ibid.
The Dogmas of Religion

Religious ideas and dogmas evolved through a long process of development in the course of history. But psychologically those teachings are "not precipitates of experience or end results of thinking; they are illusions, fulfilment of the oldest, strongest and most urgent wishes of mankind. The secret of their strength lies in the strength of those wishes". With this explanation of religious ideas as illusions, FREUD thought he gave only a psychological twist to the great critiques of religion:

"All I have done—and this is the only thing that is new in my exposition—is to add some psychological foundation to the criticisms of my great predecessors."

For this reason these dogmas cannot outlive scientific thought:

"The scientific spirit brings about a particular attitude towards worldly matters; before religious matters it pauses for a little, hesitates, and finally there too crosses the threshold. In this process there is no stopping; the greater the number of men to whom the treasures of knowledge become accessible, the more widespread is the falling-away from religious belief—at first only from its obsolete and objectionable trappings, but later from its fundamental postulates as well."

Hence FREUD advocated a fully secular-oriented personality formation, "an education to reality". For, "a human being cannot remain child for all eternity", nor shall he be exploited for all the time in his neurotic inclinations. Such an education will help people to strip themselves of all stimulants and intoxicants, of that "sweet—or bitter sweet—poison from childhood."

A secular god therefore must replace the God of religion. This new god, "the primacy of intellect" or the Logos, FREUD hoped, would fulfil the same purposes which religion expected from its god, namely "the love of man and the decrease of suffering."

52. Ibid. GW XIV 352; SE XXI 30
53. Ibid. GW XIV 358; SE XXI 35
54. Ibid. GW XIV 362; SE XXI 38
55. Ibid. GW XIV 373; SE XXI 49
56. Ibid.
57. Ibid. GW XIV 377; SE XXI 53
other gods:

"You know why: in the long run nothing can withstand reason and experience, and the contradiction which religion offers to both is all too palpable. Even purified religious ideas cannot escape this fate, so long as they try to preserve anything of the consolation of religion. No doubt if they confine themselves to a belief in a higher spiritual being, whose qualities are indefinable and whose purposes cannot be discerned they will be proof against the challenge of science; but then they will also lose their hold on human interest." 58

FREUD thus put his trust completely in science which alone can, according to him, answer or at least attempt to answer possible questions and solve problems of man:

"No, our science is no illusion. But an illusion it would be to suppose that what science cannot give we can get elsewhere." 59

To conclude, this book represents, as FREUD claimed, "my completely negative attitude to religion, in any form and however attenuated." 60

2. A Religious Experience (1928)

In this short essay FREUD confessed that he preferred to remain to the end what he was always — "an infidel Jew". The alleged reason:

"As for myself God had not done so much for me. He had never allowed me to hear an inner voice; and if, in view of my age, he did not make haste, it would not be my fault, if I remained to the end of my life what I now was, 'an infidel Jew'." 61

Here again he does not forget to add that the formation of religion is a repetition of the Oedipus situation. 62

58. Ibid. GW XIV 378; SE XXI 54
59. Ibid. GW XIV 380; SE XXI 56
60. FREUD & PFISTER, Psycho-Analysis and Faith, 63. "In the next few weeks a pamphlet of mine will be appearing which has a great deal to do with you. I had been wanting to write it for a long time, and postponed it out of regard for you; but the impulse became too strong. The subject matter as you will easily guess is my completely negative attitude to religion, in any form and however attenuated."
61. FREUD, A Religious Experience, GW XIV 394; SE XXI 170
62. Ibid. GW XIV 395; SE XXI 171
FREUD begins this book taking into account the objections of R. ROLLAND mainly regarding religious experience. He was accused of having discarded the proper source of religiosity, an "oceanic feeling" noticeable in millions of people. FREUD'S answer:

"I cannot discover this 'oceanic' feeling in myself.... From my own experience, I could not convince myself of the primary nature of such a feeling. But this gives me no right to deny that it does in fact occur in other people. The only question is whether it is being correctly interpreted and whether it ought to be regarded as the fons et origo of the whole need for religion."^63

But psychologically the origin of religious attitudes must be traced back, according to FREUD, to the infantile feelings of helplessness:

"The derivation of religious needs from the infant's helplessness and the longing for the father aroused by it seems to me incontrovertible, especially since the feeling is not simply prolonged from childhood days, but is permanently sustained by fear of the superior power of Fate."^64

As long as this helplessness is inborn in man, there is always a tendency to take refuge in psychological projections like visions, delusions and illusions. Religion thus becomes a mass-delusion:

"A special importance attaches to the case in which this attempt to procure a certainty of happiness and a protection against suffering through a delusional remoulding of reality is made by a considerable number of people in common. The religions of mankind must be classed among the mass-delusions of this kind. No one, needless to say, who shares a delusion ever recognizes it as such."^65

In FREUD'S opinion, the means employed by religion in the pursuit of this happiness are also objectionable:

"Religion restricts this play of choice and adaptation, since it imposes equally on everyone its own path to the acquisition of happiness and protection from suffering. Its technique consists in depressing the value of life and distorting the picture of the real world in a delusional manner — which

63. FREUD, Civilization and Its Discontents, GW XIV 422 — 3; SE XXI 65
64. Ibid. GW XIV 429 — 30; SE XXI 72
65. Ibid. GW XIV 440; SE XXI 81
presupposes an intimidation of the intelligence. At this price, by forcibly fixing them in a state of psychical infantilism and by drawing them into a mass-delusion, religion succeeds in sparing many people an individual neurosis. But hardly anything more.\textsuperscript{66}

As we are living in an age of science and technology, FREUD means, time has come to give up such delusions and to return to oneself. Contemporary man is not far from this goal:

"Long ago he formed an ideal conception of omnipotence and omniscience which he embodied in his gods. To these gods he attributed everything that seemed unattainable to his wishes, or that was forbidden to him. One may say, therefore, that those gods were cultural ideals. Today he has come very close to the attainment of this ideal, he has almost become a god himself. Only, it is true, in the fashion in which ideals are usually attained according to the general judgement of humanity."\textsuperscript{67}

These ideals are nothing but the fabrications of the "Cultural Superego", evolved in the society in the course of time and they form the general moral code:

"The cultural-super-ego has developed its ideals and set up its demands. Among the latter, those which deal with the relations of human beings to one another are comprised under the heading of ethics."\textsuperscript{68}

4. New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis (1933)

In a lecture on "A Weltanschauung", FREUD summarized what he had to say and what he so far did say about religion. Of the three Weltanschauungen or "mental pictures of the universe", namely art, religion and philosophy, religion alone is, according to FREUD, to be taken seriously as an enemy to science and scientific spirit.\textsuperscript{69}

The greatness of religion seems to consist in fulfilling three functions:

\textsuperscript{66} Ibid. GW XIV 443 - 4; SE XXI 84 - 5
\textsuperscript{67} Ibid. GW XIV 450; SE XXI 91
\textsuperscript{68} Ibid. GW XIV 502; SE XXI 142
\textsuperscript{69} FREUD, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW XV 172; SE XXII 160
"If we are to give account of the grandiose nature of religion, we must bear in mind what it undertakes to do for human beings. It gives them information about the origin and coming into existence of the universe; it assures them of its protection and of ultimate happiness in the ups and downs of life and it directs their thoughts and actions by precepts which it lays down with its whole authority."\textsuperscript{70}

But the whole strength as well as the weakness of religion lies in its ethical demands. The amount of protection and happy satisfaction assigned to an individual depends on his fulfilment of the ethical precepts. Religion promises men "protection and happiness if they would only fulfil certain ethical requirements."\textsuperscript{71} FREUD summarized his opinions as follows:

"In summary, therefore, the judgement of science on the religious \textit{Weltanschauung} is this. While the different religions wrangle with one another as to which of them is in possession of the truth, our view is that the question of the truth of religious beliefs may be left altogether on one side. Religion is an attempt to master the sensory world in which we are situated by means of the wishful world which we have developed within us as a result of biological and psychological necessities. But religion cannot achieve this. Its doctrines bear the imprint of the times in which they arose, the ignorant times of the childhood of humanity. Its consolation deserves no trust. Experience teaches us that the world is no nursery. The ethical demands on which religion seeks to lay stress need, rather, to be given another basis; for they are indispensable to human society and it is dangerous to link obedience to them with religious faith. If we attempt to assign the place of religion in the evolution of mankind, it appears not as a permanent acquisition but as a counterpart to the neurosis which individual civilized men have to go through in their passage from childhood to maturity."\textsuperscript{72}

5. \textit{Moses and Monotheism} (1939)

This is the last work of FREUD on religion, indeed the last one he ever

\textsuperscript{70} Ibid. GW XV 174; SE XXII 161
\textsuperscript{71} Cfr. Ibid. GW XV 180; SE XXII 167
\textsuperscript{72} Ibid. GW XV 181; SE XXII 168
wrote, his "last creative effort". As the very title indicates, it deals with a certain Moses, the liberator of the Jewish people, their law-giver and founder of their religion. F R E U D established certain theses here which contradict some of the fundamental assertions of Christianity.

The first thesis of F R E U D: "Moses was an Egyptian." His arguments were based mainly on a philological study of the term "Moses", on the analysis of the "myth" of Moses' birth in the Bible and on the "story of the Exodus." Accordingly Moses must have lived in Egypt immediately following Ikhnaton.

Hence the second thesis: 'The religion Moses brought to the Jews was an 'Atonreligion' , an Egyptian religion. The resemblance of the one to the

73. E. JONES, LWF III 388
74. In a letter to ARNOLD ZWEIG (Sept. 30, 1934) F R E U D wrote: "The starting point of the essay you are familiar with; it is the same as that of your Bilanz (the persecution of the Jews in Germany). In view of the recent advances one asks oneself how the Jews have become what they are and why they have drawn on to themselves such undying hatred. I soon discovered the formula for it. Moses created the Jews. So my essay got the title: The Man Moses an Historical Novel..... It is divided into three sections... The undertaking breaks down on the third one, which brings something new and fundamental for strangers — though nothing for me after Totem and Taboo. It is the thought of those strangers that make me keep the finished essay secret, for, we live here in an atmosphere of strict catholic beliefs....". Quoted in E. JONES LWF III 206
75. F R E U D, Moses and Monotheism, GW XVI 103; SE XXIII 7
76. Ibid. GW XVI 103 ff.; SE XXIII 6 ff.
77. The Hebrew term "Mosheh" is according to F R E U D of Egyptian origin, F R E U D, Moses and Monotheism, GW XVI 104; SE XXIII 7.
78. Ibid. GW XVI 108; SE XXIII 12
79. Ibid. GW XVI 112 ff.; SE XXIII 13
80. According to some scholars, 'Akhenaten' (Ikhnaten), a "heretic-king", the son of Pharoah Amenophis III (1406 - 1370 B.C.) was responsible to take a long step toward a true monotheism, effecting a transition from the figure of a supreme, universal Sun — god (Amon - Re) and its mythological trappings to the adoring of the "solar disk" (Aten) as the only god. Cfr. W. F. ALBRIGHT, From the Stone Age to Christianity, (New York 1957) 218ff. Cfr. also A. ERMAN, Die Religion der Ägypter (Berlin 1934) 107ff; H. FAIRMAN, City of Akhenaten (Egypt Exploration Society Memoir 44, London 1951); KEES, Der Götterglaube im alten Ägypten, (Berlin 1956); H.M. STEWART, "Some Pre - Amarnah Sun - Hymns", Journal of Egyptian Archeology 46 (1960) 83 - 90; A. GARDENER, Egypt of the Pharoahs (Oxford 1962); R. NORTH, Archeo - Biblical Egypt (Rome 1967), especially his conclusions 73ff.
81. F R E U D, Moses and Monotheism, GW XVI 118 ff.; SE XXIII 20 ff.;
other, of the Mosaic religion to the Atonreligion was at best seen in the strongly held monotheism in both.

Through his ethnological survey and historical study FREUD arrived at the conclusion that there were two forms of Jewish religion founded by two different leaders who are known under the same name Moses:

"Jewish history is familiar to us for its dualities: two groups of people who came together to form a nation, two kingdoms into which this nation fell apart, two gods' names in the documentary sources of the Bible. To these we add two fresh ones: the foundation of two religions — the first repressed by the second but nevertheless later emerging victoriously behind it, and two religious founders, who are both called by the same name of Moses and whose personalities we have to distinguish from each other." 82

The first Moses was, according to FREUD, murdered in the wilderness by the Israelites themselves and the memory of this crime remained a latent force in their racial unconscious in spite of the might of the second Moses and the replacement of their religion through the Jewish religion proper. The subsequent sense of guilt and remorse justified their suffering and the need for punishment. This is the ground of their supposedly higher morals:

"In a fresh rapture of moral asceticism they imposed more and more new instinctual renunciations on themselves and in that way reached — in doctrine and precept at least — ethical heights which had remained inaccessible to the other peoples of antiquity." 83

FREUD fitted some way or other these 'historical' findings into the psycho-analytic mould he constructed long ago. With a reference to his early work Totem and Taboo, he wrote:

"From that time I have never doubted that religious phenomena are only to be understood on the pattern of the individual neurotic symptoms familiar to us — as the return of the long since forgotten, important events in the primaeval history of the human family." 84

Furthermore, the historical truth of religion is to be understood as the return of the repressed and of the forgotten into paranoid distortions, compulsive convictions and delusional errors:

82. Ibid. GW XVI 154; SE XXIII 52
83. Ibid. GW XVI 243; SE XXIII 134
84. Ibid. GW XVI 160; SE XXIII 58
"We have long understood that a portion of forgotten truth lies hidden in delusional ideas, that when this returns it has to put up with distortions and misunderstandings, and that the compulsive conviction which attaches to the delusion arises from this core of truth and spreads out on to the errors that wrap it round. We must grant an ingredient such as this of what may be called historical truth to the dogmas of religion as well, which, it is true, bear the character of psychotic symptoms but which, as group phenomena, escape the curse of isolation." 85

The basic claim of psycho-analysis that "what may be operative in an individual's psychical life may include not only what he has experienced himself but also things that were innately present in him at his birth, elements with a phylogenetic origin — an archaic heritage" 86 was neatly applied to religion:

"If our account of primaeval history is accepted as on the whole worthy of belief, two sorts of elements will be recognized in religious doctrines and rituals: on the one hand fixations to the ancient history of the family and survivals of it, and on the other hand revivals of the past and returns, after long intervals, of what has been forgotten." 87

FREUD could find explanations or better justifications for almost every assertion of religion. The sacred ("das Heilige") was seen as the continued will of the primal father. Same way the emotional ambivalence in one's relation to God, the sense of guilt felt for every transgression of a law, the subsequent wish for punishment, the notion of Christian sacrifice, all fitted perfectly to this model.

Christianity is, according to FREUD, a fabrication of a certain Saul or Paul, a Roman Jew from Tarsus. He got inspirations at the murder of the new prophet Jesus, who preached sublime ethical ideals. Paul could win some sympathetic Jews to his side, who were waiting for the Messiah, — the wish for the return of the murdered father — Moses.

"It is plausible to conjecture that remorse for the murder of Moses provided the stimulus for wishful phantasy of the Messiah, who was to return and lead his people to redemption and the promised world-dominion. If Moses was the first Messiah, Christ became his substitute and successor, and Paul could exclaim to the peoples with some historical justification:

85. Ibid. GW XVI 190 — 1; SE XXIII 85
86. Ibid.GW XVI 204f.; SE XXIII 98
87. Ibid. GW XVI 190; SE XXIII 84
‘Look! the Messiah has really come: he has been murdered before your eyes!’ Then, too, there is a piece of historical truth in Christ’s resurrection, for he was the resurrected Moses and behind him the returned primal father of the primitive horde, transfigured and, as the son, put in the place of the father.”

Paul recognized Christ as the Messiah. The phantasy of expiation corresponding to the sense of guilt gave origin to the gospel of salvation. If Judaism had been a father-religion, Christianity became a son-religion.

Gradually the Jewish religion was set aside by some and ever since there exists the hatred towards the Semites.

Sacrifice, or the formula of the killing of God became the focal theme also of the new religion: “we are freed from all guilt since one of us has sacrificed his life to absolve us.”

‘With the strength it derived from the source of historical truth, this new faith overthrew every obstacle. The blissful sense of being chosen was replaced by the liberating sense of redemption. But the fact of the parricide, in returning to the memory of mankind, had to overcome greater resistances than the other fact, which had constituted the subject-matter of monotheism; it was also obliged to submit to a more powerful distortion. The unnameable crime was replaced by the hypothesis of what must be described as a shadowy ‘original sin’.”

88. Ibid. GW XVI 196; SE XXIII 89 – 90
89. Ibid. GW XVI 194; SE XXIII 88
90. Ibid. GW XVI 244; SE XXIII 135
91. Ibid.
Chapter Three

A SYNTHESIS OF THE FREUDIAN CONCEPT OF RELIGION

One may find three important conceptions of religion in the works of Freud, namely, religion a neurosis, religion an illusion, and finally, religion a reconciliation. We consider each one of them separately.

A. Religion as Neurosis


1. The Notion of Neurosis

To consider religion as a neurosis, it is necessary to clarify the notion of neurosis here. Freud admitted that this term is very wide and...
vague. Generally it is understood to mean a mental conflict, more precisely, a conflict between the different 'functions' of mind, an emotional disturbance which results from unsuccessful resolution of unconscious conflicts. Evidently this is a more advanced concept. Actually we find an evolution of the meaning of this concept in the Freudian works, an evolution in the definition or better in the "delimitation" of the term.

In an essay of 1894, FREUD distinguished neurosis from psychosis. "Studies on hysteria" gave him more insight into the matter. Sexuality was seen as the core of neurotic troubles. FREUD based here the distinctions of mental illness mainly on this etiology of neurosis. Neurosis results from a fixation on, or a regression to some phase of infantile sexuality. As the concept of sex was widened, it has great repercussions on the comprehension of neurosis. When FREUD revised his "Libido theory" in 1914, he assumed that the ego was libidinally charged and he confirmed his position on the "narcissistic form of neurosis." This evolution of the term came to its climax in 1924, when FREUD distinguished neurosis and psychosis on the one...

6. Cfr. FREUD, Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905) GW V 142 – 45; SE VII 237 – 41. FREUD further admitted frankly: "In other words, we have once more come unawares upon the riddle which has so often confronted us: whence does neurosis come – what is its ultimate, its own peculiar raison d'etre? After tens of years of psycho-analytic labours, we are as much in the dark about this problem as we were at the start". FREUD, Inhibitions, Symptom and Anxiety (1926) GW XIV 180; SE XX 148 – 149.


8. The metapsychological concepts as developed by FREUD will be considered in Part Three of this work.


10. FREUD, Studies on Hysteria (1893 – 95) GW I, SE II; Sexuality in the Aetiology of the Neuroses (1898) GW I, SE III.


12. This point will be considered in Part Three. Roughly it means the Freudian theory about the sex-energy; cfr. Part Three, Chapter Seven, B 2.

13. FREUD, Narcissism: An Introduction, GW X SE XIV.

hand and actual neurosis on the other. The actual neurosis arises from the subject’s current sexual practices rather than from his past life. FREUD included the narcissistic form of neurosis in the first category.

We are interested here more in the obsessional form of neurosis. In 1909 FREUD confessed that his early definition of compulsive ideas was no more tenable. They are now understood by FREUD as “wishes, attempts, impulses, reflexions, doubts, prescriptions and prohibitions.” What is typical of an obsessional idea is its distortion from the original.

FREUD gave some psychological peculiarities of the obsessional form of neurosis. It is characterized by the degree of superstition involved, by its compulsive nature, by the need for uncertainty and for doubt, by the omnipotence of thoughts and by an ambivalence of emotions. Compulsion is an attempt to compensate for the doubt and to correct the intolerable conditions of inhibitions to which the doubt bears witness. The dammed-up psychic energy finds an outlet for its discharge in a substitutive act. FREUD says:

“This energy makes itself felt now in commands, now in prohibitions according as the affectionate impulse or the hostile one snatches control of the pathway leading to discharge.”

An obsessive-compulsive idea represents an act regressively, and owes its origin to a traumatic fixation at an early stage of development. This was clarified by FREUD in another work, The Disposition to Obsessional Neurosis, where he pointed out how the developmental process of mind could be arrested at a fixation to which a neurotic person regresses because of external disturbances. Thus the predisposing fixation is to be sought in a stage of libido development prior to the establishment of the object-choice.

The formation of the super-ego is stronger, according to FREUD, in the obsessional neurotics. Generally at the beginning of the latency period occur

15. FREUD, Notes upon a Case of Obsessional Neurosis (1909) GW VII 446; SE X 229.
16. Ibid. GW VII 449; SE X 222.
17. Ibid. GW VII 446f.; SE X 229f.
18. Ibid. GW VII 459; SE X 244.
19. FREUD, From the History of an Infantile Neurosis (1918) GW XII, SE XVII 8
20. 1913, GW VIII, SE XII
the dissolution of the Oedipus complex, the creation or consolidation of the super-ego and the establishment of a moral barrier in the ego. In the case of neurotics, especially of the obsessional kind, this process goes beyond normality:

"In addition to the destruction of the Oedipus complex a regressive degradation of the libido takes place, the super-ego becomes exceptionally severe and unkind, and the ego, in obedience to the super-ego, produces strong reaction- formations in the shape of conscientiousness, pity and cleanliness. Implacable, though not always on that account successful, severity is shown in condemning the temptation to continue early infantile masturbation, which now attaches itself to regressive (sadistic - anal) ideas but which nevertheless represents the unsubjugated part of the phallic organization."^21

In other words:

"Early trauma - defence - latency - outbreak of neurotic illness - partial return of the repressed. Such is the formula which we have laid down for the development of a neurosis."^22

From an economic point of view therefore, following the dual instinct theory of FREUD^23 that all drives are composed of a fusion of two primary instincts, sexual and aggressive, we can say that neurosis results from a dammed-up libido or sex energy — that is, from sexual frustrations. From a dynamic and structural point of view neurosis is a conflict that results from an attempt, often unsuccessful, to resolve an internal conflictual situation between the different mental functions, namely, the id, ego and super-ego, effected through a repression of the instinctual wishes that are unacceptable to the ego. Often they result in taboos or super-ego prohibitions. Neurotic symptoms are so to say compromises between the repressed wish (id) and the repressing agency (ego). Thus the dammed-up energy will be partly discharged in a disguised form. Those symptoms, therefore, act also as defence-mechanisms for the ego.

21. FREUD, Inhibitions, Symptom and Anxiety (1926) GW XIV 144; SE XX 114 — 115.
22. FREUD, Moses and Monotheism (1939) GW XVI 185; SE XXIII 80.

We give a summary of the Freudian Theory of Instincts in Part Three, Chapter Seven B.
2. The Supposed Similarities between Neurosis and Religion

FREUD compared neurosis with religion and *vice versa*. For him such a comparison between individual neurosis and the neurosis of mankind in general, and both with religion was valid; because as he says:

"The compromise character between obsessive actions as neurotic symptoms and the corresponding religious performances is most clearly perceived."\(^24\)

Summarizing those similarities pointed out by FREUD mainly in his work, *Obsessive Actions and Religious Practices*, we can enumerate\(^25\) them as follows:

- The prick of conscience in the case of omissions
- A practical isolation from the day-to-day activities
- Scrupulosity in the execution of the minutest details
- Domination of a sense of guilt
- Wish for punishment and self-imposed acts of penance
- Compromise-formations
- Psychic displacements

Out of these similarities it is more important to consider the sense of guilt:

"One can say that the one who suffers from compulsion and prohibitions behaves himself as if he were under the dominion of a sense of guilt, the origin of which he is not aware of, an unconscious sense of guilt, as one may express it.... This sense of guilt takes its origin from early psychic processes, but finds constant renewal in every subsequent new attempt which occasions a lurking sense of expectant anxiety, an expectation of misfortune which is connected with the notion of punishment."\(^26\)

According to FREUD this analogy is strengthened by the data provided by social psychology. FREUD wrote in *Totem and Taboo*:

"... for the horror of incest displayed by the savages has long been recognized as such and stands in need of no further interpretation. All that I have been able to add to our understanding of it is to emphasize the fact that it

\(^24\) FREUD, Obsessive Actions and Religious Practices, GW VII 138; SE IX 126.
\(^26\) FREUD, Obsessive Actions and Religious Practices GW VII 135; SE IX 123.
is essentially an *infantile* feature and that it reveals a striking agreement with the mental life of neurotic patients." 27

The neurotic prohibitions and the taboos of the savages share something in common, as stated earlier. 28 Again, there is an agreement in the ambivalence of emotional life of both savages and neurotics. 29

FREUD brought these similarities to the field of religion, where, however, he found the most clear agreement with neurosis in the case of the sense of guilt:

"The sense of guilt of obsessional neurotics finds its counterpart in the protestations of the pious people that they know that at heart they are miserable sinners." 30

The religious ceremonials and rituals have thus their value and worth as long as they serve as defensive and protective measures, the same way as compulsive actions cover up a deeper individual neurosis. Because:

"The formation of a religion, too, seems to be based on the suppression, the renunciation, of certain instinctual impulses. These impulses, however, are not, as in the neurosis exclusively components of the sexual instinct; they are self-seeking, socially harmful instincts, though, even so, they are usually not without sexual components." 31

The comparison between religion and neurosis was drawn out by FREUD again in his later work, *The Future of an Illusion*, especially when he dealt with the religious assets containing "important historical collections." 32

"We know that a human child cannot successfully complete its development to the civilized stage without passing through a phase of neurosis sometimes greater and sometimes of less distinctness... This is because so many instinctual demands which will later be unserviceable cannot be suppressed by the rational operation of the child’s intellect but have to be tamed by acts of repression... In just the same way, one might assume, humanity as a whole, in its development through the ages, fell into stages analogous to the neuroses and for the same reasons..." 33

27. FREUD, Totem and Taboo, GW IX 24; SE XIII 17.
29. FREUD, Totem and Taboo, GW IX 78; SE XIII 61.
31. Ibid. GW VII 137; SE IX 125.
32. FREUD, The Future of an Illusion, GW XIV 366; SE XXI 42.
33. Ibid. GW XIV 366 – 67; SE XXI 42 – 43.
Religion enters here as "the universal obsessional neurosis of humanity." But according to FREUD, paradoxically, religion sometimes helps individuals to escape from 'individual' neurosis. These and the like similarities led FREUD to conclude that religion was a neurosis.

3. Neurosis a Private Religion and Religion a Universal Neurosis

The above mentioned similarities and analogies led FREUD to conclude that religion was a neurosis:

"In view of these similarities and analogies one might venture to regard obsessional neurosis as a pathological counterpart of the formation of religion and to describe that neurosis as an individual religiosity and religion as a universal neurosis."

For:

"Obsessional neurosis presents a travesty, half comic and half tragic, of a private religion."

And:

"The ceremonials and prohibitions of obsessional neurotics drive us to suppose that they have created a private religion of their own."

Moreover:

34. Ibid.
35. Ibid. GW XIV 367; SE XXI 43 – 44. "It has been repeatedly pointed out (by myself and in particular by Theodor Reik) in how great detail the analogy between religion and obsessional neurosis can be followed out, and how many of the peculiarities and vicissitudes in the formation of religion can be understood in that light. And it tallies well with this that devout believers are safeguarded in a high degree against the risk of certain neurotic illness; their acceptance of the universal neurosis spares them the task of constructing a personal one". Cfr. also, Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of his Childhood, GW VIII 195; SE XI 123. – Civilization and Its Discontents, GW XIV 443 – 44; SE XXI 84 – 85. "At this price, by forcibly fixing them in a state of psychical infantilism and by drawing them into a mass-delusion, religion succeeds in sparing many people an individual neurosis."
37. Ibid. GW VII 132; SE IX 119
38. FREUD, Preface to Reik's Ritual: 'Psycho-Analytic Studies', GW XII 327; SE XVII 261.
“Some cases of obsessional neurosis actually behave like a caricature of a private religion, so that it is tempting to like the official religions to an obsessional neurosis that has been mitigated by becoming universalized. This comparison, which is no doubt highly objectionable to all believers, has nevertheless proved most fruitful psychologically. For psycho-analysis soon discovered in the case of obsessional neurosis what the forces are that struggle with one another in it till their conflicts find an expression in the ceremonial obsessive actions.”

Therefore:

“The neuroses exhibit on the one hand striking and far-reaching points of agreement with those great social institutions, art, religion and philosophy. But on the other hand they seem like distortions of them. It might be maintained that a case of hysteria is a caricature of a work of art, that an obsessional neurosis is a caricature of a religion and that a paranoic delusion is a caricature of a philosophical system.”

Gradually FREUD passed from this “private religion of neurosis” to religion in general as a universal neurosis:

“Religion would thus be the universal obsessional neurosis of humanity; like the obsessional neurosis in children, it arose out of the Oedipus complex, out of the relation to the father.”

Neurosis is a regression to an early traumatic experience. The same way religion in primeval times originated as an attempt to propitiate the sense of guilt aroused by the murder of the primal father. Therefore, an emotional ambivalence and conflict lie at the root of both religion and neurosis. “Thus we recognize that the roots of the need for religion are in the parental complex.”

“Our knowledge of the neurotic illness of individuals has been of much assistance to our understanding of the great social institutions. For the neuroses themselves have turned out to be attempts to find individual solutions for the problems of compensating for unsatisfied wishes, while the institutions seek to provide social solutions for the same problems. The recession of the social factor and the predominance of the sexual one turns

39. FREUD, A Short Account of Psycho-Analysis (1924) GW XIII 429; SE XIX 206
40. FREUD, Totem and Taboo, GW IX 91; SE XIII 73.
41. FREUD, The Future of an Illusion, GW XIV 367; SE XXI 43.
42. FREUD, Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of his Childhood, GW VIII 195; SE XI 123.
these neurotic solutions of the psychological problem into caricatures which are of no service except to help us in explaining such important questions.  

Thus FREUD passed from analogy to identity and defined religion as a neurosis of mankind. As PAUL RICOEUR points out, only one thing seems to attract the attention of FREUD, namely the gap between the private character of religion of the neurotic and the universal character of the neurosis of the religious man.

B. Religion as Illusion

Even though FREUD alluded to religion as an illusion in some of his earlier works, for example, in The Psychopathology of Everyday Life, it is in The Future of an Illusion that he affirmed unconditionally and categorically that religion was an illusion of mankind that had to be overcome at any cost.

1. Notion of Illusion

FREUD defined an illusion when it refers to faith as follows:
“Thus we call a belief an illusion when a wish - fulfilment is a prominent factor in its motivation, and in doing so we disregard its relations to reality, just as the illusion itself sets no store by verification.”

Hence psychologically an illusion is a wish-fulfilment; it is a derivative of the human wishes. However, here the question is about psychic illusions and

43. FREUD, The Claims of Psycho-Analysis to Scientific Interest, GW VIII 416; SE XIII 186.
44. P. RICOEUR, Freud and Philosophy, 233.
45. GW IV 287 – 88; SE VI 258 – 59
not about sense-organ illusions which result from malfunctioning of the sense organs. An illusion must be differentiated from an error, as it need not necessarily be an error. Again it is distinguishable from delusion which is always a contradiction to reality while an illusion not necessarily. Delusion represents a distortion of reality while illusion only an anticipation. Psychic projection is another typical characteristic of an illusion. One wishes for something and according to the intensity of the wish it will be illusorily projected into the external world. Thus a dream is an illusory wish-fulfilment.\(^47\)

Illusions have their creative as well as destructive sides. The ability to experience aesthetic pleasure implies a certain amount of illusions. But it does not interfere with the adaptation with reality. But in some cases an illusion brings about a confusion between the internal and external worlds where one is rendered unable to separate what takes place within and what belongs to the external world—they are cases of neurosis.

It is the congenital helplessness that forces the human being to seek satisfaction in illusory wish-fulfilment. When nothing else is possible one returns to oneself and consoles oneself through it.

Therefore, an illusion works out principally a wish-fulfilment through projection. However, \textsc{Freud} was not unaware of the difficulty in avoiding illusions in ordinary life. \textquote{I know how difficult it is to avoid illusions; perhaps the hopes I have confessed too are of an illusory nature.}\(^48\)

\(^{47}\) \textsc{Freud}, A Metapsychological Supplement to the Theory of Dreams, GW X 414; SE XIV 223.

\(^{48}\) \textsc{Freud}, The Future of an Illusion, GW XIV 376; SE XXI 53. Cfr. also, J.C. Flugel, Man, Morals and Society (London 1945) 232. \textquote{Two further considerations should perhaps be born in mind in assessing the values of \textquote{wishful} as contrasted with \textquote{realistic} thinking. The one relates to the general difficulty of knowing the real and being able to distinguish it from the wishful phantasies, the illusory...}\.

One finds the concept of illusion explained in a quite different manner in Indian Philosophy. Sankaracharya, one of the most important commentators of the Hindu sacred books (dates of his life uncertain; scholars trace to 8\textsuperscript{th} cent. A.D.) saw the whole world as Maya, a purely illusory manifestation of Brahman, of God. It meant the phenomenal character, the incomprehensibility of the world, the world as the appearance of God, the power of the self-expression of God; universe consisting of a series of thoughts and works, as dream.... Cfr. Commentary on Brhd Aranyaka Upanisad I, 5,2. S. Radhakrishnan (Ed.) History of Philosophy Eastern and Western II (London 1967) 279.
The congenital weakness and helplessness are the ultimate reason for such illusory wish-fulfilment. Through a psychic device one tries to achieve that which cannot be materially achieved.49

2. Religion a Protective Shield over the Helplessness of Man

Already in 1910 FREUD arrived at the conclusion that the ultimate ground of the formation of religion is the helplessness of man:

"Biologically speaking, religiousness is to be traced to the small human child's long-drawn-out helplessness and need for help; and when at a later date he perceives how truly forlorn and weak he is when confronted with the great forces of life, he feels his condition as he did in childhood, and attempts to deny his own dependency by a regressive renewal of the forces which protected his infancy."50

Later in his work The Future of an Illusion FREUD restated this conclusion:

"When the growing individual finds that he is destined to remain a child for ever, that he can never do without protection against strange superior powers, he lends those powers the features belonging to the figure of his father, he creates for himself the gods whom he dreads, whom he seeks to propitiate, whom he nevertheless entrusts with his own protection. Thus his longing for a father is a motive identical with his need for protection against the consequences of his human weakness. The defence against childish helplessness is what lends its characteristic features to the adult's reaction to the helplessness which he has to acknowledge — a reaction which is precisely the formation of religion."51

If ever there exists a source for the so called religious experience, the 'oceanic' feeling of religiosity, it must be traced back, according to FREUD, to this infantile helplessness of man:

"The derivation of religious needs from the infant's helplessness and the longing for the father aroused by it seems to me incontrovertible, especially since the feeling is not simply prolonged from childhood days, but is

50. FREUD, Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of his Childhood, GW VIII 195; SE XI 123.
permanently sustained by fear of the superior power of Fate. I cannot think of any need in childhood as strong as the need for a father's protection. Thus the part played by the oceanic feeling, which might seek something like the restoration of limitless narcissism, is ousted from a place in the foreground. The origin of the religious attitude can be traced back in clear outlines as far as the feeling of infantile helplessness.\textsuperscript{52}

Thus moved by the infantile helplessness before the ever growing perils of life the individual harks back to the mnemonic image ("Erinnerungsbild") of the father:

"When the human being has himself grown up, he knows, to be sure, that he is in possession of greater strength, but his insight into the perils of life has also grown greater, and he rightly concludes that fundamentally he still remains just as helpless and unprotected as he was in his childhood, that faced by the world he is still a child. Even now, therefore, he cannot do without protection which he enjoyed as a child. But he has long since recognized, too, that his father is a being of narrowly restricted power, and not equipped with every excellence. He therefore harks back to the mnemonic image of the father whom in his childhood he so greatly overvalued. He exalts the image into a deity and makes it into something contemporary and real. The effective strength of this mnemonic image and the persistence of his need for protection jointly sustain his belief in God."\textsuperscript{53}

And, this is according to FREUD the greatest contribution of psycho-analysis to religion:

"The last contribution to the criticism of the religious Weltanschauung was effected by psycho-analysis, by showing how religion originated from the helplessness of children and by tracing its contents to the survival into maturity of the wishes and needs of childhood. This did not precisely mean a contradiction of religion, but it was nevertheless a necessary rounding-off of our knowledge of it, and in one respect at least a contradiction, for religion itself lays claim to a divine origin. And, to be sure, it is not wrong in this, provided that our interpretation of God is accepted."\textsuperscript{54}

\textsuperscript{52} FREUD, Civilization and Its Discontents, GW XIV 430; SE XXI 72.
\textsuperscript{53} FREUD, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW XV 175 — 76; SE XXII 163.
\textsuperscript{54} Ibid. GW XV 180; SE XXI 167 — 68.
3. Religion a Wish-Fulfilment

FREUD remained firm in his conclusion on the psychic origin of religious ideas, a conclusion accepted by FREUD definitively and unconditionally:

"These, which are given out as teachings, are not precipitates of experience or end-results of thinking: they are illusions, fulfilment of the oldest, strongest and most urgent wishes of mankind. The secret of their strength lies in the strength of their wishes."\(^55\)

The bitter recognition of one's helplessness before the powers of nature and the painful impression that one is so to say eternally condemned to remain a child for ever, induce one to cling to a protector. Reviving the sweet memories of his childhood, he now exalts his "father" and attributes a number of qualities to him. The benevolent rule of a "provident" God allays his fear of the dangers of life. The establishment of a moral order ensures the fulfilment of the demands of justice. The prolongation of earthly existence into a future life brings about the bliss of infinite happiness.\(^56\) FREUD wrote in The Future of an Illusion:

"Thus the benevolent rule of a divine Providence allays our fear of the dangers of life; the establishment of a moral world-order ensures the fulfilment of the demands of justice, which have so often remained unfulfilled in human civilization; and the prolongation of earthly existence in a future life provides the local and temporal framework in which these wish-fulfilment shall take place."\(^57\)

In another context FREUD wrote as follows:

"The principle of avoiding unpleasure dominates human actions until it is replaced by a better one of adaptation to the external world. Pari passu with men's progressive control over the world goes a development in their Weltanschauung, their view of the universe as a whole. They turn away more and more from their original belief in their own omnipotence, rising from an animistic phase through a religious to a scientific one. Myths, religion and morality find their place in this scheme as attempts to seek a compensation for the lack of satisfaction of human wishes."\(^58\)

\(^{56}\) Ibid.
\(^{57}\) Ibid.
\(^{58}\) FREUD, Claims of Psycho-Analysis to Scientific Interest, GW VIII 416; SE XIII 186.
In this scheme of illusory fulfilment of wishes, FREUD meant, one gets answers for the riddles of life, as the origin of the universe, the nature of and the relation between body and mind and so on. In this sense FREUD recognizes religion as an enormous relief to the individual because it removes a certain amount of individual conflicts that arise from the father-complex:

"'Answers to the riddles that tempt the curiosity of man, such as how the universe began or what the relation is between body and mind, are developed in conformity with the underlying assumptions of this system. It is an enormous relief to the individual psyche if the conflicts of its childhood arising form the father-complex — conflicts which it has never wholly overcome — are removed from it and brought to a solution which is universally accepted.'"^59

Hence the individual is forced to console himself with illusions:

"'We shall tell ourselves that it would be very nice if there were a God who created the world and was a benevolent Providence, and if there were a moral order in the universe and an after-life; but it is a very striking fact that all this is exactly as we are bound to wish it to be. And it would be more remarkable still if our wretched, ignorant and downtrodden ancestors had succeeded in solving all these difficult riddles of the universe.'"^60

Religion, nevertheless, from its part goes on with its wish-phantasies. Thus for instance:

"'No other portion of the history of religion has become so clear to us as the introduction of monotheism into Judaism and its continuation in Christianity — if we leave on one side the development which we can trace no less uninterruptedly, from the animal totem to the human god with his regular companions. (Each of the four evangelists still has his own favourite animal)...: it was the religion of their primal father to which were attached their hope of reward, of distinction and finally of world-dominion. This last wishful phantasy, long abandoned by the Jewish people, still survives among the people's enemies in a belief in a conspiracy by the 'Elders of Zion'."^61

Thus religion, according to FREUD, not only individually but also collectively originated as a wish-fulfilment; it exists now as a wish-fulfilment, it promises to fulfil the wishes of mankind. It is therefore a wish-fulfilment. That is

60. Ibid. GW XIV 356; SE XXI 33.
61. FREUD, Moses and Monotheism, GW XVI 191; SE XXIII 85.
why F R E U D compared the operation of religion with dream-life:

"The sleeper may be seized with a presentiment of death, which threatens to place him in the grave. But the dream-work knows how to select a condition that will turn even that dreaded event into a wish-fulfilment... In the same way, a man makes the forces of nature not simply into persons with whom he can associate as he would with his equals — that would not do justice to the overpowering impression which those forces make on him — but he gives them the character of a father. He turns them into gods, following in this, as I have tried to show, not only an infantile prototype but a phylogenetic one." 62

An illusion essentially implies psychic projections. Hence the relation between religion and projection will be examined here.

4. Religion and the Projection of the Mnemic Image of the Father

In the Freudian psycho-analytic terminology projection means in general an unconscious process used as a defence mechanism. 63 Dream-work is a clear example for such a device. Thus F R E U D defined dream as a projection: "A dream is therefore also a projection, an externalization of an unconscious process." 64 Hence projection can be psychologically described as "a defence mechanism employed by the unconscious part of the ego, through which internal impulses and feelings that are unacceptable to the total personality are attributed to the external object, and then enter consciousness as disguised form of the external world." 65 Projection of this kind is a clear symptom in paranoia..

As in the case of a dream, so also in a projection takes place a distortion of the internal perception. F R E U D described the mechanism as follows:

"An inner perception is repressed and as a substitute for it, its content,

64. F R E U D, A Metapsychological Supplement to the Theory of Dreams, GW X 414; SE XIV 223.
after undergoing some adjustments, comes to the conscious life as an external perception.\textsuperscript{66}

Thus projection is often used as a defence mechanism. A perception that is made to disappear by motor activity is recognized as external, as reality; when such activity makes no difference, the perception originates in the subject's body, and it is not real. Reality is of great value to the individual and he would wish for it now. He therefore tries now to transfer those perceptions outwards, or to project them to the external world.\textsuperscript{67} According to Freud, wonder-works, prophetic dreams and so on come under this category. Thus the belief in the after-life is such a mythical projection. The primitives projected their evil tendencies to the demons\textsuperscript{68} and the image of the murdered father to the totem. Henceforth the totem became the "father-surrogate" for them.\textsuperscript{69}

Already in 1897 Freud explained to his friend W. Fliess how the interior perceptions of one's mind arouses illusions which are projected to the external world — the notion of psychomythology.\textsuperscript{70} The same mechanism works in the field of religion. Thus the Jewish people projected the "father-image" to Moses, who was their leader and "father", and Christians in their turn, not on to the father, but to Christ as the son of the primal father.\textsuperscript{71}

The whole history of religion, according to Freud, beginning with totemism up to most modern religions, is the history of psychic projections of this sort:

"The first step from totemism was the humanizing of the being who was worshipped. In place of the animals, human gods appear, whose derivation from the totem is not concealed. The god is represented either in the form of an animal or at least with an animal's face, or the totem becomes the god's favourite companion, inseparable from him, or legend tells us that the

\textsuperscript{66} Freud, Psycho-Analytic Notes on an Autobiographical Account of a Case of Paranoia, GW VIII 302 — 303; SE XII 66.
\textsuperscript{67} Cfr. Ibid. GW VIII 303 f.; SE XII 67 f.
\textsuperscript{68} Freud, Totem and Taboo, GW IX 77; SE XIII 61.
\textsuperscript{69} Ibid., GW IX 170; SE XIII 141
\textsuperscript{70} Freud, Aus den Anfängen der Psycho-Analyse (London 1950) 252
\textsuperscript{71} Freud, Moses and Monotheism, GW XVI 189; SE XXIII 83
god slew this precise animal, which was after all only a preliminary stage of himself.\textsuperscript{72}

Whether it is in the matriarchal or in the patriarchal traditions, the same mechanisms are at work according to FREUD. Thus one finds in the history of Christianity such projections very clearly:

"It is plausible to conjecture that remorse for the murder of Moses provided the stimulus for the wishful phantasy of the Messiah, who was to return and lead his people to redemption and the promised world-dominion. If Moses was the first Messiah, Christ became his substitute and successor....\textsuperscript{73}

If an illusion means a wish-fulfilment through the projection of one's repressed desires to the external world, for FREUD it was fully verified in the case of the formation of religion ontogenetically or phylogenetically. Thus he defined religious ideas as psychic illusions: "religious ideas are illusions, fulfilments of the oldest, strongest and most urgent wishes of mankind."\textsuperscript{74} It must be taken for granted that he arrived at such a conclusion very early in his career, as early as 1901.\textsuperscript{75} He remained firm in this conclusion through out his life, and therefore repeated it on several occasions.\textsuperscript{76} Thus a personal God was for him psychologically nothing other than an "exalted father".\textsuperscript{77}

To conclude, religion is, according to FREUD, an illusion, a destructive defence mechanism, an infantile displacement of omnipotence and omniscience to God outside, a paranoic projection of one's own wishful phantasies. It is subject to belief and not to proof. Therefore, it is confined to the intra-psychic world of the individual, and not confirmed by the world of realities.

\textsuperscript{72} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{73} Ibid. GW XVI 196; SE XXIII 89.
\textsuperscript{74} FREUD, The Future of an Illusion, GW XIV 352; SE XXI 32
\textsuperscript{75} Cfr. FREUD, The Psychopathology of Everyday Life, GW IV 288; SE VI 259
\textsuperscript{77} FREUD, Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of his Childhood, GW VIII 195; SE XI 123; Totem and Taboo, GW IX 177; SE XIII 147
C. Religion as Reconciliation

As stated earlier\textsuperscript{78}, according to the explanations given by FREUD, the supposed original tragedy which was grounded on the Oedipus wishes and sexual jealousy, stands at the root of civilization and its assets. This primal crime gave rise to a deep sense of guilt in the whole posterity. The remorse over it demanded an act of atonement with the murdered father. The primitive people therefore made a peace-pact with the "father".\textsuperscript{79} They made a god out of the "father" (that is, father-image) and thereupon religion exists as a covenant with God.

1. Emotional Ambivalence and the Formation of Religion

By emotional ambivalence ("Gefühlsambivalenz") FREUD meant in general a kind of polarisation ("die Gegensätzlichkeit") of the emotional life.\textsuperscript{80} He was indebted to BLEULER for this term.\textsuperscript{81} However, we do not know much about the origin of such a factor, according to FREUD:

"We know nothing of the origin of this ambivalence. One possible assumption is that it is a fundamental phenomenon of our emotional life. But it seems to me quite worth considering another possibility, namely that originally it formed no part of our emotional life but was acquired by the human race in connection with their father-complex, (or, more correctly, their parental complex) precisely where the psycho-analytic examination of the modern individuals still finds it revealed at its

\textsuperscript{78} Cfr. above, the summary of the book, Totem and Taboo
\textsuperscript{79} According to FREUD, the whole system of totemism, the original form of religion came to being this way. FREUD, Totem and Taboo, GW IX 175 — 76; SE XIII 141 — 46.
\textsuperscript{80} Cfr. FREUD, Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW XI 443; SE XVI 427 — 28
\textsuperscript{81} E. BLEULER (1857 — 1939), professor of Psychiatry at the University of Zürich, and a defender of Psycho-Analysis. FREUD admitted his indebtedness to him for this concept. Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW XI 443; SE XVI 427 — 28; An Autobiographical Study, GW XIV 77; SE XX 51
strongest.\textsuperscript{82}

The substance of such an ambivalence is the direction towards the same person of contrary (affectionate and hostile) feelings:

"I have often had occasion to point out that emotional ambivalence in the proper sense of the term — that is, the simultaneous existence of love and hate towards the same object — lies at the root of many important cultural institutions. We know nothing of the origin of this ambivalence. One possible assumption is that it is a fundamental phenomenon of our emotional life."\textsuperscript{83}

The Freudian concept of emotional ambivalence is intimately connected with the theory of Oedipus complex. From the story of Oedipus FREUD went back to a real Oedipus history:

"Like Oedipus we live in ignorance of these wishes, repugnant to morality, which however, the nature has forced upon us.\textsuperscript{84}

From the early childhood days one looks for means to realize these wishes. In FREUD'S opinion, probably it is determined by our nature\textsuperscript{85} to direct our first (sexual) affection towards mother and a corresponding hatred to father, as our dreams point out. King Oedipus who killed his father and married his mother Jokaste, "is only a wish-fulfilment of our childhood.\textsuperscript{86}

From an ethnological point of view FREUD explained how such an ambivalence was clearly manifest in the behaviour of primitive people. Sexual jealousy of the sons who were exploited by their cruel father in taking for himself all the females of the clan, impelled them to form an aggressive front against him:

"... we need only suppose that the tumultuous mob of brothers were filled with the same contradictory feelings which we can see at work in the ambivalent father-complexes of our children and of our neurotic patients. They hated their father, who presented such a formidable obstacle to their craving power and their sexual desires; but they loved and admired him too. After they had got rid of him, had satisfied their hatred and had put into effect their wish to identify themselves with him, the affection which

\textsuperscript{82} FREUD, Totem and Taboo, GW IX 189; SE XIII 157
\textsuperscript{83} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{84} FREUD, The Interpretation of Dreams, GW II/III 270; SE IV 263
\textsuperscript{85} FREUD, Thoughts for the Times on War and Death, GW X 353; SE XIV 299
\textsuperscript{86} Cfr. FREUD, Dostoevsky and Parricide, GW XIV 407 — 12; SE XXI 183 — 88
had all this time been pushed under was bound to make itself felt. It did so in the form of remorse... felt by the whole group. The dead father became stronger than the living one had been — for events took the course we so often see them follow in human affairs to this day." 87

Such an ambivalence is at the root of the important cultural institution of religion 88 and it persists to these days in almost every form of religion:

"The tension of ambivalence was evidently too great for any contrivance to be able to counteract it; or it is possible that psychological conditions in general are unfavourable to getting rid of these antithetical emotions. However that may be, we find that the ambivalence implicit in the father-complex persists in totemism and in religions generally." 89

Therefore:

"As a substitute for a longing for the father, it contains the germ from which all religions have evolved." 90

The primitive "totem-meal", the shadow of which is seen in every religion, for example in the Christian Eucharist, 91 presents a clear example of the ma-

87. FREUD, Totem and Taboo, GW IX 172–73; SE XIII 143
88. Or, Ibid. GW IX 169–76, 189; SE XIII 140–46, 157. In another context FREUD wrote: "Of all the images of childhood which, as a rule is no longer remembered, none is more important for a youth or a man than that of his father. Organic necessity introduces into a man's relation to his father an emotional ambivalence which we have found most strikingly expressed in the Greek myth of King Oedipus. Little boy is bound to love and admire his father, who seems to him most powerful, the kindest and wisest creature in the world. God himself is after all only an exaltation of this picture of the father as he is represented in the mind of early childhood. But soon the other side of this emotional relationship emerges. One's father is recognized as the paramount disturber of one's instinctual life; he becomes a model not only to imitate but also to get rid of, in order to take his place. Thenceforward affectionate and hostile impulses towards him persist side by side, often to the end of one's life, without either of them being able to do away with the other. It is in this existence of contrary feelings side by side that lies the essential character of what we call emotional ambivalence". FREUD, Some Reflections on Schoolboy Psychology, GW X 206–7; SE XIII 243
89. FREUD, Totem and Taboo, GW IX 175; SE XII 145
90. FREUD, The Ego and the Id, GW XIII 265; SE XIX 37
91. FREUD, Totem and Taboo, GW IX 186; SE XIII 155. "The Christian communion, however, is essentially a fresh elimination of the father, a repetition of the guilty deed". In the original, "Die christliche Kommunion ist aber im Grunde eine neuerliche Beseitigung des Vaters, eine Wiederholung der zu sühnenden Tat". FREUD found a confirmation for his position in J.G. FRAZER: "The Christian communion has absorbed within itself a sacrament which is doubtless far older than Christianity". Quoted Ibid.
The emotional polarisation:

"In relation to the totem animal the original didhptomy was wholly retained. On the one hand the totem was regarded as the clan's blood ancestor and protective spirit, who must be worshipped and protected, and on the other hand, as a fearful and terrifying power which must be feared and obeyed. The totem was regarded as the clan's blood ancestor and protective spirit."

Freud concluded:

"Totemic religion arose from the filial sense of guilt, in an attempt to allay that feeling and to appease the father by deferred obedience to him. All later religions are seen to be attempts at solving the same problem, although their forms have been altered by external influences."

According to Freud, the psychological mechanism of the "return of the repressed" played and still continues to play a great role in the evolution of religions. Freud described the mechanism and the process of the return of the repressed as follows:

"As a result of the experience, an instinctual demand arises which calls for satisfaction. The ego resists that satisfaction, either because it is opposed by the magnitude of the demand, or because it recognizes it as a danger. The ego resists the demand, and the demand is repressed."

"After the institution of the combination of brother clan, matrilineal exogamy and totemism, a development began which must be described as a gradual and continuous repressed, played and still continues to play a great role in the evolution of religions."

The Archetypal Heritage and the Return of the Repressed in Religion

Rest. 93.94. FREUD, Moses and Monotheism, GW XVI 233-36; SE XXIII 240-41; SE XXIII 132

FREUD, Totem and Taboo, GW IX 174; SE XI 146-47

FREUD, Moses and Monotheism, GW XV 188; SE XXIII 82

FREUD, Moses and Monotheism, GW XV 240-41; SE XXIII 132
stinctual impulse is some way inhibited, its precipitating cause, with its attendant perceptions and ideas, is forgotten. This, however, is not the end of the process: the instinct has either retained its forces, or collects them again, or it is reawakened by some new precipitating cause. Thereupon it renews its demand, and, since, the path to normal satisfaction remains closed to it by what we may call the scar of repression, somewhere at a weak spot, it opens another path for itself to what is known as substitutive satisfaction, which comes to light as a symptom, without the acquisitiveness of the ego, but also without its understanding. All the phenomena of the formation of symptoms may justly be described as the "return of the repressed." 96

In dream-analysis FREUD obtained the key to open the dark mine of those primeval times. He defined dream as "a regression to the dreamer's earliest condition, a revival of his childhood." 97

Both on the ontogenetic as well as on the phylogenetic level dreams were seen as the royal road to the subterranean layers of mind.

Thus the primitive man, FREUD tells us, survives in us, in our unconscious, often unchanged. These survivals of the unconscious, which are comparable to the "screen memories" ("Deckerinnerungen") 98 of childhood, come to the fore through the mechanism of the "return of the repressed."

The whole process of the return of the repressed is complicated in itself:

"But a fresh complication arises when we become aware of the probability that what may be operative in an individual's psychical life may include not only what he has experienced himself but also things that were innately present in him at his birth, elements with a phylogenetic origin—an archaic heritage." 99

Instinctual drives by nature demand gratification. The self or the ego from its part often resents and refuses their satisfaction on different grounds, often in order to fend off an external danger. The drive itself is now inhibited and frustrated, the precipitating cause forgotten. But by the reawakening of a new cause, it renews its demands, and "since the path to normal satisfaction remains closed to it by what we may call the scar of repression, somewhere at a

96. Ibid. GW XVI 235—36; SE XXIII 127
97. FREUD, The Interpretation of Dreams, GW II/III 554; SE V 548
98. FREUD, The Psychopathology of Everyday Life, GW IV 56; SE VI 48
99. FREUD, Moses and Monotheism, GW XVI 204—205; SE XXIII 98
weak spot, it opens another path for itself to what is known as a substitutive satisfaction which comes to light as a symptom."\(^{100}\)

FREUD applied these findings to religion and found that:

"Religious phenomena are only to be understood on the pattern of the individual neurotic symptoms familiar to us — as the return of long since forgotten, important events in the primaeval history of the human family — and that they have to thank precisely this origin for their compulsive character and that, accordingly, they are effective on human beings by force of the historical truth of their content."\(^{101}\)

Therefore, the faith in a unique God is merely the return of that one person existed long time ago and through the memory of mankind now exalted as God. And this is the sole historical truth of religion for FREUD:

"We have rather found, on the contrary, that our intellect very easily goes astray without any warning, and that nothing is more easily believed by us than what, without reference to the truth, comes to meet our wishful illusions. We must for that reason add a reservation to our agreement. We too believe that the pious solution contains the truth — but the historical truth and not the material truth. And we assume the right to correct a certain distortion to which this truth has been subjected on its return. That is to say, we do not believe that there is a single great god today, but that in primaeval times there was a single person who was bound to appear huge at that time and who afterwards returned in men's memory elevated to divinity."\(^{102}\)

3. Religion 'a Covenant with the Father'\(^{103}\)

Once again parting from the same point of departure, FREUD stated that the deep and permanent sense of guilt aroused by the primal crime, brought all men together before the murdered father, or better, before the mnemonic image of the father, in order to sign a peace-pact with him. This was the first step to an original form of religion, totemism, from which other forms of religion came into being.

100. Ibid. GW XVI 235; SE XXIII 127
101. Ibid. GW XVI 160; SE XXIII 58
102. Ibid. GW XVI 237 — 38; SE XXIII 129
103. FREUD, Totem and Taboo, GW IX 174; SE XIII 144
Totemic religion arose from the filial sense of guilt, in an attempt to allay that feeling and to appease the father by deferred obedience to him. All later religions are seen to be attempts at solving the same problem.¹⁰⁴

In the totemic system the totem was the father-surrogate. Religion is therefore always a pact of reconciliation with the father re-emerging in men's mind and elevated to divinity. Freud wrote in Totem and Taboo:

"On the other hand, the claim of totemism to be regarded as a first attempt at a religion is based on the first of these taboos — that upon taking the life of the totem animal. The animal struck the sons as a natural and obvious substitute for their father; but the treatment of it which they found imposed on themselves expressed more than the need to exhibit their remorse. They could attempt, in their relation to this surrogate father, to allay their burning sense of guilt, to bring about a kind of reconciliation with their father. The totemic system was, as it were, a covenant with their father, in which he promised them everything that a childish imagination may expect from a father — protection, care and indulgence — while on their side they undertook to respect his life, that is to say, not to repeat the deed which had brought destruction on their real father."¹⁰⁵

"All later religions", Freud continued, "are seen to be attempts at solving the same problem."¹⁰⁶

The idea of sacrifice ("Opfer") among the primitives gives us another clue to go deeper in this matter. Freud, following the ethnologist Robertson Smith recognized sacrifice among the primitives as "nothing other than 'an act of fellowship between the deity and his worshippers'."¹⁰⁷ Such an offer- ceremony was always a feast of the whole clan.

"Religion in general was an affair of the community and religious duty was a part of social obligation. Everywhere a sacrifice involves a feast and a feast cannot be celebrated without sacrifice. The sacrificial feast was an oc-

¹⁰⁴. Ibid. GW IX 175; SE XIII 145
¹⁰⁵. Ibid. GW IX 174 — 75; SE XIII 144
¹⁰⁶. Ibid. GW IX 175; SE XIII 145
¹⁰⁷. Ibid. GW IX 162; SE XIII 133. In the totemic stage such a sacrifice was intimately connected with the totem animal. But as time went on, "the animal lost its sacred character and the sacrifice lost its connection with the totem feast; it became a simple offering to the deity, an act of renunciation in favour of the god. God himself had become so far exalted above mankind that he could only be approached through an intermediary — the priest". Freud, Totem and Taboo, GW IX 181; SE XIII 150
casion on which individuals rose joyously above their own interests and stressed the mutual dependence existing between one another and their god."\(^{108}\)

One should look at the primitive "totem-meal" ("die Totemmahlzeit") from this background. The annual killing and the ceremonial eating of the totem, a participation in the feastly banquet, all these meant an act of communion with god.

"Eating and drinking with a man was a symbol and a confirmation of fellowship and mutual social obligations. What was directly expressed by the sacrificial meal was only the fact that the god and his worshippers were 'commensals' (that is, that they sat at one table), but every other point in their mutual relations was included in this."\(^{109}\)

Thus the totem-meal among the primitives was a sign and symbol of their covenant with their father, with god. The commemoration of the mythical tragedy\(^{110}\) which appeased their sense of guilt and approved their justifica-

\(^{108}\) Ibid. GW IX 163; SE XIII 134

\(^{109}\) Ibid. With a reference to the primal murder of the father or the 'original sin', FREUD wrote in his Autobiography: "Now whether we suppose that such a possibility was a historical event or not, it brings the formation of religion within the circle of the father-complex and bases it upon the ambivalence which dominates that complex. After the totem animal had ceased to serve as a substitute for him, the primal father, at once feared and hated, revered and envied, became the prototype of God himself. The son's rebelliousness and his affection for his father struggled against each other through a constant succession of compromises, which sought on the one hand to atone for the act of parricide and on the other to consolidate the advantages it had brought. This view of religion throws a particularly clear light upon the psychological basis of Christianity, in which, as we know, the ceremony of the totem meal still survives with but little distortion, in the form of Communion. I should like explicitly to mention that this last observation was not made by me but is to be found in the works of Robertson Smith and Frazer." FREUD, An Autobiographical Study, GW XIV 94; SE XX 68

\(^{110}\) Here the allusion is to the hypothesis of the 'primal crime', the supposed murder of the primal father. In a footnote FREUD added: "The hypothesis, which has such a monstrous air, of the tyrannical father being overwhelmed and killed by a combination of his exiled sons, was also arrived at by Atkinson (1903, 220f.) as a direct implication of the state of affairs in Darwin's primal horde: 'The patriarch had only one enemy who he should dread ... a youthful band of brothers living together in forced celibacy, or at most in ployandrous relation with some single female captive! A horde as yet weak in their impubescence they are, but they would, when strength was gained with time, inevitably wrench by combined attacks, renewed again and again, both wife and life from
tion before the father (God) was an act of covenant with him. This covenantal aspect is some way or other retained in different religions under the symbolic sacrifices which are an essential aspect of every religion. 111 Thus in the case of the Jewish religion FREUD argued:

"In a fresh rapture of moral asceticism they imposed more and more new instinctual renunciations on themselves and in that way reached - in doctrine and precept, at least - ethical heights which had remained inaccessible to the other peoples of antiquity. Many Jews regard this attainment of ethical heights as the second main characteristic and the second great achievement of their religion... These ethical ideas cannot, however, disavow their origin from the sense of guilt felt on account of a suppressed hostility to God. They possess the characteristic - uncompleted and incapable of completion - of obsessional neurotic reaction-formations; we can guess, too, that they serve the secret purposes of punishment." 112

However, this sacrificial aspect is all the more clear in the Christian religion founded by Paul:

"Original sin and redemption by the sacrifice of a victim became the foundation stones of the new religion founded by Paul. It must remain uncertain whether there was a ringleader and instigator to the murder among the band of brothers who rebelled against the primal father, or whether such a figure was created later by the imagination of creative artists in order to turn themselves into heroes, and was then introduced into the tradition... It is worth noticing how the new religion dealt with the ancient ambivalence in the relation to the father. Its main content was, it is true, reconciliation with God the Father, atonement for the crime committed

the paternal tyrant'." FREUD, Totem and Taboo, GW IX 172; SE XIII 142, footnote 1. FREUD here refers to ATKINSON, Primal Law (1903) 220 — 21.

111. FREUD studies this question in Totem and Taboo, GW 161 — 72; SE XIII 131 — 42. Here we take religion and sacrifice in their broad sense. We do not deny that some 'religions', Buddhism for example, reject all sacrifices. Yet as scholars say: "Die Wichtigkeit des Opfers ist aber zu keiner Zeit geleugnet worden und der Opfergedanke selbst auch in den höchsten Religionen nie erloschen. Der Glaube und die Gewissheit, daß nur durch Zerstörung eines Wertes Wege zur Neuschöpfung, nur durch den Tod neue Möglichkeiten des Lebens gegeben sind, daß die schaffende Macht immer im Fluß sein muß und nicht selbstsüchtig bewahrt werden darf, läßt keine Religion ohne den Gedanken des Opfers - von seiner rohesten bis zur höchst vergeistigten Form - bestehen". A. SCHIMMEL, "Opfer: Religionsgeschichtlich", in K. GALLING (Hrsg.), Religion in der Geschichte und Gegenwart IV (Tübingen 1960) S. 1641

112. FREUD, Moses and Monotheism, GW XVI 243 — 44; SE XXIII 134 — 35
against him; but the other side of the emotional relation showed itself in the fact that the son, who had taken the atonement on himself, became a god himself beside the father and, actually, in the place of the father. Christianity, having arisen out of a father-religion became a son-religion. It has not escaped the fate of having to get rid of the father."113

To conclude, an emotional ambivalence stood, according to FREUD, at the epigenesis of religion. The primitive man wanted to wash away the original sense of guilt. He therefore, signed a peace-pact with the father, that is, with the mnemonic image of the father re-emaged in his unconscious. Religion thus became a pact, a covenant of reconciliation. The ‘return of the repressed’ exhausts its contents.

D. Summary of the Freudian Outlook on Religion

We picked out and analysed the texts from Freudian literature, at least the principal texts which deal with religion. We found that FREUD was interested in the question of religion from the very beginning of his public career to the last days of his life.

Neurosis, illusion, reconciliation, these are the three terms under which we summarized the Freudian concept of religion. To look at it as a neurosis, FREUD started with resemblances (1907)114, but gradually analogy gave way to identity (1913,1927,1939)115. FREUD always stood firm in his conclusion that religion was an outcome of the emotional conflict that results from the Oedipus wishes coupled with the human helplessness.

Rationalism and Scientism pertaining to that era echoed in FREUD’S statement that religion was an illusion, a wish-fulfilment, comparable to the dream-life. The hypothesis of the primal crime was ample evidence for him to conclude that religion arose as a pact of reconciliation with the murdered father whose image survived in the “racial unconscious” of the whole progeny.

113. Ibid. GW XVI 245; SE XXIII 135 – 36
114. FREUD, Obsessive Actions and Religious Practices, GW VII, SE IX
115. FREUD, Totem and Taboo, GW IX; SE XIII; The Future of an Illusion, GW XIV; SE XXI, Moses and Monotheism, GW XVI, SE XXIII
1. Twofold Motivation behind the Formation of Religion

FREUD distinguished two motives for the formation of religion and established a strict connection between them:

"It is, of course, my duty to point out the connecting links between what I said earlier and what I put forward now, between the deeper and the manifest motives, between the father-complex and man's helplessness and need for protection.

These connections are not hard to find. They consist in the relation of the child's helplessness to the helplessness of the adult which continues it. So that, as was to be expected, the motives for the formation of religion which psycho-analysis revealed now turn out to be the same as infantile contribution to the manifest motives."^{116}

Religion is therefore, "the sweet - or bitter sweet - poison from childhood"^{117}, a scar of the childhood, a relic of the past, an archaic heritage.

2. The Truth of Religion

FREUD was once asked whether his last book on religion - Moses and Monotheism contained anything more than what was already pointed out in The Future of an Illusion. He replied that it differed from the early work in one respect - in admitting that religion was not entirely based on illusion but also contained a historical germ of truth to which it owed its effectiveness.^^{118}

Hence we can say that the Freudian approach to religion implies two main aspects, namely a search for the "psychological significance of religious ideas."^^{119} and an inquiry into "the historical truth" contained in it.^^{120} Psychologically religion is an illusory wish-fulfilment, a paranoid projection and an infantile regression to and a fixation at an early phase of development. Gradually it has become a universal neurosis of mankind. On the other hand,

116. FREUD, The Future of an Illusion, GW XIV 345; SE XXI, 23
117. Ibid. GW XIV 373; SE XXI 49
118. FREUD, Moses and Monotheism, GW XVI 238; SE XXIII 129
119. FREUD, The Future of an Illusion, GW XIV 346; SE XXI 25
120. FREUD, Moses and Monotheism, GW XVI 238; SE XXIII 129
"the return of the repressed" and the "archaic heritage" exhaust the historical content of religion.

The inborn helplessness of man before the internal as well as the external threats is the *raison d'être* of the formation of religion. In a situation of sheer helplessness one naturally looks for and runs after protection. The sweet memories of his childhood induce him to regress to those infantile stages. He then projects power of omnipotence which alone would ward off his threats, to the "father" and wishes very much that his needs be satisfied. Thus religion is an illusory wish-fulfilment, an *illusion*. At the same time it is a *neurosis* as long as it is a regression to, a fixation at and a scar of the childhood, an arrest at immaturity and an emotional conflict. It is at the same time a covenant with the "father" who is both loved and hated; it is a promise to live in peace with him and to lead a "good" life. Thus religion is also a *reconciliation*. 
PART TWO

THE FREUDIAN CONCEPT OF MORALITY

FREUD did not leave behind any systematic treatise on morality. Nor did he care to answer some fundamental questions about it. To be frank, he was neither consistent in his approach nor clear enough in his formulations. Yet some important conclusions can be deduced from his very mode of approach to the problem of morality.

FREUD wanted to preach an ethics of liberation, an ethics freed from all religious illusions, which alone would liberate the individual from himself and from the pressures of the external world. However, he could never discover the genealogy of such a morality, as he could never arrive at the beginning and the "end" or the Omega-point of such an ethical sense.

All the same, FREUD confessed that morality is, so to say, an overcoat, which we put off every evening in order to put it on the next morning.¹ Probably because of the complications involved in such a profound question, he had to admit: "I do not break my head very much about the problem of good and evil",² although he claimed for himself to be "a very moral person".³

Here we first enumerate in Chapter IV the terms used by FREUD in connection with morality, and add a word about his very mode of approach.

¹ FREUD, Thoughts for the Times on War and Death (1915) GW X 338; SE XIV 286. "... wissen wir, daß wir mit jedem Einschlafen unsere mühsam erworbene Sittlichkeit wie ein Gewand von uns werfen — um es am Morgen wieder anzuziehen".

² Letter to PFISTER (Oct. 10, 1918) FREUD / PFISTER, Psychoanalysis and Faith (London) 1963) 61

³ Letter to Dr. PUTNAM, E. JONES, LWF II 463
Chapter V introduces morality in its inherited and institutionalized form as a systematic code of conduct as seen by FREUD. The positive ethical values respected by him will be collected in the next Chapter.
Chapter Four

USE OF THE TERM MORALITY IN THE GW

FREUD used different terms in connection with morality such as "Moral", "Sittlichkeit" and "Ethik".

A. Frequency of the Terms in Different Works

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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>SE Schriften aus dem Nachlaß (XVII)</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Sit. ....... Sittlichkeit</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Eth. ...... Ethik</td>
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B. Graphic Structure of the Frequency

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<th>GW</th>
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<th>Sittlichkeit</th>
<th>Ethik</th>
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<tr>
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<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(1900 - 1901)</td>
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<td>12</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(1901 - 1904)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>V</td>
<td>(1904 - 1905)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI</td>
<td>(1905)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>(1906 - 1909)</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>32</td>
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<td>(1909 - 1913)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(1912 - 1913)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>(1913 - 1917)</td>
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<td>21</td>
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<td>(1932 - 1939)</td>
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<td>XVII</td>
<td>(1892 - 1938)</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td></td>
<td>175</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>364</td>
</tr>
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</table>
C. A Disjunctive Use of the Terms

It must be reasonably supposed that FREUD used the different terms as “Moral”, “Sittlichkeit” and “Ethik” rather loosely and interchangeably, without taking into consideration any technical difference between them.

Some examples may illustrate this supposition. In the same context, for example, FREUD used “Sittlichkeit” and immediately afterwards “Moral”. Speaking about the origin of morality he used sometimes “Sittlichkeit”, in some other places “Moral” and still in other places “Ethik”. The following texts from different works may clarify it.

Comparing an ontogenetic Oedipus complex with a phylogenetic one, FREUD wrote:

“It may be that something quite similar occurs in the prehistoric epoch of the human species as a whole and that the beginnings of morality, religion and social order were intimately connected with the surmounting of that primaeval era.”

“Religion, morality, and a social sense — the chief elements in the higher side of man — were originally one and the same thing”.

“And here, the discovery was made that a third and extremely serious part

1. FREUD, Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis (1917) GW XI 343; SE XVI 331. These differences can be compared only in the original.
2. FREUD, The Claims of Psycho-Analysis to Scientific Interest (1913) GW VIII 415—16; SE XII 186—87; Totem and Taboo (1913) GW IX 172, 176, 188, 189 (Footnote); SE XIII 142, 146, 156, 157; On the History of Psycho-analytic Movement (1914) GW X 78; SE XIV 37; Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW XI 450; SE XVI 434; Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (1921) GW XIII 136; SE XVIII 122; Psycho-Analysis (1923) GW XIII 229; SE XVII 254; The Ego and the Id (1923) GW XIII 166; SE XIX 38.
3. FREUD, The Ego and the Id, GW XIII 265; SE XIX 37; An Autobiographical Study (1925) GW XIV 92; SE XX 66; Moses and Monotheism (1938—39) GW XVI 226, 228; SE XXIII 118.
4. FREUD, On the History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement GW X 108; SE XIV 61; A Short Account of Psycho-Analysis (1924) GW XIII 426; SE XIX 208; Civilization and Its Discontents GW XIV 502; SE XXI 142; Moses and Monotheism, GW XVI 224; SE XXIII 116, 135.
5. FREUD, The Resistances to Psycho-Analysis (1925) GW XIV 108; SE XIX 220—21. Here in the original “Sittlichkeit” is used.
6. FREUD, The Ego and the Id, GW XIII 265; SE XIX 37. Here “Moral” is used in the original.
of human intellectual activity, the part which has created the great institutions of religion, law, ethics, and all forms of civic life, has as its fundamental aim the enabling of the individual to master his Oedipus complex and to divert his libido from its infantile attachments into the social ones that are ultimately desired".

On one occasion both "Sittlichkeit" and "Moral" were explicitly used together: "In this way the Oedipus complex proves to be — as has already been conjectured in a historical sense — the source of our individual ethical sense, our morality".

Before we conclude this Chapter a word must be said about FREUD's approach towards morality.

D. Ambivalence of the Freudian Approach

A dialectic or an ambivalence can be perceived in many of the Freudian formulations. Such a 'dualism' is reflected also in his approach towards morality.

FREUD apprehended moral awareness as an expression of an interior ambivalence: "... the sense of guilt is an expression of the conflict due to ambivalence, of the eternal struggle between Eros and the instinct of destruction or death". In this context 'the sense of guilt' ("das Schuldgefühl") stands for moral conscience or morality as such.

On the one hand, FREUD spoke of morality in terms of taboos, in

7. FREUD, A Short Account of Psycho-Analysis, GW XIII 426; SE XIX 208. Here "Ethik" is used.
8. FREUD, The Economic Problem of Masochism (1924) GW XIII 380; SE XIX 167 – 68
9. Freud adhered to a dualism in almost all his theoretical formulations. In libido-theory, for example, Ego-libido / Object-libido, life-instincts / destruction-instincts, pleasure principle / reality principle etc.
11. FREUD, Civilization and Its Discontents, GW XIV 486; SE XXI 126
stinct-restraints,\textsuperscript{12} sense of guilt,\textsuperscript{13} prescriptions and prohibitions,\textsuperscript{14} categorical imperative.\textsuperscript{15} On the other hand, he defined morality as "the self-evident",\textsuperscript{16} in terms of love of mankind ("Menschenliebe"):\textsuperscript{17} "Ethics are not based on an external world order, but on the inescapable exigencies of human cohabitation".\textsuperscript{18}

These examples point to the mutually opposing aspects of the Freudian conception of morality. FREUD could perceive only some black blanks and cloudy shades in the inherited moral systems. The institutionalized morality has, in his outlook, a character of moralism, which is comparable to the "super-morality" ("Übermoral") among the neurotics. The compulsive neurotics develop a kind of super-morality in order to defend their object-love against enemies. A certain amount of this process, FREUD would say, is typical to the development of the ego and to the origin of morality in every individual.\textsuperscript{19}

On the other hand, FREUD never gave an explanation to what he really meant by the self-evidence of morality, although he used some positive conceptions related to it as the love of mankind, high ideals, moral person and the like. At any rate, one thing is certain. FREUD approached the question of morality from two basically different and opposing angles, from positive and negative poles. Any attempt to deal with the Freudian concept of morality must take into account this factor.

\textsuperscript{12} FREUD, Moses and Monotheism, GW XVI 187; SE XXIII 81
\textsuperscript{13} FREUD, Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW XI 344; SE XVI 332
\textsuperscript{14} FREUD, Thoughts for the Times on War and Death, GW X 348; SE XIV 294
\textsuperscript{15} FREUD, Totem and Taboo, GW IX 4; SE XIII 14; The Ego and the Id GW XIII 263; SE XIX 35; The Economic Problem of Masochism, GW XIII 380; SE XX 167 – 68
\textsuperscript{16} FREUD, On Psychotherapy, GW V 25; SE VII 267
\textsuperscript{17} FREUD, Letter to R. Rolland, GW XIV 553; SE XX 279. Letter to Pfister,
FREUD / PFISTER, Psychoanalysis and Faith, 61
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid. 129
\textsuperscript{19} FREUD, The Disposition to Obsessional Neurosis (1913) GW VIII 451; SE XII 325
Chapter Five

THE REPRESSIVE MORAL CODE

In this Chapter two aspects of the Freudian concept of morality will be mainly discussed, namely, the origin and operation of the moral consciousness in the individual and secondly, the origin and development of the moral systems, of morality understood as cultural standards. A particular point will be specially delineated as FREUD was much insistent on it, namely, the cultural standards of sexual morality.

A. The Origin of Moral Consciousness in the Individual

In order to trace the origin of moral consciousness in the individual, one should examine, though briefly, the Freudian anthropology. FREUD as a physician saw and described man mainly from "an inner conflict"\(^1\) and found its roots in the instinctual life of man.

"You know better. From the very first we have said that human beings fall ill of a conflict between the claims of instinctual life and the resistance which arises within them against it; and not for moment have we forgotten this resisting, repelling, repressing agency...."\(^2\)

Why is there such a conflict? According to FREUD, it belongs to the very nature of man whose substance is to be seen in the sum total of interior forces called the 'id'. These instinctual impulses always and everywhere look for satisfaction. Hence, FREUD says, the wish for happiness is to be considered as the point of departure in case of individual moral standards, that is, "the domination of the pleasure principle in mental life"\(^3\) as the starting point:

1. A. RESCH, "Das moralische Urteil bei Sigmund Freud", Studia Moralia, 1974 Nr. 11, 159
2. FREUD, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis (1933) GW XV 62 — 63; SE XXII 57
3. FREUD, An Autobiographical Study, (1925) GW XIV 85; SE XX 58; Civilization
‘One thing only I know for certain and that is that man’s judgements of value follow directly his wishes for happiness – that accordingly, they are an attempt to support his illusions with arguments. I should find it very understandable if someone were to point out the obligatory nature of the course of human civilization and were to say, for instance, that the tendencies to a restriction of sexual life or to the institution of a humanitarian ideal at the expense of natural selection were developmental trends which cannot be averted or turned aside and to which it is best for us to yield as though they were necessities of nature.’

Among these instinctual impulses sexuality occupies the central position and therefore the sexual function, according to FREUD, plays an incomparable and enviable role in the whole development of the individual personality and his value systems. Hence we should examine the sexual function more closely here.

Sexuality is to be understood here in its broader sense of psycho-sexuality, which includes:

‘all the activities of the tender feelings which have primitive sexual impulses as their source, even when impulses have become inhibited in regard to their original sexual aim or have exchanged this aim for another which is no longer sexual.’

Furthermore:

‘We use the word ‘sexuality’ in the same comprehensive sense as that in which the German language uses the word ‘lieben’ (to love).’

FREUD outlined the early sexual development, that is at the same time the early personality development in his An Autobiographical Study as follows:

‘The sexual function, as I found, is in existence from the very beginning of the individual’s life, though at first it is attached to the other vital functions and does not become independent of them until later; it has to pass through a long and complicated process of development before it becomes what we are familiar with as the normal sexual life of the adult. It begins in the ego, consisting of these two identifications in some way united with

and Its Discontents (1930) GW XIV 505 — 506; SE XXI 146; New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW XV 81; SE XXII 74
4. FREUD, Civilization and Its Discontents, GW XIV 505 — 506; SE XXI 145
5. FREUD, ‘Wild’ Psycho-Analysis (1910) GW VIII 120; SE XI 222.
6. Ibid.
by manifesting itself in the activity of a whole number of component instincts.\(^7\)

These component instincts operate independently of one another in a search for pleasure and at this stage of development they find their object mostly in one's own body. So the sexual function here is predominantly auto-erotic. Those instincts then pass through different stages of organization namely, oral, anal-sadistic and genital.\(^8\) To the energy of the sexual instinct FREUD gave the name libido.\(^9\)

Sexuality has, according to FREUD, not only an erotic content but it implies also a neurotic context. That is to say, the libido does not always pass through the course of development smoothly. The process of arriving at an early object-choice or object-relation complicates the whole process of individual development:

"The process of arriving at an object which plays an important part in mental life, takes place alongside of the organization of the libido. After the stage of auto-erotism, the first love-object in the case of both sexes is the mother; and it seems probable that to begin with a child does not distinguish its mother’s organ of nutrition from its own body. Later, but still in the first years of infancy, the relation known as the Oedipus complex becomes established: boys concentrate their sexual wishes upon their mother and develop hostile impulse against their father as being a rival, while girls adopt analogous attitude. All of the different variations and consequences of the Oedipus complex are important."\(^10\)

Hence the ambivalent attitude toward one’s parents and the ‘object-relation’ to them entail a positive and a negative content of the Oedipus complex in both sexes in their own ways. At the dissolution of this complex\(^11\) those four trends (the ‘normal positive’ complex plus the ‘inverted negative’ one towards each of the parents) will group themselves in order to produce father and mother-identifications:

"The broad general outcome of the sexual phase dominated by the Oedipus complex may, therefore, be taken to be the forming of a precipitate

7. FREUD, An Autobiographical Study, GW XIV 60 – 61; SE XX 35;
8. Ibid. GW XIV 61; SE XX 35
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid GW XIV 61 – 62; SE XX 36
11. FREUD, The Dissolution of the Oedipus Complex (1924) GW XIII; SE XIX
each other. This modification of the ego retains its special position; it confronts the other contents of the ego as an ego-ideal or super-ego.

The super-ego is, however, not simply a residue of the earliest object-choices of the id; it also represents an energetic reaction-formation against those choices. Its relation to the ego is not exhausted by the precept: 'You ought to be like this (like your father)'. It also comprises the prohibition: 'You may not be like this (like your father) — that is, you may not do all that he does. Some things are his prerogative'.

The moral barrier is, according to FREUD, established in the individual at the dissolution of the Oedipus complex; it is built upon the repressed sexual instincts, the most powerful among the impulses in human beings. Individual morality therefore retains the important characteristics of the super-ego. In the words of FREUD:

'We see, then, that a child's first object-choice is an incestuous one. The whole course of development that I have described is run through rapidly. For the most remarkable feature of the sexual life of man is its diphasic onset, its onset in two waves, with an interval between them. It reaches a first climax in the fourth or fifth year of a child's life. But thereafter this early efflorescence of sexuality passes off; the sexual impulses which have shown such liveliness are overcome by repression, and a period of latency follows, which lasts until puberty and during which the reaction-formations of morality, shame, and disgust are built up.'

Thus, the final resolution of the Oedipus complex appears to lead to the incorporation of both the parents through the formation of the super-ego. Together with this super-ego a number of reaction-formations come into being, and morality finds its way here in the Freudian scheme.

In other words, the origin of moral consciousness in the individual is to be envisioned in the background of the structural analysis of the mental mechanism outlined by FREUD from a topographic point of view, namely, in the metapsychological terminology, in the background of the tripartite structure — the id, the ego and the super-ego. As it is clear from the above given descriptions, morality, according to FREUD is "located" in the super-ego as a precipitate in the ego, formed as reaction-formation against the Oedipus

12. FREUD, The Ego and the Id (1923) GW XIII 261; SE XX 34
13. FREUD, An Autobiographical Study, GW XIV 62; SE XX 37
wishes. Such an ideal is at the same time the expression of the most powerful instinctual impulses:

"The ego ideal is therefore the heir of the Oedipus complex, and thus it is also the expression of the most powerful impulses and most important libidinal vicissitudes of the id. By setting up this ego ideal, the ego has mastered the Oedipus complex and at the same time placed itself in subjection to the id. Whereas the ego is essentially the representative of the external world, of reality, the super-ego stands in contrast to it as the representative of the internal world, of the id. Conflicts between the ego and the ideal will, as we are now prepared to find, ultimately reflect the contrast between what is real and what is psychical, between the external world and the internal world."\(^{15}\)

Paradoxically, the id, out of which at least the major part of the super-ego, the ideal is formed, knows no value, no morality.

"The id of course knows no judgement of value: no good and evil, no morality. The economic or, if you prefer, the quantitative factor, which is intimately linked to the pleasure principle, dominates all its processes. Instinctual cathexes seeking discharge — that, in our view, is all there is in the id. It even seems that the energy of these instinctual impulses is in a state different from the other regions of the mind, far more mobile and capable of discharge."\(^{16}\)

Qualitatively the id, as the reservoir of all the instincts, drives, impulses, by nature primitive and irrational remains unconscious in the deep dark layers of mind. No wonder, if an ideal, a morality formed out of those primitive drives appear irrational and infra-human, as taboo prohibitions.\(^{17}\)

FREUD summarized the whole process of the formation of the super-ego, the ego ideal, the morality in this context, in the following lines:

"For this super-ego is as much a representative of the id as of the external world. It came into being through the introjection into the ego of the first objects of the id's libidinal impulses — namely, the two parents. In this process the relation to those objects was desexualized; it was diverted from its direct sexual aims. Only in this way was it possible for the Oedipus complex to be surmounted. The super-ego retained essential features of

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15. FREUD, The Ego and the Id, GW XIII 264; SE XIX 36
16. FREUD, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW XV 81; SE XXII 74
17. Ibid. GW XV 71 f.; SE XXII 64 f.
the introjected persons — their strength, their severity, their inclination to supervise and to punish.... The super-ego — the conscience at work in the ego — may then become harsh, cruel and inexorable against the ego which is in its charge. Kant's Categorical Imperative is thus the direct heir to the Oedipus Complex.

But the same figures who continue to operate in the super-ego as the agency we know as conscience after they have ceased to be objects of the libidinal impulses of the id — these same figures also belong to the real external world. It is from there that they were drawn; their power, behind which lie hidden all the influences of the past and of tradition, was one of the most strongly-felt manifestations of reality. In virtue of this concur-
rence, the super-ego, the substitute for the Oedipus complex, becomes a representative of the real external world as well and thus also becomes a model for the endeavours of the ego.

In this way the Oedipus complex proves to be... the source of our individual ethical sense, our morality. The course of childhood development leads to an ever-increasing detachment from parents, and their personal significance for the super-ego recedes into the background. To the imago
ty leave behind there are then linked the influences of teachers and authorities, self-chosen models and publicly recognized heroes, whose fig-
ures need no longer be introjected by an ego which has become more res-
sistant. The last figure in the series that began with parents is the dark power of Destiny which only the fewest of us are able to look upon as impersonal."

The result is therefore, the establishment of a moral code which retains its compulsive character and manifests itself in the form of a categorical impera-

"The super-ego retains the character of the father, while the more power-
ful the Oedipus complex was and the more rapidly it succumbed to repres-
ion (under the influence of authority, religious teaching, schooling and reading), the stricter will be the domination of the super-ego over the ego later on — in the form of conscience or perhaps of an unconscious sense of guilt."19

Once the individual has developed the moral consciousness, it works in him as conscience. FREUD has his own interpretation of the moral con-
science in the individual.

18. FREUD, The Economic Problem of Masochism (1924) GW XIII 380 — 81; SE XIX 167 — 68
19. FREUD, The Ego and the Id, GW XIII 262; SE XXI 34 — 35
B. The Moral Conscience

FREUD dealt with the question of moral conscience extensively in the *Totem and Taboo*. The so called "taboo conscience" was the original form of (moral) conscience:

"If I am not mistaken, the explanation of taboo also throws light on the nature and origin of conscience. It is possible, without any stretching of the sense of the terms, to speak of a taboo conscience or, after a taboo has been violated, of a taboo sense of guilt. Taboo conscience is probably the earliest form in which the phenomenon of conscience is met with."[^20]

FREUD further tried to define conscience as follows:

"For what is 'conscience'? On the evidence of language it is related to that of which one is 'most certainly conscious'...

Conscience is the internal perception of the rejection of a particular wish operating within us. The stress, however, is upon the fact that this rejection has no need to appeal to anything else for support, that it is quite 'certain of itself'. This is even clearer in the case of consciousness of guilt — the perception of the internal condemnation of an act by which we have carried out a particular wish ... This same characteristic is to be seen in the savage's attitude towards taboo. It is a command issued by conscience; any violation of it produces a fearful sense of guilt which follows as a matter of course and of which the origin is unknown."[^21]

As in the case of the origin of taboos and obsessional neurosis, conscience too arose on a basis of emotional ambivalence, from quite specific human relations to which this ambivalence was attached. Here again, "one of the opposing feelings involved shall be unconscious and kept under repression by the compulsive domination of the other."[^22]

For FREUD, this is the reason why conscience often takes the form of moral anxiety and even scruples.

"If the ego is obliged to admit its weakness, it breaks out in anxiety — realistic anxiety regarding the external world, moral anxiety regarding the super-ego and neurotic anxiety regarding the strength of the passions of the id."[^23]

[^20]: FREUD, *Totem and Taboo* (1913) GW IX 85; SE XIII 67
[^21]: Ibid. GW IX 85; SE XIII 67 - 68
[^22]: Ibid.
[^23]: FREUD, *New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis*, GW XV 85; SE XXII 78
"We have attributed the function of conscience to the super-ego and we have recognized the consciousness of guilt as an expression of a tension between the ego and the super-ego. The ego reacts with feelings of anxiety (conscience anxiety) to the perception that it has not come up to the demands made by its ideal, the super-ego." 24

It is the unconscious sense of guilt that expresses itself as pangs of conscience, remorse, need for punishment etc. They are merely the different functions of super-ego:

"Though it cannot be of great importance, it may not be superfluous to elucidate the meaning of a few words such as 'super-ego', 'conscience', 'sense of guilt', 'need for punishment' and 'remorse', which we have often, perhaps, used too loosely and interchangeably. They all relate to the same state of affairs, but denote different aspects of it. The super-ego is an agency which has been inferred by us, and conscience is a function which we ascribe, among other functions, to that agency. This function consists in keeping a watch over the actions and intentions of the ego and judging them, in exercising a censorship. The sense of guilt, the harshness of the super-ego, is thus the same thing as the severity of the conscience. It is the perception which the ego has of being watched over in this way, the assessment of the tension between its own strivings and the demands of the super-ego. The fear of this critical agency (a fear which is at the bottom of the whole relationship), the need for punishment, is an instinctual manifestation on the part of the ego, which has become masochistic under the influence of a sadistic super-ego." 25

Again, FREUD spoke of conscience in terms of "a self-observing critical instance" 26 and he identified it with a special function of the ego:

"We know the self-observing agency as the ego-censor, the conscience; it is this that exercises the dream-censorship during the night, from which repressions of inadmissible wishful impulses proceed." 27

In The Ego and the Id, FREUD presented conscience as the "normal, conscious sense of guilt":

"An interpretation of the normal, conscious sense of guilt (conscience) presents no difficulties; it is based on the tension between the ego and the

25. FREUD, Civilization and Its Discontents, GW XIV 496; SE XXI 136
26. FREUD, On Narcissism: An Introduction (1914) GW X 162; SE XIV 96
27. FREUD, Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis (1917) GW XI 444; SE XVI 429
ego ideal and it is the expression of a condemnation of the ego by its critical agency. The feelings of inferiority so well known in neurotics are presumably not far removed from it.\textsuperscript{28}

FREUD further distinguished two kinds, or better two different stages of the development of the individual conscience. First of all there is the "original, infantile stage of conscience,"\textsuperscript{29} which is totally subject to extraneous influence. Here a person "feels guilty (devout people would say 'sinful') when he has done something which he knows to be 'bad'.\textsuperscript{30} The motive for such a feeling is one's helplessness and the consequent dependence on others. Conscience in this stage can be designated as "fear of loss of love."\textsuperscript{31}

But the real conscience is established, according to FREUD, only when the external authority is properly introjected:

"A great change takes place only when the authority is internalized through the establishment of a super-ego. The phenomena of conscience then reach a higher stage. Actually, it is not until now that we should speak of conscience or a sense of guilt. At this point, too, the fear of being found out comes to an end; the distinction, moreover, between doing something bad and wishing to do it disappears entirely, since nothing can be hidden from the super-ego, not even thoughts. It is true that the seriousness of the situation from a real point of view has passed away, for the new authority, the super-ego, has no motive that we know of for illtreating the ego, with which it is intimately bound up; but genetic influence, which leads to the survival of what is past and has been surmounted, makes itself felt in the fact that fundamentally things remain as they were at the beginning. The super-ego torments the sinful ego with the same feeling of anxiety and is on the watch for opportunities of getting punished by the external world.\textsuperscript{32}

This later stage of the development of conscience exhibits a peculiarity which was absent in the earlier stage, that is, so to say a religious aspect. In the words of FREUD:

"For the more virtuous a man is, the more severe and distrustful is its be-

\textsuperscript{28} FREUD, The Ego and the Id, GW XIII 280; SE XIX 51
\textsuperscript{29} FREUD, Civilization and Its Discontents, GW XIV 483; SE XXI 124
\textsuperscript{30} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{31} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{32} Ibid. GW XIV 484 – 85; SE XXI 125
haviour so that ultimately it is precisely those people who have carried saintliness furthest who reproach themselves with the worst sinfulness.\textsuperscript{33}

Here FREUD sees a clear example of a kind of 'transmoralization' of ethics: that is, the enhancing of morality as a consequence of ill-luck and attributing its source to a higher power:

"The field of ethics, which is so full of problems, presents us with another fact: namely that ill-luck — that is, external frustration — so greatly enhances the power of the conscience in the super-ego. As long as things go well with man, his conscience is lenient and lets the ego do all sorts of things; but when misfortune befalls him, he searches his soul, acknowledges his sinfulness, heightens the demands of his conscience, imposes abstinence on himself and punishes himself with penances. Whole peoples have behaved in this way, and still do. This, however, is explained by the original infantile stage of conscience, which, as we see, is not given up after the introjection into the super-ego, but persists alongside of it and behind it. Fate is regarded as a substitute for the parental agency. If a man is unfortunate it means that he is no longer loved by this highest power; and, threatened by such a loss of love, he once more bows to the parental representative in his super-ego — a representative whom, in his days of good fortune, he was ready to neglect. This becomes especially clear where Fate is looked upon in the strictly religious sense of being nothing other than an expression of the Divine Will.\textsuperscript{34}

This attitude of self-reproach, or at its worst the "scapegoatism", is only a natural outcome of an increased frustration, because the more severe the repression of an instinct is, the more powerful is its return in disguise. The so-called temptations in the religious field are to be, according FREUD, understood in this background:

"Moreover, when saints call themselves sinners, they are not so wrong, considering the temptations to instinctual satisfaction to which they are exposed in a specially high degree — since, as is well known, temptations are merely increased by constant frustration, whereas an occasional satisfaction of them causes them to diminish, at least for the time being.\textsuperscript{35}

The individual conscience, therefore, palpitates out of the fear of external authority and of the internal control of the super-ego. If the external autho-

\textsuperscript{33} Ibid. GW XIV 485; SE XXI 125 – 26
\textsuperscript{34} Ibid. GW XIV 485 – 86; SE XXI 126
\textsuperscript{35} Ibid. GW XIV 485; SE XXI 126
rity insists on the renunciation of instinctual gratifications, the super-ego presses on the punishment. This instinctual renunciation is dialectically repeated. In the chronological sequence, first comes renunciation of instincts owing to the fear of aggression by the external authority, and then follows the establishment of an internal authority which subsequently demands such a renunciation. In this second situation bad intentions are equated with bad actions and hence arise a sense of guilt and a need for punishment. FREUD continues:

"Every renunciation of instinct now becomes a dynamic source of conscience and every fresh renunciation increases the latter's severity and intolerance. If we could only bring it better into harmony with what we already know about the history of the origin of conscience, we should be tempted to defend the paradoxical statement that conscience is the result of instinctual renunciation, or the instinctual renunciation (imposed on us from without) creates conscience, which then demands further instinctual renunciation." 36

As long as conscience is the introjection of and identification with the parental and external authority — the super-ego in its judicial function — it may be called the "internal voice".

"It observes the ego, gives it orders, judges it and threatens it with punishments, exactly like the parents whose place it has taken. We call this agency the super-ego and are aware of it in its judicial functions as our conscience." 37

36. Ibid. GW XIV 488; SE XXI 128. In another context, distinguishing "four facets in the rich personality of Dostoevsky: the creative artist, the neurotic, the moralist and the sinner", FREUD wrote: "The moralist in Dostoevsky is the most readily assailable. If we seek to rank him high as a moralist on the plea that only a man who has gone through the depths of sin can reach the summit of morality, we are neglecting a doubt that arises. A moral man is one who reacts to temptation as soon as he feels it in his heart, without yielding to it. A man who alternately sins and then in his remorse erects high moral standards lays himself open to the reproach that he has made things too easy for himself. He has not achieved the essence of morality, renunciation, for the moral conduct of life is a practical human interest.... After the most violent struggles to reconcile the instinctual demands of the individual with the claims of community, he landed in the retrograde position of submission both to temporal and spiritual authority, of veneration both for the Tsar and for the God of the Christians, and of the narrow Russian nationalism — a position which lesser minds have reached with smaller effort." FREUD, Dostoevsky and Parricide, GW XIV 399 — 400; SE XXI 177

37. FREUD, An Outline of Psycho-Analysis (1940) GW XVII 136; SE XXIII 205
FREUD attributed a compulsive and categorical characteristic to this internal voice:

"I shall presently bring forward a suggestion about the source of its power to dominate in this way — the source, that is, of its compulsive character which manifests itself in the form of categorical imperative."\(^{38}\)

In the Freudian metapsychology\(^{39}\), "the ego is formed to a great extent out of identifications which take the place of abandoned cathexes by the id", and therefore, "the first of these identifications always behave as a special agency in the ego and stand apart from the ego in from of a super-ego."\(^{40}\)

That is to say that the super-ego is derived form the first object-cathexes of the id, from the Oedipus complex. Conscience, according to FREUD, is the judicial function of the super-ego. Hence conscience too displays the same characteristics against the ego:

"The super-ego's relation to the later alterations of the ego is roughly similar to that of the primary sexual phase of childhood to later sexual life after puberty. Although it is accessible to all later influences, it nevertheless preserves throughout life the character given to it by its derivation from the father-complex — namely, the capacity to stand apart from the ego and to master it. It is a memorial of the former weakness and dependence of the ego, and the mature ego remains subject to its domination. As the child was once under a compulsion to obey its parents, so the ego submits to the categorical imperative of its super-ego."\(^{41}\)

In short, moral conscience in the individual is super-ego in its judicial function. It is formed at the dissolution of the Oedipus complex through the introjection of and identification with the parental authority. It retains the essential features of the introjected persons, especially, their strength, severity, inclination to supervise and to punish. In the words of FREUD:

"The super-ego retained the essential features of the introjected persons — their strength, their severity, their inclination to supervise and to punish... it is easily conceivable that, thanks to the defusion of instinct which oc-

\(^{38}\) FREUD, The Ego and the Id, GW XIII 263; SE XIX 35
\(^{39}\) Cfr. below, Part Three
\(^{40}\) Cfr. FREUD, The Ego and the Id, GW XIII 257 — 65; SE XIX 30 — 35. This point of identification will be taken into detailed consideration later in Part Three and Four.
\(^{41}\) FREUD, The Ego and the Id, GW XIII 277 — 78; SE XIX 48
curs along with this introduction into the ego, the severity was increased. The super-ego — the conscience at work in the ego — may then become harsh, cruel, and inexorable against the ego which is in its charge.

In one of his last works FREUD wrote:

"The picture of an ego which mediates between the id and the external world, which takes over the instinctual demands of the former in order to lead them to satisfaction, which derives perceptions from the latter and uses them as memories, which, intent on its self-preservation, puts itself in defence against excessively strong claims from both sides and which, at the same time, is guided in all its decisions by the injunctions of a modified pleasure principle — this picture in fact applies to the ego only up to the end of the first period of childhood, till about the age of five. At about that time an important change has taken place. A portion of the external world has, at least partially, been abandoned as an object and has instead, by identification, been taken into the ego and thus become an integral part of the internal world. The new psychical agency continues to carry on the functions which have hitherto been performed by the people (the abandoned objects) in the external world: it observes the ego, gives it orders, judges it and threatens it with punishments, exactly like the parents whose place it has taken. We call this agency the super-ego and are aware of it in its judicial functions as our conscience. It is remarkable that the super-ego often displays a severity for which no model has been provided by the real parents...."

This passage gives an overall summary of what we so far said about the moral conscience and its operation in the individual.

We have considered the origin and operation of morality in the individual. In the Freudian psycho-analysis the ontogenetic structures stand in close relationship with phylogenetic acquisitions. Hence, the origin and development of morality as a system will be analysed now.

C. The Origin of Moral Systems

The phylogenesis of moral systems is, according to FREUD, comparable to the ontogenesis of moral consciousness. Morality as a universal code of con-

42. FREUD, The Economic Problem of Masochism, GW XIII 380; SE XIX 167
43. FREUD, An Outline of Psycho-Analysis, GW XVII 136 — 37; SE XXIII 205
duct also took origin in the same context as a reaction-formation against the rival feeling or Oedipus wishes of primitive peoples.

As pointed out earlier, Freud based most of the important conclusions on the ‘primal tragedy’. Examining the taboo-observances as the earliest moral restrictions and the emotional ambivalence found among the primitives of animistic and totemistic stages, Freud was influenced by “the striking correspondence between the two taboo-ordinances of totemism (not to kill the totem and not to have sexual relations with any woman of the same totem-clan) and the two elements of the Oedipus complex (getting rid of the father and taking mother to wife)”.

Further, taking into account Darwin’s conjecture that men originally lived in hordes, each under the domination of a single powerful, violent and jealous male, and also the reports of Robertson Smith about the “totem meal”, Freud constructed the following hypothesis or in his words, a “vision”:

“The father of the primal horde, since he was an unlimited despot, had seized all the women for himself; his sons, being dangerous to him as rivals, had been killed or driven away. One day, however, the sons came together and united to overwhelm, kill, and devour their father, who had been their enemy but also their ideal. After the deed they were unable to take over their heritage since they stood in one another’s way. Under the influence of failure and remorse they learned to come to an agreement among themselves; they banded themselves into a clan of brothers by the help of the ordinances of totemism... The totem meal was the festival commemorating the fearful deed from which sprang man’s sense of guilt (or ‘original sin’) and which was the beginning at once of social organization, of religion and of ethical restrictions.”

Thus the primitive tragedy or the primal crime, Freud would say, accounts for the great cultural institutions. A deep sense of guilt caught hold of the primitive men and at this point those “higher” institutions of civilization originated as reaction-formations. Here again, the Oedipus wishes stand at their root:

44. Cfr. above, the summary of the book Totem and Taboo, in Part One
46. Freud, Totem and Taboo, GW IX 161; SE XIII 133
47. Freud, An Autobiographical Study, GW XIV 93 — 94; SE XX 68
“The significance of the Oedipus complex began to grow in gigantic proportions and it looked as though social order, morals, justice and religion had arisen together in primaeval ages of mankind as reaction-formation against the Oedipus complex.”

FREUD was very clear in his formulation which we find in his autobiography:

“In my latest speculative work I have set about the task of dissecting our mental apparatus on the basis of the analytic view of pathological facts and have divided it into an ego, an id, and a super-ego. The super-ego is the heir of the Oedipus complex and represents the ethical standards of mankind.”

The brutal murder of the primal father had on the phylogenetic way of the development of mankind the same consequences as the dissolution of the Oedipus complex through the introjection of the parental authority on the ontogenetic level. The successive developments after the parricide led the primitive cannibals to sign an agreement among them, as a sort of social contract. That is the origin of “civilization” and its praiseworthy assets:

“It must be supposed that after the parricide a considerable time elapsed during which the brothers disputed with one another for their father’s heritage, which each of them wanted for him alone. A realization of the dangers and uselessness of these struggles, a recollection of the emotional ties with one another which had arisen during the period of their expulsion, led at last to an agreement among them, a sort of social contract. The first form of a social organization came about with a renunciation of instinct, a recognition of mutual obligations, the introduction of definite institutions, pronounced inviolable (holy) — that is to say, the beginning of morality and justice.”

Beside the dead-body of the murdered Father took shape the “earliest ethical commandments”, the first and most important among them was, ‘thou shall not kill’.

The emotional ambivalence towards the father, the remorse felt at the sight of the brutality of the act of murder but also the triumph over his cru-

48. FREUD, Psycho-Analysis, GW XIII 229; SE XVIII 253
49. Here the reference is to The Ego and the Id (1923) GW XIII; SE XIX
50. FREUD, An Autobiographical Study, GW XIV 85; SE XX 82
51. FREUD, Moses and Monotheism, GW XVI 187 — 88; SE XXIII 82
52. FREUD, Thoughts for the Times on War and Death, GW X 348 f.; SE XIV 295
elty, all these gave rise to the feast of totem meal, “a commemoration of the memorable and criminal deed, which was the beginning of so many things — of social organization, of moral restrictions, and religion.”

As in the case of individual moral consciousness, so also morality as an institutional system had its origin with instinctual renunciation and it continues to exist as renunciation of instincts.

Thus, take for example the ethical principles of the “father-religion” presented by Moses. Even though there was no direct expression of murderous hatred of the father in the framework of this religion, there was an unending sense of guilt in the form of a bad conscience for having sinned against God and for not ceasing to sin, which was uninterruptedly kept awake by the Prophets and which soon formed an essential part of the whole religious system. This sense of guilt had yet another motivation:

“A sense of guilt on account of their own sinfulness offered a welcome means of exculpating God: they deserved no better than to be punished by him since they had not obeyed his commandments. And, driven by the need to satisfy this sense of guilt, which was insatiable and came from sources so much deeper, they must make those commandments grow ever stricter, more meticulous and even more trivial. In a fresh rapture of moral asceticism they imposed more and more new instinctual renunciation on themselves and in that way reached — in doctrine and precept at least — ethical heights which had remained inaccessible to the other people of antiquity.”

In sum then, the Oedipus complex proved to be “the source of our individual ethical sense, our morality” and also of morality in the historical sense, of moral systems. Thus the ontogenesis and the phylogenesis of morality coincide at least in certain aspects. For FREUD, the moral consciousness of individual and the moral standards of civilization went together; they originate together, they exist together. And this is the “higher” nature in man:

“Psycho-analysis has been reproached time after time with ignoring the higher, moral, supra-personal side of human nature. The reproach is doubtly unjust, both historically and methodologically. For, in the first place, we have from the very beginning attributed to the function of instigating

53. FREUD, Totem and Taboo, GW IX 172; SE XIII 142
54. FREUD, Moses and Monotheism, GW XVI 243; SE XXIII 134
55. FREUD, The Economic Problem of Masochism, GW XIII 380; SE XIX 168
repression to the moral and aesthetic trends in the ego... But now that we have embarked upon the analysis of the ego we can give an answer to all those whose moral sense has been shocked and who have complained that there must be surely a higher nature in man: 'Very true', we can say, 'and here we have that higher nature, in this ego ideal or super-ego, the representative of our relation to our parents. When we were little children we knew these higher nature, we admired them and feared them; and later on we took them into ourselves.'

D. A Code of Prescriptions and Prohibitions

According to FREUD's psycho-analysis ontogeny is phylogeny in a miniature form. Analogous to the individual development the society too evolves a super-ego which is based on the impressions left behind by the images of great leaders:

"It can be asserted that the community too, evolves a super-ego under whose influence cultural development proceeds... The super-ego of an epoch of civilization has an origin similar to that of an individual. It is based on the impression left behind by the personalities of great leaders — men of overwhelming force of mind or men in whom one of the human impulses has found its strongest and purest, and therefore often its most one-sided, expression."  

An important point of agreement between the individual and cultural super-ego is that "the former, just like the latter, sets up strict ideal demands."  

According to FREUD, the primitive taboos were the original forms of such prescriptions and prohibitions:

"Taboos, we must suppose, are prohibitions of primaeval antiquity which were at some time externally imposed upon a generation of primitive men; they must, that is to say, no doubt have been impressed on them violently by the previous generation. These prohibitions must have concerned

56. FREUD, The Ego and the Id, GW XIII 264; SE XIX 35 — 36
57. FREUD, Civilization and Its Discontents, GW XIV 501; SE XXI 141
58. Ibid. GW XIV 502; SE XXI 142
activities towards which there was a strong inclination. They must then
have persisted from generation to generation, perhaps merely as a result
of tradition transmitted through parental and social authority.\(^59\)

It was in this sense that W. WUNDT defined a taboo as “the unwritten
code of law of mankind.”\(^60\)

A taboo is primarily formulated under prohibitions. There is a polarisation
between the desired and the forbidden in every taboo. “Taboo is a primaeval
prohibition forcibly imposed (by some authority) from outside, and directed
against the most powerful longings to which human beings are subject. The
desire to violate it persists in the unconscious; those who obey the taboo have
an ambivalent attitude to what the taboo prohibits.”\(^61\)

However, the psychology of prohibition shows that “where only few pro-
hibitions exist they are carefully observed, but where one is accompanied by
prohibitions at every step, one feels definitely tempted to disregard them.”\(^62\)

According to FREUD, this is exactly what happened to the cultural demands
of our epoch:

“In our research into, and therapy of a neurosis, we are led to make two
reproaches against the super-ego of the individual. In the severity of its
commands and prohibitions it troubles itself too little about the happiness
of the ego, in that it takes insufficient account of the resistances against
obeying them — of the instinctual strength of the id (in the first place),
and of the difficulties presented by the real external environment (in the
second). Consequently we are very often obliged, for therapeutic purposes,
to oppose the super-ego and we endeavour to lower its demands. Exactly
the same objections can be made against the ethical demands of the cultu-
ral super-ego. It, too, does not trouble itself enough about the facts of the
mental constitutions of human beings. It issues a command and does not
ask whether it is possible for people to obey it.”\(^63\)

The unconditional and categorical characteristic of this morality depends
on the authority of the primal father introjected into the ego.\(^64\)

\(^{59}\) FREUD, Totem and Taboo, GW IX 41; SE XIII 31
\(^{60}\) W.WUNDT, Völkerpsychologie II, “Mythus und Religion” II (1908) p. 308.
Quoted and commented by FREUD, Totem and Taboo, GW IX 27 — 29; SE XIII 22—25
\(^{61}\) FREUD, Totem and Taboo, GW IX 45; SE XIII 34 — 35
\(^{62}\) FREUD, The Question of Lay Analysis, GW XIV 269; SE XX 235
\(^{63}\) FREUD, Civilization and Its Discontents, GW XIV 503; SE XXI 143
\(^{64}\) FREUD, The Dissolution of the Oedipus Complex, GW XIII 399; SE XIX 176
father who stood as a threat against the incestuous wishes of the child — of primitive generation — is now exercising the same prohibiting authority. The super-ego now stands against the ego as "a strict father confronts a child." 65

Thus FREUD meant that our cultural moral standards are too heavy for the "layman" to bear: "Our civilized standards make life too difficult for the majority of human organizations." 66 "Our civilization imposes an almost intolerable pressure on us and it calls for a corrective." 67 We live under a "premature trauma of prohibition", 68 because "even ordinary normal morality has a harshly restraining, cruelly prohibiting quality." 69 We are forced to throw off "our hard-worn morality whenever we go to sleep, in order to put it on again next morning." 70 No wonder, if this civilization creates more and more neurotics and hypocrites!

E. The Cultural Sexual Morality

The repression of the cultural super-ego is constantly and most clearly manifest in the field of sexuality. FREUD tried to bring out this fact in his essay, Civilized Sexual Morality and Modern Nervous Illness (1908). 71 Under the domination of this civilized sexual morality, he contended, health and efficiency of the individuals are very badly impaired. The clear reason for such a situation is, "our civilization is built upon the suppression of in-

65. FREUD, The Question of Lay Analysis, GW XIV 254; SE XX 223
66. FREUD, Psycho-Analysis, GW VIII 58; SE XI 54
67. FREUD, The Question of Lay Analysis, GW XIV 285; SE XX 249 — 50
68. FREUD used this phrase as he spoke about the possible fate of the new science - psycho-analysis: "The stream of eager learners who will then flow to Europe will be obliged to pass Vienna by, for here the development of analysis may have succumbed to a premature trauma of prohibition.... But one thing I do know. It is by no means so important what decision you give on the question of lay analysis. It may have a local effect. But the things that really matter — the possibilities in psycho-analysis for internal development — can never be affected by regulations and prohibitions". FREUD, The Question of Lay Analysis, GW XIV 285; SE XX 250
69. FREUD, The Ego and the Id, GW XIII 284; SE XIX 54
70. FREUD, Thoughts for the Times on War and Death, GW X 338; SE XIV 286
71. GW VII 141 — 167; SE IX 177 — 204
stincts"; 72 and "the injurious influence of civilization reduces itself in the main to the harmful suppression of the sexual life of the civilized peoples (or classes) through the 'civilized' sexual morality prevalent in them". 73 Modern man thus finds it hard to cope with the demands of this civilization. 74 The basic ground of enmity is the fact of the "cultural frustration" of the instinctual life of man:

".... it is impossible to overlook the extend to which civilization is built upon a renunciation of instinct, how much it presupposes precisely the nonsatisfaction (by suppression, repression or some other means?) of powerful instincts. This 'cultural frustration' dominates the large field of social relationship between human beings. As we already know, it is the cause of the hostility against which all civilizations have to struggle." 75

This civilization thus gave birth to an "exacting and ruthless morality". 76 Discarding the uniqueness of the individuals, it makes too much generalizations and accepts the same standards for all at all times:

"It is one of the obvious social injustices that the standard of civilization should demand from every one the same conduct of sexual life — conduct which can be followed without any difficulty by some people, thanks to their organization, but which imposes the heaviest psychical sacrifices on others; though, indeed, the injustices as a rule wiped out by disobedience to the injunctions of morality." 77

The re-orientation of sexual instincts or the so called sublimation, highly esteemed by some is after all possible only for a small minority:

"Mastering it by sublimation, by deflecting the sexual instinctual forces away from their sexual aim to higher cultural aims, can be achieved by a minority and then only intermittently, and least easily during the period of ardent and vigorous youth. Most of the rest become neurotic or are harmed in one way or another. Experience shows that the majority of the people who make up our society are constitutionally unfit to face the task

72. FREUD, Civilized Sexual Morality and Modern Nervous Illness, GW VII 149; SE IX 186
73. Ibid. GW VII 148; SE IX 185
74. FREUD, Civilization and Its Discontents, GW XIV 474; SE XXI 115
75. Ibid. GW XIV 457; SE XXI 97
76. FREUD, Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious, GW VI 121; SE VIII 110
77. FREUD, Civilized Sexual Morality and Modern Nervous Illness, GW VII 155; SE IX 192
of abstinence.'  
This civilization of ours has issued a number of air-tight precepts and prohibitions on human sex and has "sacralized" them. To say a word against them then will be counted as an offence against the sacred feelings of mankind. Moreover, a single and sweeping moral code for each and every one in the society stamps upon many the watermark of "social untouchability", who in turn take refuge under neurosis or hypocrisy. 

"Anyone who is able to penetrate the determinants of nervous illness will soon become convinced that its increase in our society arises from the intensification of sexual restrictions."  

Hence, according to FREUD, this epoch of civilization in which we are privileged to use sex only for the reproductive purpose, a civilization which moreover taboos every activity outside marriage, and advocates a total abstinence outside marriage and a partial one inside of it, which has established a "double morality", a civilization that taboos even normal sexual intercourse in the name of "higher" values, has become an hypocrisy itself. It is therefore, quite reasonable to ask, "whether our 'civilized' sexual morality is worth the sacrifice which it imposes on us." 

To conclude this part of the discussion on the Freudian concept of morality, we can say that FREUD considered morality in its inherited form as re-

78. Ibid. GW VII 156; SE IX 193  
79. Ibid. GW VII 157; SE IX 194. In connection with the discontents of modern civilization FREUD wrote: "I am tempted to extract a first advantage from this more restricted view of the case by applying it to the process of repression. As we have learned, neurotic symptoms are, in their essence, substitutive satisfactions for unfulfilled sexual wishes. In the course of our analytic work we have discovered to our surprise that perhaps every neurosis conceals a quota of unconscious sense of guilt, which in its turn fortifies the symptoms by making use of them as a punishment. It now seems plausible to formulate the following proposition. When an instinctual trend undergoes repression, its libidinal elements are turned into symptoms, and its aggressive components into a sense of guilt". FREUD, Civilization and Its Discontents, GW XIV 498—99; SE XXI 139  
80. FREUD, Civilized Sexual Morality and Modern Nervous Illness, GW VII 152; SE IX 189  
81. Ibid. GW VII 155; SE IX 192  
82. Ibid. GW VII 156; SE IX 193  
83. Ibid. GW VII 158; SE X 195  
84. Ibid. GW VII 167; SE IX 204
flected in the individual and echoed in the moral codes as "obscure cultural
system of inhibition". Its presence in the individual can be understood in
terms of introjection of the negatives and prohibitions of external authority.
Individually and collectively such a morality is a net of prescriptions and pro-
hibitions, psychologically known as super-ego, aimed at the control of the in-
stinctual impulses. Such a repression is at best reflected today in the code of
sex-morality.

Yet there is another aspect of the Freudian concept of morality, where
FREUD considers ethics as a human value. The next Chapter analyses this
point.

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A SELF-EVIDENT MORALITY

As it is clear from Chapter Five, Freud unhesitantly admitted morality as a historical asset. What he was deadly against was the repression of moral systems. Even though he used very strong words against contemporary moral codes and systems, there are ample reasons to think that he did in no way depreciate the value of ethical principles.

"Mankind’s ethical strivings, whose strength and significance we need not in the least depreciate, were acquired in the course man’s history; since then they have become, though unfortunately only in a variable amount, the inherited property of contemporary man." ¹

E. Jones in his funeral oration on Freud quoted some of the most impressive words from the "book of life" of this great man: "I consider the moral as something self-evident; I have practically never done something mean." ²

Now, what is meant by this self-evident morality? Freud did not care much to give an adequate explanation to it. Here probably one may have to depend more upon what Freud "did" and what he left "unsaid" rather than upon what he actually wrote.

A. Autonomy of the Moral Standards

Already in 1915 Freud wrote to his friend Dr. Putnam:

"I have always been dissatisfied with my gifts.... but I consider myself a very moral person who can subscribe to the maxim of T. Vischer: ‘what is moral is self-evident’... I have never done anything mean or malicious and cannot trace any temptation to do so. So I am not in the least proud of it." ³

1. Freud, Thoughts for the Times on War and Death, GW X 349, SE XIV 296
2. E. Jones, LWF III 264: Jones quotes the original statement: "Ich betrachte das Moralische als etwas Selbstverständliches; ich habe eigentlich nie etwas Gemeines getan."
3. Quoted in E. Jones, LWF II 463 f.
It cannot be ascertained with absolute certainty what FREUD did really mean by this phrase — 'a self-evident morality'. He himself made no direct comments on it. We deem it correct to interpret it meaning an autonomy of the moral standard supported by an ethic of honesty ("I have done nothing mean or malicious"). Here we talk about the autonomy of moral standards only in an analogical sense because the real autonomy is vested in the individual.

FREUD throughout his career advocated a retreat to the naked realities of life, leaving aside all illusions and utopian projections. Then every one will find that he is thrown back upon himself. Hence FREUD gives the following advice: 'as small holders we shall cultivate our plot'. Nevertheless, we possess something nobler in ourselves — our personal autonomy which is no public property. "The liberty of the individual is no gift of civilization".

Individual freedom was highly respected in the pre-cultural era. But civilization gradually imposed many restrictions on it. A general revolt was the result.

'The urge for freedom, therefore, is directed against particular forms and demands of civilization or against civilization altogether.'

Again, FREUD rejected that there is a natural capacity in human beings to distinguish good and evil:

"We may reject the existence of an original, as it were natural capacity to distinguish good from bad. What is bad is often not at all what is injurious or dangerous to the ego; on the contrary, it may be something which is desirable and enjoyable to the ego."

Nevertheless, there is an external determination on our moral motivation:

"Here, therefore, there is an extraneous influence at work, and it is this that decides what is to be called good or bad... Such a motive is easily discovered in his helplessness and his dependence on other people, and it can best be designated as fear of loss of love."

4. FREUD, Future of an Illusion, GW XIV 378; SE XXI 41
5. FREUD, Civilization and Its Discontents, GW XIV 457; SE XXI 95
6. Ibid. GW XIV 457; SE XXI 96
7. Ibid. GW XIV 483; SE XXI 124
8. Ibid.
In another context FREUD reminded his readers that "a human being is seldom altogether good or bad, he is usually 'good' in one relation and 'bad' in another, or 'good' in certain external circumstances and in others decidedly 'bad'." 9

The above given statements of FREUD are only some of the indications which enable one to conclude that the self-evident morality envisaged by FREUD could mean an autonomy of the moral standards.

B. An Ethic of Honesty

As stated before, FREUD adopted in his life the self-evident morality as the "Leitmotiv". His justification was: "I have done nothing mean or malicious."

E. JONES picked out three important qualities from FREUD'S life: his nobility of character ("Erhabenheit"), direct and instinctive love of truth, his hatred of all deception, ambiguousness and prevarication and finally his courage and inflexible determination. 10

Some one may find it not difficult to point out some black marks in FREUD'S character. 11 He was, for example, furious and often angry and used bitter and unsympathetic words against his "enemies". He hated his motherland, 12 the Catholic Austria, the Christians and their religion, even his own profession. He dreamed of a day when he could remove his feet "from the ground of the fatherland."

He wished very much that pessimism be his "prominent characteristic." 14

9. FREUD, Thoughts for the Times on War and Death, GW X 332; SE XIV 282
12. In a letter to W. Fliess, FREUD wrote: "I hate Vienna almost personally and I gather fresh strength as soon as I remove my foot "vom vaterstädtlichen Boden". Quoted in E. JONES, LWF I 293
13. Cfr. E. JONES LWF II 437
14. In 1919 FREUD wrote: "I can not deny that in the cheerful pessimism that was always characteristic of me, the second element occasionally becomes the more prominent." E. JONES, LWF III 6
Yet it seems to us that the nobility of his character remains unbeaten. As in the case of any other man in his status here also we find very strong reaction-formations "against ubiquitous presence of anti-semitism". For, the world around him turned to be "an enormous prison", that "seems to me to have lost its vitality and to be doomed to perdition", a world, "from which I ask personally nothing more than that it should leave me in peace." Thus FREUD had to spend the major part of his life in "victoriously resisting the hostile effects of life for sixty, seventy or even eighty years."

With E. JONES one can mention a number of praiseworthy qualities in FREUD'S life. The prominent among them are his passion for truth and his dedication to the human cause. 'The whole energy to work' was his life-motto. He spent twelve or even more hours a day for his patients. The luxuries of Western life did not spoil his rather simple life. Even in the zenith of his glory, he did not like any celebration in his honour. In the words of his biographer: "He was the soul of honour and never deviated from the highest standards of ethical behaviour in his personal life or from those of professional probity in his work."

"The most striking and probably the strongest emotional force in Freud was his passion for truth and his uncompromising faith in reason."

FREUD demanded the same sincerity of conduct and honesty of life from others, especially from his colleagues and disciples. According to him, the integrity of character is a must for a therapist.

"And from this it follows that one important qualification is required of the physician in his work: not only must his own character be irreproachable — 'As to morals, that goes without saying' as the hero of Vischer's novel Auch Einer was in the habit of declaring — but he must also have

15. E. JONES, LWF III 198
16. E. JONES, LWF III 194 (letter dated June 10, 1933). In another letter of Jan.10, 1910, one reads as follows: "... in view of the inevitable ingratitude of humanity, I do not expect anything either for my children later." E.JONES, LWF II 446
17. E. JONES, LWF III 191 (letter of April 23, 1933)
18. Ibid. 215.
19. Ibid. 216.
20. E. JONES, LWF II 449 — 50.
overcome in his own mind that mixture of prurience and prudery with which, unfortunately, so many people habitually consider sexual problems."\(^{22}\)

This must be the reason why he reproached one of his colleagues for using what is called a "kissing technique" in analysis and pointed out its danger.\(^{23}\) He advised his co-workers to use utmost care in treatment, as a surgeon, who puts aside all his other feelings and concentrates his mental forces on the single aim of performing the operation as skilfully as possible.\(^{24}\) More than from the therapists and analysts, a sincerity of conduct was demanded from the patients themselves so much so that it was said to be the basic law of the psycho-analytic technique.\(^{25}\) FREUD told his patients:

"Finally, never forget that you have promised to be absolutely honest, and never leave anything out because, for some reason or other, it is unpleasant to tell it."\(^{26}\)

C. The Humanist In Freud

An ethic of honesty goes parallel with a humanism of one kind or another. Here we take humanism in its very general sense in which the supreme cosmic value is seen to be residing in man or in the accomplishments and ideals of human society.

It is true that FREUD did not want to include himself in the company of those philosophers who claim "to rescue the God of religion."\(^{27}\) Yet he wanted to save humanity and that, out of a deep love of it.\(^{28}\) He identified himself with Hannibal, the liberator,\(^{29}\) with Moses, the restorer.\(^{30}\) For this

\(^{22}\) FREUD, On Psychotherapy, GW V 25; SE VII 267
\(^{23}\) Cfr. E. JONES, LWF III 174 – 76
\(^{24}\) FREUD, Recommendations on Analytic Technique, GW VIII 380 – 81; SE XII 115
\(^{25}\) Cfr. E. FROMM, Man for Himself (London 1949) 36
\(^{26}\) FREUD, Further Recommendations on Technique, GW VIII 468; SE XII 135
\(^{27}\) FREUD, Civilization and Its Discontents, GW XIV 432; SE XXI 74
\(^{28}\) FREUD & PFISTER, Psycho-Analysis and Faith, 35
\(^{29}\) FREUD, The Interpretation of Dreams, GW II/III 202; SE IV 196 f.
\(^{30}\) FREUD, Moses and Monotheism, passim
reason, the Protestant Pastor PFISTER refused to admit FREUD'S self-
qualification as a "godless Jew". "For he who lives the truth lives in God and
he who strives for freeing of love 'dwelleth in God'."\(^{31}\)

It was not without reason that FREUD compared his notion of Eros\(^{32}\) with the concept of love in St. Paul\(^{33}\). As G. ZILBOORG says FREUD here
not only brings his concept of libido nearer to the notion of love in St. Paul,
but also he almost equated one with the other.\(^{34}\) FREUD once wrote to
PFISTER: "I had special sympathy for St. Paul as a genuinely Jewish charac-
ter".\(^{35}\) Even though FREUD perceived the Christian ideal of the love of neigh-
bour as an illusion, yet one can reasonably conclude that he respected and
appreciated the high ethical principles of Christianity.\(^{36}\)

It must be the deeply felt love of mankind that prompted FREUD to write
the following lines during the war-time:

"We can not but feel that no event has ever destroyed so much that is
precious, in the common possessions of humanity, confused so many of
the clearest intelligences or so thoroughly debased what is highest."\(^{37}\)

His main objection to such a total war was that it cut away the ethical
ties between man and man.\(^{38}\) FREUD undoubtedly loved man and mankind.
He dedicated himself for the cause of humanity. Though he hated his mother-
land, he loved mankind and because of this love he stood decidedly to the
fury of a civilization for the sake of what he considered a great truth.

31. FREUD & PFISTER, Psycho-Analysis and Faith, 63
32. FREUD understands here 'Eros' in a broad sense. Cfr. FREUD, Group Psycho-
    logy and the Analysis of the Ego, GW XIII 99; SE XVIII 91
33. Ibid. Here FREUD refers to St. Paul I Cor. 13.
34. G. ZILBOORG, Freud and Religion, a Restatement (London 1958) 41
35. FREUD & PFISTER, Psycho-Analysis and Faith, 63
36. FREUD, Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, GW XIII 102; SE XVIII
    94
37. FREUD, Thoughts for the Times on War and Death, GW X 324; SE XIV 275
38. Ibid GW X 328; SE XIV 278
D. The Core of the Ethical Message of Freud

One may quite reasonably ask, after all, what did FREUD expect in the field of morality and ethics? The following passage which he wrote in connection with the war politics condemning hatred among men may give an answer to it:

"It may be that only later stages in development will be able to make some change in this regrettable state of affairs. But a little more truthfulness and honesty on all sides in the relations of men to one another and between them and their rulers — should also smooth the way for this transformation." 39

According to FREUD, such an internal change must take place in the society as a whole, in the whole civilization more than in the individual.

But in any discussion on a moral change or ethical renovation, one has to take into consideration the deep and intimate nature of man. FREUD believes in the 'moral' inclination of an ordinary man:

"If any one were inclined to put forward the paradoxical proposition that the normal man is not only far more immoral than he believes but also far more moral than he knows, psycho-analysis on whose findings the first half of the assertion rests, would have no objection to raise against the second." 40

But without taking into consideration the instinctual basis of human moral conduct, society demands 'good conduct' from all individuals indiscriminately and imposes too many restrictions on them — this was FREUD'S strongest objection to this civilization:

"Encouraged by this success, society has allowed to be misled into tightening the moral standard to the great possible degree, and it has thus forced its members into yet greater estrangement from their instinctual disposition. They are consequently subject to an unceasing suppression of instinct, and the resulting tension betrays itself in the most remarkable phenomena of reaction and compensation." 41

Thus people are forced to act continually in accordance with precepts

39. Ibid. GW X 340: SE XIV 288
40. FREUD, The Ego and the Id, GW XIII 182; SE XIX 52. Cfr. also Thoughts for the Times on War and Death, GW X 332; SE XIV 282
41. FREUD, Thoughts for the Times on War and Death, GW X 335; SE XIV 284
which are not the expression of their instinctual inclinations. Thus they are condemned to become hypocrites:

"It is undeniable that our contemporary civilization favours the production of this form of hypocrisy to an extraordinary extend. One might venture to say that it is built upon such a hypocrisy, and that it would have to submit to far-reaching modifications if people were to undertake to live in accordance with the psychological truth."\(^{42}\)

A reform is thus inevitable and that, according to FREUD, is our right:

"When we justly find fault with the present state of our civilization for so inadequately fulfilling our demands for a plan of life that shall make us happy, and for allowing the existence of so much suffering which could probably be avoided — when, with unsparing criticism, we try to uncover the roots of its imperfection, we are undoubtedly exercising a proper right and are not showing ourselves enemies of civilization. We may expect gradually to carry through such alterations in our civilization as will better satisfy our needs and will escape our criticisms."\(^{43}\)

A change of attitude, FREUD meant, must immediately come in the field of sexuality. Though he did not put forward any concrete reform-proposals as such (because it was not the business of a physician!), he insisted upon the necessity of such a reform. That is probably the only means to check the spreading of nervous illness.\(^{44}\)

Thus FREUD came forward as a liberator of humanity from the repression of this civilization. He militantly fought against the Victorian codes of conduct. At least from a broad point of view, he stands out as "one of history's great reformers", by waging a campaign for more than thirty years against conventional (sexual) morality.\(^{45}\) We find, however, FREUD justified in his claim as he wrote to PFISTER: "We know that by different routes we aspire to the same objective for the poor humanity."\(^{46}\)

\(^{42}\) Ibid.
\(^{43}\) FREUD, Civilization and Its Discontents, GW XIV 475; SE XXI 115
\(^{44}\) FREUD, Civilized Sexual Morality and Modern Nervous Illness, GW VII 167; SE IX 204
\(^{45}\) Cfr. P.ROAZEN, Freud, Political and Social Thought (New York 1968) 252; E. FROMM, Man for Himself, 35
\(^{46}\) Letter to Pfister, Oct. 22, 1927, FREUD & PFISTER, Psycho-Analysis and Faith, 113
This objective was a programme of reform familiar to the nineteenth-century literature: "a lifting of the ascetic barrier, a relaxation of the moral fervor that created more hypocrites than saints, more sick minds than healthy souls."\(^\text{47}\) This is the core of the Freudian ethical message, probably what he meant as he wrote:

"Ethics is thus to be regarded as a therapeutic attempt."\(^\text{48}\)

In summary then, one thing can not be denied. Though FREUD fought uncompromisingly against the prevalent moral system and codes of conduct, his personal life taken as a whole, and some explicit pronouncements testify that he was not a "total subverter of all moral values". We must say that his fight was against antiquated ideologies rather than against inspirational ideals, against "transvaluations" rather than against the fundamental human values themselves. FREUD seems to convey the following ethical message: Human life must rise above the stale moralities and sterile systems. Morality should not be any more "a kind of high way code for traffic among mankind."\(^\text{49}\)

E. Conclusion to Part Two

In spite of all theoretical ambiguities and ideological confusions, FREUD was clear in his practical position in ethics. He once wrote to PFISTER:

"I do not break my head very much about good and evil, but I have found little that is 'good' about human beings on the whole. In my experience most of them are harsh, no matter they publicly subscribe to this or that ethical doctrine or to none at all... If we are to talk of ethics, I subscribe to a high ideal from which most of the human beings I have come across depart most lamentably."\(^\text{50}\)

This must be the main reason why he drew out a clear distinction between morals as a repressive force and real ethical values. Contemporary morality in its inherited form, according to FREUD, is no more acceptable, because it

\(^{47}\) P. RIEF, Freud, the Mind of the Moralist (New York 1959) 149
\(^{48}\) FREUD, Civilization and Its Discontents, GW XIV 502; SE XXI 142
\(^{49}\) FREUD & PFISTER, Psycho-Analysis and Faith, 123
\(^{50}\) Letter of Oct. 9, 1918, Ibid., 61 – 62
rests on a repressive super-ego. The real motivation, however, must be the love of mankind:

"I was myself a disciple of the love of mankind, not for sentimental motives or in pursuit of an ideal, but for sober, economic reasons, because, our instincts and the world around us being what they are, I could not but regard that love as no less essential for the survival of the human race than such things as technology...."^51

It must be in this sense that FREUD envisioned ethical principles as "indispensable to human society."^52 At this point it must be concluded that FREUD confronted mostly a deteriorated and degenerated form of moral systems, which deviated very much from the ideals he held. And it is against those systems and codes that he raised his voice mainly. Nevertheless, there is no reason to get discouraged. For, according to him, "Gold never occurs in nature without an admixture of silver and copper, but that is no reason for not recognizing the essential differences between them"^53

Hence we can not simply agree with people who affirm that "morals of a normal man are beyond the reach of psycho-analysis"^54, that "morality is one of the spiritual values maltreated by Freud"^55 and that "we shall not ask for a sexual morality from Freud."^56

51. Letter to R. Rolland, FREUD, GW XIV 553; SE XX 279
52. FREUD, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW XV 180; SE XXII 168
53. Letter to Pfister, April 11, 1927, FREUD & PFISTER, Psycho-Analysis and Faith, 107
54. P. VALORI, La civilta cattolica, 5,(1969) 425
55. R. DALBIEZ, La methode psychoanalytique et la doctrine freudienne (Paris 1949) 347
PART THREE

METAPSYCHOLOGY
THE THEORETICAL BACKGROUND OF THE FREUDIAN CONCEPTS
OF RELIGION AND MORALITY

An elaborate, extensive and exhaustive study of the Freudian theories is beyond the scope of this work. At the same time, a concise, yet possibly succinct exposition of his fundamental concepts is inevitable in this context. For it is into the meta-psychological mould that FREUD fitted his analytic findings and everyday facts; with this yardstick of 'psychical apparatus', he tried to evaluate cultural assets and to calculate the value systems of mankind.
Chapter Seven

THE FREUDIAN THEORY OF MIND

As FREUD himself has repeatedly revised his theories, one should start with an introduction into the very evolution of his theoretical concepts. After this introduction we will analyse his theories from different points of view and finally, we will summarize them.

A. Evolution of the Freudian Theoretical Concepts

Freudian theories and therefore psycho-analysis in its initial stages evolved gradually and progressively. FREUD himself gave his theories time and again so many modifications, as facts gathered from new observations necessitated intermittent changes. Probably from the Studies on Hysteria\(^1\) he got the first clue to a systematic approach. Here he discovered the influence of what he called the Infantile Sexuality.\(^2\) The neurotic symptoms were seen to be resulting from overt active or passive childhood seductions. Already by this time, especially from the facts gathered from dream-analysis, FREUD postulated the existence of a deeper layer of mind, where early perceptions and memory traces are buried. Thus we find an attempt at an initial systematization in an early substantial work of FREUD — The Interpretation of

1. FREUD, Studies on Hysteria (1893 – 95), GW I SE II.
2. In the psycho-analytical usage, ‘infant’ means a child under, say, 4 or 5, and ‘infantile’ refers to pre-genital, pre-oedipal or unsublimated. Thus infantile sexuality embraces “sexual phenomena assumed to be normal, ubiquitous, and inevitable during the infantile phases of libidinal development and which persist into adult life only in so far as (a) the Oedipus complex has not been resolved, (b) sublimations have not occurred, and (c) the activities have not been integrated into the fore-pleasure of adult sexuality”. C. RYCROFT, A Critical Dictionary of Psycho-Analysis (Penguin Reference Books 1968) 71.

The Freudian concept of ‘infantile sexuality’ will be more closely analysed later in this Chapter.
Dreams. The discovery of the phenomenon of infantile sexuality from self-analysis and from the analysis of his patients gave him new insights into the matter. By this time the mental functioning was perceived to be distributed between what he called the Conscious (-preconscious) systems and the Unconscious system. Neurotic symptoms were considered to be resulting from a conflict between the sex-drives residing in the unconscious and the ego-instincts (self-preservative instincts) operating from the preconscious-conscious systems.

FREUD here employed dreams abundantly alike of the patient’s conscious and unconscious processes. Previously analysis concentrated on psychopathology. But by now it is translated also into the ‘normal life’. FREUD describes the situation as follows:

"Previously psycho-analysis had only been concerned with solving pathological phenomena and in order to explain them it had often been driven into making assumptions whose comprehensiveness was out of all proportion to the importance of the actual material under consideration. But when it came to dreams, it was no longer dealing with a pathological symptom, but with a phenomenon of normal mental life which might occur in any healthy person. If dreams turned to be constructed like symptoms, if their explanation required the same assumptions — the repression of the impulses, substitutive formation, compromise-formation, the dividing of the conscious and the unconscious into various psychical systems — then psycho-analysis was no longer an auxiliary science in the field of psychopathology; it was rather the starting-point of a new and deeper science of the mind which would be equally indispensable for the understanding of the normal."

Further, the early emotional ambivalence was seen as the nucleus of neurotic conflicts. As it shall be explained later, such an ambivalent situation in a child was described as Oedipus Complex, where the libido, the energy behind it, was perceived to be attached to the imagos of the parental figures. At its dissolution, a precipitate is formed in the self, in the ego. FREUD called this new factor, the super-ego, which was found to be the seat of ethical and social standards. At this stage FREUD explained neurosis as a conflict result-

3. FREUD, The Interpretation of Dreams (1900) GW II/III; SE IV/V
4. FREUD, An Autobiographical Study (1925) GW XIV 73; SE XX 47
ing from inadequately discharged libido or the dammed-up energy which may be converted into pathological symptoms.

A Theory of Instincts was developed gradually. Freud first postulated the bi-polar tendencies - the ego - and sexual instincts. Later in the period known as 'ego-psychology', Freud charged the ego with sex-energy and therefore revision of the early theory was necessary. The evolution of the theory of instincts came to its peak when Freud finally postulated two basic instincts, or better, two basic classes of instincts, namely, the Eros and the destructive instinct — the former aiming at self-preservation plus the preservation of the species and the latter at self-destruction and aggression.

But the most important development in the Freudian theory of mind came by the time known as the Metapsychological Period. Freud attempted to elaborate a systematic theory and to give a theoretical axis to his practical conclusions. In his monumental work Totem and Taboo, drawing a comparison between the savage observances and the neurotic compulsions, Freud developed psycho-analysis into a philosophy of culture. Ontogeny was seen as a repetition of phylogeny and vice versa. From a supposed Oedipal story he went back to a real Oedipus history, and stated that the great cultural institutions like religion, morality, art, social order and so on took shape from a 'murderous crime' committed at the dawn of human race.

By the introduction of the concept of Narcissism in 1914, the whole systematic approach took another course of direction. Freud advanced the idea that a narcissistic-libido cathects the ego and with that a fresh com-

5. Cf. Freud, Instincts and Their Vicissitudes (1915) GW X, SE XIV; The Ego and the id (1923) GW XIII 268 - 76; SE XIX 40 - 47; An Outline of Psycho-Analysis (1940) GW XVII 70 - 73; SE XXIII 148 - 51
6. Here the reference is mainly to the period from 1914 ("Narcissism: an Introduction") to 1923 ("The Ego and the Id")
7. From 1915 to 1917, when Freud wrote the five Metapsychological Papers: Instincts and their Vicissitudes (1915) GW X, SE XIV; Repression (1915) GW X, SE XIV; The Unconscious (1915) GW X, SE XIV; A Metapsychological Supplement to the Theory of Dreams (1917) GW X, SE XIV; Mourning and Melancholia (1917) GW X, SE XIV
8. Freud, Claims of Psycho-Analysis to Scientific Interest (1913) GW VIII 413; SE XIII 184
plication arose. The original distinction of instincts into two main groups—sexual and ego instincts—became now untenable.

FREUD revised his theories again in 1920, in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* and included narcissistic libido as a manifestation of the sexual instincts and identified it as the self-preservative instincts, that is, the ego instincts. Later in 1923 the theory of the aggressive instinct which was earlier recognized as a part of the sex-instinct was modified and by 1933 the death-instinct was postulated in opposition to Eros. The death-instinct included aggressiveness and a tendency to destroy.

From a structural and genetic point of view FREUD systematized his theories in *The Ego and the Id* (1923) and distinguished three functions of the mental mechanism—the Id (*Ego*), the Ego (*Ich*) and the Super-ego (*Überich*). The human psyche was seen as a battleground of the three different functions and the ego or the self is said to be between the devil and the deep sea. The irrational and infra-human drives of the id buried in the unconscious crave for unconditional and immediate gratification. The id with its primitive drives, however, constitutes the core of the human being and it follows the pleasure principle. But the super-ego, the perpetual monument of one's infantile helplessness and a replica of the parental prohibitions, opposes such a gratification and represses the drives. So long as the ego is able to act 'diplomatically' and to make compromises between the internal cravings and the external threats represented by the super-ego, the person is 'normal' and healthy. But when the ego fails in this task, on account of any reason whatsoever, there is the danger of a mental outbreak.

Thus in the period of 1920 – 1926, FREUD developed a Structural

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10. FREUD, *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (1920) GW XIII, SE XVIII
11. FREUD, *The Ego and the Id*, (1923) GW XIII, SE XIX
12. FREUD, *New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis* (1933) GW XV, SE XXII
13. Parallel to the energy of the sex drives 'libido', FREUD never named the energy of the aggressive drive. But two of his pupils have suggested 'destrudo' (WEISS) and 'mortido' (FEDERN), Cfr. L. EIDELBERG, Encyclopedia of Psychoanalysis (The Free Press 1968) 20
Hypothesis in which the mental mechanism was viewed mainly from a topic or topographic outlook. Mental processes were grouped and studied under the triad of id, ego and super-ego.

In the final outcome, the theory of mind put forward by FREUD can be approached from three different angles — the topographic or structural, the dynamic and the economic points of view.15

The topographic analysis of mind presupposes the genetic determinants in the individual under the scheme of the triad of id, ego and super-ego. Accordingly, the present behaviour patterns are explained in terms of previous developmental stages and adaptational modes. The early Freudian scheme of Cs.Pcs.Ucs is now given a qualitative connotation. They are considered as psychical qualities.

From a dynamic point of view psycho-analysis considers all mental processes as an interplay of forces or instinctual drives. They are grouped under the dual instinct theory of Eros and destructive instinct — the one aims at union and communion and the other at disintegration and dissolution.

The economic stand-point views mental operation in terms of the increase and decrease of instinctual tension and the damming-up or free discharge. The pleasure-unpleasure principle must be brought under this heading. FREUD proposed the theory of the domination of the pleasure principle.

Thus according to the Freudian psycho-analysis, mental life and modes of behaviour should be understood as the end result of a continuous interaction between the various forces, by nature complex, but are integrated into the self from within and from without.

Mental conflicts are viewed in the light of the different schemes delineated above. Structurally, mental conflicts occur between the different functions of mind — the id, ego and super-ego. FREUD believed that ultimately all mental conflicts are between the cravings of the id and the repressing agency — the super-ego.

From a dynamic point of view conflicts may occur between activity and passivity, between masculinity and femininity, while economically, life instincts versus death instincts.

15. FREUD, An Autobiographical Study, GW XIV 85; SE XX 58 — 59
Out of these three stand-points, we start with the dynamic approach, more precisely with the theory of instincts.

**B. The Theory of Instincts**

FREUD qualified his theory of instincts as a “mythology”, as “an obscure subject”.

“The theory of instincts is so to say our mythology. Instincts are mythical entities, magnificent in their indefiniteness. In our work we cannot for a moment disregard them, yet we are never sure that we are seeing them clearly. You know how popular thinking deals with the instincts. People assume as many and as various instincts as they happen to need at the moment — a self-assertive instinct, an imitative instinct, an instinct of play, a gregarious instinct and many others like them. .... behind all these little *ad hoc* instincts there lay concealed something serious and powerful which we should like to approach cautiously”.

**1. The Nature of Instincts**

The term originally used by FREUD in this connection is “Trieb”. It must be noted that there is no strict counterpart for it in English. By a *Trieb* is understood: “a powerful, striving, imperative force within a living organism, deeply rooted in its psychical nature and closely connected with the somatic sources from which it springs”. So the German *Trieb* may be more properly rendered to English as instinctual drive or instinctual impulse. (As it is already in common use, we too use the term “instinct”).

According to FREUD, an instinct is a psychic force which arises within the

16. FREUD, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW XV 101; SE XXII 95
17. FREUD, Psycho-Analysis (1926) GW XIV 301; SE XX 265
18. FREUD, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW XV 101 — 102; SE XXII 95
19. L. EIDELBERG, Encyclopedia of Psychoanalysis, op. cit., p. 197
organism and has its source in somatic processes. That is, instincts have an organic origin. The later definition given by FREUD is:

"We assume that forces which drive the mental apparatus into activity are produced in the bodily organs as expression of the major somatic needs".

So the instincts represent "an instigation to mental activity". FREUD compared them to "Hunger and Love", "a quite formidable pair of forces". Another definition given by FREUD to instincts is:

"The forces which we assume to exist behind the tensions caused by the needs of the id".

FREUD distinguished an instinct from a stimulus: "by the fact that it arises from sources of stimulation within the body, that it operates as a constant force and that the subject cannot avoid it by flight, as is possible with an external stimulus".

Four elements may be distinguished in an instinct:

The Impetus ("Drang") — the motor element of the instinct, the amount of force or the measure of the demand upon energy which it represents.

The Aim ("Ziel") — always the satisfaction which can only be obtained by abolishing the condition of stimulation in the source of instinct. There can occur also an inhibition of the aim.

The Object ("Objekt") — in or through which it can attain its aim. A close attachment to an object can become also a fixation.

The Source ("Quelle") — somatic process in an organ or part of the body from which there results a stimulus represented in mental life by an instinct.

As regards the nature of the instincts FREUD gave the following description:

20. FREUD, Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, GW V 67; SE VII 168
22. Ibid.
23. Here the reference is to SCHILLER, "Die Weltweisen": "Hunger and Love are what moves the world", Cfr. GW XIV 227; SE XX 200 (footnote)
24. FREUD, An Outline of Psycho-Analysis, GW XVII 67; SE XXII 148
25. Ibid.
26. FREUD, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW XV 102 — 103; SE XXII 96
'They are characterized by possessing an immense (somatic) store of power ("the compulsion to repeat"); and they are represented mentally as images or ideas with an affective charge. In psycho-analysis, no less than in other sciences, the theory of the instincts is an obscure subject".28

'They represent the somatic demands upon the mind. Though they are the ultimate cause of all activity, they are of a conservative nature; the state, whatever it may be, which an organism has reached gives rise to a tendency to re-establish that state as soon as it has been abandoned. It is thus possible to distinguish an indeterminate number of instincts, and in common practice this is in fact done. For us, the important question arises whether it may not be possible to trace all these numerous instincts back to a few basic ones. We have found that the instincts can change their aim (by displacement) and also that they can replace one another — the energy of one instinct passing over to another".29

In another connection FREUD put it still more clearly:

'Well, these instincts fill the id: all the energy in the id, as we may put it briefly, originates from them. Nor have the forces in the ego any other origin; they are derived from those in the id. What, then, do these instincts want? Satisfaction — that is, the establishment of situations in which the bodily needs can be extinguished. A lowering of the tension of the need is felt by our organ of consciousness as pleasurable; an increase of it is soon felt as unpleasure. From these oscillations arises the series of feelings of pleasure-unpleasure, in accordance with which the whole mental apparatus regulates its activity. In this connection we speak of a 'dominance of the pleasure principle'".30

As mentioned above, FREUD first adhered to a polarization between the ego instincts and the sexual instincts — both distinguished through their aims, that is, self-preservation or the preservation of the species through reproduction. The ego instincts were also called the self-preservative drives. FREUD included here everything that had to do with the preservation, assertion and magnification of the individual. Nevertheless, these instincts were neither clearly defined nor extensively studied by FREUD.

To the sexual instincts FREUD attributed "the copiousness ("Reichhaltig-
keit") called for by infantile and perverse sexual life”.  

FREUD’s substantial contribution, especially in early stages, was in the field of sexuality.

‘The first object of our study was only the sexual instincts, whose energy we named ‘libido’. It was in relation to them that we sought to clarify our ideas of what an instinct is and what is to be attributed to it. Here we have the libido theory”.  

2. The Libido Theory

FREUD described sexual instincts in terms of their source, object and aim. Their source is a state of excitation in the body; aim, the removal of that excitation. Hence sexual instincts as somatic processes arise in the various parts of the body known as erotogenic zones, namely, oral, anal, phallic, and genital. These excitations from such zones or their respective organs were called component instincts.

‘There can be no question but that the libido has somatic sources, that it streams to the ego from various organs and parts of the body. This is most clearly seen in the case of that portion of the libido which, from its instincual aim, is described as sexual excitation. The most prominent of the parts of the body from which this libido arises are known by the name of ‘erotogenic zones’, though in fact the whole body is an erotogenic zone of this kind. The greater part of what we know about Eros — that is to say, about its exponent, the libido — has been gained from a study of the sexual function, which, indeed, on the prevailing view, even if not according to our theory, coincides with Eros. We have been able to form a picture of the way in which the sexual urge, which is destined to exercise a decisive influence on our life, gradually develops out of successive contributions from a number of component instincts, which represent particular erotogenic zones”.

Libido is, therefore, the particular energy responsible for our sexual activity:

“Libido means in psycho-analysis in the first place the force (thought of

31. FREUD, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW XV 102; SE XXII 96
32. Ibid.
33. FREUD, An outline of Psycho-Analysis, GW XVII 73; SE XXIII 151
quantitatively variable and measurable) of the sexual instincts directed towards an object — 'sexual' in the extended sense required by analytic theory". 34

In the early formulation of FREUD of the ego instincts as opposed to the sexual instincts, the ego was free of libido, 35 but it had to be revised as FREUD says: "Further study showed that it was necessary to set alongside this 'object-libido', a 'narcissistic' or 'ego-libido', directed to the subject's own ego; and the interaction of these forces has enabled us to account for a number of normal and abnormal processes in mental life". 36 Thus FREUD distinguished between an ego-libido and an object-libido according as the libido remains stored up in the ego or it is invested in (sexual) objects. But when this investment is withdrawn, the libido may take the ego as subject and then it is called 'narcissistic-libido'.

Thus an important revision of the libido-theory came in 1914. 37 The concept of libido was elaborated and the ego was libidinally charged. FREUD now extended the erotogenicity — an activity of the given bodily area, which consists in conveying sexually exciting stimuli to the mind — from the mere periphery of the body into the internal organs.

And, here FREUD met with great objections even from his colleagues. He was accused of 'pansexualism', of a monistic approach to the mental mechanism. 38 But FREUD objected to it and pointed out how erroneous the charge of pan-sexualism is, which is often levelled at psycho-analysis. 39

FREUD altered his view again in the period 1920 — 23 40 and that was the...

34. FREUD, A Short Account of Psycho-Analysis, GW XIII 420; SE XIX 203
35. FREUD, Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, GW V; SE VII
36. FREUD, A Short Account of Psycho-Analysis, GW XIII 420; SE XIX 203
37. FREUD, On Narcissism: An Introduction, GW X; SE XIV
38. Here it is interesting to note that already in 1911 JUNG identified the concept of libido with BERGSON's 'elan vital', with life-energy in general and thus purged it from sexual connotation. Cfr. E. JONES, LWF II 317. Yet as JONES points out, FREUD had "an obsessional determination to confine himself to two sets of instincts only" (LWF III 328)
39. FREUD A Short Account of Psycho-Analysis, GW XIII 240; SE XIX 204
40. FREUD, Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920) GW XIII; SE XVIII; The Ego and the Id (1923) GW XIII; SE XIX
climax of the evolution of his theory of instincts. Accordingly, both instincts — ego and sexual instincts — contained libido. The narcissistic libido was subdivided into primary and secondary, the former was identified with object libido. Thus in the new formulation sexual instincts contained object-libido while the ego instincts, the secondary narcissistic libido. Under normal conditions the presentations of the external objects are cathexed by object-libido and those of the self by secondary narcissistic libido.

Thus one can say that FREUD here developed a second instinct theory in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920). He introduced the concept of the destructive instincts and the classification was hereafter between erotic instincts and destructive (death) instincts, or between Eros and Thanathos. FREUD studied this theme again in The Ego and the Id (1923) under the concept of aggression. If the Eros looks for pleasure, Thanathos opposes it and aims at the return into an inorganic state. The id was seen as a vital stratum from which all the instincts arose and in their move to gratification they enter into relations of fusion and defusion of instincts. According to FREUD, these instincts now produce their psychological derivatives only after mixing up with each other into aggressive and sexual instinct fusions. Thus a certain amount of aggression will be implied also in Eros and vice versa.

Sadism and masochism were considered as two excellent examples of the fusion and defusion of instincts:

"It is our opinion, then, that in sadism and in masochism we have before us two excellent examples of a mixture of the two classes of instinct, of Eros and aggressiveness; and we proceed to the hypothesis that this relation is a model one — that every instinctual impulse that we can examine consists of similar fusions or alloys of the two classes of instinct. These fusions of course, would be in the most varied ratios. Thus the erotic instinct would introduce the multiplicity of their sexual aims into the

41. GW XIII 59 - 66; SE XVII 36 - 43
42. In this connection FREUD used the terms, "Todestrieb" (death-instinct), "Desteaktionstrieb" (destructive instinct), "Selbstzerstörung" (Self-destruction). But he used "Thanathos" only in conversation. Later analysts adopted it. Cfr. E. JONES, LWF II 295
43. FREUD, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW XV 111 - 12; SE XXII 104 - 105
44. Ibid.
fusion, while the others would only admit of mitigations or gradations in their monotonous trend". 45
The sexual instincts deserve closer study in this context.

3. A Wider Concept of Sexuality

As SIGMUND FREUD is widely known for his theory of sexuality, and more than that, he is misunderstood at least in the popular judgements, a word must be added here about the concept of sexuality in the Freudian theories.

FREUD himself corrected this misunderstanding by drawing a clear borderline between the analytic understanding and the 'vulgar' sense of the term sex. 46 He put it in very clear terms that sexuality is not to be identified with genitality:

"The belief that in man sexual life begins only at puberty is incorrect. On the contrary, signs of it can be detected from the beginning of extra-uterine existence; it reaches a first culminating point at or before the fifth year (‘early period’), after which it is inhibited and interrupted (‘latency period’) until the age of puberty, which is the second climax of its development. This diphasic onset of sexual development seems to be distinctive of the genus Homo. All experiences during the first period of childhood are of greatest importance to the individual, and in combination with his inherited sexual constitution form the dispositions for the subsequent development of character and disease. It is wrong to make sexuality coincide with ‘genitality’": 47

Starting from some ‘neglected facts’ 48, FREUD tried to convince his readers, psycho-analysis provoked astonishment and contradicted “all the popular opinions on sexuality“:

"Its principal findings are as follows:
a) Sexual life does not begin only at puberty, but starts with plain manifestations soon after birth.

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45. Ibid.
46. FREUD, A Short Account of Psycho-Analysis, GW XIII 420; SE XIX 204
47. FREUD, Psycho-Analysis, GW XIV 304; SE XX 267 (Italics mine)
48. FREUD mentions three such facts here; we quote them in next pages; Cfr. Note
b) It is necessary to distinguish sharply between the concepts of 'sexual' and 'genital'. The former is the wider concept and includes many activities that have nothing to do with the genitals.

c) Sexual life includes the function of obtaining pleasure from zones of the body — a function which is subsequently brought into the service of reproduction. The two functions often fail to coincide completely.\(^\text{49}\)

This distinction between sexuality and genitality was drawn by FREUD already in 1905.\(^\text{50}\) Strictly speaking, genitality is only one aspect of sexuality, though the fully evolved and therefore the most important one. Sexuality, on the other hand, includes all functions which are directed towards the attainment of pleasure. It is not confined to a particular place or organ, or to particular time. It entails bodily as well as psychic elements. Hence FREUD preferred the term 'psycho-sexuality', in the comprehensive sense of the term 'love'.\(^\text{51}\)

As regards the nature of the sexual instincts, FREUD wrote as follows:

‘The sexual instincts are noticeable to us for their plasticity, their capacity for altering their aims, their replaceability, which admits of one instinctual satisfaction being replaced by another, and their readiness for being deferred, of which we have just given a good example in the aim-inhibited instincts‘.\(^\text{52}\)

In the sexual life of an individual, according to FREUD, there is an unbroken line of development, an uninterrupted course of evolution.

‘It is not the case, then, that we recognize a sexual instinct which is from the first the vehicle of an urge towards the aim of the sexual function — the union of the two sex-cells. What we see is a great number of component instincts arising from different areas and regions of the body, which strive for satisfaction fairly independent of one another and find that satisfaction in something that we may call 'organ pleasure'. The genitals are the latest of these ‘erotogenic zones’ and the name of ‘sexual’ pleasure cannot be withheld from their organ-pleasure. These impulses which strive for pleasure are not all taken up into final organization of the sexual function’.\(^\text{53}\)

49. FREUD, An Outline of Psycho-Analysis, GW XVII 74 — 75; SE XXIII 152
50. FREUD, Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, GW V, SE VII
51. Cfr. above, Chapter Five, Note 6. (FREUD, 'Wild' Psycho-Analysis, GW VIII 120; SE XI 222)
52. FREUD, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW XV 104; SE XXII 97
53. Ibid. GW XV 104 — 105; SE XXII 99
According to FREUD, it is already in the nature of instincts that some of them may be inhibited in their aims and only partly satisfied, even though the aim of an instinct is always its complete gratification.

"A number of them are set aside as unserviceable, by repression or some other means; a few of them are diverted from their aim in the remarkable manner I have mentioned and used to strengthen other impulses; yet others persist in minor roles, and serve for the performance of introductory acts, for the production of fore-pleasure. You have heard how in the course of this long-drawn-out development several phases of preliminary organization can be recognized and also how this history of the sexual function explains its aberrations and atrophies".

Perhaps the most important contribution of SIGMUND FREUD to the understanding of human sex is his 'discovery' of the infantile sexuality and his re-definition of sexual perversions. He claims to have built all his theories and insights upon analytical facts.

"According to the prevailing view human sexual life consists essentially in an endeavour to bring one's own genitals into contact with those of someone of the opposite sex. With this are associated, as accessory phenomena and introductory acts, kissing this extraneous body, looking at it and touching it. This endeavour is supposed to make its appearance at puberty — that is, at the age of sexual maturity — and to serve the purposes of reproduction. Nevertheless, certain facts have always been known which do not fit into the narrow framework of this view. It is a remarkable fact that there are people who are only attracted by individuals of their own sex and by their genitals. It is equally remarkable that there are people whose desires behave exactly like sexual ones but who at the same time entirely disregard the sexual organs or their normal use; people of this kind are

54. Here FREUD refers to the phenomenon of 'sublimation'. "A certain kind of modification of the aim and change of the object, in which our social valuation is taken into account, is described by us as 'sublimation'. Besides this, we have grounds for distinguishing instincts which are 'inhibited in their aim' — instinctual impulses from sources well known to us with an unambiguous aim, but which come to a stop on their way to satisfaction, so that a lasting object-cathexis comes about and a permanent trend (of feeling). Such, for instance, is the relation of tenderness, which undoubtedly originates from the sources of sexual need and invariably renounces its satisfaction". FREUD, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW XV 103; SE XXII 97. Cfr. also: Part Five, Chapter Ten Note 98

55. Ibid. GW XV 105; SE XXII 98
known as ‘perverts’. And lastly it is a striking thing that some children (who are on that account regarded as degenerate) take very early interest in their genitals and show signs of excitation in them.  

4. Infantile Sexuality

The sexual development, according to FREUD, begins diffusely with a gratification connected with sucking which is at the same time related to a vital somatic need — hunger. So the onset of sexuality is so to say at the mother’s breast. The first organ to emerge as an erotogenic zone and to make libidinous demands is the mouth.

“It has been found that in early childhood there are signs of bodily activity to which only an ancient prejudice could deny the name of sexual and which are linked to psychical phenomena that we come across later in adult erotic life — such as fixation to particular objects, jealousy and so on. It is further found, however, that these phenomena which emerge in early childhood from part of an ordered course of development, that they pass through a regular process of increase, reaching a climax towards the end of the fifth year, after which there follows a lull.”

This pregenital organization of sexuality, that is, before it reaches the stage of genitality, evolves in a sequence of events.

“The first of these ‘pregenital’ phases is known to us as the oral one because, in conformity with the way in which an infant in arms is nourished, the erotogenic zone of the mouth dominates what may be called the sexual activity of that period of life. At a second level the sadistic and anal impulses come to the fore, undoubtedly in connection with the appearance of the teeth, the strengthening of the muscular apparatus and the control of the sphincter functions. ...Thirdly comes the phallic phase in which in both sexes the male organ (and what corresponds to it in girls) attains an importance which can no longer be overlooked. We have reserved the name of genital phase for the definitive sexual organization which is established after puberty and in which the female genital organ for the first time meets with the recognition which the male one acquired long before.”

56. FREUD, An Outline of Psycho-Analysis, GW XVII 74; SE XXIII 152
57. Ibid. GW XVII 75; SE XXIII 153
58. FREUD, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW XV 105; SE XXII 98 – 99
In the earliest stage of sexual development, namely, in the oral phase, the child knows only one satisfaction, that of the hunger-need. It serves the purpose of self-preservation by means of nourishment. FREUD, however, sees it sexual:

"Primarily, of course, this satisfaction serves the purpose of self-preservation by means of nourishment; but physiology should not be confused with psychology. The baby’s obstinate persistence in sucking gives evidence at an early stage of a need for satisfaction which, though it originates from and is instigated by the taking of nourishment, nevertheless, strives to obtain pleasure independently of nourishment and for that reason may and should be termed sexual". 59

This oral phase is so to say 'cannibalistic', as is symbolized in sucking the breasts, thumb etc., and it is characterized by its exclusive autoerotism. It has not yet a proper sexual object. Its sexual aim is dominated by the autoerogenetic zone. During this phase sadistic impulses already occur sporadically along with the appearance of teeth.

Those sadistic impulses extend themselves far greater into the second phase which is better described as sadistic-anal, as a continuation of the oral-sadistic phase. Here satisfaction is sought mainly in aggression and in excretory functions.

"The second stage, characterized by the emergence of the biting activity, may be described as the 'oral-sadistic' one; it exhibits for the first time the phenomena of ambivalence, which become so much clear afterwards, in the following sadistic-anal phase. The value of these new distinctions is to be seen especially if we look for the dispositional points in the development of the libido in the case of particular neuroses, such as obsessional neurosis and melancholia". 60

In this stage the polar functions of activity and passivity are at work and here one recognizes the onset of ambivalence in (emotional) relations.

The third phase known as the phallic one is "a forerunner of the final form taken by sexual life and already much resembles it". 61 But not the genitals of both sexes but only the male one (the phallus) plays the significant role here.

59. FREUD, An Outline of Psycho-Analysis, GW XVII 76; SE XXIII 154
60. FREUD, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW XV 105; SE XXII 99
61. FREUD, An Outline of Psycho-Analysis, GW XVII 76; SE XXIII 154
With that the development of infantile sexuality reaches its peak and thereafter boys and girls have, according to FREUD, different histories. Intellect also now comes to the service of sexuality in the form of "sexual researches".62

A boy now enters what is called the Oedipus situation. Externally one perceives a certain amount of organ manipulation accompanied by some phantasies of object relation to mother. This situation will be solved and, according to FREUD, the psychic balance in every individual will largely, if not exclusively, depend upon the way in which one has faced it. As it shall be explained later, an analogous situation exists also in a girl. This is evidently a definite turning point in every individual's emotional life.

In the normal path of development the component instincts of those early phases exist side-by-side until later they give way to the primacy of the genital zone. At any stage a fixation can occur and a neurosis may develop. Once their aim is completely inhibited, naturally they seek substitutive channels. Mature sexuality is above all threatened by a fixation or a regression to the pregenital stages.63 Thus the later FREUD gave a shift of emphasis:

"Our attitude to the phases of the organization of the libido has in general shifted a little. Whereas earlier we chiefly emphasized the way in which each of them passed away before the next, our attention now is directed to the facts that show us how much of each earlier phase persists alongside of and behind the later configurations and obtains a permanent representation in the libidinal economy and character of the subject".64

As aforesaid, infantile sexuality culminates in the Oedipus complex, dissolution of which plays perhaps the most important role in the individual psychic life.

62. FREUD, Some Reflections on a Schoolboy Psychology, GW X 207; SE XIII 245
63. Psycho-Analysis contends that "Mature sexuality is threatened from three directions: from the first by a fixation or regression to the pregenital stages which mobilizes defense mechanisms and thus prevents a moral discharge of genital desires; from the second by latent homosexual wishes which interfere with mature heterosexual performance; and from the third by the presence of aggressive wishes which combine with sexual needs to mobilize fear and feelings of guilt". L. EIDELBERG, Encyclopedia of Psycho-analysis, op. cit., p. 401
64. FREUD, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW XV 106; SE XXII 100
The Oedipus complex is, no doubt, a pivotal assumption in the Freudian psycho-analysis. One finds a repetition of this idea in almost all the works of Freud. Its existence in the individual was established already from the investigations on dreams. With that, Freud thought that he found an explanation for all the important cultural assets. That is why E. Fromm qualified Oedipus complex as "Freud's drama par excellence".

Oedipus complex basically implies an emotional relationship, by nature ambivalent, of the child towards the parents; more concretely, it is a desire to possess the parent from the opposite sex and the rival antagonistic feeling to the other. According to Freud, no one is exempted from this situation. It is to be recognized as a fact of experience and a programme of life.

"... it is, nevertheless, a phenomenon determined and laid down by heredity and which is bound to pass away according to programme when the next pre-ordained phase of development sets in".

The fact of bisexuality complicates the matter further. According to

65. Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams, GW II/III 270; SE IV 263
67. Freud would say: "Like Oedipus we live in ignorance of these wishes repugnant to morality, which however the nature has forced upon us." Interpretation of Dreams, GW II/III 270; SE IV 263; Cfr. also, Thoughts for the Times on War and Death, GW X 353; SE XIV 299; Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-Year-Old Boy, GW VII 345; SE X 112
68. Freud, The Dissolution of the Oedipus Complex, GW XIII 395 - 96; SE XIX 174
69. Freud viewed bisexuality as a psychological fact. Accordingly, every individual displays a mixture of the character-traits belonging to his own and the opposite sex; and he shows a combination of activity and passivity, whether or not these last character-traits tally with his biological ones. Cfr. Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, GW V 121 - 23; 127 - 8; SE VII 143 - 44, 147; The Ego and the Id, GW XIII 261; SE XIX 33; Analysis Terminable and Interminable, GW XVI 89 - 90; SE XXII 243 - 44. Freud wrote: "The matter is made more difficult to grasp by the complicating circumstance that even in boys the Oedipus complex has a double orientation, active and passive, in accordance with their bisexual constitution; a boy also wants to take his mother's place as the love-object of his father — a fact which we describe as the feminine attitude." Cfr. also: Some Psychical Consequences of the Anatomical Distinction between the Sexes, GW XIV 21; SE XIX 250
FREUD, no human being is fully masculine or feminine, but a blend of the two sides of humanity and it is the relative strength of the masculinity or femininity that determines the individual. Bisexuality comes to play a role in the subsequent vicissitudes of the Oedipus complex. Thus FREUD would affirm that:

"Closer study usually discloses the more complete Oedipus complex, which is twofold, positive and negative, and is due to the bisexuality originally present in children: that is to say, a boy has not merely an ambivalent attitude towards the father and an affectionate object-choice towards his mother, but at the same time he also behaves like a girl and displays an affectionate feminine attitude to his father and a corresponding jealousy and hostility towards his mother."\(^{70}\)

Moreover, FREUD reminds his readers to take into consideration the ontogenetic as well as the phylogenetic sides of this phenomenon together. As the individual, so also mankind as a while developed such a complex at the dissolution of which the civilization itself arose.

From the individual sexual development, it must be remembered that this complex is contemporaneous with the phallic phase in which the male organ or phallus is the centre of attention in both sexes. This phallic phase does not develop into a definitive genital organization, but is submerged and is succeeded by the latency period. Thus both sexes develop an Oedipus complex, at its dissolution a super-ego is formed, more or less powerful, and the latency period follows, which grows into the period of maturity.

In the male child the process will be as follows:

"When the (male) child’s interest turns to his genitals he betrays the fact by manipulating them frequently; and he then finds that the adults do not approve of this behaviour. More or less plainly, more or less brutally, a threat is pronounced that this part of him which he values so highly will be taken away from him. Usually it is from women that this threat emanates; ... It happens particularly often that the little boy is threatened with castration, not because he plays with his penis with his hand, but because he wets his bed every night and cannot be got to be clean...

Now it is my view that what brings about the destruction of the child’s phallic genital organization is this threat of castration. Not immediately, it is true, and not without other influences being brought to bear as

\(^{70}\) FREUD, The Ego and the Id, GW XIII 261; SE XIX 33
well”.71

The furious adult reprimands at this stage create in the child a latent fear of rejection, deprivation and mutilation — “a child is being beaten”.72 Together with this threat, FREUD continues, two experiences of children heighten the complex and help dissolve the situation. They are the experience of the withdrawal of the mother’s breast and the daily demand on a child to give up the contents of the bowel, and secondly, the sight of the female genitals at whose sight he anticipates the loss of his organ. The concomitant masturbation is, according to FREUD, “only a genital discharge of the sexual excitation belonging to that complex, and throughout his later years will owe its importance to that relationship”.73

The normal dissolution of the complex in a boy is as follows:

“The Oedipus complex offered the child two possibilities of satisfaction, an active and a passive one. He could put himself in his father’s place in a masculine fashion and have intercourse with his mother as his father did; in which case he would soon have felt the latter as a hindrance; or he might want to take the place of his mother and be loved by his father. ... But now his acceptance of the possibility of castration, his recognition that women were castrated, made an end of both possible ways of obtaining satisfaction from the Oedipus complex. For both of them entailed the loss of his penis — the masculine one as a resulting punishment and the feminine one as a precondition. If the satisfaction of love in the field of the Oedipus complex is to cost the child his penis, a conflict is bound to arise between his narcissistic interest in that part of his body and the libidinal cathexis of his parental objects. In this conflict the first of these forces normally triumphs: the child’s ego turns away from the Oedipus complex”.74

An analogous situation is present in a female child75, though proliferated in a slightly different manner. The observation of a penis in a boy and its

71. FREUD, The Dissolution of the Oedipus Complex, GW XIII 396 — 97; SE XIX 174 — 75
73. FREUD, The Dissolution of the Oedipus Complex, GW XIII 398; SE XIX 176
74. Ibid.
75. One should not forget the fact that FREUD presented a predominantly male psychology, in which often only analogous applications are made to the female characters.
absence, perceived as a loss in herself, generates the ‘penis-wish’ coupled with a ‘penis-envy’. The acceptance in resignation of this loss enables her to attempt at a compensation. By way of symbolism and analogy, the penis-wish is transformed into a ‘child-wish’, the wish to bear a child, which is now expected from the father as a gift. Accordingly, she adopts the mother’s role and a feminine attitude towards her father. As these wishes are never fulfilled, FREUD tells us, the complex dissolves itself slowly.

“Her Oedipus complex culminates in desire, which is long retained, to receive a baby from her father as a gift — to bear him a child. One has an impression that the Oedipus complex is then gradually given up because this wish is never fulfilled. The two wishes — to possess a penis and a child — remain strongly cathected in the unconscious and help to prepare the female creature for her later sexual role”.  

This turning away from the early object-cathexes is replaced by identifications and the formation of the super-ego. The parental authority, especially the severity of the father, is introjected into the ego where it forms a moral barrier.

“We are at present dealing with the beginning of the latency period, a period which is characterized by the dissolution of the Oedipus complex, the creation or consolidation of the super-ego and the erection of ethical and aesthetic barriers in the ego”.

The original incestuous barrier perpetuates itself in the newly formed moral code of the individual. The libidinal trends belonging to the Oedipus situation are partly desexualized and sublimated, and partly inhibited in their aims and changed into impulses of affection. This process of turning away from the object-cathexes is called repression.

“I see no reason for denying the name of ‘repression’ to the ego’s turning away from the Oedipus complex, although later repressions come about for the most part with the participation of the super-ego, which in this case is only just being formed. But the process we have described is more than a repression. It is equivalent, if it is ideally carried out, to a destruction and abolition of the complex”.

The pathogenic role of the Oedipus complex was analysed by FREUD in a

76. FREUD, The Dissolution of the Oedipus Complex, GW XIII 401; SE XIX 179
77. FREUD, Inhibitions, Symptom and Anxiety, GW XIV 144; SE XX 114
78. FREUD, The Dissolution of the Oedipus Complex, GW XIII 399; SE XIX 177
case study (1909) known as “Little Hans”. It was a therapeutic application of psycho-analysis. Little Hans’ neurosis was characterized by a phobia of horses (“The horse will bite me”). FREUD traced its origin to Hans’ libidinal desires and thought that little Hans was “really a little Oedipus”. Hans wished very much that his father be away (“weg”) and dead (“tot”). Here the bipolar contents of the Oedipus wishes are present. According to FREUD, “the repressions of early education” (“die Verdrängung durch Verurteilung”) played a great part in causing this neurosis.

“... considering the education given by his parents, which consisted in the omission of our usual educational sins”.

At the close of this study FREUD deduced a dramatic conclusion, that between the ‘nervous’ and ‘normal’ children or adults no sharp borderline can be drawn, and that ‘illness’ is purely a practical concept of gradation. That is to say, if the ego has succeeded only in achieving a simple repression and not a proper destruction and abolition of the Oedipus complex, its elements will remain in the unconscious and later will come to the fore as pathological symptoms. Thus sexual aberrations and ‘perversions’ are, according to FREUD magnified infantile sexuality, diverted from their aims — “a regression to the early infantile impulse”. In conclusion then:

“I have no doubt that the chronological and causal relations described here between the Oedipus complex, sexual intimidation (the threat of castration), the formation of the super-ego and the beginning of the latency period are of a typical kind; but I do not wish to assert that this type is the only possible one. Variations in the chronological order and in the linking

79. FREUD, Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-Year-Old Boy, GW VII 241 – 377; SE X 3 – 149
80. Ibid. GW VII 345; SE X 112. “Er ist wirklich ein kleiner Oedipus.”
81. Ibid.
82. FREUD, Some Psychical Consequences of the Anatomical Distinction between the Sexes, GW XIV 21; SE XIX 250
83. FREUD, Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-Year-Old Boy, GW VII 375; SE X 147
84. Ibid. GW VII 338; SE X 103. “Unterlassungen unserer gebräuchlichen Erzühlungs-sünden.”
85. Ibid. GW VII 376; SE X 147
86. FREUD, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW XV 134; SE XXII 126
up of these events are bound to have a very important bearing on the de-
velopment of the individual". 87

After the analysis of mind from an economic point of view, we should
deal with its dynamism.

C. The Psychical Qualities

Under this title which we borrow from FREUD 88 we want to present a
short account of the early picture of mind outlined by him from a purely
psychical point of view.

Here one has to start with the apparent fact of consciousness which in-
cludes a wide range of perception, feelings, thought-processes and volitions.
They may be accompanied by somatic processes, but not necessarily. In order
to ‘localize’ these internal events, FREUD postulated the existence of an un-
conscious, even though, as he says, ‘The majority of philosophers, however,
as well as many other people, dispute this and declare that the idea of some-
thing psychical being unconscious is self-contradictory’. 89

Thus the basic classification of psychical events and processes given by
FREUD is into two — conscious and unconscious:

"In the course of this work the distinctions which we describe as psychical
qualities force themselves on our notice. There is no need to characterize
what we call ‘conscious’: it is the same as consciousness of philosophers
and of everyday opinion. Everything else psychical in our view is ‘the un-
conscious’. We are soon led to make an important division in this uncon-
scious. Some processes become conscious easily; they may then cease to be
conscious, but can become conscious once more without any trouble: as
people say, they can be reproduced or remembered. This reminds us that
consciousness is in general a highly fugitive state. What is conscious is con-
scious only for a moment". 90

Here FREUD took for granted the existence of what is called a ‘precon-
scious’.

87. FREUD, The Dissolution of the Oedipus Complex, GW XIII 401; SE XIX 179
88. FREUD, An Outline of Psycho-Analysis, GW XVII 79; SE XXIII 157
89. Ibid. GW XVII 80; SE XXIII 158
90. Ibid. GW XVII 81; SE XXIII 159
"Everything unconscious that behaves in this way, that can thus easily exchange the unconscious state for the conscious one, is therefore preferably described as 'capable of becoming conscious' or as preconscious". 91

Thus the division is now complete:

"Thus we have attributed three qualities to psychical processes: they are either conscious, preconscious or unconscious. The division between the three classes of material which possess these qualities is neither absolute nor permanent. What is preconscious becomes conscious, as we have seen, without any assistance from us; what is unconscious can, through our efforts, be made conscious, and in the process we may have a feeling that we are often overcoming very strong resistances". 92

We now deal with each one of them separately.

1. The Conscious

The conscious generally represents the sensory perceptions, feelings and ideas. It is usually equated with "the quality of being conscious" — all that is psychical or mental:

"All that is conscious is psychical and conversely, all that is psychical is conscious". Freud, however, corrects this (mis)understanding of some philosophers and 'amateur psychologists', because, "the equation of what is mental with what is conscious had the unwelcome result of divorcing psychical processes from the general context of events in the universe and of setting them in complete contrast to all others ..." 93

"Psycho-analysis escaped such difficulties as these by energetically denying the equation between what is psychical and what is conscious. No; being conscious cannot be the essence of what is psychical. It is only a quality of what is psychical, and an inconstant quality at that — one that is far oftener absent than present. The psychical, whatever its nature be, is in itself unconscious and probably similar in kind to all the other natural processes of which we have obtained knowledge". 94

91. Ibid. GW XVII 82; SE XXIII 159 — 60
92. Ibid. GW XVII 82; SE XXIII 160
93. FREUD, Some Elementary Lessons in Psycho-Analysis, GW XVII 143; SE XXIII 283
94. Ibid. GW XVII 144; SE XXIII 283
As regards the function of consciousness, it is first of all attached to the ego which controls motility and exercises censorship. Moreover:

"Of the phenomenon of consciousness we can at least say that it was originally attached to perception. All sensations which originate from the perception of painful, tactile, auditory or visual stimuli are most readily conscious. Thought-processes and whatever may be analogous to them in the id, are in themselves unconscious and obtain access to consciousness by becoming linked to the mnemonic residues of visual and auditory perceptions along the path of the function of speech".

Moreover, this system of perceptual-conscious is the window of the whole mental apparatus, opened to the external world:

"... the outmost superficial portion of the mental apparatus, which we describe as the system Pept-Cs (perceptual-conscious). This system is turned towards the external world, it is the medium for the perceptions arising thence, and during its functioning the phenomenon of consciousness arises in it. It is the sense-organ of the entire apparatus".

2. The Preconscious

Preconscious is a system that exists between the conscious and the unconscious according to the conceptual model of the mental apparatus from a qualitative point of view. The preconscious elements were defined by Freud earlier (1900) as verbal images which could be hyper-cathected and made available to consciousness with little or no effort and which could then be decathected again, remaining in latent form as a result of loss of attention. Thus the early description was based on the ability of the contents to become conscious. It contains memories which, although do not come to the conscious state by themselves, still remain accessible. It is the reservoir of everything we

95. FREUD, The Ego and the Id, GW XIII 243; SE XIX 17
96. FREUD, Moses and Monotheism, GW XVI 204; SE XXIII 97
97. FREUD, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW XV 81 — 82; SE XXII 75
98. FREUD, The Interpretation of Dreams, GW II/III 545, 617 — 19; SE V 541 — 42, 574 — 77
can remember, all that is accessible to recall, the storehouse of memory. Regarding the latent thoughts which do not become conscious, FREUD made a later distinction. Subsequently he modified also the concept of the unconscious:

"We see, however, that we have two kinds of unconscious — the one which is latent but capable of becoming conscious, and the one which is repressed and which is not, in itself and without more ado, capable of becoming conscious. ... The latent, which is unconscious only descriptively, not in the dynamic sense, we call preconscious; we restrict the term unconscious to the dynamically unconscious repressed". 99

The preconscious stands in relation to both conscious and unconscious states so much so that the real antithesis is only between the conscious and the unconscious. 100 Something becomes conscious "through becoming connected with the word representations corresponding to it" 101, that is, through their mnemonic residues. How do we make something that is repressed (pre)conscious? "It is done by supplying Pcs. intermediate links through the work of analysis" 102, that is, the repressed elements are made conscious through the mediation of the preconscious. Here FREUD recognizes the value of not only the analytic technique, but also the meaning of symbolism in language. 103

3. The Unconscious

Some philosophers prior to FREUD already used the term unconscious, but in a metaphysical sense. 104 Perhaps FREUD used it for the first time in a specifically psychological sense, as a quality of mind. He recognized it as a deeper layer of the psyche with dynamic influences, where forgotten and repressed memories are buried. For him the concept of unconscious was a cor-

99. FREUD, The Ego and the Id, GW XIII 241; SE XIX 15
100. FREUD, The Question of Lay Analysis, GW XIV 225; SE XX 198
101. FREUD, The Ego and the Id, GE XIII 247; SE XIX 19 - 20
102. Ibid. GW XIII 249; SE XIX 21
103. FREUD, Moses and Monotheism, GW XVI 205; SE XXIII 98
ner-stone in psycho-analysis. ¹⁰⁵

According to B. Wolman, Freud postulated the existence of the unconscious under the proof of the following factors: amnesias and split personality, dream interpretation, psychopathology of everyday life, symptom-formation and the process of resistance, and transference in psycho-analytic treatment. ¹⁰⁶

In the case of amnesia the forgotten and hidden memories re-appear after a lapse of time. The same happens in the question of hysterical dissociation or 'split-personality'. According to Freud, only an unconscious layer of mind can account for these facts. Again, a dream is a wish-fulfilment. ¹⁰⁷ The hidden desires or forbidden wishes find an escape or exit from the inhibiting censorship of the ego only through dreams, parapraxes ¹⁰⁸ and neurotic symptoms. They all point to the existence of this subterranean layer of mind. ¹⁰⁹

As mentioned earlier, Freud distinguished two kinds of unconscious. One that is easily accessible to the conscious state which is called the latent conscious or the preconscious and secondly, there is the unconscious proper. From a topographic point of view the whole of the id and part of the ego and of the super-ego are unconscious.¹¹⁰ In its content one should differentiate between what is repressed and so becomes unconscious, and what is by nature unconscious.

"Originally, to be sure, everything was id; the ego was developed out of the id by the continual influence of the external world. In the course of this development certain of the contents of the id were transformed into the preconscious state and so taken into the ego; others of its contents remained in the id unchanged, as its scarcely accessible nucleus. During this development, however, the young and feeble ego put back into the unconscious state some of the material it had already taken in, dropped it, and behaved in the same way to some fresh impressions which it might have taken in, so that these, having been rejected, could leave a trace only in the

¹⁰⁵. Freud, An Autobiographical Study, GW XIV 56; SE XX 31
¹⁰⁶. Freud, Moses and Monotheism, GW XVI 201; SE XXIII 95
¹⁰⁸. Freud, The Psychopathology of Everyday Life, (1901) GW IV; SE VI
¹⁰⁹. Cfr. the summary at the end of this Chapter
¹¹⁰. Cfr. the graphic structure below
id. In consideration of its origin we speak of this latter portion of the id as the repressed".\textsuperscript{111}

Repression in general is a defence mechanism by which the ego debars the objectionable instinctual impulses from access to consciousness and to direct motor discharge. The impulses retain at the same time their full cathexis of energy. In 1923 Freud stated\textsuperscript{112} that the instinctual energy remaining in the unconscious can be discharged without the help of the unconscious. That is what happens in dreams, parapraxes, neurotic symptoms and the like.

"On the other hand, the repressed impulse, which was now unconscious, was able to find means of discharge and of substitutive satisfaction by circuitous routes and thus to bring the whole purpose of the repression to nothing. In the case of conversion hysteria the circuitous route led to somatic innervation; the repressed impulse broke its way through at some point or other and produced symptoms".\textsuperscript{113}

Properly speaking, all repressions occur in childhood period and added to that come later in life "after-repressions".\textsuperscript{114}

Freud traced the operation of the unconscious as primary process as opposed to the secondary process of the ego. Investigation into dreams revealed a complex network in which the latent content, or the unconscious 'thoughts' are transformed into the manifest content\textsuperscript{115} with a displacement of instinctual energy and a condensation of ideas, in order to escape the ego censorship. Freud called it the primary process.\textsuperscript{116} Thus he drew a clear

\textsuperscript{111} Freud, An Outline of Psycho-Analysis GW XVII 85; SE XXIII 163; Cfr. also, The Ego and the Id, GW XIII 245 – 46; SE XIX 14
\textsuperscript{112} Freud, The Ego and the Id, GW XIII 239 – 55; SE XIX 13 – 27
\textsuperscript{113} Freud, An Autobiographical Study, GW XIV 55; SE XX 30
\textsuperscript{114} Freud, Analysis Terminable and Interminable, GW XVI 71; SE XXIII 227.
"All repressions take place in early childhood; they are primitive defensive measures taken by the immature feeble ego. In later years no fresh repressions are carried out; but the old ones persist, and their services continue to be made use of by the ego for mastering the instincts. New conflicts are disposed of by what we call 'after-repression'." ("Nachverdrängung")
\textsuperscript{115} Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams, GW II/III 283 – 84; SE IV 274
\textsuperscript{116} Freud, Some Additional Notes on Dream Interpretation as a Whole (1925) GW I 572; SE XIX 138. "On the basis of a number of experiences I am inclined to draw the conclusion that thought-transference of this kind comes about particularly easily at the moment at which an idea emerges from the unconscious or, in theoretical terms, as it passes over from the 'primary process' to the 'secondary process'."
line between the two processes, conscious and unconscious:

"We have found that processes in the unconscious or in the id obey different laws from those in the preconscious ego. We name these laws in their totality the primary process, in contrast to the secondary process which governs the course of events in the preconscious, in the ego".\footnote{117}

As mentioned above, the unconscious contains mainly the instinctual cathexes of the id, their representations. An impulse exists in the unconscious through its representations, as a quantitative sum of excitation without qualitative values.\footnote{118} All that is inherited, that is fixed in the constitution, the archaic heritage, find their way here. Thus phylogeny plays a signal role in laying foundation of the human mind.\footnote{119} But the repressed does not exhaust the content of the unconscious, which has a wider range of objects. In passing, one may say here with J. NUTTIN that this widened concept of the unconscious prompted the psycho-analysts to narrow the boundaries between the normal and the pathological, until finally they established a sole difference of degree between the normal and the pathological cases.\footnote{120} In conclusion it must be said that the Freudian triad of Cs.-Pcs.-Ucs. presents a systematic approach to the mental mechanism. Mental conflicts were seen to be arising between the conscious and unconscious systems. Nevertheless, FREUD gave a more comprehensive study in his later years, integrating all the different approaches to form the metapsychology proper.

\section*{D. The Metapsychology}

FREUD used the term metapsychology to describe his general theory. In general it means a comprehensive study of the mental mechanisms and processes where the different approaches are co-ordinated and integrated. In the final outcome it entails three different approaches — the topographical, the
dynamic and the economic. Topography refers to the 'localizations' within the psychical apparatus, the triad of Id, Ego, Super-ego. Dynamic approach presupposes the theory of instincts, while the economic one refers to the distribution of the energy within the apparatus. Nevertheless, we find a full-fledged metapsychological formulation only in the later works of FREUD. About its development he wrote as follows:

"I had already made attempts at earlier stages of my work to arrive at some general points of view on the basis of psycho-analytic observation. In a short essay, 'Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning' (1911b), I drew attention (and there was, of course, nothing original in this) to the domination of the pleasure-unpleasure principle in mental life and to its displacement by what is called the reality-principle. Later on (in 1915) I made an attempt to produce a 'Metapsychology'. By this I meant a method of approach according to which every mental process is considered in relation to three co-ordinates, which I described as dynamic, topographical, and economic respectively; and this seemed to me to represent the furthest goal that psychology could attain".  

1. Transition to Metapsychology Proper

FREUD seems to have used this term 'Metapsychology' for the first time in a letter to FLIESS in 1898:

"I would ask you seriously whether I may use the term metapsychology for my psychology that takes one beyond consciousness".  

One finds an attempt at an exploration into a systematic approach in FREUD already by 1900, especially in the seventh Chapter of The Interpretation of Dreams. At this time he wanted to replace metaphysics through metapsychology. However, the Metapsychological Papers of 1915—1917 prepared the way properly. No doubt, in his monumental work on theories, The Ego and the Id, FREUD brought all the elements together and co-ordinated them.

121. FREUD, An Autobiographical Study, GW XIV 85; SE XX 58 — 59
122. Letter to Fliess, March 10, 1898. Quoted in E. JONES, LWF I 357
123. FREUD, The Psychopathology of Everyday Life, GW IV 288; SE VI 259
124. Cfr. above, Note 7
According to FREUD, a fully evolved metapsychological formulation embraces a combination of all the different approaches to the mental processes — genetic, systematic, economic, structural or topographic. FREUD summarized them into three basic approaches mentioned above — the dynamic, the topographic, the economic.\(^1\)\(^2\)\(^5\)

Nevertheless, it should be noted here that the new construction was in no way a total destruction of the old formulations, but only a development and completion. Thus the metapsychology integrated into itself the 'depth-psychology', providing a new frame of reference.\(^1\)\(^2\)\(^6\) The old geographical plan was replaced by a new dynamic structure.\(^1\)\(^2\)\(^7\)

The dynamic outlook presupposes the mental phenomena to be looked upon as being the result of the interaction and counteraction of forces, while the economic aspect leads one to ascertain the fate of the given volumes of excitation. We have explained both these approaches in connection with the instinct-theory and the psychical qualities.\(^1\)\(^2\)\(^8\) What now remains is the topographic or structural analysis.

2. The Topography of Mind\(^1\)\(^2\)\(^9\)

The core of this approach was explained by FREUD as follows:

'Topographically, psycho-analysis regards the mental apparatus as a com-

\(^1\)\(^2\)\(^5\) FREUD, An Autobiographical Study, GW XIV 85; SE XIX 58 — 59; The Ego and the Id, GW XIII 240 — 41; SE XIX 14 — 15; Analysis Terminable and Interminable, GW XVI 70 — 71; SE XXIII 226 — 27; Psycho-Analysis, GW XIV 301 — 302; SE XX 265 — 266

\(^1\)\(^2\)\(^6\) FREUD, A Short Account of Psycho-Analysis, GW XIII 422; SE XIX 205

\(^1\)\(^2\)\(^7\) As C. S. HALL put it: 'When Freud changed his model from a conscious-pre-conscious-unconscious one to an id-ego-super-ego one, he intended to do away with the conception of boundaries or barriers between consciousness and unconsciousness and to replace a geographical plan with a dynamic one.' "Psycho-analytic Theory and its Applications", op. cit., p. 156

\(^1\)\(^2\)\(^8\) Cfr. above, B and C

\(^1\)\(^2\)\(^9\) FREUD originally, in ‘The Interpretation of Dreams’ (1900) used the term topographic (‘topisch’) in connection with the concept of the systems Ucs., Pcs., Cs. Later in 1923 (‘Psycho-Analysis’) he referred to the id, ego, and super-ego as the topographic division. Hence there is a bit of confusion today in the use of the term, as some
pound instrument, and endeavours to determine at what points in it the various mental processes take place. According to the most recent psychoanalytic views, the mental apparatus is composed of an 'id', which is the repository of the instinctual impulses, of an 'ego', which is the most superficial portion of the id and one which has been modified by the influence of the external world, and of a 'super-ego', which develops out of the id, dominates the ego and represents the inhibitions of instinct that are characteristic of man. The quality of consciousness, too, has topographical reference; for processes in the id are entirely unconscious, while consciousness is the function of the ego's outermost layer, which is concerned with the perception of the external world". 130

At this point FREUD justifies the alterations and modifications in the psycho-analytic concepts. As a science founded upon the observation of facts of mental life, "its theoretical superstructure is still incomplete and subject to constant alterations". 131 Again, even though psycho-analysis started with explaining the pathological phenomena, it developed into a psychology of normal mental life. 132 So its conclusions are 'open to revision'.

Hence the topographic outlook divides the total personality from genetic plus dynamic points of view into a tripartite structure — id-ego-super-ego — "three realms, regions, provinces, into which we divide the individual's mental apparatus". 133

3. Characteristics of the Id.

For this term 'Id', FREUD acknowledged his indebtedness to GROD-
DECK, who was following the Nietzschean usage. FREUD describes the id:

"We have arrived at our knowledge of this psychical apparatus by studying the individual development of human beings. To the oldest of these psychical provinces or agencies we give the name of id. It contains everything that is inherited, that is present at birth, that is laid down in the constitution — above all, therefore, the instincts, which originate from the somatic organization and which find a first psychical expression here (in the id) in forms unknown to us".

In a footnote FREUD added to it:

"This oldest portion of the psychical apparatus remains the most important throughout life; moreover, the investigations of psycho-analysis started with it".

Hence the id contains the sum total of our instinctual forces. Cut off from the external world and having no spacio-temporal relations, it is buried in the depth of the unconscious and remains so. "It is the dark, inaccessible part of our personality." We come to some knowledge of it through dreams and neurotic symptoms. It is by nature of a negative character. Thus, as FREUD says:

"We approach the id with analogies: we call it a chaos, a cauldron full of

135. G. GRODDECK, Das Buch vom Es (Vienna 1923). "ID", a Latin word for 'it', used by Freud's translators to translate his 'das Es', the term he borrowed from Groddeck and used to designate the unorganized parts of the psychic apparatus. (Groddeck's translators prefer 'the IT'). C. RYCROFT, A Critical Dictionary of Psychoanalysis, op. cit., p. 66

136. F. NIETZSCHE habitually used this grammatical term for whatever in our nature is impersonal and, so to speak, subject to natural law. Cfr. the Editor's introduction to "The Ego and the Id", SE XIX 7 - 8. FREUD commented on it as follows: 'We will no longer use the term 'unconscious' in the systematic sense and we will give what we have hitherto so described a better name and one no longer open to misunderstanding. Following a verbal usage of Nietzsche's and taking up a suggestion by Georg Groddeck (1923), we will in future call it the 'id'. This impersonal pronoun seems particularly suited for expressing the main characteristic of this province of the mind — the fact of its being alien to the ego". New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW XV 79; SE XXII 72.

137. FREUD, An Outline of Psycho-Analysis, GW XVII 67 — 68; SE XXIII 145

138. Ibid.

139. FREUD, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW XV 80; SE XXII 73
seething excitations. We picture it as being open at its end to somatic influences, and as there taking up into itself instinctual needs which find their psychical expression in it, but we cannot say in what substratum. It is filled with energy reaching it from the instincts, but it has no organization, produces no collective will, but only a striving to bring about the satisfaction of the instinctual needs subject to the observance of the pleasure principle. The logical laws of thought do not apply in the id, and this is true above all of the law of contradiction. Contrary impulses exist side by side, without cancelling each other out or diminishing each other: at the most they may converge to form compromises under the dominating economic pressure towards the discharge of energy. There is nothing in the id that could be compared to with negation; and we perceive with surprise an exception to the philosophical theorem that space and time are necessary forms of our mental acts.\textsuperscript{140} There is nothing in the id that corresponds to the idea of time; there is no recognition of the passage of time.\textsuperscript{141}

The id knows no judgements of value, no morality.\textsuperscript{142} It is governed by the law of primary process in the unconscious. It is dominated by the pleasure principle. "The id obeys the inexorable pleasure principle."\textsuperscript{143} In other words, "Instinctual cathexes seeking discharge — that, in our view, all there is in the id".\textsuperscript{144}

However, according to FREUD, this primitive id constitutes the core of the human being:

"The core of our being, then, is formed by the obscure \textit{id}, which has no direct communication with the external world and is accessible even to our knowledge only through the medium of another agency. Within this id the organic \textit{instincts} operate, which are themselves compounded of fusions of two primal forces (Eros and destructiveness) in varying proportions and are differentiated from one another by their relation to organs or systems of organs. The one and only urge of these instincts is towards satisfaction, which is expected to arise from certain changes in the organs with the help

\textsuperscript{140} The reference is to E. KANT. Cfr. FREUD, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, GW XIII 27 – 28; SE XVIII 28
\textsuperscript{141} FREUD, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW XV 80; SE XXII 73 – 74
\textsuperscript{142} Ibid. GW XV 81; SE XXII 74
\textsuperscript{143} FREUD, An Outline of Psycho-Analysis, GW XVII 129; SE XXIII 198. "Das Es gehorcht dem unerbittlichen Lustprinzip".
\textsuperscript{144} FREUD, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW XV 81; SE XXII 74
of objects in the external world. But immediate and unheeding satisfac-
tion of the instincts, such as the id demands, would often lead to perilous
conflicts with the external world and to extinction. The id knows no solici-
tude about ensuring survival and no anxiety ... The processes which are
possible in and between the assumed psychical elements in the id (the pri-
mary process) differ widely from those which are familiar to us through
conscious perception in our intellectual and emotional life; nor are they
subject to the critical restrictions of logic, which repudiates some of these
processes as invalid and seeks to undo them.” 145

Even though the id is completely submerged in the unconscious, those ele-
ments which are taken from it for the formation of the ego and the super-ego
(this point will be considered here immediately) can become conscious. The
id is separated from the ego through a censor or resistance which controls the
flow of its derivatives. The positive energy of the libido and the negative de-
structive one are originally seated in the id. When the ego and the super-ego
develop, they derive their energy from the id. 146 Thus ultimately the id is the
confused land of passions, instinctual impulses and habit tendencies.

4. The Psychology of the Ego.

FREUD wrote in The Ego and the Id:

“We have formed the idea that in each individual there is a coherent orga-
nization of mental processes; and we call this his ego. It is to this ego that
consciousness is attached; the ego controls the approaches to motility —
that is, to the discharge of excitations into the external world; it is the
mental agency which supervises all its own constituent processes, and
which goes to sleep at night, though even then it exercises the censorship
on dreams. From this ego proceed the repressions, too, by means of which
it is sought to exclude certain trends in the mind not merely from cons-
ciousness but also from other forms of effectiveness and activity.” 147

The ego is developed from the id:

145. FREUD' An Outline of Psycho-Analysis, GW XVII 128; SE XXIII 197 – 98
also, B. B. WOLMAN, The Unconscious Mind, the Meaning of Freudian Psychology (New
Jersey 1968) 48ff.
147. FREUD, The Ego and the Id, GW XIII 243; SE XIX 17
"We shall now look upon an individual as a psychical id, unknown and unconscious, upon whose surface rests the ego, developed from its nucleus, the Pcpt. system. If we make an effort to represent this pictorially, we may add that the ego does not completely envelop the id, but only does so to the extent to which the system Pcpt. forms its (the ego's) surface, more or less as the germinal disc rests upon the ovum. The ego is not sharply separated from the id; its lower portion merges into it."  

Thus the ego is "a portion of the id."  

"We need scarcely look for a justification of the view that the ego is that portion of the id which was modified by the proximity and influence of the external world, which is adapted for the reception of stimuli and as a protective shield against stimuli, comparable to the cortical layer by which a small piece of living substance is surrounded."  

Therefore, FREUD reminds his readers: "But we shall not overlook the fact that the id and the ego are originally one." Yet it is not a mere part or a subdivision of the id, because it is a development and an acquisition. It produces a high degree of organization, which the id completely lacks.  

"But what distinguishes the ego from the id quite especially is a tendency to synthesis in its contents, to a combination and unification in its mental processes which are totally lacking in the id."  

In other words:  

"To adopt a popular mode of speaking, we might say that the ego stands for reason and good sense while the id stands for the untamed passions."  

What is conspicuous about the ego is that it stands as a mediator between the internal and external world, and controls the transactions between the two. It censors the persistent demands of the id. The remarkable contrasts between the id and the ego are:

148. Ibid. GW XIII 251; SE XIX 24  
149. FREUD, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW XV 83; SE XXII 76  
150. Ibid. GW XV 82; SE XXII 75  
151. FREUD, Analysis Terminable and Interminable, GW XVI 85 — 86; SE XXIII 240  
152. FREUD, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW XVI 85 — 86  
SE XXII 76  
153. Ibid. GW XV 83; SE XXII 76  

21 Kottayarkil, FREUD
The Id

- primitive
- unorganized
- follows pleasure principle
- emotional
- subject to the law of primary process, which ignores differences and contradictions, and is beyond space and time.

The Ego

- civilized
- organized
- follows reality principle
- rational
- subject to the law of secondary process, which is analytical and subject to principles of contradiction and to the categories of space and time.

Nevertheless, from a dynamic point of view the ego is weak and feeble. It owes its energy to the id and later in life it is subject to the pressures of its own precipitate, the super-ego. As a child grows up, it develops an ego, in the beginning, naturally, very weak. The newly born infant is a bundle of needs and drives. As the child depends on the external world for the gratification of those needs, the ego is gradually formed through introjections.

An infantile ego, analogically an immature ego of an adult, confuses the inner stimulations with external stimuli. In this case the 'reality-testing' does not occur and therefore, perception will be equated with reality. Illusions, hallucinations and the like are to be counted at this stage.  

In *The Ego and the Id* FREUD corrected an early view  which ascribed the function of reality-testing to the super-ego, and affirmed that it is a function of the ego.  That is the function of checking a perception of the subject against the external world and eliminate, if needed, from the picture of

154. Cfr. FREUD, The Ego and the Id, GW XIII 248; SE XIX 20; An Outline of Psycho-Analysis, GW XVII 84; SE XXIII 162

155. Referring to his earlier view (cfr. Group psychology, GW XIII 126; SE XVIII 114) FREUD said that all his earlier views still hold good, “Except that I seem to have been mistaken in ascribing the function ‘reality-testing’ to this super-ego, a point which needs correction. It would fit in perfectly with the relations of the ego to the world of perception if the reality-testing remained a task of the ego itself”. FREUD, The Ego and the Id, GW XII 256; SE XIX 28, footnote 2.

156. Ibid. GW XIII 256; SE XIX 28
the outer world elements that may stem from inner sources of excitation. For the ego can take itself as an object, though it is a subject by itself.

"The ego can take itself as an object, can treat itself like other objects, can observe itself, criticize itself, and do Heaven knows what with itself. In this one part of the ego is setting itself over against the rest. So the ego can be split; it splits itself during a number of functions — temporarily at least. Its parts can come together again afterwards." 157

The ego is thus attached to the external world, and as long as it is in touch with reality, it can somehow keep its task of maintaining the harmony and balance between the two worlds. But it may be weakened in proportion to the pressures coming from the id or to the overpower of the super-ego. A total detachment from the realities gives way to psychoses. However, the ego tries often to make compromises, and for that purpose it will be compelled to mask the unconscious percepts of the id with preconscious rationalizations, to colour reality with inner conflicts, to behave in a mode of diplomatic insecurity. 158

To summarize the characteristics of the ego:

"Here are the principal characteristics of the ego. In consequence of the pre-established connection between sense perception and muscular action, the ego has voluntary movement at its command. It has the task of self-preservation. As regards external events, it performs the task of becoming aware of stimuli, by storing up experiences about them (in the memory), by avoiding excessively strong stimuli (through flight), by dealing with moderate stimuli (through adaptation) and finally by learning to bring about expedient changes in the external world to its own advantage (through activity). As regards internal events, in relation to the id, it performs that task by gaining control over the demands of instincts, by deciding whether they are to be allowed satisfaction by postponing that satisfaction to times and circumstances favourable in the external world or by suppressing their excitations entirely." 159

Nevertheless, the ego has, according to FREUD, a very awkward but sympathetic posture in the whole topographic framework of mind. The ego al-

157. FREUD, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW XV 63; SE XXII 58
158. Cfr. FREUD, The Ego and the Id, GW XIII 247 — 48; SE XIX 21 — 22; New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW XV 84 — 85; SE XXII 77 — 78
159. FREUD, An Outline of Psycho-Analysis, GW XVII 68; SE XXIII 145 — 46
ways stands between the devil and the deep sea.

"We are warned by a proverb against serving two masters at the same time. The poor ego has things even worse: it serves three severe masters and does what it can to bring their claims and demands into harmony with one another. These claims are always divergent and often seem incompatible. No wonder that the ego so often fails in its task. Its three tyrannical masters are the external world, the super-ego and the id .... Owing to its origin from the experiences of perceptual system, it is earmarked for representing the demands of the external world, but it strives too to be a loyal servant of the id, to remain on good terms with it, to recommend itself to it as an object and to attract its libido to itself. In its attempt to mediate between the id and reality, it is often obliged to cloak the Ucs. commands of the id with its own Pcs. rationalizations, to conceal the id's conflicts with reality, to profess, with diplomatic disingenuousness, to be taking notice of reality even when the id has remained rigid and unyielding." ¹⁶⁰

The individual develops not only an ego, but also a super-ego very early in life. This super-ego deserves now our closer attention.

5. The Concept of Super-Ego

Already in his very early work, The Interpretation of Dreams, FREUD spoke of a 'censorship' that prevents the morally unacceptable ideas from coming to the conscious, a censor that is responsible for repression and dream-work. Further investigations into cases of mental conflicts led FREUD to establish this criticizing element as a special factor, and the name super-ego was given to it. Thus the super-ego is a part of the ego in which self-observation, self-criticism and other reflective activities develop. It is the sum total of the 'idealizations' and introjections of the individual — of the inhibited forces from within and of the internalized forces from without.

As we mentioned above, the super-ego is formed at the dissolution of the Oedipus complex as a precipitate in the ego.

"The super-ego owes its special position in the ego, or in relation to the ego, to a factor which must be considered from two sides: on the one hand

¹⁶⁰. FREUD, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW XV 84 — 85; SE XXII 77 — 78
it was the first identification and one which took place while the ego was still feeble, and on the other hand it is the heir to the Oedipus complex and has thus introduced the most momentous objects into the ego ... Although it is accessible to all later influences, it nevertheless preserves throughout life the character given to it by its derivation from the father-complex — namely the capacity to stand apart from the ego and to master it. It is a memorial of the former weakness and dependence of the ego, and the mature ego remains subject to its domination.”

A number of identifications take place together with the dissolution of the Oedipus complex. Here we are interested in a particular form of identification which terminates the complex through the introjection of the (lost) object.

“When it happens that a person has to give up a sexual object, there quite often ensues an alteration of his ego which can only be described as a setting up of the object inside the ego, as it occurs in melancholia ... It may be that by this introjection, which is a kind of regression to the mechanism of the oral phase, the ego makes it easier for the object to be given up or renders that process possible. It may be that this identification is the sole condition under which the id can give up its objects.”

Thus the super-ego is said to be the direct heir to the Oedipus complex. It sprouts from “the ashes of the Oedipus complex.” Nevertheless, the surmounting of this complex through the establishment of the super-ego is only partially successful. At its genesis the super-ego seems to absorb only

161. FREUD, The Ego and the Id, GW XIII 277; SE XIX 48
162. FREUD, The Dissolution of the Oedipus Complex, GW XIII 395 — 402; SE XIX 173 — 79
163. Cfr. FREUD, Group Psychology, GW XIII 116 — 18; SE XVIII 107 — 108; The Ego and the Id, GW XIII 257 — 63; SE XIX 28 — 35; Civilization and Its Discontents, GW XIV 482 — 93; SE XXI 123 — 33; New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW XV 69 — 76; SE XXII 63 — 69; An Outline of Psycho-Analysis, GW XVI 72f.; SE XXIII 190 — 93
164. FREUD, The Ego and the Id, GW XIII 257; SE XIX 29
167. FREUD, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW XV 70; SE XXII 64
some negative qualities and prohibitions of the introjected objects and thus it exists in the individual as a monument of one’s weakness and inabilities.

“As a child was once under a compulsion to obey its parents, so the ego submits to the categorical imperative of its super-ego.”\(^ {168}\)

Again:

“The super-ego seems to have made a one-sided choice and to have picked out only the parents’ strictness and severity, their prohibiting and punitive function, whereas their loving care seems not to have been taken over and maintained. If the parents have really enforced their authority with severity we can easily understand the child’s in turn developing a severe super-ego. But, contrary to our expectation, experience shows that the super-ego can acquire the same characteristic of relentless severity even if the upbringing had been mild and kindly and had so far as possible avoided threats and punishments.”\(^ {169}\)

The basis of the whole process is an identification,\(^ {170}\) the assimilation of one ego to another one, one ego coming to resemble another one, as a result of which the first ego behaves like the second in certain respects, imitates it and in a sense takes it up to itself. But there is a difference between an identification proper and the choice of object. In the case of an identification, for example the boy wants to be like his father, while in object-choice he wants to have him, to possess him.

“If one has lost an object or has been obliged to give it up, one often compensates oneself by identifying oneself with it and by setting it up once more in one’s ego, so that here object-choice regresses, as it were, to identification”\(^ {171}\)

In such an identification which leaves precipitates of the early object-cathexes in the ego, the parents are the prototype; but it will be repeated often enough later in the child’s life. Later influences too become the ideal models:

“In the course of development the super-ego also takes on the influences of those who have stepped into the place of parents — educators, teachers, people chosen as ideal models. Normally it departs more and more from the original parental figures; it becomes, so to say, more impersonal. ...

\(^{168}\) FREUD, The Ego and the Id, GW XIII 277 — 78; SE XIX 48

\(^{169}\) FREUD, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW XV 68; SE XXII 62

\(^{170}\) Cfr. Ibid. GW XV 69; SE XXII 63

\(^{171}\) Ibid.
Identifications then come about with these later parents as well, and indeed they regularly make important contributions to the formation of character; but in that case they only affect the ego, they no longer influence the super-ego, which has been determined by the earliest parental imagos.\footnote{172}

Thus the early identifications are more lasting in the later life of the individual; they determine the fate of the super-ego. Different identifications can have pathological consequences, they can bring about a disruption of the ego and may cause ‘multiple personality’:

“It may come to disruption of the ego in consequence of the different identifications becoming cut off from one another by resistances; perhaps the secret of the cases of what is described as ‘multiple personality’ is that the different identifications seize hold of consciousness in turn”.\footnote{173}

Thus the super-ego exists in the individual as “the legitimate heir of the parental agency”\footnote{174}, as “the heir of that emotional attachment which is of such importance for childhood”\footnote{175} as “the precipitate of the old picture of the parents”.\footnote{176} Even though “the automatisation of the super-ego”\footnote{177} takes place early in one’s life, it will be really consolidated only at the dissolution of the Oedipus complex through a process of identification which implies an introjection of the parental qualities and an eventual projection of them. In other words, identification is through idealization and idealization often brings about an “idolization” — Identification $\rightarrow$ Idealization $\rightarrow$ Idolization.

This super-ego is said to be the seat and vehicle of the higher cultural institutions such as religion, morality, art, philosophy and social order:

“All every individual has in fact gone through this phase but has afterwards energetically repressed Its purport and succeeded in forgetting it. A horror of incest and an enormous sense of guilt are left over from this prehistoric epoch of individual’s existence. It may be that something quite similar occurred in the prehistoric epoch of the human species as a whole and that
the beginnings of morality, religion and social order were intimately connected with the surmounting of that primaeval era”. 178

6. Cultural Dividends of the Super-Ego

The super-ego as the heir to the Oedipus complex and as equated with the parental introjects, displays itself, first of all, in the individual as the moral conscience. 179

“The super-ego applies the strictest moral standard to the helpless ego which is at its mercy; in general it represents the claims of morality; and we realize all at once that our moral sense of guilt is the expression of the tension between the ego and the super-ego”. 180

Here FREUD contradicts the supposition that morality has been given by God and is deeply implanted in us. 181 The psychological truth underlying this supposition, according to FREUD, is that it is the monument of childhood weakness and dependence. Here history repeats itself and in this sense it may be said to be deeply implanted in us.

Thus the super-ego is “the vehicle of the ego ideal by which the ego measures itself, which it emulates, and whose demand for ever greater perfection it strives to fulfil”. 182

Moreover, on account of its origin from the Oedipus wishes, deeply buried in the unconscious terrain of the id, the super-ego stands in close correlation with the phylogenetic heritages. Thus not only biological but also historico-cultural elements play a signal role in it. In other words, the super-ego is a product of both the individual and of the species.

“Owing to the way in which the ego ideal is formed, it has the most abundant links with the phylogenetic acquisition of each individual — his archaic heritage. What has belonged to the lowest part of the mental life of each of

178. FREUD, Resistances to Psycho-Analysis, GW XIV 108; SE XIX 220 — 21
179. Cfr. above, the concept of morality in Part Two.
180. FREUD, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW XV 67; SE XXII 61; Cfr. also, An Outline of Psycho-Analysis, GW XVII 136; SE XXIII 205
181. FREUD, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW XV 67; SE XXII 61
182. Ibid. GW XV 71; SE XXII 64 — 65
us is changed, through the formation of the ideal, into what is highest in
the human mind by our scale of values". 183

"But the derivation of the super-ego from the first object cathexes of the
id, from the Oedipus complex, signifies even more for it. This derivation, as
we have already shown, brings it into relation with the phylogenetic acquisi-
tions of the id and makes it a reincarnation of former ego-structures which
have left their precipitates behind in the id. Thus the super-ego is always
close to the id and can act as its representative vis-à-vis the ego. It reaches
deep down in the id and for that reason is farther from consciousness than
the ego is". 184

Thus the history of mankind repeats itself:

"Mankind never lives entirely in the present. The past, the tradition of the
race and of the people, lives on in the ideologies of the super-ego, and
yields only slowly to the influences of the present and to new changes;
and so long as it operates through the super-ego it plays a powerful part in
human life, independently of economic conditions". 185

However, according to FREUD, the history of this civilization is a history
of instinctual renunciations. For this civilization is built upon the instinctual
renunciations, upon the restrained and desexualized Eros 186, re-channelled to
affective trends, that is, upon the 'sublimated' energy. 187 Thus Eros together
with Ananke 188 becomes the creator of civilization. "Eros and Ananke (Love

183. FREUD, The Ego and the Id, GW XIII 265; SE XIX 36
184. Ibid, GW XIII 278; SE XIX 48 – 49
185. FREUD. New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW XV 73 – 74; SE
XXII 67
186. FREUD, The Ego and the Id, GW XIII 273; SE XIX 44
187. Ibid. GW XIII 274; SE XIX 45. "If this displaceable energy is desexualized libi-
do, it may also be described as sublimated energy; for it would still retain the main pur-
pose of Eros — that of uniting and binding — in so far as it helps towards establishing the
unity, or tendency to unity, which is particularly characteristic of the ego".
188. 'Ananke', the Greek term for external necessity, means otherwise fate. Freud
used it to designate the counterpart to inner necessity arising from Eros and destructive
drives, and described inner necessity and Ananke as the parents of human culture.
"There is no doubt that the prescribed course of development can be disturbed and
altered in each individual by recent external influences. But we know the power which
forced a development of this kind upon humanity and maintains its pressure in the same
direction to-day. It is, once again, frustration by reality, or, if we are to give it its true,
grand name, the pressure of vital needs — Necessity (Ananke)". FREUD, Introductory
Lectures on Psycho-analysis, GW XI 368; SE XVI 355
and Necessity) have become the parents of human civilization". This love operates in civilization both in its original form, in which it does not renounce direct sexual satisfaction, and in its modified form as aim-inhibited affection, that is desexualized energy sublimated into affective trend — genital love in the service of founding families and the aim-inhibited love into forming friendships and community. But in the course of development, according to Freud, this process works in a dialectic:

"On the one hand love comes into opposition to the interests of civilization; on the other, civilization threatens love with substantial restriction."^190

In this process, as H. Marcuse says, civilization, introducing a 'surplus-repression', plunges into a destructive dialectic: the perpetual restrictions on Eros ultimately weaken the life instincts and strengthen and release the very forces against which they were 'called-up' — those of destruction.^191

Controls and restrictions were introduced already from the very beginning of the human race, especially on the two basic human instincts — sexuality and aggression. Hence the growth of this civilization is to be identified with the degree of repression on those two instincts.

"If civilization imposes such great sacrifices not only on man's sexuality but on his aggressivity, we can understand better why it is hard for him to be happy in that civilization. In fact primitive man was better off in knowing no restrictions of instinct. To counterbalance this, his prospects of enjoying this happiness for any length of time were very slender. Civilized man has exchanged a portion of his possibilities of happiness for a portion of security".192

We have already explained how in the course of the development of this civilization the higher institutions of religion and morality stemmed from the instinctual renunciations. They sprouted from the original ambivalent feelings of primitive men and they developed together as two wings of this civilization.193 Freud fitted all these elements perfectly into the metapsychologi-

189. FREUD, Civilization and its Discontents, GW XIV 460; SE XXI 101
190. Ibid, GW XIV 462; SE XXI 103
191. H. MARCUSE, Eros and Civilization, 40.
192. FREUD, Civilization and its Discontents, GW XIV 474; SE XXI 115
193. This point, indeed the central theme of this work, will be considered in the next part of this book.
cal mould, more correctly into the concept of super-ego, both on the ontogenetic and on the phylogenetic level.

E. The Psychical Apparatus

Here we want to summarize the theoretical concepts of FREUD. He found two terminal points of our knowledge of our psychic life — the bodily organ, the brain or the nervous system as the scene of action and secondly, our acts of consciousness. Starting from them FREUD constructed two hypotheses. The first was concerned with the ‘localization’ of the mental processes, and the second, with psychical qualities.

“Our two hypotheses start out from these ends or beginnings of our knowledge. The first is concerned with localization. We assume that mental life is the function of an apparatus to which we ascribe the characteristics of being extended in space and of being made up of several portions — which we imagine, that is, as resembling a telescope or microscope or something of the kind.”

From a genetic and developmental point of view three provinces were localized — id, ego and super-ego. On the other hand, the psychical qualities were recognized under the triad of Cs., Pcs. and Ucs. The former tripartite structure represents the metapsychology and the suprastructure, while the latter, the depth-psychology and the infrastructure.

Accordingly, a theory of instincts was developed, which, in the final outcome, differentiates two basic classes of instincts.

“... we have to distinguish two classes of instincts, one of which, the sexual instincts or Eros, is by far the more conspicuous and accessible to study. It comprises not merely the uninhibited sexual instinct proper and the instuctual impulses of an aim-inhibited or sublimated nature derived from

194. The phrase is taken from FREUD, An Outline of Psycho-Analysis, GW XVII 67; SE XXIII 144
195. Ibid. GW XVII 67; SE XXIII 145
196. Ibid. GW XVII 79; SE XXIII 158
197. Ibid. GW XVII 67; SE XXIII 145
198. Cfr. above, Note 5
it, but also the self-preservative instinct, which must be assigned to the ego and which at the beginning of our analytic work we had good reason for contrasting with the sexual object-instincts. The second class of instincts...in the end we came to recognize sadism as its representative". 199

FREUD further believed in a 'fusion' or better, 'defusion' ("Mischung"/"Entmischung") 200 of the two classes of instincts so much so that none of them exists in its purest form, but only as mixed together, though with a dominance of one or the other.

In the metapsychological framework, the id contains all these primitive instincts — all that is inherited, and all that is repressed. Qualitatively it is ruled by the unconscious; economically it is dominated by the pleasure principle. The ego is gradually developed from the id, together with the influence of the external world. The super-ego is formed as a precipitate in the ego, as a derivative of the early ambivalent relations to the parents, as the heir to the Oedipus complex. It displays the censoring and criticizing instance which keeps the resistance over the repressed. As it is formed through early identifications with the parental authority, it is a relic and replica of the moral standards of the parental introjects.

FREUD depicted the whole mechanism of mind as follows: 201

"I should like to portray the structural relations of the mental personality, as I have described them to you, in the unassuming sketch which I now present you with:

199. FREUD, The Ego and the Id, GW XIII 268; SE XIX 40
200. Ibid. GW XIII 269; SE XIX 41
201. FREUD, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW XV 85; SE XXII 78. Compare with an earlier diagram, The Ego and the Id, GW XIII 252; SE XIX 24
As you see here, the super-ego merges into the id; indeed, as heir to the Oedipus complex it has intimate relations with the id; it is more remote than the ego from the perceptual system. The id has intercourse with the external world only through the ego — at least according to this diagram. It is certainly hard to say to-day how far the drawing is correct. In one respect it is undoubtedly not. The space occupied by the unconscious id ought to have been incomparably greater than that of the ego or the pre-conscious. I must ask you to correct it in your thoughts."^\textsuperscript{202}

The sketch in the original German edition is as follows:

\begin{center}
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{sketch.png}
\end{center}

\textbf{In summary:}

"Psycho-analysis, in its character of depth-psychology, considers mental life from three different points of view: the dynamic, the economic and the topographical"^\textsuperscript{203}

\textit{\textbf{1. The Dynamic Point of View}}

From a dynamic point of view, mental processes are seen as an interplay of forces, "which assist or inhibit one another, combine with one another, enter into compromises with one another, etc."^\textsuperscript{204} All these forces, as they have an organic origin, are called the \textit{instincts}, that are mentally represented

\begin{itemize}
  \item 202. FREUD, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW XV 85; SE XXII 78 – 79
  \item 203. FREUD, Psycho-Analysis, GW XIII 301; SE XVIII 265
  \item 204. Ibid.
\end{itemize}
as images or ideas with an affective charge. In the final formulation, FREUD recognized two basic classes of such instincts — the Eros, the instinct which strives for closer union, its energy known as libido, and secondly, the instinct of destruction, which leads towards the dissolution of what is living. They can mix together; this phenomenon is known as the defusion of instincts.

2. The Economic Analysis

From an economic standpoint FREUD supposed that the mental representatives of the instincts have a charge (cathexis = "Besetzung") of definite quantities of energy. The natural bent of mind is to hinder any damming-up of these energies and to keep as low as possible the total amount of the excitations with which it is loaded. The course of the mental processes is automatically regulated by the pleasure-unpleasure principle. Unpleasure is related to an increase of excitation, while pleasure tends to decrease it. Individual development (education!) will teach the original pleasure principle to undergo modifications in reference to the external world and to give way to reality principle, to postpone the pleasure of satisfaction and to tolerate feelings of unpleasure.205

3. The Topographic Approach

Topographically or structurally FREUD regarded the psyche as a compound instrument and tried to localize the different mental processes. Accordingly, three provinces206 were differentiated in the mental apparatus:

The Id the repository of the instinctual impulses; contains all that is inherited as well as repressed; qualitatively, entirely unconscious.

205. Ibid. GW XIV 302; SE XX 266
206. Ibid.
The Ego

the periphery of the id, which has been modified by the influence of the external world; mostly conscious; consciousness is the function of the ego's outermost layer, which is concerned with the perception of the external world.

The Super-Ego — developed from the id, dominates the ego, represents the inhibitions of instincts, reproduces the parental introjects; partly conscious and mostly unconscious; the seat of higher cultural institutions;

Mental conflicts are explained from this frame of reference as conflicts between the different functions or the different provinces of mind, the ego as the battle-ground, the instinctual claims of the id versus the inhibiting agencies of the super-ego.

Finally, in this Freudian scheme, the higher dividends of civilization are seen as the derivatives of the super-ego. The institutions of religion and morality find their way here.
PART FOUR

FREUD CONFRONTING RELIGION AND MORALITY –
THE ETIOLOGY OF PESSIONISM

Many people even today enthusiastically speak about FREUD’s totally negative attitude to religion and a quasi sceptical approach to morality. But few are interested in inquiring into the reason for such an attitude.

We too agree with the above mentioned propositions, but with a distinction and some reservations. FREUD adopted a totally negative attitude towards a religion that appeared to him and a mostly sceptical approach towards a moral system he experienced.

Religion and morality were not two completely isolated questions for FREUD, but two “abnormally budging” dimensions of contemporary civilization. On a theoretical level he found that both these phenomena sprouted from the same spring, they had an homogeneous origin and simultaneous developments. In the practical field FREUD saw his contemporary civilization as a “two-edged-sword”, religion on the one side and morality on the other. Their entwined activities provided ample proofs for his position.

Thus FREUD envisioned religion and morality as inextricably intertwined phenomena in their origin, further developments and contemporary existence, where, through his personal life, he experienced them work, one intruding into the other, as the following graphic structure of the frequency of the terms religion and morality used by FREUD in the GW clearly shows:
RELIGION AND MORALITY AS INTERTWINED PHENOMENA

In the Freudian metapsychology, the super-ego is seen as the seat of higher cultural institutions. According to Freud, those cultural assets are the ancestral heritages of the oedipal relations on the ontogenetic as well as on the phylogenetic level. They originated as reaction-formations through the process of identification.

A. Religion and Morality - the Twin-Sprouts of the Oedipus Complex and the Twin-Fruits of the Super-ego

In the Freudian psycho-analysis, Oedipus complex is the germ and core of the cultural institutions. According to Freud, such a conflictual situation and ambivalent relations are alert not only in the individual but also in the whole species.

Freud's substantial work Totem and Taboo is an inquiry into the origin and development of the "higher" cultural institutions, religion and morality, the sacred and the good. In the primitive totemism, Freud found the displacement of their ambivalent attitude to the father, and recognized it as the primal form of religion as such. Even though Freud once distinguished totemism from religion, totemism was in general considered as "the oldest form of religion". He again found the twofold taboo prohibition at the

1. Cfr. above, Part Three, Chapter Seven
2. Cfr. above, The Theory of Instincts, Part Three, Ch. Seven B
3. This is the general outcome of Freud's investigations in Totem and Taboo. This point will be clarified further in this Chapter.
5. Cfr. Freud, Short Writings, GW XII 328; SE XVIII 262; Totem and Taboo, GW IX 173; SE XIII 144
root of every posterior moral code.

"The two taboos of totemism with which human morality has its beginning are not on a par psychologically. The first of them, the law protecting the totem animal, is founded wholly on emotional motives: the father had actually been eliminated, and in no real sense could the deed be undone. But the second rule, the prohibition of incest, has a powerful practical basis as well. Sexual desires do not unite men, but divide them. Though the brothers had banded together in order to overcome their father, they were all one another's rivals in regard to the women.... Thus the brothers had no alternative, if they were to live together, but... to institute the law against incest... In this way they rescued the organization which had made them strong... Here, too, may perhaps have been the germ of the institution of matriarchy... which was in turn replaced by the patriarchal organization of the family".7

As it will be clarified in the next pages of this book, in Totem and Taboo FREUD tried to establish the fact of the origin of all later religions from totem(ism) and of all later moral codes from the two original taboo observances, both originating and developing together. FREUD's travel through the jungle of savage beliefs and practices enabled him to conclude that the Oedipus complex which constituted the core of individual neurosis, stood also on a collective level at the origin of "higher" cultural institutions and "values" such as religion, morality and social order.

Here we are interested in the interrelation between religion and morality. First we consider their "pair-bonded" origin.

1. The Genetic Twinship

As in the case of any other basic concept in FREUD's theory, here again, one should start with the Oedipus complex. According to FREUD, King Oedipus was the prototype of each one of us.8 Only in him were the original wishes fulfilled. We in our turn shrink back from those wishes with the whole

6. FREUD, Totem and Taboo, GW IX 173f.; SE XIII 144f.
7. Ibid. GW IX 173; SE XIII 144
8. FREUD, The Interpretation of Dreams, GW II/III 169; SE IV 263
force of repression and seek to close our eyes to the scenes of our childhood. In our early education or in the process of “culturalization” we confront an incest barrier as an ancestral heritage. FREUD, supported by personal convictions obtained from self-analysis, passed here from the individual to the species. He wrote to his friend FLEISS already in 1897:

“One single thought of general value has been revealed to me. I have found, in my own case too, falling in love with the mother and jealousy of the father, and now regard it as a universal event of early childhood, even if not so early as in children who have been made hysterical. But the Greek legend seizes on a compulsion which every one recognizes because he feels its existence within himself. Each member of the audience was once, in germ and phantasy, just such an Oedipus, and each one recoils in horror from the dream-fulfilment here transplanted into reality, with the whole quota of repression which separates his infantile state from his present one.”

This incest barrier, FREUD contends, perpetuates itself on the phylogenetic level first through the taboos of totemism and then through its derivatives, the posterior moral codes.

“If I am not mistaken, the explanation of taboo also throws light on the nature and origin of conscience. It is possible, without any stretching of the sense of the terms, to speak of a taboo conscience or, after a taboo has been violated, of a taboo sense of guilt. Taboo conscience is probably the earliest form in which the phenomenon of conscience is met with... any one who has a conscience must feel within him the justification for the condemnation, must feel self-reproach for the act that has been carried out. The same characteristic is to be seen in the savage’s attitude towards taboo.”

Those primitive taboos cannot be viewed, nevertheless, independently of totemism, the earliest form of religion, for the simple reason that the taboos as a social pact were grounded on the totemic kinship and the “personal pact” with the father. In the following lines we read one of the most important conclusions of FREUD:

“At the conclusion, then, of this exceedingly condensed inquiry, I should like to insist that its outcome shows that the beginnings of religion, mo-

9. Cfr. Ibid.
10. Letter of Oct. 15, 1897, SE I 265 (Italics mine)
11. FREUD, Totem and Taboo, GW IX 85; SE XIII 67 — 69
ral, society and art converge in the Oedipus complex. This is in complete agreement with the psycho-analytic finding that the same complex constitutes the nucleus of all neuroses, so far as our present knowledge goes. It seems to me a most surprising discovery that the problems of social psychology, too, should prove soluble on the basis of one single concrete point — man's relation to his father. It is even possible that yet another psychological problem belongs in this same connection. I had often had occasion to point out that emotional ambivalence in the proper sense of the term — that is, the simultaneous existence of love and hate towards the same object — lies at the root of many important cultural institutions.\textsuperscript{12}

Later on, in \textit{The Ego and the Id}, in which he presents the core of his theories, \textsc{Freud} repeated this conclusion with greater emphasis:

"It is easy to show that the ego ideal, answers to everything that is expected of the higher nature of man. As a substitute for the longing for the father, it contains the germ from which all religions have evolved. ... As a child grows up, the role of the father is carried on by teachers and others in authority; their injunctions and prohibitions remain powerful in the ego and continue, in the form of conscience, to exercise the moral censorship ... Social feelings rest on identifications with other people, on the basis of having the same ego ideal.\textit{Religion, morality, and a social sense} — the chief elements in the higher side of man (I am at the moment putting science and art on one side) — were originally one and the same thing. According to the hypothesis which I put forward in \textit{Totem and Taboo} they were acquired phylogenetically out of the father-complex: \textit{religion and moral restraint through the process of mastering the Oedipus complex itself, and social feeling through the necessity for overcoming the rivalry that then remained between the members of the younger generation}".\textsuperscript{13}

One finds this conclusion in \textit{Totem and Taboo} where \textsc{Freud} tried to systematize his findings.\textsuperscript{14} It seems that this conclusion was valid for him once and for all. That may be the reason why he repeated it several times, almost in all his important (later) works.\textsuperscript{15} Thus:

\textsuperscript{12} Ibid. GW IX 188; SE XIII 156 - 7 (Italics mine)
\textsuperscript{13} FREUD, The Ego and the Id, GW XIII 265 - 6; SE XIX 37 (Italics mine)
\textsuperscript{14} FREUD, Totem and Taboo, GW IX 169; SE XIII 156
\textsuperscript{15} FREUD, Totem and Taboo, GW IX 169 - 60, 172, 173 - 4, 188; SE XIII 131 - 2, 142, 144 - 5, 156 - 7; The Ego and the Id, GW XIII 262 - 3, 265 - 6; SE XIX 34 - 5, 37 - 8; A Short Account of Psycho-Analysis, GW XIII 426; SE XIX 208; Resistances
"The study made by psycho-analysis of dreams and neuroses has given it the necessary experience to enable to guess the technical procedures that have governed these distortions. But in a number of instances it can also reveal the hidden motives which have led to this modification in the original meaning of myths....

A similar application of its points of view, its hypotheses and its findings has enabled psycho-analysis to throw light upon the origin of our great cultural institutions — on religion, morality, justice and philosophy. By examining the primitive psychological situations which were able to provide the motive for creations of this kind, it has been in a position to reject certain attempts at an explanation that were based on too superficial a psychology and to replace them by a more penetrating insight".\(^{16}\)

In *Moses and Monotheism* where FREUD applied his new discoveries on religion and morality,\(^{17}\) we find clearer conclusions on the genetic convergence of religion and morality:

"Even though it may seem that instinctual renunciation and the ethics founded on it do not form part of the essential content of religion, yet genetically they are most intimately connected with it. Totemism, which is the earliest form of a religion which we recognize, carries with it, as indispensable constituents of its system, a number of commands and prohibitions which have no other significance of course, than as instinctual renunciations".\(^{18}\)

Thus the whole civilization and its institutionalizations revolve around the axis of the nostalgia for the father. Religion arose as an attempt to reconcile with the primal father, murdered in the wilderness but re-emerged in the racial unconscious.\(^{19}\) In totemic time people worshipped the first father-surroga-
totem, and in later forms of religion, God. As we said above\(^\text{20}\) totemism imposed some taboo observances on them. A taboo was a primitive ("uraltes") prohibition imposed on the individual from outside by an authority. In such a taboo there is always a dichotomy between the forbidden and the desired.\(^\text{21}\) FREUD considered those taboos as the first institutionalization of morals. Exploration into the relationship between totem and taboo will give us a deeper insight into the genetic twinship of religion and morality.

FREUD established a parallelism between the "infantilism" in the taboo of incest-horror and the mental life of neurotics, between a taboo as a collective neurosis and obsessional neurosis as an individual taboo.\(^\text{22}\) He confirmed his position by tracing the origin of these situations back to the unconscious. The genetic cycle was thus perfect — from the individual to the species and from the species again back to the individual.

Going a step further FREUD postulated a real Oedipus history and a real parricide on the phylogenetic level. The animal phobia of "little Hans" was a prototype of the displacement of the ambivalent father-complex onto the animals — to the totem.\(^\text{23}\) When FREUD conjoined it with the primal horde theory of DARWIN and the totem-meal-kinship put forward by ROBERTSON SMITH, everything was in perfect agreement and thus as he would say, he deduced his conclusion "as a synthesis of the researches in different fields."\(^\text{24}\)

Through the "devouring" of the feared but envied father, the primitive people accomplished their identification with him. That is why, the totem-meal was a repetition and commemoration of the original criminal deed, which is at the same time the origin of the cultural institutions.

"A particular animal was set up in the father's place as a totem. It was regarded as ancestor and protective spirit and may not be injured or killed. But once a year the whole male community came together to a ceremonial meal at which the totem animal (worshipped at all other times) was torn to pieces and devoured in common. No one might absent himself from this

\(^{20}\) Cfr. above, the summary of the book Totem and Taboo
\(^{21}\) FREUD, Totem and Taboo, GW IX 45; SE XIII 35
\(^{22}\) Ibid. GW IX 156f; SE XIII 17, 28f
\(^{23}\) Ibid. GW IX 156f; SE XIII 129f
\(^{24}\) Ibid. GW IX 122; SE XIII 100
meal: it was the ceremonial repetition of the killing of the father, with which social order, moral laws and religion had taken their start.  

As it was already said earlier, religion here took shape as a personal pact with this murdered father, as an attempt to appease the sense of guilt, and all later religions “are seen to be attempts at solving the same problem.”

Morality on the other hand, arose together with the social order as a covenant between the brothers (“Gesellschaftsvertrag”), not to repeat the dreadful crime any more. It was a sign of their renewed obedience and regained seal of covenant.

“The earliest moral precepts and restrictions in primitive society have been explained by us as reactions to a deed which gave those who performed it the concept of ‘crime’. They felt remorse for the deed and decided that it should never be repeated and that its performance should bring no advantage. This creative sense of guilt still persists among us. We find it operating in an asocial manner in neurotics, and producing new moral precepts and persistent restrictions, as an atonement for crimes that have been committed and as a precaution against the committing of new ones... What lie behind the sense of guilt of neurotics are always psychical realities and never factual ones.”

FREUD therefore stated explicitly that religion and morality were not sharply distinguished from one another in their origin. The ‘vertical’ relations resulted from the original parricide and generated better ‘horizontal’ relations, the fraternal feelings in society. In FREUD’s words:

“In thus guaranteeing one another’s lives, the brothers were declaring that no one of them must be treated by another as their father was treated by them jointly. They were precluding the possibility of a repetition of their father’s fate. To the religiously-based prohibition against killing the totem was now added the socially-based prohibition against fratricide... Society was now based on complicity in common crime; religion was based on the sense of guilt and the remorse attaching to it; while morality was based partly on the exigencies of this society and partly on the penance demanded by the sense of guilt.”

25. FREUD, Moses and Monotheism, GW XVI 239 – 40; SE XXIII 131 (Italics mine)
26. Cfr. above. Religion as a Covenant with the Father, Chapter Three
27. FREUD, Totem and Taboo, GW IX 175; SE XIII 145
28. Ibid. GW IX 191; SE XIII 159
29. Ibid. GW IX 175; SE XIII 146
Thus Freud would say that the ambivalent attitude towards the 'father' contains the germ from which cultural institutions originate. In other words, if "in the beginning was the Deed,"\textsuperscript{30} it was the end of one game, but the beginning of another one, the drama of humanity. E. Fromm therefore qualified Freud's theory of Oedipus complex as the secularised version of the "original sin."\textsuperscript{31}

It is clear from the above given texts that religion and morality, according to Freud, originated as reaction-formations against the Oedipus wishes both on the ontogenetic and the phylogenetic level. This point is to be further analysed here.

2. Religion and Morality as Reaction—Formations

For the sake of clarity, we have to start with a short description of the Oedipal situation as explained by Freud. In an early phase of life a confluence of a straightforward sexual-object cathexis toward's one's mother and an early identification with the father give rise to normal Oedipus complex\textsuperscript{32} Both these relations exist side by side until sexual wishes towards the mother are intensified and the father is perceived as an obstacle.\textsuperscript{33} Here is the proper origin of the complex.

In a boy, along with the dissolution of this complex and giving up of the object-cathexis of the mother, two things can occur: an identification with the lost-object, the mother, or an intensified identification with the father. According to Freud, the latter is the normal case.\textsuperscript{34} In an analogous manner the identification with the mother may be intensified in a girl.\textsuperscript{35}
But the final outcome of the conflictual situation in both sexes would be a twofold identification — both some way or other united with each other, and a modification of the ego through the abandonment of the object-cathexis. The lost objects are now replaced through identification. The prohibitions, especially those in the field of sexuality are interiorized and the ego is secured against the return of the early object-cathexis. According to FREUD, this turning away from the objects is the first step towards building up the moral barrier. The early object-cathexis is replaced by the introjection of authority — father and the outside world — which primarily aims at the observance of the incest prohibitions. The ego here takes over the libido from the object-cathexis of the id and binds it to the alternation of the ego produced by means of identification. Such a transformation of the erotic libido into ego-libido involves an abandonment of the sexual aims, a desexualization.

Through this transformation, that is, an identification together with a desexualisation, there occurs a defusion of instincts ("Triebentmischung"). Such a defusion is responsible for the general characteristic of harshness and cruelty shown by the super-ego, for its dictatorial 'thou shall not'. The double aspect of the super-ego, the positive 'you ought to be' and the negative 'you shall not be', "derives from the fact that the ego ideal had the task of repressing the Oedipus complex". If the ego has not succeeded in properly either an identification with his mother or an intensification of his identification with his father, we are accustomed to regard the latter outcome as more normal; it permits the affectionate relation to the mother to be in a measure retained. In this way the dissolution of the Oedipus complex would consolidate the masculinity in a boy's character. In a precisely analogous way, the outcome of the Oedipus attitude in a little girl may be an intensification of her identification with her mother (or the setting up of such an identification for the first time) — a result which will fix the child's feminine character."

36. FREUD, The Ego and the Id, GW XIII 262; SE XIX 34
37. Cfr. above, the origin and development of moral consciousness in the individual, Chapter Five.
38. FREUD, The Ego and the Id, GW XIII 273f; SE XIX 43f;
39. Ibid. GW XIII 284; SE XIX 54 — 5
40. Ibid. GW XIII 262 — 3; SE XIX 34
41. Ibid.
mastering the Oedipus complex, as it usually happens, FREUD continues, "the energetic cathexis of the latter, springing from the id, will come into operation once more in the reaction-formation of the ego ideal." 42

At this point FREUD concluded:

"And now, as a third point, psycho-analysis has shown us, to our astonishment, the enormously important part played by what is known as the 'Oedipus complex' — that is, the emotional relation of a child to its parents — in the mental life of human beings... And here, the discovery was made that a third and extremely serious part of human intellectual activity, the part which has created the great institutions of religion, law, ethic and all forms of civic life, has as its fundamental aim the enabling of the individual to master his Oedipus complex and to divert his libido from its infantile attachments into the social ones that are ultimately desired." 43

In the individual:

"The authority of the father or the parents is introjected into the ego, and there it forms the nucleus of the super-ego, which takes over the severity of the father and perpetuates his prohibition against incest and so secures the ego from the return of the libidinal object-cathexis". 44

If "ontogeny is a repetition of phylogeny" 45, the higher cultural institutions including organized religion and moral codes are to be considered as "reactions to the same great event with which civilization began" 46:

"If the prehistoric and ethnological material on this subject is worked over psycho-analytically, we arrive at an unexpectedly precise result: namely that God the Father once walked upon earth in bodily form and exercised his sovereignty as chieftain of the primal human horde until his sons united to slay him. It emerges further that this crime of liberation and the reactions to it had as their result the appearance of the first social ties, the basic moral restrictions and the oldest form of religion, totemism. But later religions too have the same content". 47

42. Ibid. GW XIII 267; SE XIX 38
43. FREUD, A Short Account of Psycho-Analysis, GW XIII 426; SE XIX 208
44. FREUD, The Dissolution of the Oedipus Complex, GW XIII 399; SE XIX 176
45. FREUD, The Claims of Psycho-Analysis to Scientific Interest, GW VIII 413; SE XIII 184
46. FREUD, Totem and Taboo, GW IX 175; SE XIII 145
47. FREUD, Preface to Reik's Ritual: 'Psycho-Analytic Studies', GW XII 328; SE XVII 262
If the ego-ideal is formed as a "reaction-formation against the instinctual process of the id"\textsuperscript{48}, the vicissitudes of the human species created in the id and left behind in it are over the ego and re-experienced. FREUD thus linked the individual and the species together:

"Owing to the way in which the ego ideal is formed, it has most abundant links with the phylogenetic acquisition of each individual — his archaic heritage. What has belonged to the lowest part of the mental life of each of us is changed, through the formation of the ideal, into what is highest in human mind by our scale of values".\textsuperscript{49}

In the individual, during latency period, the early efflorescence is overcome through repression which lasts until puberty, "during which the reaction-formations of morality, shame, and disgust are built up".\textsuperscript{50} On a communal level, "The super-ego is the heir of the Oedipus complex and represents the ethical standards of mankind".\textsuperscript{51}

FREUD concluded therefore that religion and morality were formed "phylogenetically out of the father-complex".\textsuperscript{52}

"At the conclusion, then, of the exceedingly condensed inquiry, I should like to insist that its outcome shows that the beginning of religion, morals, society and art converge in the Oedipus complex".\textsuperscript{53}

Together with the dissolution of the Oedipus complex a number of reaction-formations take place and the cultural assets of religion and morality find their place here in the Freudian scheme. Those reactions are formed principally through the process of identification which implies at the same time an introjection and a projection. The whole process will be considered now in detail.

\textsuperscript{48} FREUD, The Ego and the Id, GW XIII 286; SE XIX 56
\textsuperscript{49} Ibid. GW XIII 265; SE XIX 36
\textsuperscript{50} FREUD, An Autobiographical Study, GW XIV 62; SE XX 36
\textsuperscript{51} Ibid. GW XIV 85; SE XX 59
\textsuperscript{52} FREUD, The Ego and the Id, GW XIII 265; SE XIX 37
\textsuperscript{53} FREUD, Totem and Taboo, GW IX 188; SE XIII 156
3. Identification: Introjection of Ideals and Projection of Omnipotence

Here one should begin with a clarification of the concept of identification. **FREUD** described it in general as an early expression of an emotional attachment to another person or object.\(^{54}\) It is fundamentally characterized by a kind of moulding up of one’s ego after a pattern.

“We can only see that identification endeavours to mould a person’s own ego after the fashion of the one that has been taken as a model”\(^{55}\).

Identification is therefore a process, conscious or unconscious, in which the subject has the impression that he thinks, feels or acts like the object. **FREUD** thus described it in terms of an object-attachment. However, he distinguished different kinds of such identifications as:

“... first of all, identification is the original form of emotional tie with an object, secondly, it is a regressive substitute for a libidinal object-tie, through the introjection of the object into the ego, thirdly, by perception of a common quality shared with some other person who is not an object of sexual instinct”\(^{56}\).

In most of the cases the (lost) object is introjected into the ego. This introjection of the object alters or even divides the ego, where one ‘piece’ then contains the lost object. During the Oedipal period the child’s ego turns away from the complex in the following manner, according to **FREUD**:

“The object-cathexes are given up and replaced by identifications. The authority of the father or the parents is introjected into the ego, and there it forms the nucleus of the super-ego, which takes over the severity of the father and perpetuates his prohibition against incest, and so secures the ego from the return of the libidinal object-cathexes. The libidinal trends belonging to the Oedipus complex are in part desexualized and sublimated (a thing which probably happens with every transformation into an identification) and in part inhibited in their aim and changed into impulses of affection”\(^{56}\).

**FREUD** quoted two examples in order to clarify such an identification.

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54. **FREUD**, Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, GW XIII 115; SE XVIII 105
55. Ibid. GW XIII 116; SE XVIII 106
56. **FREUD**, The Dissolution of the Oedipus Complex, GW XIII 399, SE XIX 176 — 7
through the introjection of the (lost) object. Thus in cases of male homosexuality as a substitute for the object that is renounced or lost (mother), the same object is now introjected into the ego. Again, in cases of melancholia (depressions) the relentless self-deprecation coupled with unyielding self-criticism and bitter self-reproaches reveal ultimately the ego’s revenge upon the object (introjected).  

This newly formed precipitate of the ego, that is the ego ideal (super-ego), operates through different functions as “self-observation, the moral conscience, the censorship of dreams and the chief influence in repression”. That is why FREUD stated in another context that the super-ego retains the essential features of the introjected persons, “their strength, their severity, their inclination to supervise and to punish”. The ego suffers in between.

Nevertheless, a dialectic is involved in the whole process of identification — a dialectic of internal idealization and external projections, a dialectic of internalization of parental imperatives and of wish-fulfilment through the projection of (parental) power to the external world.

As aforesaid, this process of identification requires an abandonment of the sexual aims — a change of the object-libido into narcissistic libido — a desexualization now replaces the early cathexes through displacement of energy and through illusory wish-fulfilments. The ego, threatened by the external as well as the internal world, shields the anxiety through a “flight-reflex” (“Fluchtreflex”) by withdrawing its cathexis from the id. “This primitive reaction”, FREUD continues, “is later replaced by the carrying out of protective cathexis (the mechanism of phobias)”.  

The ego thus becomes the actual seat of anxiety, as it is threatened from three sides — the id, the super-ego and the external world.

“The ego is simply obeying the warning of the pleasure principle. On the other hand, we can tell what is hidden behind the ego’s dread of the super-ego, the fear of conscience. The superior being, which turned into the ego ideal, once threatened castration, and this dread of castration is

57. FREUD, Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, GW XIII 118; SE XVIII 107 – 8
58. Ibid. GW XIII 121; SE XVIII 110
59. FREUD, The Economic Problem of Masochism, GW XIII 380; SE XIX 167
60. FREUD, The Ego and the Id, GW XIII 286; SE XIX 56
probably the nucleus round which the subsequent fear of conscience has gathered; it is this dread that persists as the fear of conscience”.  

The ego, perceiving that it is hated and persecuted by the super-ego, now surrenders itself:

"To the ego, therefore, living means the same as being loved — being loved by the super-ego, which here again fulfils the same function of protecting and saving that was fulfilled in earlier days by the father and later by Providence or Destiny”.  

On the same point FREUD wrote in another context:

"The last figure in the series that began with the parents is the dark power of Destiny which only few of us are able to look upon as impersonal ..., but all who transfer the guidance of the world to Providence, to God, or to God and Nature, arouse a suspicion that they still look upon those ultimate and remotest powers as parental couple in a mythological sense and believe themselves linked to them by libidinal ties".

Thus FREUD remained firm in his conclusion that the "mythical representations" of religion are nothing but "psychology projected into the external world" and that the personal God is "an exalted father".

In short, the super-ego entails the substance of religion and morality. As the ego ideal it contains the germ from which all religions have evolved, and it exercises in the individual the moral censorship.

"It is easy to show that the ego ideal answers to everything that is expected of the higher nature of man. As a substitute for a longing for the father, it contains the germ from which all religions have evolved. The self-judgement which declares that the ego falls short of its ideal produces the religious sense of humility to which the believer appeals in his longing. As a child grows up, the role of the father is carried on by teachers and others in authority; their injunctions and prohibitions remain powerful in the ego ideal and continue, in the form of conscience, to exercise the moral censorship".

Thus the super-ego as the ego ideal contains not only the nucleus of reli-

61. Ibid. GW XIII 287; SE XIX 57  
62. Ibid. GW XIII 288; SE XIX 58  
63. FREUD, The Economic Problem of Masochism, GW XIII 381; SE XIX 168  
64. Cfr. above, p. 13  
65. Cfr. above, p. 45  
66. FREUD, The Ego and the Id, GW XIII 265; SE XIX 37
gion and morality, but also the germ of the ethical core of religion and the religious core of morality.

B. The "sacralized" Morality and the "moralized" Religion of Our Contemporary Culture

Not only in their origin, but in the whole process of their development, are religion and morality interwoven. Both have, as stated above, a common stem — the Oedipus complex, more precisely the father complex resulting from the Oedipal situation. The mastering of this conflictual situation stands at the origin of the creation of religion and morality. In the individual this is executed by the process of identification and the final outcome is the formation of a precipitate in the ego which consists of a father- and mother-identification, some way united together, where the ego ideal or super-ego is formed. In this process, according to FREUD, the introjected moral principles are so to say "sacralized", and religion, that is the exaltation of the father-image into divinity, is "moralized".

1. A Sacralized Morality

As aforesaid, the introjection of the (lost) objects and the projection of their qualities to the external world are the two fundamental elements that govern the process of identification. More concretely it means the introjection of the parents, their authority and ideals and a corresponding pro-

67. Cfr. above: "The Genetic Twinship", p.156. FREUD, Totem and Taboo, GW IX 188; SE XIII 156 — 7; The Ego and the Id, GW XIII 255 — 6; SE XIX 37; The Claims of Psycho-Analysis to Scientific Interest, GW VIII 412; SE XIII 185; Moses and Mono-
theism, GW XVI 227; SE XXIII 119


69. Cfr. the brief summary given above in Part Three
jection of omnipotence on to them, primarily to the mnemonic image of the father and to the external world as such. Because of the dependence and helplessness of the child, — later as an adult before the powers of nature — the parental authority is impersonally internalized:

"The super-ego seems to have made a one-sided choice and to have picked out only the parents' strictness and severity, their prohibiting and punitive function". 70

Thus according to FREUD, the individual super-ego which replaces the Oedipus complex becomes also a representative of the real outer world, and thus a model for the ego's endeavours, because the power of the parents behind which one concealed all the influence of the past and of tradition, was one of the most acutely felt manifestations of reality in the course of the development of the child. 71 Such an ethical barrier, which is built up in the individual early in life 72 and which implies a "desexualization" or sublimation 73 is gradually considered "higher" in the human mind by our scale of values.

"What has belonged to the lowest part of the mental life of each of us is changed, through the formation of the ideal, into what is highest in the human mind by our scale of values". 74

Totemism, the original form of religion cannot be imagined without the two taboo prohibitions which constitute its core. The individual super-ego formed at the Oedipal situation has the same content. 75 Thus a morality that arises together with religion, or as a part of it is "sacralized":

"Going back to ethics, we may say in conclusion that part of its precepts are justified rationally by the necessity for delimiting the rights of society as against the individual, the rights of the individual as against society and those of individuals as against one another. But what seems to us so grandiose about ethics, so mysterious and, in a mystical fashion, so self-

70. FREUD, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW XV 68; SE XXII 62
71. FREUD, The Economic Problem of Masochism, GW XII 380; SE XIX 167
72. FREUD, Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety, GW XIV 144; SE XX 114 — 5
73. Cfr. above, "The Oedipus Complex and Its Dissolution", p.119
74. FREUD, The Ego and the Id, GW XIII 265; SE XIX 36
75. FREUD, Totem and Taboo, GW IX 160; SE XIII 132
evident, owes these characteristics to its connection with religion, its origin from the will of the father". 76

FREUD here insisted once again on the similarity between ontogeny and phylogeny:

"... early infantile sexual life reaches its peak in what is known as the Oedipus complex... Every individual has in fact gone through this phase but has afterwards energetically repressed its purport and succeeded in forgetting it. A horror of incest and an enormous sense of guilt are left over from this prehistoric epoch of the individual's existence. It may be that something similar occurred in the prehistoric epoch of the human species as a whole and that the beginnings of morality, religion and social order were intimately connected with the surmounting of that primaeval era". 77

Thus not only in the individual but in the whole history of mankind are the institutions of religion and morality interwoven.

2. A "Moralized" Religion

According to FREUD, human race has so far passed through three different, but successive stages — the animistic (mythological), religious and scientific. 78 The primitives of the animistic phase projected omnipotence onto the natural forces and subsequently to the totem. At the same time they made themselves subject to a number of moral restrictions and prohibitions with self-imposed punishments. Thus in the totem-meal, one perceives a religion and a moral code sprouting from the same original sense of guilt. 79

In the post-animistic or religious stage the epigenesis of religion and morality remained the same with one exception. The natural forces and the totem gave way to gods and gradually to one all powerful God. Thus in the religious epoch, a God stood behind man’s moral conduct in order to "sanctify" it through his retributions — rewards and punishments. The fear of those punishments and the ambition for those rewards stimulated man’s moral conduct.

76. FREUD, Moses and Monotheism, GW XVI 230; SE XXIII 122
77. FREUD, Resistances to Psycho-Analysis, GW XIV 107; SE XIX 220 — 1
78. FREUD, Totem and Taboo, GW IX 96; SE XIII 77
79. FREUD, Moses and Monotheism, GW XVI 139 — 40; SE XXIII 131
Thus, according to Freud, a kind of transvaluation of our life on earth through the guaranteeing of a God above takes place on the ontogenetic as well as on the phylogenetic level. Contemporary civilization has launched a "sacred morality" and a "good religion".

"The religion which began with the prohibition against making an image of God develops more and more in the course of centuries into a religion of instinctual renunciations. It is not that it would demand sexual abstinence; it is content with a marked restriction of sexual freedom. God, however, becomes entirely removed from sexuality and elevated into the ideal of ethical perfection. But ethics is limitation of instinct. The Prophets are never tired of asseverating that God requires nothing other from his people than a just and virtuous conduct of life — that is, abstention from every instinctual satisfaction which is still condemned as vicious by our morality to-day as well. And even the demand for belief in him seems to take a second place in comparison with the seriousness of these ethical requirements. In this way instinctual renunciation seems to play a prominent part in the religion, even if it did not stand out in it from the first".80

Religion, according to Freud, has the most important task "of assuring people of its protection and of ultimate happiness in the ups and downs of life".81 But:

"The assurance of protection and happiness are more intimately linked with the ethical requirements. They are the reward for fulfilling these commands; only those who obey them may count upon these benefits, punishment awaits the disobedient".82

Thus religion reveals itself as the guardian of moral conduct and ethical demands. This is all the more clear in cases where the individuals have to face their fate, where misfortune befalls man.

"Fate is regarded as a substitute for the parental agency. If a man is unfortunate it means that he is no longer loved by this highest power; and, threatened by such a loss of love, he once more bows to the parental representative in his super-ego — a representative whom, in his days of good fortune, he was ready to neglect. This becomes especially clear where Fate is looked upon in the strictly religious sense of being nothing else than an

80. Ibid. GW XVI 226; SE XXIII 118 — 9
81. FREUD, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW XV 174; SE XXII 161
82. Ibid. GW XV 174; SE XXII 162
expression of the Divine Will. The people of Israel had believed themselves to be the favourite child of God, and when the great Father caused misfortune after misfortune to rain down upon this people of his, they were never shaken in their belief in his relationship to them or questioned his power or righteousness. Instead, they produced the prophets, who held up their sinfulness before them; and out of their sense of guilt they created the overstrict commandments of their priestly religion. 

Religion therefore, according to Freud, exploiting the congenital helplessness of man and his tendency to illusory wish-fulfilments, directs and controls the moral conduct of the individual through promises:

"Thus the benevolent rule of a divine Providence allays our fear of the dangers of life; the establishment of a moral world-order ensures the fulfilment of the demands of justice, which have so often remained unfulfilled in human civilization; and the prolongation of the earthly existence in a future life provides the local and temporal framework in which these wish-fulfilments shall take place".

In one word, life on earth is perceived and prescribed, if not sacrificed, in the name of a God above and a life after. Moral conduct is "transvalued" through a process of "eschatologization". But Freud was very much sceptical about the whole process.

"At this point the ethics based on religion introduces its promises of a better after-life. But so long as virtue is not rewarded here on earth, ethics will, I fancy, preach in vain".

Religions have, to a great extent at least, succeeded in "representing the after-life as the more desirable, the truly valid one and reducing the life which is ended by death to a mere preparation".

Thus religion manipulates the moral conduct of man for its domination, and morality reveals itself as grounded on religion from which it sucks the whole strength.

83. FREUD, Civilization and Its Discontents, GW XIV 486; SE XXI 126 — 7
84. FREUD, The Future of an Illusion, GW XIV 352; SE XXI 30
85. FREUD, Civilization and Its Discontents, GW XIV 504; SE XXI 143
86. FREUD, Thoughts for the Times on War and Death, GW X 348; SE XIV 295
So far we tried to show that religion and morality had an homogeneous origin and a simultaneous development. In the whole cultural evolution they remained inextricably intertwined and, according to FREUD, they exist now as two wings of the contemporary civilization.

On the ontogenetic level, at the establishment of the super-ego in a child, the parental authority is introjected and the moral precepts — prescriptions and prohibitions — are incorporated into forming up the conscience. Sooner or later this "parental conscience" will be sacralized. The same process is to be seen at work on the phylognetic level. FREUD started from "our thesis that the religious Weltanschauung is determined by the situation of our childhood". 87

"The same father (or parental agency) which gave the child life and guarded him against its perils, taught him as well what he might do and what he must leave undone, instructed him that he must adapt himself to certain restrictions on his instinctual wishes ... The child is brought up to the knowledge of his social duties by a system of loving rewards and punishments, he is taught that his security in life depends on his parents (and afterwards other people) loving him and on their being able to believe that he loves them. All these relations are afterwards introduced by men unaltered into their religion. Their parents' prohibitions and demands persist within them as a moral conscience. With the help of this same system of rewards and punishments, God rules the world of men. The amount of protection and happy satisfaction assigned to an individual depends on his fulfilment of the ethical demands; his love of God and his consciousness of being loved by God are the foundations of the security with which he is armed against the dangers of the external world and of his human environment. Finally, in prayer he has assured himself a direct influence on the divine will and with it a share in the divine omnipotence". 88

According to FREUD, such a "transvaluation" of human life and a "transmoralization" of human conduct is the grandiose goal of this religious civilization. Founded on the so called will of God, religion exists today 'mo-

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87. FREUD, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW XV 177; SE XXII 164
88. Ibid.
ralized’ and morality ‘sacralized’ or ‘religionized’. Suppression of individual
instincts is the very substance of these ‘institutionalizations’, a suppression
coming from the sacralized father-image.89 This sacralization is said to be the
secret of the sacredness of moral laws:

‘The renunciation has been a progressive one in the course of the evolu-
tion of civilization. The single steps in it were sanctioned by religion; the
piece of instinctual satisfaction which each person had renounced was
offered to the Deity as a sacrifice, and the communal property thus ac-
quired was declared ‘sacred’. The man who, in consequence of his unyield-
ing constitution, cannot fall in with this suppression of instincts, becom-
as a ‘criminal’, an ‘outlaw’, in the face of society — unless his social position
or his exceptional capacities enable him to impose himself upon it as a
great man, a ‘hero’.”90

Psycho-analysis has succeeded, nevertheless, in going into the very delicate
core of the interrelation between religion and morality, and in unveiling the
“folly” of such a civilization:

“If the sole reason why you must not kill your neighbour is because God
has forbidden it and will severely punish you for it in this or in next life —
then, when you learn that there is no God and that you need not fear this
punishment, you will certainly kill your neighbour without hesitation, and
you can only be prevented from doing so by mundane force”.’91

In another context FREUD repeated the same conclusion:

“Strengthened by these preliminary exercises, the scientific spirit gained
enough courage at last to venture on an examination of the most impor-
tant and emotionally valuable elements of the religious Weltanschauung.
People may always have seen, though it was long before they dared to say
so openly, that the pronouncements of religion promising men protection
and happiness if they would only fulfil certain ethical requirements had
also shown themselves unworthy of belief”.92

Yet, according to FREUD, this civilization of ours, goes on with its moral-
izing and sacralizing functions, with its ‘sacred’ morality and ‘good’ religion.

89. Ibid. GW XV 176; SE XXII 163
90. FREUD Civilized Sexual Morality and Modern Nervous Illness, GW VII 150;
SE IX 187
91. FREUD, The Future of an Illusion, GW XIV 363; SE XXI 39
92. FREUD, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW XV 180; SE XXII 167
4. The Present-day "Sacred" Morality and "Good" Religion

Totemism, the earliest form of religion, introduced a number of prescriptions and prohibitions which "have no other significance, of course, than as instinctual renunciations". But, according to FREUD, religion is the brain of such an ethical code:

"But what seems to us so grandiose about ethics, so mysterious and, in a mystical fashion, so self-evident, owes these characteristics to its connection with religion, its origin from the will of the father". Yet FREUD would say that "In these regulations are to be seen the first beginnings of a moral and social order".

The most important achievement of the next era, the religious epoch is the establishment of "higher" cultural ideals and demands, collected under the title "ethics". In the severity of its prescriptions it takes too little trouble about individual happiness, while the individual is always led by the pleasure principle:

"As we see, what decides the purpose of life is simply the programme of pleasure principle. This principle dominates the operation of the mental apparatus from the start. There can be no doubt about its efficacy, and yet its programme is at loggerheads with the whole world, with the macrocosm as much as with the microcosm. There is no possibility at all of its being carried through; all the regulations of the universe run counter to it".

Again:

"In the severity of its commands and prohibitions it troubles itself too little about the happiness of the ego, in that it takes insufficient account of the resistances against obeying them... Consequently we are very often obliged, for therapeutic purposes, to oppose the super-ego and we endeavour to lower its demands. Exactly the same objections can be made against the ethical demands of the cultural super-ego. It, too, does not trouble itself enough about the facts of the mental constitution of human

93. FREUD, Moses and Monotheism, GW XVI 227; SE XXIII 119
94. Ibid. GW XVI 231; SE XXIII 122
95. Ibid. GW XVI 227; SE XXIII 119
96. FREUD, Civilization and Its Discontents, GW XIV 502; SE XXI 142
97. Ibid. GW XIV 434; SE XXI 76
beings. It issues a command and does not ask whether it is possible for people to obey it”.98

This religious civilization, however, mainly under the pretext of the promise of the happiness in an after-life — “ethics based on religion introduces its promises of a better after-life”99 — heightens its commands and demands. Hence an appallingly large number of people are dissatisfied with it. They in their turn now show an attitude of unyielding revolt or utter indifference. Thus the mere promises, though of happiness, prove themselves to be fruitless in keeping the revolting mass submissive to religion. Consequently large moral concessions are now being introduced:

“It is doubtful whether men were in general happier at a time when religious doctrines held unrestricted sway; more moral they certainly were not. They have always known how to externalize the precepts of religion and thus nullify their intentions. The priest, whose duty it was to ensure obedience to religion, met them half-way in this”.100

Religion interprets the situation as follows:

“God’s kindness must lay a restraining hand on His Justice. One sinned, and then one made a sacrifice or did penance and then one was free to sin once more. Russian introspectiveness has reached the pitch of concluding that sin is indispensable for the enjoyment of all the blessings of divine grace, so that at bottom, sin is pleasing to God. It is no secret that the priests could only keep the masses submissive to religion by making such large concessions as these to the instinctual nature of man. Thus it was agreed: God alone is strong and good, man is weak and sinful”.101

Thus religion has to support not only morality but also immorality:

“In every age immorality has found no less support in religion than morality has”.102

FREUD, therefore, discovered the grandiose acquisition of the religious civilization, namely its moral assets as a great deception of itself. He stated boldly that this civilization was a hypocrisy, that this society “maintains a
condition of *cultural hypocrisy*”. 103

"It is undeniable that our contemporary civilization favours the production of this form of hypocrisy to an extraordinary extent. One might venture to say that it is built upon such a hypocrisy… Thus there are very many more cultural hypocrites than truly civilized men” 104

But FREUD does not want to leave contemporary civilization in such a miserable condition. He proposes a way out from the eternal impasse.

C. The Exit from the Impasse

As our contemporary civilization has grown into such a deplorable situation as described above, FREUD raised courageously the following question:

"If the achievements of religion in respect to man’s happiness, susceptibility to culture and moral control are no better than this, the question cannot but arise whether we are not overrating its necessity for mankind, and whether we do wisely in basing our cultural demands upon it”. 105

Hence FREUD proposed the following solution. Our moral conduct is to be dismantled of its “religious cloak”. Morality must be made completely independent of a God above and must be given a more simple, but rational and social basis:

"In behaving in this way we are investing the cultural prohibition with a quite special solemnity, but at the same time we risk making its observance dependent on belief in God. If we retrace this step — if we no longer attribute to God what is our own will and if we content ourselves with giving the social reason — then, it is true, we have renounced the transfiguration of the cultural prohibition, but we have also avoided the risk of it. But we gain something else as well. Through some kind of diffusion or infection, the character of sanctity and inviolability — of belonging to another world, one might say — has spread from a few major prohibitions on to every other cultural regulation, law and ordinance”. 106

103. FREUD, Resistances to Psycho-Analysis, GW XIV 106 ; SE XIX 219
104. FREUD, Thoughts for the Times on War and Death, GW X 336; SE XIV 284
105. FREUD, The Future of an Illusion, GW XIV 361; SE XXI 38
106. Ibid. GW XIV 364; SE XXI 41
With the solemn wiping away of the emblem of sacredness from our moral laws, according to FREUD, we have nothing to lose, but only to gain:

"Along with their pretended sanctity, these commandments and laws would lose their rigidity and unchangeableness as well. People could understand that they are made, not so much to rule them, as on the contrary, to serve their interests; and they would adopt a more friendly attitude to them, and instead of aiming at their abolition, would aim only at their improvement".107

However, FREUD was not so optimistic as to think that this goal will be reached overnight.

"I know, too, the objection that can be made against this, to the effect that in the history of mankind, trends such as these, which were considered unsurmountable, have often been thrown aside and replaced by other trends. Thus I have not the courage to rise up before my fellowmen as a prophet, and I bow to their reproach that I can offer them no consolation: for at bottom that is what they are all demanding — the wildest revolutionaries no less passionately than the most virtuous believers".108

Yet, as the great "Heavenly Powers"109 fade away and crumble, FREUD hoped very much, "the eternal Eros will make an effort to assert himself in the struggles with his equally immortal adversary".110 Here we find a challenging aspect and we will deal with it in later discussion.

To conclude: FREUD envisioned his contemporary civilization having a moralizing and sacralizing function. Both these functions as institutions originated in a dramatic situation, because "in the beginning was the Deed".111 Both have the same developmental history. Religion and moral ordinances were "not sharply distinguished in totemism".112 Both these institutions coexist now, one complementing the other.

If at all our present moral systems have any value, it must be traced back to the sacralizing function of this civilization. The same way religion derives its

107. Ibid. GW XIV 365; SE XXI 41
108. FREUD, Civilization and Its Discontents, GW XIV 506; SE XXI 145
109. Here the reference is to one of the Harp-player's songs in Goethe's Wilhelm Meister, Cfr. Ibid. GW XIV 493; SE XXI 133
110. Ibid. GW XIV 506; SE XXI 145
111. FREUD, Totem and Taboo, GW IX 194; SE XIII 161
112. Ibid. GW IX 176; SE XIII 145 — 6
worth and value from its moralizing function. If there was no "original sin" these institutions would not have come into existence.

FREUD conjoined the two taboo observances among the primitives — against parricide and secondly, the incest-horror — with the two components of the Oedipus complex, namely love and hatred, fascination and fear. The result was that the two great cultural institutions — religion and morality — were seen as the final outcome of such a situation.

Religion arose as a covenant with the murdered father(image), no more to kill him but to venerate him; morality as a social pact among the ‘brothers’ to lead a “good” life. The sense of guilt originally felt at the criminal deed and archaically inherited by everyone contains the germ of religion and morality. Thus the religious civilization for FREUD was “a self-abnegation achieved with moral artistry”.

However, we find that FREUD had his own personal justifications for such an unsympathetic approach towards this civilization. The next Chapter will deal with it.

113. The phrase is from P. RIEF, The Triumph of the Therapeutic; Uses of Faith after Freud (New York 1966) 48
Chapter Nine

FREUD ENCOUNTERING RELIGION AS A MORAL SYSTEM AND 
MORALITY AS A SACRALIZED INSTITUTION

From the foregoing Chapter it is clear that on a theoretical level FREUD found both religion and morality sprouting from the same source and developing together inextricably intertwined. On the ground of the primitive ambivalent feelings, consolidated in the Oedipus wishes, religion and morality took origin in the form of a super-ego. Hence FREUD dismissed all optimisms regarding these two institutions in their present form. Even if there is something like an 'oceanic feeling' of religious experience, it has no right to escape scientific thought on the furnace of which it melts away.1 'Scientific' Weltanschauung explains all those phenomena of religion as illusions and neurotic symptoms.

The second 'highest' institution of this civilization — morality — too meets the same fate. The psychological truth contained in "the assertion that conscience is of divine origin", that morality, "which is supposed to have been given us by God and thus deeply implanted in us", consists, according to FREUD, in the fact that "even if, conscience is something 'within us', it is not from the first. In this it is a real contrast to sexual life, which is in fact there from the beginning of life and not only a later addition".2

Now in the practical field too FREUD met with an illegitimate intrusion of religion into the moral field and vice versa. The probable reason may be that:

"Unfortunately what history tells us and what we ourselves have experienced does not speak in this sense but rather justifies a judgement that be-

1. Cfr. FREUD, Civilization and Its Discontents, GW XIV 430; SE XXI 72; New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW XV 183; SE XXII 170
2. FREUD, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW XV 66 — 7; SE XXII 61 — 2
lief in the 'goodness' of human nature is one of those evil illusions by which mankind expect their lives to be beautified and made easier while in reality they only cause damage'.

FREUD's diffidence in human nature and behaviour was strengthened by the inhibitions of 'civilized' authority and the hypocrisy of the 'religious' persons, by the sadistic tendencies of religious institutions and the masochistic returns of "ethical conversions". Hence from his part, FREUD wanted to remain to the last what he was always — 'an infidel Jew'.

A. Morality a Religious Epithet and Religion a Personal Problem

For Freud

In order to understand FREUD's attitude towards cultural institutions, more precisely his abject antipathy towards "religious-ethical conversions", one must dive deep into his personal background, his life-situations, his (inferiority) complex of 'Jewship', and the reactions of his fellowmen and of contemporary society to psycho-analysis as such.

1. Personal Background

FREUD was born into the Jewish community, which is known for its strict moral outlook on religion and unconditional adhesion to the traditions, religious or otherwise. He speaks of having been very greatly influenced early in life by the reading of the Bible. He wrote in his Autobiography:

"My deep engrossment in the Bible story (almost as soon as I had learnt the art of reading) had, as I recognized much later, an enduring effect upon the direction of my interest".

3. Ibid. GW XV 110 - 11; SE XXII 104
4. FREUD in a letter to Dr. PUTNAM, July 8, 1915, quoted in E. JONES, LWF II 464
5. FREUD, A Religious Experience, GW XIV 394; SE XXI 170
6. FREUD, An Autobiographical Study, GW XIV 4; SE XX 8. (This point is not found in the GW 1948 edition). It is interesting to read the inscription in the Bible given to
It is interesting to note that this sentence was added to the Autobiography later in 1935. Exactly at this time he was dedicating more time in analysing religious questions. However, according to E. JONES, such an influence is to be understood in an "ethical" sense, in addition to an historical interest, and does not mean any 'religious commitment' even at those early days.  

More important in this context is the influence of the Catholic Nannie on the young Freud. This "prehistoric old nurse" took the young boy to the Church-services, preferably to the Catholic Churches. These church-goings should have influenced FREUD, no doubt, very much for good or for bad. Did he react the same way as any other child or did he look at those big churches with high steeples and the solemnities therein with a feeling of estrangement ("Entfremdungsgefühl") and of jealousy? The answer must be sought mainly in his later reactions. With all probability a feeling of hostility budded already in his early life. JONES observes:

"A child would soon observe that his family did not belong to the majority and never attended the Churches, so that the chimes rang out not brotherly love but hostility to the little circle of non-believers. Perhaps there was an echo of these chimes in that night long after when his sleep

SIGMUND by his father JAKOB FREUD: "It was the seventh year of your age that the Spirit of God began to move you to learning. I would say the Spirit of God speaketh to you: 'Read my book; there will be opened to thee sources of knowledge and of the intellect'. It is the Book of books; it is the well that wise men have digged and from which law-givers have drawn the waters of their knowledge.

Thou hast seen in this Book the vision of the Almighty, thou hast heard willingly, thou hast done and hast tried to fly high upon the wings of the Holy Spirit. Since then I have preserved the same Bible. Now on your 35th birth-day I have brought it out from its retirement and I send it to you as a token of love from your old father". Quoted in E. JONES, LWF I 19

7. JONES writes: "When Freud spoke of having been greatly influenced by his early reading of the Bible he can only have meant in an ethical sense, in addition to his historical interest. He grew up devoid of any belief in a God or Immortality and does not appear to have felt the need of it". LWF I 19; Compare, Ibid. LWF III 375

8. FREUD, The Interpretation of Dreams, GW II/III 253; SE IV 248

9. Ibid.

10. The young SIGMUND is said to have "preached sermons" at home expounding God's doings. E. JONES, LWF I 19

11. The St. Mary's Catholic Church in his village with its high steeple, boasted of the best chimes of the province.
was disturbed by church-bells so that, to put an end to the annoyance he dreamed that the Pope was dead".  

This dream about the death of the Pope shall be considered later.

The case of the Catholic Nannie requires further considerations. She was the subject of immediate contact and authority for the young FREUD. It is therefore quite natural to conclude that early in his life he introjected her prescriptions and prohibitions, including the ‘sublime ideals’ of her religion. But her sudden disappear^ must have made lasting influence on him about her personality as well as about her ‘religion’. When FREUD later came to know about the reason for her disappearance, “her sinning against the ethics of her own religion”, it was a confirmation for his position, to his later conclusion that “Christianity was a hypocritical mockery”.

In analysing the personal background of FREUD, one cannot overlook his “pessimism” in life and his “death-complex”. He wished pessimism to be his chief virtue and saw life always black. He sensed everywhere antipathy and met only enemies. Inhibited by his own society, he felt always frustrated and threatened by “death-instincts”.

It is a fact that all throughout his life FREUD was too much preoccupied with thoughts about his death. He lamented over his senility (“Greisenalter”), over the funeral wreaths waiting for him, over the obituary (“Nachruf”) in one word, over the “painful riddle of death”. He prepared himself for death, though very reluctantly, on several occasions. One time when the pre-calculated date passed quietly, he made the sarcastic remark: “That shows what little trust one can place on the Supernatural”.

12. E. JONES, LWF I 12
13. When FREUD was two and a half, the nurse was caught in a theft and accused of dishonest acts. E. JONES, LWF I 9
14. Ibid. LWF III 374
15. Ibid. 375
16. Some one qualified it as a ‘constitutional pessimism’. H. L. PHILIP, Freud and Religious Belief (London 1956) 68
19. The phrase is taken from FREUD, The Future of an Illusion, GW XIV 336; SE XXI 16
20. E. JONES, LWF II 437; Cfr. Ibid. III 418
2. The Jew-Complex

Another very important factor that contributed much to the antireligious struggle of FREUD was undoubtedly his "semitic feeling" in an anti-semitic world.\textsuperscript{21} He wrote in his Autobiography about this painful fact as follows:

"When in 1873, I first joined the University, I experienced some appreciable disappointments. Above all, I found that I was expected to feel myself inferior and an alien because I was a Jew. I refused absolutely to do the first of these things. I have never been able to see why I should feel ashamed of my descent or, as people were beginning to say, of my 'race'. I put up, without much regret, with my non-acceptance into the community; for it seemed to me that in spite of this exclusion an active fellow-worker could not fail to find some nook or cranny in the framework of humanity. The first impressions at the university, however, had one consequence which was afterwards to prove important; for at an early age I was made familiar with the fate of being in the Opposition and of being put under the ban of the 'compact majority'.\textsuperscript{22} The foundations were thus laid for a certain degree of independence of judgement.\textsuperscript{23}

About those early experiences FREUD later made the following comment:

"If felt as though I were despised and universally shunned. In my loneliness I was seized with a longing to find a circle of picked men of high character who would receive me in a friendly spirit in spite of my temerity.\textsuperscript{24}

This feeling of emancipation and estrangement together with a sense of racial minority or inferiority\textsuperscript{25} sprouted already in his early childhood and remained very strong all throughout his life. Even though "he did not resent being a Jew\textsuperscript{26} as a member of an "extraneous minority" ("außenstehende Minderzahl")\textsuperscript{27}, it must be supposed that time and again he felt a kind of

\textsuperscript{21} For a recent analysis of the topic, Cfr. A. SCHICK 'The Jew as a Sacrificial Victim', PsR 58 (1971) 82
\textsuperscript{22} Here the reference is to IBSEN's "Enemy of the People", footnote 1 in SE XX 9
\textsuperscript{23} FREUD, An Autobiographical Study, GW XIV 34; SE XX 9. Cfr. also, FREUD, A comment on Anti-Semitism, SE XXIII 291 - 93
\textsuperscript{24} FREUD, Address to the Society of B'Nai B'Rith, GW XVII 51; SE XX 273
\textsuperscript{25} Cfr. FREUD, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW XV 66 - 7; SE XXII 61 - 2
\textsuperscript{26} E. JONES, LWF II 20
\textsuperscript{27} FREUD, Moses and Monotheism, GW XVI 196; SE XXIII 90

Kottayarkil, F R E U D
resignation, if not a feeling of 'guilt'.

"... I have always had a strong feeling of solidarity with my fellow people and have always encouraged it in my children as well. We have all remained in the Jewish denomination."

Thus he was very sympathetic towards "the poor Jewish people." But the question is whether this resentment grew out of opposition and hostility towards the domineering majority, "as a Jew I was prepared to join the Opposition and to do without agreement with the 'compact majority'", or is it a helpless resignation to Fate, which he explained in another context as "a materialization of our conscience, of the severe super-ego within us, itself a residue of the punitive agency of childhood."

Another incident from his early life throws light upon this matter. The story is narrated by J. FREUD, his father; but in this context the young SIGMUND's reaction is relevant. The conversation between the father and the son:

"When I was a young man, he said, 'I went for a walk one Saturday in the streets of your birth place; I was well dressed, and had a new fur cap on my head. A Christian came up to me and with a single blow knocked off my cap into the mud and shouted: 'Jew! get off the pavement!'. 'And what did you do', I asked. I went into the roadway and picked up my cap, was his quiet reply.'"

It must be concluded that the shouting, "Jew, get off the pavement," made a never recoverable scar in the heart of the young boy.

In later life FREUD had to suppress his "flowing passions" often because he felt himself powerless to fight against them. Once he burst out furiously during a conversation with an outcry:

28. According to FREUD inferiority complex and feeling of guilt go together. Cfr. GW XV 66f; SE XXII 61f
29. FREUD, Letter to the Editor of the Jewish Press Centre Zürich, GW XIV 556; SE XIX 291
30. FREUD, Moses and Monotheism, GW XVI 196; SE XXIII 90
31. FREUD, Address to the Society of B‘Nai B‘Rith, GW XVI 51; SE XX 274
32. FREUD, An Open Letter to Romain Rolland — A Disturbance of Memory on the Acropolis, GW XVI 253; SE XXII 243
33. FREUD, The Interpretation of Dreams, GW II/III 202 — 3; SE IV 197
34. Originally, "Jud, herunter vom Trotoir". Ibid.
35. E. JONES, LWF I 197
“Quite enough the Jews have suffered for their convictions. Now the time has come for our Christian colleagues to suffer in their turn for theirs.”

For such anti-semitic feelings FREUD put the whole blame upon the Christian religion, especially upon the “Catholic Vienna”. As he claims, therefore, already during his student-days "the foundations were thus laid for a certain degree of independence of judgement" in order to sit in the Opposition and to fight against the 'compact majority'.

In the following words, with a tint of retaliation, but in a mournful tone, FREUD addressed a meeting of his fellowmen:

"That you were Jews could only be agreeable to me; for I was myself a Jew, and it had always seemed to me not only unworthy but positively senseless to deny the fact. What bound me to Jewry was (I am ashamed to admit) neither faith nor national pride, for I have always been an unbeliever and was brought up without any religion though not without a respect for what are called the ‘ethical’ standards of human civilization. Whenever I felt an inclination to national enthusiasm I strove to suppress it as being harmful and wrong, alarmed by the warning examples of the people among whom we Jews live. But plenty of other things remained over to make the attraction of Jewry and Jews irresistible — many obscure emotional forces, which were the more powerful the less they could be expressed in words, as well as a clear consciousness of inner identity, the safe privacy of common mental construction. And beyond this there was a perception that it was to my Jewish nature alone that I owed two characteristics that had become indispensable to me in the difficult course of my life. Because I was a Jew I found myself free from many prejudices which restricted others in the use of their intellect; and as a Jew I was prepared to join the Opposition and to do without agreement with the ‘compact majority’.

According to FREUD, as long as the accusation of the abominable crime of “God-murder” persists, the Christian reproaches never cease to be and the opposition ever increases. In his words:

“The poor Jewish people, who with their habitual stubbornness continued to disavow the father's murder, atoned heavily for it in the course of ti-

36. Ibid. III 200
37. FREUD, An Autobiographical Study, GW XIV 35; SE XX 9;
38. FREUD, Address to the Society of B'Nai B'Rith, GW XVII 51; SE XX 273 — 4
me. They were constantly met with the reproach ‘You killed our God’! And this reproach is true, if it is correctly translated. If it is brought into relation with the history of religions, it runs: ‘You will not admit that you murdered God (the primal picture of God, the primal father, and his later reincarnations)’. There should be an addition declaring: ‘We did the same thing, to be sure, but we have admitted it and since then we have been absolved’. Not all the reproaches with which anti-semitism persecutes the descendants of the Jewish people can appeal to a similar justification.”^39

FREUD further inquired into the reasons for such a hatred, and found that, after all, it is through a bloody compulsion (“durch blutigen Zwang”) that they became Christians and remain so, and therefore, they are so to say ‘misbaptized’:

“The deeper motives for the hatred of the Jews are rooted in the remotest past ages; they operate from the unconscious of the people, and I am prepared to find that at first they will not seem to be credible. I venture to assert that jealousy of the people which declared itself the first-born, favourite child of God the father, has not yet been surmounted among other peoples even today; it is as though they had thought there was truth in the claim. Further, among the customs by which the Jews made themselves separate, that of circumcision has made a disagreeable, uncanny impression, which is to be explained, no doubt, by its recalling the dreaded castration and along with it a portion of the primaeval past which is gladly forgotten. And finally, as the latest motives in the series, we must not forget that all those peoples who excel today in their hatred of the Jews became Christians only in late historic times, often driven to it by bloody coercion. It might be said that they are all ‘misbaptized’. They have often left, under a thin veneer of Christianity, what their ancestors were, who worshipped a barbarous polytheism.”^40

It must be on this ground of enmity and opposition that FREUD longed for a flight from the “Catholic Vienna.” He once wrote to his friend FLIESS:

“I hate Vienna almost personally ... I gather fresh strength as soon as I remove my foot ‘vom vaterstädtlichen Boden’.”^41

FREUD did not hesitate to trace the origin of the ‘German anti-semitism’ to the Catholic Church:

39. FREUD, Moses and Monotheism, GW XVI 196; SE XXIII 90
40. Ibid. GW XVI 198; SE XXIII 91
41. Literally “from the ground of the fatherland”, E. JONES, LWF I 293
"At the earlier date I was living under the protection of the Catholic Church, and was afraid that the publication of my work would result in the loss of that protection and would conjure up a prohibition upon the work of the adherents and students of psycho-analysis in Austria. Then, suddenly, came the German invasion and Catholicism proved, to use the words of the Bible, ‘a broken reed’. In the certainty that I should now be persecuted not only for my line of thought but also for my ‘race’ — accompanied by many of my friends, I left the city which, from my early childhood, had been my home for seventy-eight years".

Implied in these lines is, no doubt, a certain amount of bitterness of experience and a great degree of protest, silent as it may be. With the Nazi invasion, FREUD had to give up his “Germanship” and retreat to his “Jewship”. FREUD confessed:

“My language is German, my culture, my attainments are German. I considered myself German intellectually, until I noticed the growth of anti-semitic prejudice in Germany and German Austria. Since that time I consider myself no longer a German. I prefer to call myself a Jew."

FREUD uttered these words when, as JONES tells us, “they began a systematic suppression of the Jews.”

In short, FREUD saw Christianity, especially the Catholic Church as the cradle of ‘anti-semitic grudges’. In his calculation the Church played the central role in the theatre of a thankless world of his time. With reference to the withholding of the publication of his last book on religion, Moses and Monotheism FREUD wrote:

“It is the thought of these uninitiated readers that makes me hold over the finished work. For we live here in an atmosphere of Catholic orthodoxy. They say that the politics of our country are determined by one Pater Schmidt, who lives in St. Gabriel near Mödling. He is a confidant of the Pope.”

Hence FREUD once ‘prayed’: “God protect us from friends.”

42. Here the reference is to Moses and Monotheism (1939) GW XVI; SE XXIII
43. FREUD, Moses and Monotheism, GW XVI 159; SE XXIII 57
44. Quoted from G. S. VIERECK, Glimpses of the Great (London 1930) 34
45. E. JONES, LWF III 187
47. E. JONES, LWF III 6
In this connection we deem it opportune to make one observation. Every Christian of today should make an examination of conscience on the following accusation: "Hundreds of years after the death of Jesus under hellenistic and pagan oriental influences Christianity became consolidated in the 'Church' and the dogmas became fixed. All the beauty of Christ's teachings, the beneficial aspects and noble ethics of Christianity could not prevent the adulteration and violation of Christ's doctrine. Murder was committed in the name of heavenly love, and aggression became permissible. In accusing the Jew of committing the greatest crime in the worst manner, other people felt absolved from their own guilt. The way was free for human sacrifice under a new rationalization."^48

3. The Religion of the Church and the Trauma of Prohibition^49

It must be quite reasonably supposed that the religion FREUD confronted was a 'morally degenerated institution', which supported immorality, and that also in the name of morality.®® One of the clear manifestation of such an immorality at his time in his country was, according to him, the "horror of prohibition":

"In our country from of old a positive furor prohibendi (passion for prohibitions) has been the rule, a tendency to keep people under tutelage, to interfere and to forbid, which as we all know, has not borne particularly good fruit."^51

He met there "an overflow of prescriptions and prohibitions",®® "most strict and life-risking prohibitions",®3 "a quite undisguised encroachment of police supervision to the detriment of intellectual freedom".®4 In other

49. The Phrase ('Verbotstrauma') is from FREUD, The Question of Lay Analysis, GW XIV 268, 284; SE XX 235, 250
51. FREUD, The Question of Lay Analysis, GW XIV 268; SE XX 235
52. Ibid. GW XIV 269; SE XX 236
53. Ibid. GW XIV 170; SE XX 237
54. Ibid.
words, "Our civilization imposes an almost intolerable pressure on us".  
Thus as a real threat to religion as such the new psycho-analytic movement was looked upon with great suspicion:

"In any case, things have so turned out that to-day the conservative democracies have become guardians of cultural advance and that, strange to say, it is precisely the institution of the Catholic Church which puts up a powerful defence against the spread of this danger to civilization — the Church which has hitherto been the relentless foe to freedom of thought and to advances towards the discovery of the truth! We are living here in a Catholic country under the protection of that Church, uncertain how long that protection will hold out. But so long as it lasts, we naturally hesitate to do anything that would be bound to arouse the Church's hostility. This is not cowardice, but prudence... The psycho-analytic researches which we carry on are in any case viewed with suspicious attention by Catholicism. I will not maintain that this is unjustly so. If our work leads us to the conclusion which reduces religion to a neurosis of humanity and explains its enormous power in the same way as a neurotic compulsion in our individual patients, we may be sure of drawing the resentment of our ruling powers down upon us. Not that I should have anything to say that would be new or that I did not say clearly a quarter of a century ago. but it has been forgotten in the meantime and it could not be without effect if I repeated it to-day and illustrated it from an example which offers a standard for all religious foundations. It would probably lead to our being prohibited from practising psycho-analysis. Such violent methods of suppression are, indeed, by no means alien to the Church; the fact is rather that it feels it as an invasion of its privileges if someone else makes use of those methods".

Thus professionally as well as personally FREUD always lived under the sway of prohibitions, under "Verbotstrauma". And he was very much sceptical about the positive fruits of such prohibitions, because "where one is accompanied by prohibitions at every step one is definitely tempted to disregard them". In other words, strong prohibitions are only an incentive to hypocrisy and pharisaism.

55. Ibid. GW XIV 285; SE XX 249 – 50
56. Here the reference is to, Totem and Taboo, GW IX SE XIII
57. FREUD, Moses and Monotheism, GW XVI 158; SE XXIII 55
58. FREUD, The Question of Lay Analysis, GW XIV 269; SE XX 235
The so called "Christian Science" was perceived as the backbone of such methods and the Vatican, as the brain-centre. With a reference to the ban of the practice of psycho-analysis in Rome and of the "Rivista italiana di psicanalisi", FREUD wrote as follows:

"It is said to have come direct from the Vatican and Pater Schmidt to have been responsible for it. Now any publication of mine will be sure to attract a certain amount of attention, which will not escape the notice of this inimical priest.... It is, therefore, not the occasion for a martyrdom".  

The authority of the whole Church (or religious civilization?) was seen by FREUD to be consolidated in the Pope whose immediate representative was Father Schmidt. Years later ANNA FREUD wrote: "In the totally non-religious Freud-household Pfister, in his clerical garb and with the manners and behaviour of a pastor was like a visitor from another planet".

Nevertheless, from his part FREUD was always prepared to face any challenge, any trauma of prohibition:

"Why the prohibition? Any one who holds his life dear will make the prohibition for himself; and anyone who wants to kill himself in that way will not ask for permission".

A word must be added here about FREUD's "Rome-complex". Not only the archeological Rome but also the Christian Rome attracted very much his attention. According to JONES, FREUD called the latter "the lie of salvation", as it was "the source of all the persecutions Freud's people endured.

59. About 'Christian Science', FREUD writes: "In English-speaking countries the practices of Christian Science have become very widespread: a kind of dialectical denial of the evils in life, based on an appeal to the doctrines of Christian religion. I do not hesitate to assert that that procedure represents a regrettable aberration of the human spirit; but who in America or England would dream of forbidding it and making it punishable? Are the authorities so certain of the right path to salvation that they venture to prevent each man from trying 'to be saved after his own fashion' ('nach seiner Façon selig zu werden')". FREUD, The Question of Lay Analysis, GW XIV 270; SE XX 236

In this context FREUD wrote to JONES: "But you are lucky to live in a country where 'Christian Science' together with all of so called 'psychical research' mingled with hocus-pocus and palmistry do not prevail as they do here to heighten opposition to all psychology." E. JONES, LWF III 423.

60. FREUD, letter to A. ZWEIG, E. L. FREUD (ed.), The Letters of Sigmund Freud and Arnold Zweig, op. cit. p. 92

61. A. FREUD, in FREUD / PFISTER, Psychoanalysis and Faith, 11

62. FREUD, The Question of Lay Analysis, GW XIV 270; SE XX 237
throughout the ages" and moreover, his entering Rome betokened "his willingness to take appropriate steps to circumvent the clerical anti-semitic authorities who had for so many years denied him his well-earned entry into the ranks of university professors".

All the same, FREUD had a lasting longing for Rome, which began to unveil itself in a series of dreams. It came to its peak when he identified himself with Hannibal the liberator. FREUD's comments:

"Hannibal and Rome symbolized the conflict between the tenacity of Jewry and the organization of the Catholic Church. And the increasing importance of the effects of the antisemitic movement upon our emotional life helped to fix the thoughts and feelings of those early days".

E. JONES, the official biographer of FREUD, refuted any attempt to 'theologize' these longings of FREUD for Rome. However, we doubt very much whether one can completely dismiss with all 'theological connections' from them. These longings would rather derive from FREUD's attitude towards Vatican and the Pope. They constituted the core of his arch-enemy, the Catholic Church. Those dreams may be a symbolic expression of the unconscious wish to conquer this enemy and to establish his autonomy and supremacy. Did he not dream one time that the Pope was dead? FREUD narrates a dream occurred to him during a vacation time in Tyrol:

"... One morning I woke up knowing I had had a dream that the Pope was dead... It had been a reaction on the part of my need for sleep to the noise with which the pious Tyrolese had been trying to wake me".

Actually FREUD visited Rome several times and it should be taken for granted that he enjoyed very much all those occasions. He once wrote from

63. E. JONES, LWF II 20
64. Ibid. 21
65. FREUD, The Interpretation of Dreams, GW II/III 198 f.; SE IV 193 f.
66. Ibid. GW II/III 202; SE IV 196
68. E. FROMM arrived at the following conclusion: "Visiting Rome meant, apparently, for Freud's unconscious, the conquest of the enemy city, the conquest of the world. Rome was Hannibal's aim, it was Napoleon's aim, and it was the capital of the Catholic Church, which Freud deeply disliked", Sigmund Freud's Mission (London 1959) 75
69. FREUD, The Interpretation of Dreams, GW II/III 238; SE IV 232
Rome to his wife: "It feels quite natural to be in Rome; I have no sense of being a foreigner here". He appreciated much the archeological Rome; but it appears, unfortunate enough, that he had an envious and grudgeful look at the Christian Rome as the central cell of his enemy.

4. Against Religious Inhibitions

In spite of his professed indifferentism in matters of religion, FREUD fought militantly against "religious inhibitions", especially against "catholic repressions". His strongest objection was against the inhibiting prohibition against thought:

"The prohibition against thought issued by religion to assist in its self-preservation is also far from being free from danger either for the individual or for human society. Analytic experience has taught us that a prohibition like this, even if it is originally limited to a particular field, tends to widen out and thereafter to become the cause of severe inhibitions in the subject's conduct of life. This result may be observed, too, in the female sex, following from their being forbidden to have anything to do with their sexuality even in thought. Biography is able to point to the damage done by the religious inhibition of thought in the life stories of nearly all eminent individuals in the past". 71

The problem is all the more acute, according to FREUD, when one sees that such an inhibition starts already with an early religious conditioning of one's life which develops into an "intellectual atrophy":

"Can an anthropologist give the cranial index of a people whose custom it is to deform their children's heads by bandaging them round from their earliest years? Think of the depressing contrast between the radiant intelligence of a healthy child and the feeble intellectual powers of the average adult. Can we be quite certain that it is not precisely religious education which bears a large share of the blame for this relative atrophy? I think it would be a very long time before a child who was not influenced began to trouble himself about God and things in another world. Perhaps his thoughts on these matters would then take the same paths as they did with

70. Quoted in E. JONES, LWF II 108
71. FREUD, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW XV 185, SE XXII
his forefathers. But we do not wait for such a development; we introduce him to the doctrines of religion at an age when he is neither interested in them nor capable of grasping their import. Is it not true that the two main points in the programme for the education to-day are retardation of sexual development and premature religious influence? Thus by the time the child's intellect awakens, the doctrines of religion have already become unassailable... How can we expect people who are under the dominance of prohibitions of thought to attain the psychological ideal, the primacy of the intelligence?"  

Thus F R E U D concluded that such a religious and intellectual conditioning is the basic reason for the intellectual atrophy, for example, in the case of women in general, for the "physiological feeble mindedness". Therefore:

"So long as a person's early years are influenced not only by a sexual inhibition of thought but also by a religious inhibition and by a loyal inhibition derived from this, we cannot really tell what in fact he is like".  

The ultimate source of such inhibitions and repressions was, according to F R E U D, the Catholic Church, symbolized in certain persons. About this kind of a person F R E U D reported:

"Just imagine it, the fellow plays the upholder of moral rectitude denouncing evil, thus assuming the prerogative of talking nonsense, parading his ignorance and superficiality, unloading his spleen, distorting and making insinuations. And all this is in the name of the higher morality".

This religious civilization, therefore, gives rise to a "gigantic hypocrisy". F R E U D once wrote to L O U ANDREAS-SALOME:

"My secret conclusion was: since we can only regard the highest civilization of the present as disfigured by a gigantic hypocrisy, it follows that we are originally unfit for it. We have to abdicate, and the Great Unknown, He or It, lurking behind Fate, will somehow repeat such an experiment with another race".

73. Ibid. GW XIV 371; SE XXI 48. "Sie wissen auch, daß man den Frauen im allgemeinen den sogenannten physiologischen Schwachsinn nachsagt, d. h. eine geringere Intelligenz als die des Mannes".  
74. Ibid.  
75. F R E U D / P F I S T E R, Psychoanalysis and Faith, 33  
76. Quoted in E. J O N E S, LWF II 199. About L O U ANDREAS-SALOME, F R E U D wrote in 1937: "For the last 25 years of her life this remarkable woman was attached to psycho-analysis, to which she contributed valuable writings and which she practised as well." F R E U D, Shorter Writings, GW XVI 270; SE XXIII 297
We find the same displeasure expressed in a sarcastic language in a letter to Dr. PUTNAM:

"I will add that I have no dread at all of the Almighty ("der liebe Gott"). If we ever were to meet I should have more reproaches to make to him than he could to me. I should ask him why he had not given me better intellectual equipment, and he could not complain that I had not made the best use of my supposed freedom... But I consider myself a very moral person... I stand for an incomparably freer sexual life, although I myself have made very little use of such freedom: only in so far as I myself judged it to be allowable.

The publicity with which moral demands are made, often makes an unpleasant impression on me. What I have seen of religious—ethical conversions has not been very inviting".

In the light of these personal judgements (or prejudices?) FREUD tried to analyse the religious Weltanschauung.

B. Psycho-Analytic ‘Zeitgeist’ Facing A Religio-Moralistic Weltanschauung

FREUD told PFISTER that 'his' psycho-analysis was neither religious nor irreligious. Still he dedicated one whole section of his New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis to a 'philosophy of life', intended to summarize the psycho-analytic Weltanschauung, but devoted to explain away the religious Weltanschauung.

FREUD described a Weltanschauung roughly as a philosophy of life, an intellectual confrontation of the existential problems. Nevertheless, it has only a relative and personal value: One organizes his value-systems in the

77. Letter to Dr. PUTNAM, July 8, 1915, quoted in E. JONES, LWF II 463—64
78. ‘Zeitgeist’, literally means ‘the spirit of the time’ and ‘Weltanschauung’, roughly, a ‘philosophy of life’
79. FREUD / PFISTER, Psychoanalysis and Faith, 16
80. FREUD, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW XV 170—197; SE XXII 158—182
81. Ibid. GW XV 170; SE XXII 158
mould of this “world-atlas”, and the notions of good and evil, right and wrong will ultimately be founded on it. Hence one may contradict another one’s philosophy of life, but shall not try to affirm its falsity because it is “an individual drawing of the world”. 82

There was but one source of knowledge for FREUD: observation and inquiry. 83 Yet he admitted the possibility of different Weltanschauungen existing parallely. He left to the individual’s freedom to follow what one likes. 84 Science, philosophy and religion are, according to FREUD, the most important philosophies of life at present, religion being the most powerful one. But religion so far proved its utter failure in its outlook on life. Happily, FREUD contends, we are living in a post-religious era. It is up to Science and Reason to take the place of religion and God.

Here again, one should keep in mind the important conclusion of FREUD: “The instinctual demands forced away from direct satisfaction are compelled to enter on new paths leading to substitutive satisfaction, and in the course of these detours they may become desexualized and their connection with their original instinctual aims may become looser. And at this point we may anticipate the thesis that many of the highly valued assets of our civilization were acquired at the cost of sexuality and by the restriction of sexual motive forces”. 85

1. Discontents of the Contemporary Religio-Moralistic Civilization

This civilization of ours failed, FREUD tells us, deplorably in its basic function of making man happy. First of all, it is in the least interested in the well-being of the individuals. The cultural super-ego troubles itself too little about their happiness. It does not take into account the facts of life. “It

82. THOMAS MANN explained it as “Wahrheitsmut”. Cfr. T. MANN, Freud und die Zukunft (Wien 1936) passim
83. FREUD, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW XV 171; SE XXII 169; The Future of an Illusion, GW XIV 354; SE XXI 31. “But scientific work is the only road which can lead us to a knowledge of reality outside ourselves.”
84. Ibid. GW XV 172; SE XXII 160
85. FREUD, An Outline of Psycho-Analysis, GW XVII 131 –32; SE XXIII 201
issues a command and does not ask whether it is possible for people to obey it".\textsuperscript{86}

The failure of this religious civilization can again be perceived in the philosophy of life it sustains. It assures of its protection and of happiness in the ups and downs of life and it directs their thoughts and actions through the precepts which it lays down with its own authority.\textsuperscript{87}

But religion has exploited the primitive helplessness of man confronted with the terrible powers of nature. Preaching the gospel of submissive resignation, it threw everything into the hands of a supreme authority, under whose name it created laws in order to conquer the rebellious. To alleviate the human misery it promised a future (utopian) unending life of Paradise. In one word, religion transvalued human life. A God thus fixed his feet upon the extension of the infantile helplessness of man. Thus FREUD affirmed: "... the religious Weltanschauung is determined by the situation of our childhood".\textsuperscript{88}

Again, the means and methods employed by religion in order to keep the mass submissive to it are deceptions in themselves. Thus, for example, the Christian religion always insists upon the instinctual renunciations of every sort.

"The religion which began with the prohibition against making an image of God developed more and more in the course of centuries into a religion of instinctual renunciations".\textsuperscript{89}

Moreover, "generally speaking, our civilization is built upon the suppression of instincts".\textsuperscript{90}

Thus the moral standards of our civilization makes life too difficult for the majority of people. They encourage a retreat from the facts and realities of life. But FREUD reminds us further:

\textsuperscript{86} FREUD, Civilization and Its Discontents, GW XIV 503; SE XXI 143
\textsuperscript{87} FREUD, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW XV 172; SE XXII 161
\textsuperscript{88} Ibid. GW XV 177; SE XXII 164
\textsuperscript{89} FREUD, Moses and Monotheism, GW XVI 226; SE XXIII 118 – 9
\textsuperscript{90} FREUD, Civilized Sexual Morality and Modern Nervous Illness, GW VII 148; SE IX 186; A short Account of Psycho-Analysis, GW XIII 424 – 25; SE XIX 206
"We ought not to exalt ourselves so high as completely to neglect what was originally animal in our nature". 91

This religious civilization, therefore divides man in himself, alienates him from his own personality, emancipates his 'self' from himself. It is an exploitation of the individual for the community. It is a denial of the living present for the sake of a projected future. Religion devalues life and depreciates and distorts the real picture of the world. It intimidates the intellect at the expense of the ruin of thousands.

Moreover, to the outsiders and 'unbelievers' religion is doubly intolerant: "Therefore a religion, even if it calls itself the religion of love must be hard and unloving to those who do not belong to it. Fundamentally indeed, every religion is in this same way a religion of love for all those whom it embraces, while cruelty and intolerance towards those who do not belong to it are natural to every religion". 92

On the whole, the compensation religion offers for the instinctual renunciations, namely the promise of protection and 'insurance' of future are not more than psychic illusions:

"People may always have seen, though it was long before they dared to say so openly, that the pronouncements of religion promising men protection and happiness if they would only fulfil certain ethical requirements had also shown themselves unworthy of belief". 93

In other words, this religion or this religio-moralistic civilization failed utterly in all its fundamental perspectives and strategic objectives. FREUD tells us, therefore, a good God and a merciful Providence can help us no more.

2. The Cultural Hypocrisy

This civilization, in addition, has, according to FREUD, given birth to another ignominious factor, namely, a "cultural hypocrisy". 94 It sustains the

91. FREUD, Five Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW VIII 59; SE XI 54
92. FREUD, Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, GW XIII 107; SE XVIII 98
93. FREUD, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-analysis, GW XV 180; SE XXII 167
94. FREUD, Resistances to Psycho-Analysis, GW XIV 105; SE XIX 219
society at the expense of the individual. Instinctual initiatives are renounced, if not sacrificed, for the communal progress. At the same time we all remain what we were originally, “what was originally animal in our nature”\(^{95}\). The result is, FREUD sadly comments, the ridiculous situation of hypocrisy:

“In the first place it has set up a high ideal of morality — morality being the restriction of instincts — and insists that all its members shall fulfil that ideal without troubling itself with the possibility that obedience may bear heavily upon the individual. Nor is it sufficiently wealthy or well-organized to be able to compensate the individual for the amount of his instinctual renunciation. It is consequently left to the individual to decide how he can obtain, for the sacrifice he has made, enough compensation to enable him to preserve his mental balance. On the whole, however, he is obliged to live psychologically beyond his means, while the unsatisfied claims of his instincts make him feel the demands of civilization as a constant pressure upon him. Thus society maintains a condition of cultural hypocrisy which is bound to be accompanied by a sense of insecurity and a necessity for guarding what is an undeniably precarious situation by forbidding criticism and discussion. This line of thought holds good for all instinctual impulses, including, therefore, the egoistic ones.”\(^{96}\)

No wonder, therefore, a society which demands equally good conduct of life from every one at all times without taking into account its instinctual basis adds to the number of neurotics and hypocrites.

“Any one thus compelled to act continually in accordance with precepts which are not the expression of his instinctual inclinations, is living, psychologically speaking, beyond his means, and may objectively be described as a hypocrite, whether he is clearly aware of the incongruity or not. It is undeniable that our contemporary civilization favours the production of this form of hypocrisy to an extraordinary extent. One might venture to say that it is built upon such a hypocrisy; and that it would have to submit to far-reaching modifications if people were to undertake to live in accordance with psychological truth. Thus there are very many more cultural hypocrites than truly civilized men”\(^ {97}\).

This religious civilization of our epoch, by putting the moral code of absolute principles and watertight prohibitions ‘high-up-in-the-heavens’, propagates hypocrisy and neurosis. It has turned into a fraud. It is built upon the

\(^ {95}\) FREUD, Five Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW VIII 59; SE XI 54
\(^ {96}\) FREUD, Resistances to Psycho-Analysis, GW XIV 105; SE XIX 219
\(^ {97}\) FREUD, Thoughts for the Times on War and Death, GW X 336; SE XIV 284
hypocrisy of instinctual renunciation and therefore it is a hypocrisy.

3. A Sadistic-Masochistic Civilization

In the Freudian psycho-analysis sadism and masochism are intimately connected with sexual life.

"As you know, we call it sadism when sexual satisfaction is linked to the condition of the sexual object's suffering pain, ill-treatment and humiliation, and masochism when the need is felt of being the ill-treated object oneself".98

FREUD contended that a certain amount of these trends are included in (normal) sexual relations and we call them perversions only when they push the real sexual aims into the background and substitute them. In simple terms, sadism is destruction and masochism is suffering. FREUD distinguished three kinds of masochism: "an erotogenic, a feminine and a moral masochism".99

The first is pleasure in pain, the second is so to say the physiologically conditioned passivity and the third, which is the most important one, is the unconscious sense of guilt. In the Freudian metapsychology, the super-ego can be said to be more sadistic through its strict demands and inhibitions, while the ego from its part is more inclined to masochistic returns, through a passive submission and resignation.

The process is more or less as follows:

"If the father was hard, violent and cruel, the super-ego takes over those attributes from him and, in the relations between the ego and it, the passivity which was supposed to have been repressed is re-established. The super-ego has become sadistic, and the ego becomes masochistic — that is to say, at bottom passive in a feminine way. A great need for punishment develops in the ego, which in part offers itself as a victim to Fate, and in part finds satisfaction in ill-treatment by the super-ego (that is, in the sense of guilt). For every punishment is ultimately castration and, as such, a fulfillment of the old passive attitude towards the father. Even Fate is, in the last

98. FREUD, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW XV 111; SE XXII 105
99. FREUD, The Economic Problem of Masochism, GW XIII 373; SE XIX 161

Kottayarikil, FREUD
resort, only a later projection of the father”. 100

Now applied to this epoch of civilization, it can be said that religion, according to the mind of FREUD, with its strict demands or moralizations, with its “passion for prohibitions” (furor prohibendi)101, with its taboo on intellectual awakening, with its uncompromising suppression of instincts, takes the place of a sadistic monarch. Ethics on the other hand, has turned into moral masochism, and conscious-anxiety.102 Religion always stand “to supervise and to punish”, while morality reacts to it as a neurotic patient through self-inflicted tortures and torments, through pangs of conscience and sense of guilt, through suffering and submission.

And here FREUD raised the fundamental question:

“If the achievements of religion in respect to man’s happiness, susceptibility to culture, and moral control are no better than this, the question cannot but arise whether we are not overrating its necessity for mankind, and whether we do wisely in basing our cultural demands upon it”.103

FREUD was thus, so to say, compelled to propose a solution.

C. A Solution Proposed

FREUD thought that he had unmasked completely the contemporary religious civilization, which needs a reform in more than one respect. Yet he did not want to be a reformer, but only an observer. Nevertheless, any reform, according to him must start at bottom. For people can be neither kept nor remain children for ever. The “dangerous mass” cannot stay away for all the time from any chance of intellectual awakening. Therefore, he said, “the relationship between civilization and religion must undergo a fundamental revision”.104 This fundamental revision will be more or less the following:

“The ethical demands on which religion seeks to lay stress need, rather, to be given another basis; for they are indispensable to human society and it

100. FREUD, Dostoevsky and Parricide, GW XIV 408 — 409; SE XXI 185
101. FREUD, The Question of Lay Analysis, GW XIV 268; SE XX 235
102. FREUD, The Economic Problem of Masochism, GW XIII 379; SE XIX 167
103. FREUD, The Future of an Illusion, GW XIV 361; SE XXI 38
104. Ibid. GW XIV 363; SE XXI 39
is dangerous to link obedience to them with religious faith".  
In such a reform one has to take into consideration certain facts.

1. No Leap from the Beautiful to the True

In one respect religion failed utterly, and that is, in arriving “at correspondence with reality”, in affirming ‘truth’.

“This correspondence with the real external world we call ‘truth’. It remains the aim of scientific work even if we leave the practical value of that work out of account. When, therefore, religion asserts that it can take the place of science, that, because it is beneficient and elevating, it must also be true, that is in fact an invasion which must be repulsed in the most general interest. It is asking a great deal of a person who has learnt to conduct his ordinary affairs in accordance with the rules of experience and with a regard to reality, to suggest that he shall hand over the care of what are precisely his most intimate interest to an agency which claims as its privilege freedom from the precepts of rational thinking”.

Thus it is not the future that should regulate the present; the realities of life cannot be made subject to the illusions of another world; the threats of an unseen and unknown God will not diminish ‘evil’ on earth.

“It may then be asked why religion does not put an end to this dispute which is so hopeless for it by frankly declaring: ‘It is a fact that I cannot give you what is commonly called ‘truth’; if you want that, you must keep to science. But what I have to offer you is something incomparably more beautiful, more consoling and more uplifting than anything you could get from science. And because of that, I say to you that it is true in another, higher sense’. It is easy to find an answer to this. Religion cannot make this admission because it would involve its forfeiting all its influence on the mass of mankind. The ordinary man only knows one kind of truth, in the ordinary sense of the word. He cannot imagine what a higher or a highest truth may be. Truth seems to him no more capable of comparative de-

105. FREUD, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW XV 181; SE XXII 168 (Italics mine)
106. Ibid. GW XV 186; SE XXII 172. In the original, “... den Sprung vom Schönen zum Wahren kann er nicht mitmachen”.
107. Ibid. GW XV 184; SE XXII 170 – 71
degrees than death; and he cannot join in leap from the beautiful to the true. Perhaps you will think as I do that he is right in this\textsuperscript{108}.

Therefore, there is only one truth, or only one criterion of truth, namely, "correspondence with the external world".\textsuperscript{109} Religion cannot afford it, but science can provide it.

2. Ethics as a Therapeutic Attempt\textsuperscript{110}

As the basic human interests are at stake, as "cultural frustration dominates the large field of social relationships between human beings",\textsuperscript{111} mankind must be prepared to undergo a therapy, bitter as it might be, yet necessary to cure the neurosis of mankind. Hence FREUD offered some "therapeutic recommendations":

"If the development of civilization has such a far-reaching similarity to the development of the individual and if it employs the same methods, may we not be justified in reaching the diagnosis that, under the influence of cultural urges, some civilizations, or some epochs of civilization — possibly the whole of mankind — have become 'neurotic'? An analytic dissection of such neuroses might lead to therapeutic recommendations which could lay claim to great practical interest... the diagnosis of communal neuroses is faced with a special difficulty. In an individual neurosis we take as starting-point the contrast that distinguishes the patient from his environment, which is assumed to be 'normal'. For a group all of whose members are affected by one and the same disorder no such background could exist; it would have to be found elsewhere. And as regards the therapeutic application of our knowledge, what would be the use of the most correct analysis of social neuroses, since no one possesses the authority to impose such a therapy upon the group? But in spite of these difficulties we may expect that one day someone will venture to embark upon a pathology of cultural communities".\textsuperscript{112}

\textsuperscript{108} Ibid. GW XV 185 — 86; SE XXII 172
\textsuperscript{109} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{110} FREUD, Civilization and Its Discontents, GW XIV 503; SE XXI 142. "Die Ethik ist also als ein therapeutischer Versuch aufzufassen ...".
\textsuperscript{111} Ibid. GW XIV 457; SE XXI 97
\textsuperscript{112} Ibid. GW XIV 504 — 505; SE XXI 144
Yet FREUD thinks that it is the basic human relationship that sustains the community, ethics is the therapy for communal neuroses:

"People have at all times set the greatest value on ethics, as though they expected that it in particular would produce especially important results. And it does in fact deal with a subject which can easily be recognized as the sorest spot in every civilization. Ethics is thus to be regarded as a therapeutic attempt — as an endeavour to achieve, by means of a command of the super-ego, something which has so far not been achieved by means of any other cultural activities. As we already know, the problem before us is how to get rid of the greatest hindrance to civilization — namely, the constitutional inclination of human beings to be aggressive to one another".  

At this point FREUD thought that an abolition of private property would ensure better human cohabitation. For ownership of private wealth gives the individual power, and with it the temptation to ill-treat his neighbour. "If private property is abolished, all wealth held in common, and everyone allowed to share in the enjoyment of it, ill-will and hostility would disappear among men". Thus FREUD concluded:

"I too think it quite certain that a real change in the relations of human beings to possessions would be of more help in this direction than any ethical commands".  

But these are only some of the premises for the real solution of the problem, which demands, however, more drastic changes. As we see it, the real "therapeutic recommendation" of FREUD is what now follows.

3. A Purely Rational Basis for Ethics

As we mentioned earlier, FREUD wanted to give "another basis" to the "ethical demands on which religion seeks to lay stress", "a social basis to our ethical precepts". We will examine here what he actually did mean by
these statements.

In one of his monumental work on religion, *The Future of an Illusion*, FREUD wrote in connection with the basic moral prohibition against killing another person as follows:

"We assert that the prohibition has been issued by God. Thus we take it upon ourselves to guess His intentions, and we find that He, too, is unwilling for men to exterminate one another. In behaving in this way we are investing the cultural prohibition with a quite special solemnity, but at the same time we risk making its observance dependent on belief in God. If we retrace this step — if we no longer attribute to God what is our own will and if we content ourselves with giving the social reason — then, it is true, we have renounced the transfiguration of the cultural prohibition, but we have also avoided the risk to it... Through some kind of diffusion or infection, the character of sanctity and inviolability — of belonging to another world, one might say, has spread from a few major prohibitions to every other cultural regulation, law and ordinance... Since it is an awkward task to separate what God himself has demanded from what can be traced to the authority of an all powerful parliament or a high judiciary, it would be an undoubted advantage if we were to leave God out altogether and honestly admit the purely human origin of all regulations and precepts of civilization. Along with their pretended sanctity, these commandments and laws would lose their rigidity and unchangeableness as well. People could understand that they are made, not so much to rule them as, on the contrary, to serve their interests; and they would adopt a more friendly attitude to them..."\(^\text{118}\)

Thus the cultural precepts, according to FREUD, should be dismantled, not only of their sacred origin but also of their sacred goal, their 'other-worldliness' completely. People will have thus to give up all their illusions, and to return to earth, to the realities of life, and as "honest smallholders on earth", they must try to cultivate human relationships.

"As honest smallholders on this earth they will know how to cultivate their plot in such a way that it supports them. By withdrawing their expectations from the other world and concentrating all their liberated energies into their life on earth, they will probably succeed in achieving a state of things in which life will become tolerable for everyone and civilization no longer oppressive to anyone. Then with one of our fellow-unbelievers, 118. Ibid. GW XIV 365; SE XXI 41 (Italics mine)
they will be able to say without regret:

Den Himmel überlassen wir
Den Engeln und den Spatzen.\(^{119}\)

Thus we must be prepared, FREUD tells us, to be content with "a purely rational basis of the cultural standards". Primacy must be given not to illusions but to realities, not to emotions but to reason, because, "in the long run nothing can withstand reason and experience, and the contradiction which religion offers to both is all too palpable".\(^{120}\)

4. Education to Reality\(^{121}\)

The only exit from the above mentioned impasse is, according to FREUD, an "education to reality", "education freed from the burden of religious doctrines",\(^{122}\) destined to prepare people to face the realities of life as they are. When one realizes that one has nothing to rely upon except one's own powers, one will use them properly. Hence the emancipation from the protecting powers and the threatening authority is the primary requisite for the normal development of human capacities.\(^{123}\) FREUD placed this message as the core of his teaching:

"Men cannot remain children for ever; they must in the end go out into 'hostile life'. We may call this 'education to reality'. Need I confess to you that the sole purpose of my book is to point out the necessity for this forward step"?\(^{124}\)

\(^{119}\) "We leave heaven to the angels and the sparrows"; FREUD, The Future of an Illusion, GW XIV 373 – 4; SE XXI 50. FREUD quotes from HEINE's poem "Deutschland", Caput I.
\(^{120}\) Ibid. GW XIV 378; SE XXI 54
\(^{121}\) Ibid.
\(^{122}\) Ibid.
\(^{123}\) E. FROMM put it in the following way: "Only if we grow up and cease to be children dependent on and afraid of authority can we dare to think for ourselves; but the reverse is also true. Only if we dare to think can we emancipate ourselves from domination by authority." E. FROMM, Psychoanalysis and religion, 13 – 14
\(^{124}\) FREUD, The Future of an Illusion, GW XIV 373; SE XXI 49
5. Freedom from Intoxicants

Aware of the fact that we are thrown back upon ourselves, FREUD advises us, we must thus free ourselves from the "opium of religion"125 from the "stimulants and intoxicants".126

"Thus I must contradict you when you go on to argue that men are completely unable to do without the consolation of the religious illusion, that without it they could not bear the troubles of life and the cruelties of reality. That is true, certainly, of the men into whom you have instilled the sweet — or bitter-sweet — poison from childhood onwards. But what of the other men, who have been sensibly brought up? Perhaps those who do not suffer from the neurosis will need no intoxicant to deaden it".127

According to FREUD, at least in Russia people have succeeded in this attempt, even though they robbed them of the freedom of thought:

"In Soviet Russia they have set about improving the living conditions of some hundred millions of people who were held firmly in subjection. They have been rash enough to withdraw the 'opium' of religion from them and have been wise enough to give them reasonable amount of sexual liberty".128

The instinctual life of man is, therefore, not to be subdued through stimulants and intoxicants, but to be subordinated to the dictatorship of reason.129 Here there is no question of an "eradication of the evil tendencies", because, the core of our being is formed by the "obscure id",130 which "knows no judgements of value: no good and evil, no morality".131 An intrusion of any power under the pretext of civilization is to be shunned. Thus FREUD viewed the encroachments of the State and different prohibitions of the Church as far from propitious.132

125. FREUD, Moses and Monotheism, GW XVI 157; SE XXIII 54
126. FREUD, The Future of an Illusion, GW XIV 373; SE XXI 49
127. Ibid.
128. FREUD, Moses and Monotheism, GW XVI 157; SE XXIII 54
129. FREUD, Why War?, GW XVI 24; SE XXII 212 — 13
130. FREUD, An Outline of Psycho-Analysis, GW XVII 128; SE XXIII 197
131. FREUD, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW XV 81; SE XXII 74
132. In order to escape the abuse of authority, of the political leaders for example, FREUD suggested that an "upper stratum of men with independent minds" must be
Finally, it should not be forgotten that human life is subject to evolution and history. Consequently the value systems also must undergo modifications. Through physical alterations and psychical modifications the face of any particular civilization undergoes substantial changes and therefore, the value systems should be again and again re-moulded:

"Sensations which were pleasurable to our ancestors have become indifferent or even intolerable to ourselves; there are organic grounds for the changes in our ethical and aesthetic ideals".  

In sum, FREUD advocated an openness and a retreat to the naked realities of life without illusions and transfigurations. That is the only way leading to human happiness.

"I am far more interested in the blossom than anything that may happen to me after I am dead ... I am not a pessimist. I permit no philosophic reflection to spoil my enjoyment of the simple things of life".  

D. An Idealistic Premise Against A Presumed Illusion

Before we conclude this Chapter, we add a word about the Freudian choice against, or substitute for religion. Once upon a time, FREUD tells us, religion was everything "that played an intellectual part in men's lives, that it took the place of science when there was scarcely yet such a thing as science, and that it constructed a Weltanschauung, consistent and self-contained to an unparalleled degree, which, although it has been profoundly shaken, persists to this day". But it presents an ignominious picture today.

Such a religious civilization can neither be healed nor bettered, but be only substituted. Any attempt, rational or theological, to make it more 'realistic', formed. In this case: "It goes without saying that the encroachments made by the executive power of the State and the prohibition laid by the Church upon freedom of thought are far from propitious for the production of a class of this kind." FREUD, Why War?, GW XVI 24; SE XXII 212 - 13

133. Ibid. GW XVI 26; SE XXII 214
134. FREUD quoted in E. JONES, LWF III 133
135. FREUD, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW XV 173; SE XXII 161

30 Kottayarikil, FREUD
will be mere "distortive rationalizations". When the four walls of religion crumble, only one thing can stand, from which we can expect the fulfilment of our wishes, though not all on a sudden. It is the Logos, science, dictatorship of reason — whatever name one may give it, it is the new God for Freud. Thus he opted for a new God, and concluded his thesis on religion, The Future of an Illusion with the following words:

"No, our science is no illusion. But an illusion it would be to suppose that what science cannot give us, we can get elsewhere".138

Freud’s attack on religion, therefore, as G. Zilboorg pointed out, proliferated in the form of a "double negative" and its sharpness was derived from "the knights in scientific armor, known throughout the history of scientific endeavour and literature."139 That means he took to himself the age-old maxim: "Tout par raison — raison par tout".140

Thus religion and its higher dividends wither away on the teststone of science and reason. For the telltales of miracles contradict the findings of observation, dogmas remain as the relics of primitive ignorance. Thus Freud wanted to transcribe the well-known saying of Goethe: "He who possesses science and art also has religion; but he who possesses neither of those two, let him have religion".141 This meant for Freud an anti-thesis between religion and the two achievements of man, which now substitute religion; to a man of science, science is his religion.142

136. Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, GW XIV 431; SE XXI 74
137. Freud, The Future of an Illusion, GW XIV 378; SE XXI 54
138. Ibid., GW XIV 380; SE XXI 56
139. G. Zilboorg, Freud and Religion, a Restatement, 23. According to him, Freud’s logic is as follows: "Religion is an illusion, a phantasy because it is not scientific. If it is unscientific it is against science, and since we are for science, we are against all the enemies of science and therefore against its greatest enemy — religion."
141. "Wer Wissenschaft und Kunst besitzt,
    hat auch Religion;
Wer jene beiden nicht besitzt,
der habe Religion!". Goethe in den "Zahmen Xenien" IX (Gedichte aus dem Nachlaß). Quoted and commented by Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, GW XIV 432; SE XXI 75
142. Ibid.
Through the stupendous progress of science and technology, man who for a long time had attributed omnipotence and omniscience to a God above, now became a God for himself.\(^{143}\) No more does he need a God who stands with the retributions — rewards and punishments — behind his moral conduct.

At this stage FREUD hoped very much that his new God would gain a monarchical supremacy at least in a foreseeable future:

"Our best hope for the future is that intellect — the scientific spirit, reason — may in process of time establish a dictatorship in the mental life of man. The nature of reason is a guarantee that afterwards it will not fail to give man’s emotional impulses and what is determined by them the position they deserve... Whatever, like religion’s prohibition against thought, opposes such a development, is a danger for the future of mankind".\(^{144}\)

Thus FREUD tried, successfully enough, to enroll his name among the great pioneers of the newly developed scientific era, from KEPLER to DARWIN.\(^{145}\) He did not want a God above him as the foundation and support, as the origin and the aim, as the "root and fruit" of his moral conduct.

One may here quite legitimately conclude that FREUD rejected religion fundamentally on moral grounds. He attacked it because he opted for ethics. He forsook God for the sake of man. Ultimately he wanted to offer a better foundation for ethics.

Promotion of ethics, FREUD thought, requires an unconditional dethronement of God and an abasement of religion. Religion as a projection into the past and an illusion of the future, has no more future. Hence an ethics based on such a foundation crumbles together with the collapse of religion. The future belongs, therefore, not to religion, but to science. Ethics of the coming age must be ‘scientific’ rather than religious. Science alone has the last word about the real. It alone can bridge being and becoming, logos and cosmos.\(^{146}\)

Thus from the God of religion FREUD returned to the idol of science. In the place of a presumed illusion, he enthroned a "factual illusion". In the words of a Freudian critic: “Thus one of world’s most determined disillusionists

\(^{143}\) Cfr. Ibid. GW XIV 450; SE XXI 91
\(^{144}\) FREUD, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW XV 185; SE XXII 171 — 72
\(^{145}\) Ibid. GW XV 187 — 88; SE XXII 173
\(^{146}\) FREUD, The Future of an Illusion, GW XIV 378 — 80; SE XXI 54 — 56
falls into the trap of ruthlessly tearing from his life one of man's great 'illusions', only to substitute for it another". 147

E. Conclusion

In this part of our dialogue with FREUD, we tried to point out how FREUD confronted religion and morality (morals). And for us this "how" is of paramount importance and is the "why" at least partially, for FREUD's pessimistic outlook on religion and morality.

FREUD lived a "religio-moralistic" civilization, where both elements — religion and morality — were *inevitably intertwined*, however, not the perennial values of these two institutions, but the dark shades of their deviations and painful scars of their adulterations. In other words, FREUD envisioned the world of his time as a "meeting point of extremes between the fanaticism of one-sided morality and the superstition of text-worshipping religiosity". 148

Such a religio-moralistic-civilization had its genesis, according to FREUD, in the dark ages from a dramatic "primitive episode". Religion arose as a pact of reconciliation with the murdered father (image) and morals as a scar of the never reparable crime.

Religion and morals, therefore, *sprouted from the Oedipus complex* on a phylogenetic level and its history repeats itself on an ontogenetic level. They were the *twin-fruits* of the super-ego, the reaction-formations in overcoming one's Oedipus complex through the mechanism of *identification* — morals through the *introjection* of external (parental) authority and "ideals", and religion through the *projection* of the (parental) 'omnipotence' onto the external world, a process that culminates in an all powerful God — identification through idealization into 'idolization'. The primitive sense of guilt and infantile helplessness (that continues to exist in an adult stage too) are said to be the ultimate causes of the creation of religion and morals.

Thus not only in their origin, but all throughout their developments reli-

147. H. W. PUNNER, Freud (London 1949) 220
148. We borrow the expression from B. BOSANQUET, Some Suggestions in Ethics (London 1918) 119
region and morality remained interwoven.

FREUD obtained confirmations for his stand on the interrelationship between religion and morality also from his personal experiences. The religion he met was a "moral" (personal) problem and the morals he experienced were a "religious dilemma" for him. His personal background coupled with his Jew-complex brought to him "proofs" for it.

The weight of the whole antipathy was directed towards the prevalent and potent power of his time — the Catholic Church. (To be sincere, the Church too was not completely innocent in this matter; may be because of the imprudence of some individuals!). FREUD’s intolerance to religion, therefore, derives largely from the intolerance of religion, which tends to see life black or white and could not accept compromises and complexities in it which are the subject-matter of psychology.149

The Freudian psycho-analysis attempted to cure the religious wounds of contemporary civilization, a civilization, which exploiting and alienating the majority, repressed the mass and suppressed the individuals. As compensation, it offered an illusion of a blissful eternal life. Thus it "transvalued" life through a kind of "transmoralization of human life".

But sad enough, this religio-moralistic civilization failed utterly in its outlooks and "outlaws". It fell into an impasse. The exit opened up by FREUD was an "autonomization of ethics from religious roots", a search for a more reasonable foundation for our moral conduct. His substitute was the dictatorship of reason. Thus FREUD, an iconoclast returned to the idolatry of science.

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149. Cfr. E. JONES, LWF II 452.
PART FIVE

A CHRISTIAN ENCOUNTER OF THE FREUDIAN CONCEPTS OF RELIGION AND MORALITY

Our investigations hitherto has brought the conclusion that the Freudian approach to religion and morality was ambivalent and dialectical. One finds in the Freudian writings uncompromising and hair-splitting attacks as well as challenging and iconoclastic elements.

So far we allowed FREUD to speak for himself. What now remains is our comments. In the abundantly mountainous post-freudian literature almost every aspect of FREUD's speculations has been critically studied. The Freudian 'revolution' had its good results as well as bad influences upon human life. Hence an elaborate critique is out of place at present. We will rather confine ourselves to our thesis — the interrelation between religion and morality according to FREUD. He himself has given the following guideline:

"Since I am used to being misunderstood, I think it worth while to insist explicitly that the deviations which I have proposed in these pages do not in the least overlook the complexity of the phenomena under review. All that they claim is to have added a new factor to the sources, known or still unknown, of religion, morality and society — a factor based on a consideration of the implications of psycho-analysis. I must leave to others the task of synthesizing the explanation into a unity. It does, however, follow from the nature of the new contribution that it could not play any other than a central part in such a synthesis, even though powerful emotional resistances might have to be overcome before its great importance was recognized". ¹

1. FREUD, Totem and Taboo (1913) GW IX 189; SE XIII 157, footnote 2 (Italics mine)
Taking this premise as a starting-point, in this final part of our discussion with FREUD, we attempt at such a synthesis. But we first start with some negative aspects of the Freudian approach; we gather in Chapter Ten some very general anti-theses against the Freudian thesis.

Secondly, in Chapter Eleven, we try to extract the important positive and challenging elements and then some way to respond to them from a Christian point of view. We take FREUD as a challenging protagonist, in the light of the contemporary awareness of dialogue from every corner.

Thesis and anti-thesis lead to synthesis. Therefore, in the last Chapter we look for common formulas. However, between the Freudian psycho-analysis and Christianity we propose a 'dialogal' synthesis rather than a merging fusion or a conglomeration of mere cut-pieces. Such a dialogue is possible, we think, on the basis of what unites the two together.
Chapter Ten

POUNTS OF DISSERT WITH FREUD

In making a critical evaluation of the Freudian stand on religion and morality, it may be helpful, if we summarize here, though very briefly, his outlook on them.

A. Religion

1. A General Outlook on the Freudian Concept of Religion

One finds that Freud was interested in the question of religion from the very beginning of his career to the end of his life. We got this impression from the analysis of the texts collected from his works. More than 700 times he used the term ‘religion’ in his Gesammelte Werke. We gathered, analysed and synthesized them, at least the principal ones, in Part One of this book. To our surprise we found that Freud considered this time-honoured institution of mankind mainly, if not exclusively, as a “phenomenon of repression”.2

The Freudian description of religion can be summed up under three main headings: religion, a neurosis, an illusion and a reconciliation.

Several reasons prompted Freud to conclude that religion was a neurosis. He started with similarities and analogues. He could draw out many a parallelism of this kind between the private religion of neurotics and religion as a collective neurosis.3

When Freud confirmed his position on the phylogenetic level analogy


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gave way to identity. He founded his theories on some ethnological explanations. There he found what he sought. He introduced the primal horde- and primitive episode-hypotheses to his findings. Hereafter everything revolved around the figure ('Imago') of a supposedly murdered "Arch-father" ("Urvaifter") and religion was explained in terms of the return of the repressed and archaic heritage.

Again on the clinical level FREUD built a second analogy between the traumatic neurosis which the history of the child reveals and the universal obsessional neurosis of humanity. Neurosis in general is the result of the repressed passions facing the control of the super-ego. Mankind as a whole too had to pass through such a stage due to the inabilities man faced before the violent powers of nature. The present form of religion is the scar of this primitive immaturity and infantilism, a relic of the unsuccessful dissolution of early Oedipus complex.

Besides, there is at least one more reason to call religion a neurosis. In the practical field this religion of ours exercises an inhibitive and repressive attitude. Hence this form of religion is a "source" of neurosis.

Now it was easy for FREUD to conclude that religion was a mere illusion. He made use of the dream-analogy here. A wish-fulfilment is the "raison d'être" of an individual dream as well as "collective" dream — religion. An illusion implies a projection, disregard of reality and a wish-fulfilment. By projection one detaches the best of one's own being from oneself construing

Some others, however, could find no identity at all. For example: P. ROAZEN, Freud, Political and Social Thought (New York 1968) 130. However, a thorough reading of the 'Totem and Taboo' and 'Moses and Mono theism' will confirm the former position.

5. P. RICOEUR, "The Atheism of Freudian Psychoanalysis", art.cit. 67

6. FREUD, The Future of an Illusion, GW XIV 362 f; SE XXI 38 — 39

7. FREUD, Obsessive Actions and Religious Practices GW VII 137; SE IX 125; Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of His Childhood (1910) GW VIII 195 — 196; SE XI 123 — 24; Preface to Reik's Ritual: 'Psycho-Analytic Studies', GW XII 327; SE XVII 261

8. FREUD, The Future of an Illusion, GW XIV 352, SE XXI 17
it as a higher or highest being outside oneself. He 'venerates' it as if it were another independent being, while actually it is himself. Thus religion as an illusion is an alienation and estrangement of one's "self" from "one-self". One is made absent from oneself.

Religion owes its existence to our sense of need, to the strategy of desire. Every individual is terribly in need of some external protection, especially in certain stages of development — thus the individual in his early childhood and mankind in its primitive stages. Even after coming to the age of maturity, external threats force him to regress to early childhood memories of protection, received especially from the parents. Those sweet memories are now projected to the father-image. Phylogenetically the successive displacements of this father-figure onto the totem, then onto the spirits and demons, culminated in a final displacement onto the God of religion.

Finally, religion is a reconciliation, a peace-pact with the murdered father, or better with the father-image re-emerging in the racial unconscious. Starting from the Darwinian hypothesis, FREUD stated:

"In 1912 I took up a conjecture of Darwin's to the effect that the primitive form of human society was that of horde ruled over despotically by a powerful male. I attempted to show that the fortunes of this horde have left indestructible traces upon the history of human descent; and especially that the development of totemism, which comprises in itself the beginnings of religion, morality and social organization, is connected with the killing of the chief by violence and the transformation of the paternal horde to a community of brothers.®

An analysis of the two taboos prevalent among the primitive tribes (parricide- and incest-prohibitions) unveiled the fact that they corresponded to the basic components of the Oedipus complex. FREUD considered it as the core of his findings. To his surprise, he found that the higher cultural institutions, such as religion and morality sprouted from this nucleus. The remorse of the sons over the murder of the father united them together in order to sign a pact of non-violence and veneration. As a sign of their propitiation, a common-meal was instituted. Social order came to being as a covenant of the

9. FREUD, Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (1921) GW XIII 136; SE XVIII 122
brothers, and morals as self-imposed instinctual renunciations.

The ambivalent attitude towards the murdered father included also an element of revolt and jealousy. Thus the sons attempted to overthrow and to take the place of the father. The son-religion substituted the father-religion. FREUD enthusiastically applied all these findings to Christianity.

In short, the Freudian concept of religion revolves around the pivot — the father-image, the nostalgia for the father, the "symbolism" of paternity. Religion, therefore, for FREUD was the archaic repetition of its own origin. It has an aspect of repentance as well as revolt.10

2. Critical Observations on the Freudian Concept of Religion

We raise our objections mainly against the Freudian methodology, against his very mode of approach towards religion.

a) A Partial and Prejudiced Approach

1. The Freudian approach towards religion was partial. FREUD was interested merely in the psychology of religion. He dwelt on the "psychological concept" of God as "ein erhöhter Vater",11 on the psychology of religious assets,12 so much so that it was more a "psychologizing approach" towards reli-

10. P. RICOEUR "concluded: "Omnipotence of thoughts, paranoic projections, displacement of the father onto the animal, ritual repetition of the killing of the father and of the filial revolt constitute the 'indestructible' basis of religion". Freud and Philosophy 243

11. "an exalted father". FREUD, Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of his childhood, GW VIII 195; SE XI 123; Totem and Taboo, GW IX 177; SE XIII 147; Civilization and Its Discontents, GW XIV 431; SE XXI 74

12. FREUD, The Future of an Illusion, GW XIV 346f; SE XXI 25f; He stated in his autobiography: "I mayset a higher value on my contributions to the psychology of religion, which began with the establishment of a remarkable similarity between obsessive actions and religious practices or ritual (1907b). Without as yet understanding the deeper connections, I described the obsessional neurosis as a distorted private religion and religion as a kind of universal obsessional neurosis". FREUD, An Autobiographical Study,
We do not deny that Freud dealt also with the very foundation of religion, with religious experience. But here he preferred to remain on the realm of his own explanations and justifications, cutting religion for a size chosen by himself.

2. Without any scruple he passed from 'some' to 'all'.

3. Freud was concerned mainly, if not solely, with the common-man-religion, from which he deduced general conclusions.

4. He restricted himself to the Western religion.

5. He looked at religion only as "cultural phenomena", "der kostbare Besitz der Kultur", religion in its inherited form.

GW XIV 92; SE XX 66; With a reference to the 'primal tragedy' he wrote: "This view of religion throws a particularly clear light upon the psychological basis of Christianity, in which, as we know, the ceremony of the totem meal still survives with but little distortion, in the form of communion. Ibid. GW XIV 94; SE XX 68


14. Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, GW XIV 421f; SE XXI 64f; A Religious Experience, GW XIV 394f; SE XXI 170f

15. For example, Cfr. Freud, A Short Account of Psycho-Analysis (1924) GW XIII 429; SE XIX 206; Cfr. above, Part One, Chapter Three A 3

16. Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, GW XIV 431; SE XXI 74; "... was der gemeine Mann unter seiner Religion versteht". "In my Future of an Illusion (1927c) I was concerned much less with the deepest sources of the religious feeling than with what the common man understands by his religion — with the system of doctrines and promises which on the one hand explains to him the riddles of this world with enviable completeness, and, on the other, assures him that a careful Providence will watch over his life and will compensate him in a future existence for any frustrations he suffers here. The common man cannot imagine this Providence otherwise than in the figure of an enormously exalted father".

17. Freud, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW XV 182; SE XXII 68 — 69. "Endlich habe ich meine Erörterung streng genommen auf eine einzige Gestaltung der Religion, die der abendländischen Völker eingeschränkt". "Finally, I restricted my remarks, strictly speaking, to one single form taken by religion, that of the Western peoples". In 'The Future of an Illusion' he was still more clear: "The religious ideas that have been summarized above have of course passed through a long process of development and have been adhered to in various phases by various civilizations. I have singled out one such phase, which roughly corresponds to the final form taken by our present-day white Christian civilization". GW XIV 341; SE XXI 20

18. "the most precious possession of civilization". Freud, The Future of an Illusion; GW XIV 341; SE XXI 20
6. He was interested only in the institutionalism and dogmatism of religion.
7. It can be safely concluded that FREUD considered the problem of religion not with the seriousness it required. That is why he traced its origin and development to a supposed hypothesis. Some one pointed out that he treated religion as "a gigantic vermiform appendix".

The Freudian approach towards religion was prejudicial: FREUD saw in religion always an enemy, "der ernsthafte Feind". He started from the premise that religion was an enemy who was to be fought against. One cannot evidently adopt an impartial and unsophisticated approach towards a life-time enemy.

b) Aprioristic Conclusions

The way in which FREUD tackled the question of religion gives us the impression that he arrived at his conclusions on it very early in his life. Thus we see him running after proofs to disprove the validity of religion. He started with analogues. Finding their insufficiency, he sought for historical "proofs". Here he took extreme liberties and limitless arbitrariness. The case of two Moses, for instance, is a mere arbitrary presumption. FREUD thus delayed the publication of *Moses and Monotheism* on account of the lack of "historical proofs". He took much of it merely for granted and attempted to

19. We borrow this phrase from L. MUMFORD, The Condition of Man (London 1944) 364
20. "(religion alone is to be taken) seriously as an enemy". FREUD, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW XV 173; SE XXII 160
21. FREUD was not satisfied with his thesis "The Future of an Illusion". He wrote to FERENCZI: "I regard it as weak analytically and inadequate as a self-confession". Letter quoted in E. JONES, LWF III 147
22. S. A. BARON, Review of S. Freud's "Moses and Monotheism", American Journal of Sociology 45 (1939) 475
23. FREUD, letter to A. ZWEIG, Sept. 30, 1934, quoted in E. JONES, LWF III 206. Years before, FREUD wrote to PFISTER: "I am finding the psychogenesis of religion very hard going ... ", Letter, Dec. 14, 1911. FREUD / PFISTER, Psychoanalysis and Faith, 53
settle the whole question of the historicity of religion, especially of Christian-
ity, merely apriori. 24

We therefore arrive at the fact of an “anticipated conclusion” on religion in FREUD. Hence some one called FREUD an atheist in “an immature age”. 26

c) Psychoanalytic Totalitarianism and Reductive Absolutism

We have already said that FREUD treated the question of religion from a phenomenological point of view, from its “symptomatic manifestations”. Nevertheless, he admitted that there might be something “numinous” behind the religious symptoms. 27 But he did not care about it, or disregarded it or even turned his back deliberately (?) on it. Why?

If he was concerned solely with the common-man-religion, as he told us explicitly, why was he so much worried about the non-provability of religious dogmas, 28 or about the intellectual ruin of many faced to the ‘religious illusions’, 29 or about the supposed “Denkhemmung” (inhibition of thought) coming from religion?

If he was interested merely in the Western form of religion, why did he jump from this religion to religion in general?

The fact is that FREUD spoke mostly, if not solely, about his personal attitudes towards religion, adding much of his personal unbelief 30 and taking

25. Already in 1901 FREUD spoke of religion in terms of “in die Außenwelt projizierte Psychologie”. The Psychopathology of Everyday Life, GW IV 287f; SE VI 259
26. H. L. PHILIP, Freud and Religious Belief, 15
27. FREUD, Civilization and Its Discontents, GW XIV 430; SE XXI 72; Cfr. also: D. RIESMAN, Freud und die Psychoanalyse (Frankfurt/M. 1965) 128; P. DEMPSEY, Freud, Psychoanalysis and Catholicism (Cork 1956) 39
28. FREUD, The Future of an Illusion, GW XIV 348f; SE XXI 256;
29. Ibid. 349; SE XXI 26
30. FREUD explicitly admitted that his views on religion were personal ones; FREUD, letter to PFISTER, Nov. 26, 1927, FREUD & PFISTER, Psychoanalysis and Faith, 117
31. P. RICOEUR, Freud and Philosophy, 534
very little from the (genuine) belief of others. He never made a real attempt
to grasp the whole content of religion among those who "really" believe. His
study (on an empirical level) was limited to a chosen circle.\textsuperscript{32}

Thus we arrive at a "guilt" of generalization. Oedipus complex was his
proof to pass from the individual to the species.\textsuperscript{33} "Little Hans" was the
model for him for the whole of human childhood.\textsuperscript{34} \textsc{Freud}'s patients were
his confirmations. Polemics were his method of arguing. No wonder, if he
confused reality with symbols, a real religion with "religious symptoms" or
even with dogmas\textsuperscript{35} and gave an overall and sweeping denial of religion
without making any distinctions at all.

d) A Kind of Psychologizing Scientism

Respect for borderlines is a necessary prerequisite in any science. The prob-
lems about God and religion are not solved solely by psychoanalytic herme-
nenutics.\textsuperscript{36} All sciences have the obligation to respect their boundaries.

For \textsc{Freud}, as a pure rationalist, the only and absolute word about the
real was science and reason.\textsuperscript{37} Still he stopped short on the way to the real.
Thus, for instance, he deliberately turned his back upon the historical find-
ings and their de-mythologizing interpretations.\textsuperscript{38} No simple and gratuitous
assertions are real proving!

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{32} H. L. \textsc{Philip}, \textit{Freud and Religious Belief}, 70
\item \textsuperscript{33} \textsc{Freud}, letter to W. \textsc{Fließ}, quoted above; \textsc{SE} I 265
\item \textsuperscript{34} J. \textsc{Scharfenberg}, \textit{Freud und seine Religionskritik als Herausforderung für
den christlichen Glauben} (Göttingen 1970) 143
\item \textsuperscript{35} \textsc{Freud}, \textit{The Future of an Illusion}, \textsc{GW} VIV 379; \textsc{SE} XXI 55; G. \textsc{Zilboorg}
says: "Whenever he (Freud) dealt with the topic of religion he rejected religion in its
entirety, frequently confusing faith with superstition, ritual with magic, theology with
illusion". \textsc{Freud and Religion a Restatement} (London 1958) 13
\item \textsuperscript{36} Cfr. P. \textsc{Ricoeur}, \textit{Freud and Philosophy}, 531f; Id. "The Atheism of Freudian
Psychoanalysis", art. cit. 68f; A. \textsc{Wucherer-Huldenfeld}, "Die 'Religion' Freuds",
\textsc{Arzt und Christ} 15 (1969) 19; H. L. \textsc{Philip}, \textit{Freud and Religious Belief}, 51
\item \textsuperscript{37} Cfr. W. A. \textsc{Luijpen} / H. J. \textsc{Koren}, \textit{Religion and Atheism} (Louvain 1971) 46 f
\item \textsuperscript{38} P. \textsc{Ricoeur}, \textit{Freud and Philosophy}, 537
\end{itemize}
e) An Approach solely to attack?

One must seriously doubt whether the whole Freudian approach towards religion was characterized by the (sole) motive to attack it. If not, why did he never undertake a critical approach to his own criticism of religion? Was it a sign of his ‘intellectual pride’ and utter contempt for any one who disagrees with him, we do not know.

f) Analogy or Analogism?

FREUD began his first serious study on religion from the angle of analogy, starting with religious symptoms, rites, rituals, religious observances, ceremonials and so on. Analogy by itself cannot and should not lead to identity. Analogy has a more limited application.

When one comes to the hermeneutics of symbols, one recognizes that they cannot be simply explained away, as FREUD did, through the psychoanalytic interpretations alone. According to P. RICOEUR, the case of symbols has to be settled by the "philosophy of reflection", which can only acknowledge and salute them "at the horizon of their archeology and teleology".

It is true that FREUD opened up the endless vistas of the unconscious mind. There he came across the uninterrupted chain of ‘archaic inheritance’. Not only the id but even the ego was said to be inherited to a certain extent. Yet he could not recognize any positive value as transmitted by the bygone generations. He admitted the symbolic significations and adopted them in his technique of interpretation. And the same FREUD tried to explain away all the rites and rituals in religion as ‘neurotic symptoms’. We would say that FREUD missed here an opportunity to ‘touch’ the eternal horizons.

39. G. ZILBOORG arrived at the same conclusion: Freud and Religion, 39
40. G. ZILBOORG, Freud and Religion, 39
41. FREUD, Obsessive Actions and Religious Practices, GW VII 131f; SE IX 123f
42. P. RICOEUR, Freud and Philosophy, 540f
43. For an explanation of the Freudian concept of ‘archaic heritage’, cfr. the note added by the Editor in SE XXIII 102
44. Cfr. especially, FREUD, Analysis Terminable and Interminable, GW XVI 85; SE XXIII 240

32 Kottayarikil, FREUD
g) An Hypothesis is not a Thesis

The hypotheses of primitive episode and of the primal horde are pivotal in the Freudian speculations. The whole civilization and its possessions revolved around them, so much so that religion and morality would not have been instituted, had there not been that brutal murder of the arch-father in the wilderness.

FREUD himself viewed this episode as man's conjecture. But he traced the origin of religion and morality back to this 'conjecture', to this "daring hypothesis", to this "just-so-story". Here we cannot but agree with G. ZILBOORG in affirming that FREUD "cut religion to a size chosen by himself". He saw there only what he wanted to see. Nevertheless, as some one pointed out, "the mere citations from ethnological books do not make the Freudian works an ethnological authority, nor a work of biblical exegesis". Had he not confessed that he was not an ethnologist, but only a psychologist, and that he had no right to deny the existence of religion in other people? Then he should have respected his limitations as a psychologist as regards the 'ethnological excavations'.

h) Ambivalence and Intolerance

Not only in his personal life but more than that, in his theories, an ambivalence of approach is clearly seen. His ambivalence of character was re-

45. Cfr. the quotation given above, no 9
46. H. L. PHILIP, Freud and Religious Belief, 49
47. A. L. KROEBER, Anthropology (New York 1948) 616
48. G. ZILBOORG, Freud and Religion, 49
50. FREUD, Moses and Monotheism, GW XVI 240; SE XXIII 131; "Above all, I am not an ethnologist but a psycho-analyst. I had a right to take out of ethnological literature what I might need for the work of analysis".
51. FREUD, Civilization and Its Discontents, GW XIV 422 - 23; SE XXI 65
52. Such an ambivalence is clear as regards his personal life, in his relations to his friends and colleagues, starting with his best friend Fliess to the 'dissidents'. 
lected in some of his “religious” practices. He kept many superstitions for himself.53 He really believed in the forecasted dates of his death. But he will not allow an ordinary man to keep such ‘superstitions’. He believed in occultism, but it was for his personal use alone! He maintained a “rigid authoritarianism”,54 as regards his theories and opinions and at the same time an intolerance, if not a contempt, at least on certain occasions, towards the opinion of others.55

In sum: shades of presumptuous apriorism, too much generalizations, “scientific” totalitarianism, reductive absolutism, psychologism, analogism, overriding of proper boundaries and a partial opportunism are some of the important difficulties one confronts in a general reading of the Freudian texts on religion. That is why some of his followers rejected his views on religion, qualifying them as deeply personal ones and not properly a psychoanalytic view.56

53. Cfr. E. JONES, LWF II 470f; III 406f

54. H. SACHS says: “I know it was always extremely difficult for him (Freud) to assimilate the opinions of others after he had evolved his own’’. Freud Master and Friend (Cambridge 1946) 14

55. E. FROMM narrates: “He (Freud) is not a man who loves; he is egocentric, filled with his idea of mission expecting others to follow him, wait on him, to sacrifice their independence and intellectual freedom for him”. Sigmund Freud’s Mission (London 1949) 119

One particular incident narrated by C. G. JUNG deserves special mention. On one occasion when JUNG interpreted one of FREUD’s dreams, FREUD was not satisfied with the explanations. JUNG then asked for some additional details from his private life. With a curious look, FREUD replied: “But I cannot risk my authority”. “FREUD was placing”, JUNG tells us, “personal authority above truth”. C. G. JUNG, Memories, Dreams, Reflections (London-Glasgow 1969) 181f.

56. As G. ZILBOORG says: “These are personal views of Freud, perhaps deeply personal and bound up with his own intimate personal life”. Freud and Religion, 40; For the same reason J. C. FLUGEL concluded that Freud’s theory of religion had no power to disprove the religious beliefs. Man, Morals and Society (London 1945) 265, 270
B. Morality

1. A Synoptic View of the Freudian Concept of Morality

At the very outset, it must be frankly admitted that the Freudian concept of morality is not clear in itself. Freud did not treat the problem of morality systematically; nor did he answer some fundamental questions about it. He rather left some assertions at random, raising more questions than giving any proper answer to them.

However, one may immediately notice an ambivalence in his approach towards morality. On the one hand, Freud considered it in its inherited and institutionalized form as a repressive code, a net of prescriptions and prohibitions (morals). On the other, he proclaimed himself as a “liberator of ethics”. − “ethics as a therapeutic attempt”, 57 which is indispensable for mankind, but is to be liberated from its religious legs. 58

According to Freud, our inherited morals become a source of personal estrangement when they confront the interior forces of man. For him sexuality was the pivot of the interior forces. Human sexuality has not only an erotic content but also a neurotic context which is derived from the “fact” of the Oedipus complex. Its twofold content (“detensioning” and uniting elements) divulges a tension between the individual sex assertion and submission to the parents. At the dissolution of this complex, together with the super-ego, a moral barrier is erected, as a precipitate of the parental introjects, as the relic and replica of infantile helplessness and dependence.

In explaining the phylogeny of morals, Freud again proceeded from the same fabulous murder- (hypo)thesis. Even after this bloody crime, he tells us, the original ambivalent desires persisted. At the same time a sense of guilt caught hold of mankind for ever. The cultural institutions took shape as reaction- formations against this murderous crime. Thus Freud stated that the

58. Freud, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW XV 181; SE XXII 168
sense of guilt is the ultimate source ("die letzte Quelle") of religion and morality. The primitive injunctions and inhibitions are shared by the individual and they exist in him as a moral code, and the sense of guilt exercises the function of conscience — that is the ontogeny of morals.

Metapsychologically, the super-ego is said to be the seat of morality. It comes into being through a process of identifications. Identification primarily implies an introjection, that is, the internalization or incorporation of the precepts and attitudes of external authority. This introjection entails as its counterpart a projection through which the parental precepts are explained to be inviolable. The process culminates in postulating an all-powerful God as the ultimate ground of moral precepts. Morality now becomes sacred.

The super-ego as the seat of morality includes first of all the precipitates of the past, the unconscious, archaic elements of the infantile introjects. But it includes also conscious elements of sophistication and reflective awareness.

As the super-ego has primarily introjected the severity of the external authority, the prohibitions and punishments of the parents, it now turns against the ego and torments it — it becomes sadistic. The ego from its part reacts to it through masochistic returns. Thus individual moral behaviour often assumes a masochistic tendency.

Freud thus regarded contemporary morality in its inherited form as a repressive code. Exposing to light the dark shadows of its origin, he arrived at the conclusion that this morality as our archaic heritage is considered inviolable and holy in an awkward sense of the term. The circumstances after the primal murder gave rise to the primitive taboos, which in turn created the posterior moral codes. Thus our present inherited code-morality was seen by Freud as a "secondary elaboration" of the primitive taboos.

59. Cfr. above, Part Four, Chapter Eight
60. FREUD, The Ego and the Id, GW XIII 280; SE XIX 51
61. J. C. FLUGEL noted: "The role of sado-masochism in external morality is often so plain, the correspondence between external law and the internal roles of punishment often so close, and the relation of sado-masochism to general aggression so far from clear that it would be rash to deny to sado-masochistic tendencies a significant part in the nature and function of the superego". Man, Morals and Society: A Psycho-analytical Study (London 1945) 39
62. 'Secondary elaboration' (revision) strictly means the process by which a dream is
These moral possessions, as the eternal repetitions of the primitive taboos, do not lead man to psychological and ethical maturity. For the contemporary code-morality does not take into consideration the individual constitution and uniqueness, the peculiar 'in-built' of man. Thus its ideals are placed high above and far away from the individual existential situations. This morality therefore, creates 'pharisaism', and the individuals are condemned to become hypocrites or to take refuge in neurosis. Here FREUD raised his strongest objection against contemporary 'sacralized' civilization.

This is, no doubt, only one side of the picture. No reasonable man will be satisfied with such a state of affairs. Thus FREUD advocated a 'self-evident' morality, an ethic of honesty, based on the autonomy of the individuals. It is an appeal to leave the skies above and to come to the realities below, to live the present honestly, neither with a mourning over the past nor with an illusion of the future. Hence FREUD proposed an 'honest-to-man' ethics in contrast to the traditional 'honest-to-God' morality; that is, he proposed ethics as the new 'religion'.

In considering the Freudian concept of morality one should keep in mind this basic distinction between morality in its inherited form as a repressive code, and morality as an autonomous and honest humanistic ethics.

2. Critical Observations

Presupposing much of what we already said as critical observations on the Freudian concept of religion, we now add some special considerations on morality.

We also agree perfectly with FREUD on the insufficiency and danger of a super-ego-morality. Still the way in which it is formulated by FREUD is not convincing to us and is highly objectionable.

modified by the dreamer's need to give it greater coherence and consistency. It represents the contribution of the secondary processes to the text of a dream. Cfr. FREUD, Remarks on the Theory and Practice of Dream-Interpretation, GW XIII 304, 313—14; SE XIX 112, 119—20
Here we apply the term only analogically. As the dream contents undergo modifications in order to escape the censorship, so the primitive taboos were modified in the course of cultural development.
a) The Primal Source of Moral Motivation

Our first and foremost objection goes against FREUD's theory of the origin of the present-day morality. For him the initial human helplessness was the source, indeed the *primal source* of all moral motivations. Through introjection one incorporates the precepts and moral standards of the "foreigners", beginning with the parents. However, according to FREUD, this is an "archaic" process. One follows the super-ego of the introjected objects. Thus the process is archaically repeated. Nevertheless, FREUD could not exhaust this process. He could only *guess and project* an authority behind it. He could not arrive at the ultimate and basic *ground* from which the introjective process started.

On a phylogenetic level, the two taboos stand at the origin of morality. We already explained how this form of morality took shape as a reaction against the original sacrilegious deed.

It was the sense of guilt and the remorse that accounted for the later moral prescriptions and restrictions. For FREUD this *original sense of guilt* had no history and meaning beyond the Oedipus complex and its dissolution.

But it is impossible to agree with FREUD here. The innate and universal 'guilt' cannot be explained away, as he did, through a presumption of the 'Oedipus complex'. As P. RICOEUR points out, in addition to these infantile, archaic, and neurotic sources of the sense of guilt, there is something much more profound in it, if one looks at its epigenesis guided by an increasingly refined symbolism. RICOEUR's profound study on this matter brought him to the conclusion that a non-tabuistic sense of guilt progresses by crossing two thresholds — that of justice, the fear of being unjust, remorse for having been unjust, for damaging interpersonal relationships, and secondly, that of the sin of the just man, of the evil of justice proper, the radical evil affecting

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63. FREUD, Aus den Anfängen der Psychoanalyse (London 1950) 402. „Die anfängliche Hilflosigkeit des Menschen ist die Urquelle aller moralischen Motive“.
64. FREUD, Totem and Taboo, GW IX 173; SE XIII 144
65. Ibid. GW IX 191; SE XIII 159
66. P. RICOEUR, Freud and Philosophy, 564f
67. Cfr. The bibliography RICOEUR gives here, Ibid. footnote 59
Thus the symbols of evil invite us to a “Mythic-intentionality”, though enwrapped in interpretations and reinterpretations, and in the long run, to the non-infantile non-archaic sources of our sense of guilt. In other words, what is turned today as “ontological guilt” (as a reflection of man’s awareness of what he is) is beyond the reach of psychoanalysis.

Moreover, as some modern psychological researches have concluded, more than the parental restrictions, it is their attitudes that influence children’s morality. Thus we see that FREUD could neither explain all guilt in the individual nor could he trace to it the primal source of moral motivations.

b) Conscience is more than a Guilt-System

For FREUD conscience and therefore morality was primarily learned or acquired. He presented an essentially negative attitude to it. Conscience is, according to him, internalized cultural rules; it is the self-punitive and self-critical reactions after transgressions of cultural standards. Moral behaviour is seen as a defence against guilt, a free-floating guilt. Guilt reactions are conceived as a product of identification. As we already said, this identification ends the object-relationship (towards the parents) by turning the ambivalent feelings of love and hate upon the self and thus provides instinctual energy for self-punishing guilt reactions. The function of conscience is to avoid guilt by keeping the repressed impulses from conscious awareness.

We raise two fundamental objections against this concept of conscience. First of all it is essentially a negative concept, which lacks the positive moral fibre needed to explain the moral behaviour of the individual. Secondly, it is confined to the emotional life, conscience as an emotional task and therefore is unable to account for the totality of moral development.

68. Ibid.

69. A contemporary psychologist concludes that the question about the ontological guilt and the corresponding quest for meaning is crucial, yet unanswerable and certainly untreatable by the psychotherapist. A. WHEELIS, The Illusionless Man (New York 1966)


71. Cfr. above, Part Two, Chapter Five, A, Note 12; Part Three, Chapter Seven, B 5;
FREUD referred to the super-ego as conscience with negative adjectives, as 'strict',72 'rigid',73 'harsh',74 'tyrannical',75 'demanding',76 'inexorable',77 'sadistic',78 'threatening and punishing',79 'categorical and compulsive'.80

'The super-ego seems to have made a one-sided choice and to have picked out only the parent's strictness and severity, their prohibiting and punitive function, whereas their loving care seems not to have been taken over and maintained'.81 The severity of conscience corresponds to the amount of instincts renounced and to the deprivations imposed from without.

Yet with W. LEDERER82 we must say that the Freudian psycho-analysis neglected the positive values of the super-ego. It is true that FREUD presented a coherent view of the inhibiting functions of moral structures. But restricting his studies to the severely neurotic individuals or the clinical population, he failed to define the positive functions of the super-ego in the process of socialization. Thus one finds today attempts to reevaluate the super-ego theory and to search for structures that form the basis of a positive morality.83

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73. FREUD, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW XV 68; SE XXII 62
74. FREUD, The Economic Problem of Masochism, GW XIII 380 – 81; SE XIX 167 – 68
75. FREUD, Civilization and Its Discontents, GW XIV 484 – 85; SE XXI 125
76. Ibid. GW XIV 488; SE XXI 128; FREUD, Dostoevsky and Parricide, GW XIV 399 – 400; SE XXI 177
77. FREUD, The Economic Problem of Masochism, GW XIII 380 – 81; SE XIX 167 – 68
78. FREUD, Civilization and Its Discontents, GW XIV 496; SE XXI 136
79. FREUD, The Economic Problem of Masochism, GW XIII 380; SE XIX 167; An Outline of Psycho-Analysis XVII 136 – 37; SE XXIII 205
80. FREUD, The Ego and the Id, GW XIII 263; SE XIX 35
81. FREUD, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW XV 68; SE XXII 62
82. W. LEDERER, Dragons, Delinquents and Destiny, Psychological Issues, 1964
Secondly, such a formation process of conscience is confined to the emo-
tional life of the child. Modern researches disprove it to a large extent and
therefore contradict the assumption that "such internal standards are formed
simply through a process of 'stamping in' the external prohibitions of the
culture".\textsuperscript{84} Here we have to consider further the moral development in the
individual.

c) Moral Development more Complex than an Emotional Installation

In FREUD's view morality is primarily an impulse-inhibition. As we have
already explained,\textsuperscript{85} the moral barrier is established in the individual as an
installation within one's personality of the parental introjects. Morality is,
therefore, control of sex and aggression by guilt.

The Freudian hypothesis accounts for just one aspect of morality and
moral development. Modern researches on moral development contradict
it\textsuperscript{86} and establish three basic components in this complex process, name-
ly knowledge (with judgement), feeling and behaviour. As L. KOHLBERG
says: "Our review of research on moral character and judgement indicates
that ... anxiety or guilt feelings may not be the most direct key to under-
standing the development of moral character or moral judgement".\textsuperscript{87}

According to M. L. HOFFMAN, "Quite apart from its harmful effects on
impulse expression, such a concept of conscience does not provide a satisfac-

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{84} L. KOHLBERG, "The Development of Children's Orientations Toward a Moral
          Order" I, in Vita Humana 63, 11 – 33
  \item \textsuperscript{85} Cfr. above, Part Two, Chapter Five, A: "The Origin of Moral Consciousness in
          the Individual"
  \item \textsuperscript{86} For an excellent review of modern studies on this topic, cfr. D. WRIGHT, The
          Psychology of Moral Behaviour (Penguin Books 1971) He gives an extensive bibliogra-
          phy on it.
  \item \textsuperscript{87} L. KOHLBERG, "Development of Moral Character and Moral Ideology", in
          (New York 1964) 409
\end{itemize}
tory basis for moral action. For example, it would follow from superego considerations that children who consistently resist temptation may often be incapable of rebelling against social norms even when this is desirable; and altruism may be nothing more than a reaction against one's hostile impulses. It would also follow that in moral conflict situations the individual is always under internal pressure to defend himself against the awareness of temptations. This self-deception may require a reduction in cognitive and other ego functions (e.g., ability to anticipate consequences, suspend judgement, defer gratifications, and consider alternatives)...

SEARS also concludes the same way.

Thus a feeling of guilt as a punishment from within which follows a deviation or a violation, real or phantasied, cannot afford and account for moral righteousness, as a sense of conscious virtue.

d) Free Will against Determinism

In the Freudian metapsychological frame of reference, the super-ego is said to be the seat of moral and social standards. According to FREUD, it is formed out of the id, out of the primitive irrational impulses, and qualitatively it remains largely unconscious. Thus the moral standards are unconscious products of powerful irrational motives and are based on the feeling of guilt, the need to keep antisocial impulses from conscious awareness.

The super-ego is formed from the id, which is a cauldron of instinctive drives seeking always gratification, obeying the pleasure principle and the lawlessness of the primary process. The "id knows no judgement of value,

89. R. R. SEARS, "Growth of Conscience", in I. ISCOE & H. STEVENSON (ed.) Personality Development in Children (Austin 1960) 95
90. R. BROWN, Social Psychology (New York 1965) 411 — 14
91. FREUD, An Outline of Psycho-Analysis, GW XVII 129; SE XXIII 198; Cfr. above, Part Three, Chapter Seven, D 3: "Characteristics of the Id"
92. FREUD, An Outline of Psycho-Analysis, GW XVII 86; SE XXIII 164
no morality". Thus morality was seen by FREUD as a force alien to the psychical apparatus, that deprives the individual of his instinctual birthrights.

Again, the super-ego’s characteristic modes of operation are laid down in early years and they remain substantially unchanged throughout one’s life. The postulated developmental sequence is completed in early childhood. Thus the moral barrier in FREUD’s view is formed already before cognitive and judgemental processes of the ego have sufficiently matured. The person is said to have established his moral code before he learns to assimilate internal frustration and to place under control, before he understands and evaluates the reasons underlying parental prohibitions and demands. Conscience then operates largely, if not exclusively, outside conscious awareness and is relatively unaffected by changes in reality conditions.

Thus the Freudian man can hardly claim for freedom regarding his activities and therefore cannot take the responsibility to himself.

e) Beyond Moral Principles

The Freudian model of man seems to be travelling not on the track of “moral” principles. Metapsychologically, the id, that is the sum total of the instinctual impulses, primitive drives and irrational wishes constitute the core of human being. They all look for instantaneous gratification against which moral principles stand as a hindrance. Moreover, according to FREUD, the sexual identity of man is not biologically inevitable, but is a product of early family relations. Regarding the need for sexual satisfaction FREUD wrote as follows:

“We said there that man’s discovery that sexual (genital) love afforded him the strongest experiences of satisfaction, and in fact provided him with the prototype of all happiness, must have suggested to him that he should continue to seek the satisfaction of happiness in his life along the path of sexual relations and that he should make genital erotism the central point of his life”. 95

93. FREUD, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW XV 81; SE XXII 74
94. FREUD, An Outline of Psycho-Analysis, GW XVII 128; SE XXII 197
95. FREUD, Civilization and Its Discontents, GW XIV 460; SE XXI 101
Thus FREUD established the basic "technique of living based on the value of love as a means to happiness". On the other hand, it is already determined by nature that, "A small minority are enabled by their constitution to find happiness, in spite of everything, along the path of love". Evidently, FREUD here makes a basic distinction in the very concept of love, between what he calls the genital love and the aim-inhibited love, between sex and love.

Now the conclusion is clear. For the majority of people fulfilment of life means an unconditional satisfaction of sexual instincts, a gratification without reserve, without control, without moral and social principles (?). At any rate, FREUD pleaded for "an incomparably freer sexual standard" and he saw in the case of aim-inhibited or sublimated love, where the libido is re-channeled to universal love or affection, "an exploiting love for the benefit of an inner feeling of happiness."

96. Ibid. GW XIV 460; SE XXI 82. "... one of the forms in which love manifests itself — sexual love — has given us our most intense experience of an overwhelming sensation of pleasure and has thus furnished us with a pattern for our search for happiness. What is more natural than that we should persist in looking for happiness along the path on which we first encountered it? The weak side of this technique of loving is easy to see; otherwise no human being would have thought of abandoning this path to happiness for any other. It is that we are never so defenceless against suffering as when we love, never so helplessly unhappy as when we have lost our loved object or its love. But this does not dispose of the technique of loving based on the value of love as a means to happiness".

97. Ibid. GW XIV 460; SE XXI 101

98. FREUD in a letter to Dr. PUTNAM (July 8, 1915), quoted above, cfr. Part Four, Chapter Nine, Note 77

99. FREUD, Civilization and Its Discontents, GW XIV 461; SE XX1 102. Referring to the sublimated form of love FREUD wrote as follows: "These people make themselves independent of their object's acquiescence by displacing what they mainly value from being loved on to loving; they protect themselves against the loss of the object by directing their love, not to single objects but to all men alike; they avoid the uncertainties and disappointments of genital love by turning away from its sexual aims and transforming the instinct into an impulse with an inhibited aim. What they bring about in themselves in this way is a state of evenly suspended, steadfast, affectionate feeling, which has little external resemblance any more to the stormy agitations of genital love, from which it is nevertheless derived. Perhaps St. Francis of Assisi went furthest in thus exploiting love for the benefit of an inner feeling of happiness. Moreover, what we have recognized as one of the techniques for fulfilling the pleasure principle has often been brought into connection with religion; this connection may lie in the remote regions where the dis-
Thus the Freudian *homo sexualis*\textsuperscript{100} who follows always and everywhere the pleasure principle and looks for instantaneous and unconditional satisfaction of his libidinous needs, can hardly comply with the moral standards of at least this epoch of civilization. Now the pertinent question would be: Should this epoch of civilization become more ‘primitive’, or should the *homo sexualis* become more ‘civilized’? We add to it: FREUD or psycho-analysis may not and should not settle this issue by themselves at random. FREUD, with his “erotic psychology” can probably offer, as someone suggested, not anything more than a “neurotic morality”, as long as he is “playing out of Eros myth as science”\textsuperscript{101}.

Not only the Eros but also the *destructive instincts* meet with the same fate. FREUD would say that they are determined by nature to undergo either of the following alternatives: they can either be combined with erotic instincts and be directed against oneself or they will be directed against the external world as aggressiveness:

“It seems that we can only perceive it under two conditions: if it is combined with erotic instincts into masochism or if — with a greater or lesser erotic addition — it is directed against the external world as aggressiveness. And now we are struck by the significance of the possibility that the aggressiveness may not be able to find satisfaction in the external world because it comes up against real obstacles. If this happens, it will perhaps retreat and increase the amount of self-destructiveness holding sway in the interior. We shall hear how this is in fact what occurs and how important a process this is. Impeded aggressiveness seems to involve a grave injury. It really seems as though it is necessary for us to destroy some other thing or person in order not to destroy ourselves, in order to guard against the impulse to self-destruction. A sad disclosure indeed for the moralist!

\textsuperscript{100} E. FROMM, The Crisis of Psychoanalysis (Penguin Books 1970) 47
\textsuperscript{101} P. RIEFF, Freud, the Mind of the Moralist (New York 1959) 165

**tinction between the ego and objects or between objects themselves is neglected. According to one ethical view ... this readiness for a universal love of mankind and the world represents the highest standpoint which man can reach, ... I should like to bring forward my two main objections to this view. A love that does not discriminate seems to me to forfeit a part of its own value, by doing an injustice to its object; and secondly, not all men are worthy of love”.**
But the moralist will console himself for long time to come with the im-
probability of our speculations".102

Either self-destruction or the destruction of others (at least some material
destinations), that is the only exit F R E U D finds from the impasse of aggres-
sive instincts present in every individual. It is true that there is a certain
amount of aggression and destruction in the world, that *homo homini lupus*
(mis)led man all times. Yet one should not forget the fact that mankind still
survives in spite of all destructions; and that itself is a "sad disclosure" to
F R E U D!

In conclusion we must state that the *homo freudianus* escapes or stands
beyond moral principles in general or what contemporary man names moral
principles.

Finally one should not hide the fact that F R E U D failed completely in unit-
ing the two basic elements in morality which he himself delineated — the "in-
herited" morality and the autonomous ethics. He could see practically no po-
sitive aspects in the former, nor could he find out the true "geneology" of the
latter. He had no other go than to evade some profound questions.

C. Religion and Morality Intertwined

1. Religion as Ground of Morality

We introduced the Freudian metapsychology as the theoretical background
of the concepts of religion and morality (Part Three). We found the super-ego
as the seat of cultural institutions, the major part of which remain uncon-
scious and archaic. This super-ego which is the direct heritage of the Oedipus

102. F R E U D, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis; GW XV 112 — 13;
SE XXII 105 (Italics mine). In the original: "Verhinderte Aggression scheint eine schwe-
re Schädigung zu bedeuten; es sieht wirklich so aus, als müßten wir anderes und andere
zerstören, um uns nicht selbst zu zerstören, um uns vor der Tendenz zur Selbstdestruk-
tion zu bewahren".
complex, the monument of one's infantile helplessness, a precipitate in the ego deriving from the id, as the connecting link with the phylogenetic chain, takes its full shape at the dissolution of the Oedipus complex through an identification with the father-figure. It is the legitimate heir to the parental agency, precipitate of the original parental representations.

There are regressive and "progressive" elements in the super-ego. It is regressive as long as it is the scar of prehistory (cultural archaism), the monument of the past. It becomes "progressive" through identifications.

Now to summarize the whole process (Part Four): Both religion and morals have an "homogeneous" origin from the same emotional core, the Oedipus complex. The original covenant after the cruel murder of the father, was twofold: a reconciliatory pact with the father, not to offend him any more, to respect him, to venerate him. Then a social pact ("Gesellschaftsvertrag") among the brothers imposing instinctual renunciations, consolidated in two taboos. These original taboos gave rise to the posterior moral codes and the displacement of the father-figure to the totem gave birth to totem-religion, the original form of every religion.

Religion and morals, therefore, preserve ambivalent features. Religion is the sigh of human helplessness, an appeal to the father for protection, the regressive renovations of the infantile remembrances, and at the same time an emblem of triumph over the father, a partial satisfaction for their hatred and

103. FREUD, The Ego and the Id, GW XIII 264; SE XIX 36
104. Ibid. GW XIII 277; SE XIX 48
105. Ibid. GW XIII 262; SE XIX 33
106. Ibid. GW XIII 265; SE XIX 37
107. FREUD, The Dissolution of the Oedipus Complex, GW XIII 398 - 402; SE XIX 174 - 79
108. FREUD, The Ego and the Id, GW XIII 284; SE XIX 55
109. FREUD, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-analysis, GW XV 68; SE XXII 62
110. Ibid. GW XV 71; SE XXII 65
111. FREUD, Totem and Taboo, GW IX 188; SE XIII 157; The Ego and the Id, GW XIII 265; SE XIX 37; The Economic Problem of Masochism, GW XIII 382; SE XIX 169
112. FREUD, Totem and Taboo, GW IX 169 - 72; SE XIII 140 - 42; Moses and Monotheism, GW XVI 188; SE XXIII 83
113. FREUD, Totem and Taboo, GW IX 173; SE XIII 143
114. Ibid. GW IX 122, 169 - 172, 177; SE XIII 100, 140 - 143, 146 - 47
jealousy. The in-turned instincts, therefore, seeking outlets make 'sadistic' de-
mands which clothe themselves as religion and morality. Both preserve those
two main features of the taboo, the ambivalence of desire and fear, fascina-
tion and terror.\textsuperscript{115}

Religion and morals had not only an \textit{homogeneous} origin but also a \textit{simul-
taneous} development. The ethical barrier consolidated in a later stage (latency
period),\textsuperscript{116} was subject to a "transmoralization".\textsuperscript{117} Hereafter the moral
conduct was prescribed in the name of a God beyond and a life after. Step by
step \textit{religion became the backbone of morality and morals in turn the nerve-
centre of religion}. Religion then set its high ideals and issued the sweet pro-
phesies and promises of future. Even at the expense of ethics, for which it
proclaimed to stand, supporting thus immorality, religion attempted to safe-
guard its goals — the cultural unification.\textsuperscript{118} Through the mechanism of in-
stinct-constraints religion became "moralized" and morals became "sacral-
ized."\textsuperscript{119}

Thus morality was transvalued in the name of a God. A God with his retri-
butions (rewards and punishments) became the controlling power of one's
moral conduct and conscience,\textsuperscript{120} and \textit{religion became the "ground" of mo-
rality}. At the final outcome the promised compensations became the mono-
poly of the 'elite' for the fulfilment of some ethical precepts.\textsuperscript{121}

Hence \textsc{Freud} radically objected to a religion which was seen as the foun-
dation of morality. He fought against the \textit{ethical core of religion and the reli-
gious core of ethics}, against the "supernaturalization" of ethics, against the
subjugation of our moral conduct to the authority of a God above. A child

\textsuperscript{115} Compare with the comments of P. \textsc{Ricoeur}, Freud and Philosophy, 448ff.
\textsuperscript{116} Cfr. \textsc{Freud}, Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety, GW XIV 144 – 45; SE XX
114 – 15; A Short Account of Psycho-Analysis, GW XIII 423 – 26; SE XIX 204 – 8;
This latency period must be understood from ontogenetic as well as phylogenetic
levels.
\textsuperscript{117} \textsc{Freud}, The Future of an Illusion, GW XIV 352; SE XXI 30
\textsuperscript{118} Ibid. GW XIV 361; SE XXI 37 – 38
\textsuperscript{119} \textsc{Freud}, Moses and Monotheism, GW XVI 226 – 30; SE XXIII 118 – 22
\textsuperscript{120} \textsc{Freud}, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW XV 177; SE XXII
164
\textsuperscript{121} Ibid. GW XV 180; SE XXII 166
may need such an authority, so also mankind probably in its primitive stages; but an adult not only does not need it, but finds it often as a hindrance to normal life.

Moreover, religion has no more future; it has exhausted its resources of constraints and consolations. Then, what about ethics in a post-religious era? If there is only a religious morality, we shall not have ethics in future! Hence it is on a very shaky foundation.

More than in the theoretical field, FREUD met with the intermingled activity of religion and morality in his personal life. Religion, represented by the Catholic Church was "his usually sensitive spot of hostility".\(^{122}\)

All throughout his life FREUD was subject to a "Verbotstrauma". He charged the whole blame upon the Catholic Church. He found the whole church, from individuals to the head, falling short lamentably of their high ethical ideals.

In the light of this formidable situation, he brought forward some suggestions; his radical appeal was for a secularization of morality, to take it out of the hands of God and religion, to "devaluate" it from the retributions above and thus, from the restrictions around.

However, he did not forget to enthrone another god — his god of reason and science which alone has a future in the history of gods. Now on, the scientific spirit would take the place of religious motivation and moral principles will be resuscitated by social interests alone.

2. Critical Remarks

a) Is everything permitted, if there is no God?

As it was pointed out earlier, FREUD's greatest objection to religion was formulated in the name of morality. Morality needs a more stable foundation than the "omnipotent" will of the God of religion. Hence FREUD denied re-

122. As ZILBOORG said, the Roman Cath. Church was "his usually sensitive spot of hostility". Freud and Religion, 54
ligion in order to affirm ethics — an attitude, which E. FROMM qualified as “religious”\(^\text{123}\).

This morality, therefore, rested, according to FREUD, on very shaky foundations. The argumentation was very simple: If the validity of ethical norms rests upon their being God’s commands, the future of ethics stands or falls with the belief in God.\(^\text{124}\)

*Atqui “God is dead”, religion has no future more, we live in a post-religious era. *Ergo* the interrelation between religion and morals destroy in the long run every ethical value.

This is the basic reason why FREUD invited us cordially to give up the illusions about the protection as well as the punishment of an omnipotent authority high above in the skies. He fought against the religious repressions resulting in neuroses. He asked for an education to the realities of life, to the responsibility and freedom of the individual, who must become a moral norm for himself. (As we shall see later, this is the most challenging and iconoclastic element in FREUD).

We find FREUD not fully justified in this attack on religion. No proper religion will dare to put the yoke of individual responsibility on the shoulders of a god above and leave the individual as “Wandervögel”. A true religion is a personal answer to God’s call and it is the individual who must find the best suited means to come to God. Again, as far as the authority of God is concerned, it is more an infantile fixation to approach Him as a threatening and repressing power. A true idea of God corresponds to our “need for love” and not to a false “need for punishment” (Strafbedürfnis). Furthermore, we would say with A. VERGOTE that a God behind our moral conduct corresponds to our basic need to give a more secure foundation to our daily dealings (Sicherheitsbedürfnis).\(^\text{125}\)

Hence we can boldly say that FREUD confronted only the “infantile fixations” about God and the “deviated forms” of religion.

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124. FREUD, *New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis*, GW XV 181; SE 168
b) Beyond a "scientific" ethics

Evidently the Freudian god, the logos, the human intellect, reason stands behind his ethics. In his idolatry of science and reason he gave omnipotence to them and we are told to be living under the dictatorship of reason. Unfortunately FREUD did not develop this point and we are not told much about it. All the same, FREUD wanted "something" behind the human moral conduct, some ground and foundation. So it was not a question of "to be or not to be" but how "it should not be" and partially at least "how it should be".

c) Beyond a humanistic ethics

Finally, what does FREUD actually mean by the "Selbstverständlichkeit der Moral", the self-evident morality? As he himself gives the love of mankind (Menschheitsliebe) as the sole motive behind his ethics, we interpreted this phrase as an ethic of honesty. Still the question remains: what would be the ultimate motivation for such a "universal love"? Is it a mere hedonism or is there some transhuman relationship involved? In other words, what is the elan vital of this love? What is the motive behind a love that invites me to love not only those who love me but each and every one, even my "enemies"? We would dare to say that this was the best occasion FREUD missed, where he could have "touched" the Eternal. Did he deliberately turn his back upon it, we do not know!

In short, FREUD evaded giving clarifications to many questions. One should remember that it is always easy to criticize and cast stones of blame upon what there is already, but much more difficult it is to construct what there is not yet!

126. Cfr. above, Part One, Chapter Six
127. FREUD's concept of "Menschenliebe" seemingly excludes no one. FREUD, Civilization and Its Discontents, GW XIV 475; SE XXI 114
D. A “BUT” to the Atheism of Freudian Psycho-Analysis

In spite of all what we said above as critical remarks, we add a “BUT” to the Freudian atheism. We agree with those who speak of a “totally negative” attitude of FREUD towards God and religion.

But we ask: Was it not an atheism of an “homo via perditus”. FREUD was lost on the way to the real and ultimately to the Eternal.128

Was it because he was expelled from the “foot-path” (“Ich, herunter vom Trottoir”, FREUD’s early “religious trauma”)? Or because he was given some false images of God and deviated forms of religion? Or because of his (unconscious) decision to stand always in the opposition and never to come to a compromise with his life-time enemy, the Catholic Church?

Yet FREUD stood for something noble; he held on high ideals. His opposition to religion was “religious”.129

“Somewhere, in some way, Freud seems to have sensed the transcending truth about man when he said that to be normal meant to him arbeiten und lieben”.130

FREUD’s atheism was more than an a-theism, an anti-theism, against a theism which was for him not more than a “gigantic hypocrisy”!131

E. From a Pessimistic Theory to an Optimistic Therapy

The Freudian psycho-analysis discloses a theory (the metapsychology) as well as a therapy (psychotherapy). In its theoretical applications, as we

128. It must be concluded that FREUD missed many occasions when he could have come across the Eternal, had he not turned his back upon them. Thus, for example, his concept of transference, of symbolism, of original sense of guilt, the fact of an “institution” behind the individual conscience, of sublimation and so on. G. ZILBOORG argued from the concept of Eros compared with the “caritas” in St. Paul. G. ZILBOORG Freud and Religion, 3, 60
129. E. FROMM, Psychoanalysis and Religion, 20
130. G. ZILBOORG, Freud and Religion, 60
131. FREUD used this phrase in a letter to LOU ANDREAS—SALOME. Cfr. above, Part Four, Chapter Nine, Note 76
have already seen, religion and morality occupy a paramount place. Society and civilization are necessarily built upon repressions of individual instincts, the pain of which may be reduced by a 'good' life, but shall never be completely removed. Thus the Freudian theory posits an irreconcilable antagonism between the desire for absolute happiness and the exigencies of civilization — survival.\(^{132}\) Here FREUD left no room for a genuine religious experience nor for a supernatural revelation as a source of religion, even though he recognized ethics as indispensable for mankind.\(^{133}\) Hence he approached religion as such and morality as an institution with his reductive argumentation of 'nothing-but-ness'. Accordingly, all religions are characterized by fixations on the old family history and by reproductions of the past and a return long after of what had been forgotten.\(^{134}\)

Psychologically speaking, religion on the other hand, as it shall be immediately explained, is an irreducible function that expresses man's most fundamental dispositions. As someone put it:

"Religious ideas are not contrived or made by the individual; they rather happen or force themselves upon the individual's consciousness. Psychology accepts these ideas and images of God as psycho realities, but must abstain from judgement concerning the question of an absolute reality behind them".\(^{135}\)

Thus on a theoretical level we shall not expect much from FREUD as regards the contents of religion. That is why we did not attempt at an exhaustive criticism of Freudian theories\(^{136}\) even though we do not approve all that he said.

\(^{132}\) Cfr. M. G. KALIN, The Utopian Flight from Unhappiness: Freud against Marx on Social Progress (Chicago 1974) 200
\(^{133}\) FREUD, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW XV 181; SE XXII 168
\(^{134}\) FREUD, Moses and Monotheism, GW XVI 240f.; SE XXIII 132f.
\(^{136}\) As classical examples of critics of Freud (mainly on religion) one may quote Father Wilhelm Schmidt and Bronislaw Malinowski. Father Schmidt objected to FREUD's theory that totemism is the source of all subsequent religions. For totemism does not belong to the earliest forms of human development, it is not a universal practice, the totem-meal ceremony is not essential to it, pretotemic people know nothing about cannibalism ... Cfr. W. SCHMIDT, The Origins and Growth of Religion (London 1935)
There is yet another aspect of the Freudian psycho-analysis, and that is our interest for the moment. There is no doubt that religion can take pathological forms; instead of being a source of liberation it can become a force of alienation individually or collectively. That is to say, psychological disorders can impair religious life or 'religion' may insinuate pathological states. As Oscar PFISTER maintained, the deviations of Christianity as an historical movement are attributable to psychical errors. Thus the Freudian psychoanalysis attracted the attention of even the clergy already from the very beginning, even though people like C. G. JUNG qualified FREUD's theories as "hostile to spiritual values". Thus, while rejecting the Freudian materialistic and atheistic Weltanschauung, we assume that Freudian psycho-analysis is of great psychological value and practical help to religion and morals. Without any allegiance to his pessimistic theory we can adopt his optimistic therapy, his "antiutopian critique" as a helpful and successful technique. FREUD himself confirmed it as he wrote to PFISTER:

103f; Malinowski objected to Freud's thesis that culture and religion spring suddenly into being as a result of a supposed historical event; they are rather the slow accumulation of experience. He objects also to the Freudian hypothesis of Oedipus complex and the patrilineal explanation of the origins of religion. Cfr. B. MALINOWSKI, Sex and Repression in Savage Society (London 1937) 167 – 68

137. O. PFISTER, Some Applications of Psycho-Analysis (London 1923) 22; "When it is measured against the principle laid down by Jesus in the Gospel according to Saint John ... the history of Christianity rather has the appearance of a gigantic misunderstanding or of a pathology of Christianity. In its frequently savage attachment to an irrational dogma having no connection with love, dogmatics and its history seemed to me to constitute an attempt to evade the central point of Jesus' teaching and claims. I saw man terrified by the letter of the Gospel and the tenets of the Church, any questioning of which was threatened by the stake and hell fire ..."


139. C. G. JUNG, Modern Man in Search of a Soul (London 1936) 263; "... these theories are hostile to spiritual values ... they are rational methods of treatment which actually hinder the realization of meaningful experience".

140. M. G. KALIN' The Utopian Flight from Unhappiness; Freud against Marx on Social Progress (Chicago 1974) 200
"In itself psycho-analysis is neither religious nor the opposite, but an impartial instrument which can serve the clergy as well as the laity when it is used only to free suffering people. I have been very struck at realizing how I had never thought of the extraordinary help the psycho-analytic method can be in pastoral work, probably because wicked heretics like us are so far away from that circle". ¹⁴¹

Here we perceive the challenging aspect of the Freudian protests, especially to the Catholic Christianity. The next Chapter deals with it.

¹⁴¹ Quoted in E. JONES, LWF III 312; Cfr. also a letter dated February 9, 1909, in JONES, LWF II 489–90
Chapter Eleven

THE FREUDIAN PROTEST AS A CHALLENGE TO CHRISTIANITY

In this Chapter we want to delineate the positive sides of the Freudian psycho-analysis, as it directly touches upon Christianity. By 'Christianity' we mean in this context the Christian ideals and practices represented by 'the Church', more concretely by the Catholic Church. FREUD confronted religion mainly, if not exclusively, through this Church, which was his immediate point of contact and departure, "the usually sensitive spot of his hostility".1 From this form of religion he went through the 'religion' of Western man and he took a 'detour' to other religions and finally to religion in general.

A careful and thorough reading shows that FREUD identified the Christian way of life with the Western civilization so much so that civilization meant for him ultimately a religious (Christian) civilization.

As this civilization failed utterly in its perspectives and objectives, FREUD would say, it calls for a corrective: "Our civilization imposes an almost intolerable pressure on us and it calls for a corrective".2 He was convinced that psycho-analysis as an "instrument of research" at the service of man and mankind can fulfill this task:

"As a 'depth-psychology', a theory of the mental unconscious, it can become indispensable to all the sciences which are concerned with the evolution of human civilization and its major institutions such as art, religion and the social order. It has already, in my opinion, afforded these sciences considerable help in solving their problems. But these are only small contributions compared with what might be achieved if historians of civilization, psychologists of religion, philologists and so on would agree

1. G. ZILBOORG, Freud and Religion; a Restatement (London 1958) 54
2. FREUD, The Question of Lay Analysis (1926) GW XIV 285; SE XX 249 — 50

"Unsere Kultur übt einen fast unerträglichen Druck auf uns aus, sie verlangt nach einem Korrektiv".

Kottayarikil, FREUD
themselves to handle the new instrument of research which is at their service". 3

Nevertheless, FREUD found it rather a painful therapy:

"For psycho-analysis soon discovered in the case of obsessional neurosis what the forces are that struggle with one another in it till their conflicts find a remarkable expression in the ceremonial of obsessive actions. Nothing similar was suspected in the case of religious ceremonial until, by tracing back religious feeling to the relation with the father as its deepest root, it became possible to point to an analogous dynamic situation in that case too. This instance, moreover, may warn the reader that even in its application to non-medical fields psycho-analysis cannot avoid wounding cherished prejudices, touching upon deeply-rooted sensibilities and thus provoking enmities which have an essentially emotional basis". 4

FREUD left the way open to "psychologists of religion", "to purify gold from copper", even though such a purification is a painful therapy. We now want to apply some of the findings of psycho-analysis to Christianity, more concretely to the practices of Christianity.

A. Facing the Freudian Challenge

Before making some suggestions in the field of religion and morality, we want to state why we insist upon taking FREUD, more precisely, his optimistic therapy as a challenge to Christianity.

1. Why as a Challenge?

FREUD's question to his friend Pastor PFISTER is crucial even today: He wrote to him:

3. Ibid. GW XIV 276; SE XX 248
4. FREUD, A Short Account of Psycho-Analysis (1924) GW XIII 423 – 24; SE XIX 206
"As for the possibility of sublimation to religion, therapeutically I can only envy you. But the beauty of religion certainly does not belong to psycho-analysis. It is natural that at this point in therapy our ways should part, and so it can remain. Incidentally, why was it that none of all the pious ever discovered psycho-analysis? Why did it have to wait for a completely godless Jew?"⁵

FREUD enthusiastically proclaimed himself as an atheist.⁶ He preferred to stand always in contrast to religion, its dogmas and defenders.⁷ Yet he explicitly confessed:

"These are my personal views, which coincide with those of many non-analysts and pre-analysts, but there are certainly many excellent analysts who do not share them".⁸

Thus it must be concluded that FREUD left faith as a personal affair: "Just as no one can be forced to believe, so no one can be forced to disbelieve".⁹ Even though FREUD did not personally experience religion, he stated: "But this gives me no right to deny that it does in fact occur in other people".¹⁰

Nevertheless 'religion' as FREUD saw it was a source of neurosis. Hence he was convinced that something had to be done for the 'poor humanity'. He wrote to PFISTER:

"We know that by different routes we aspire to the same objectives for the poor humanity".¹¹

On another occasion he said: "We desire the same things".¹²

We know that FREUD did not remain on this parallel route, but he ended up in an attempt, though an unsuccessful one, to replace the "other route" (religion)!

6. Cfr. above, Part One, Notes 5, 6, 7. Compare with our comments in Part Five, Chapter Ten, D
7. Cfr. FREUD, The Future of an Illusion (1927) GW XIV 378f; SE XXI 53f; New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis (1933) GW XV 170f; SE XXII 158f
8. Letter to Pfister Nov. 26, 1927. FREUD/PFISTER, Psychoanalysis and Faith, 117
9. FREUD, The Future of an Illusion, GW XIV 355; SE XXI 32
10. FREUD, Civilization and Its Discontents (1930) GW XIV 422 –23; SE XXI 65
12. FREUD, The Future of an Illusion, GW XIV 377; SE XXI 54
FREUD could pick out a number of anomalies found in the concrete form of religion either in its individual or in its institutional form. Identifying them with religion per se he wanted to free the fundamental ethical values from the backing of such a religion so that they may escape an eternal dissolution. If he had objected only to those anomalies, no one would have raised his voice against him, but respected him as a ‘religious reformer’. The point is that he gave practically no value to the genuine religion.

At any rate, we find many positive elements even in his radical attacks. We are now interested in them. How far can they help Christian theology and our way of life today?

The challenging elements in FREUD are particularly important to Catholic Christianity because FREUD parted from and raised his voice against this religion. And this religion, in its turn, has launched today a salutary appeal to dialogue in its attempts to help modern man “buffeted between hope and anguish”. It is enough to quote just one or two sentences from the Documents of Vat. II: “At the same time, a living exchange is fostered between the Church and diverse cultures of people.

To promote such an exchange, the Church requires special help ... She must rely on those who live in the world, are versed in different institutions and specialities and grasp their innermost significance in the eyes of both believers and unbelievers”.

When one understands that FREUD until today was “the accused and the condemned” and therefore he was studied mostly under the perspective of polemics, opposition and resistance, one can easily perceive the urge for an unbiased study and a good will for dialogue with him.

2. FREUD a Non-Conformist to the status quo

FREUD wrote in his psycho-analysis of the present-day culture: Civilization and Its Discontents:

13. Documents of Vat. II, GS, art. 44, W. M. ABBOT, 246
14. “Der Angeklagte und Verurteilte”; J. SCHARFENBERG, Sigmund Freud und seine Religionskritik als Herausforderung für den christlichen Glauben (Göttingen 1970) 34
"When we justly find fault with the state of our civilization for so inadequately fulfilling our demands for a plan of life that shall make us happy and for allowing the existence of so much suffering which could probably be avoided — when, with unsparing criticism, we try to uncover the roots of its imperfection, we are undoubtedly exercising a proper right and are not showing ourselves enemies of civilization".  

The sole purpose of his contestation, FREUD continued, was the expectation that gradually at least some alterations would be carried through in our "civilized" world.

At the same time FREUD maintained that civilization was a necessary course of development from individuals to humanity as a whole.  

FREUD formulated his first attacks under a trenchant criticism against conventional sex-morality or against the contemporary sexual "arrangements", which were, according to him, one of the basic causes of individual neurosis.

Some time later FREUD thought that such an insolent restriction of human instincts would in the long run extinguish the human race. However, one shall not expect anything more from this civilization, because it is built upon the restriction of instincts:

"Human civilization rests upon two pillars, of which one is the control of natural forces and the other restriction of our instincts. The ruler's throne rests upon fettered slaves! Among the instinctual components which are thus brought into service, the sexual instincts in the narrower sense of the word, are conspicuous for their strength and savagery! Woe, if they should be set loose! The throne would be overturned and the ruler trampled under foot. Society is aware of this — and will not allow the topic to be mentioned".

This civilization thus feeds up hypocrisy in the society; it is "disfigured

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15. FREUD, Civilization and Its Discontents, GW XIV 475; SE XXI 115
16. Cfr. Ibid. GW XIV 497f; SE XXI 137f
18. FREUD, Contributions to the Psychology of Love (1910) GW VIII 90f; SE XI 190f
19. FREUD, Resistances to Psycho-Analysis, GW XIV 106; SE XIX 219
20. FREUD, Thoughts for the Times on War and Death, GW X 336; SE XIV 284
by a gigantic hypocrisy.” Nevertheless, FREUD did not call for an irrational unfettering of the instincts or for an unbridled flow of passions:

“Psycho-analysis has never said a word in favour of unfettering instincts that would injure our community; on the contrary it has issued a warning and an exhortation to us to mend our ways. But society refuses to consent to the ventilation of the question, because it has a bad conscience in more than one respect. In the first place it has set up a high ideal of morality — morality being restriction of instincts — and insists that all its members shall fulfil that ideal without troubling itself with the possibility that obedience may bear heavily upon the individual.”

Hence FREUD put forward some radical reforms, even though he did not want to qualify himself as a reformer. In his reform plan sexuality occupies the foremost place:

“It is true that we are not reformers but merely observers; nevertheless, we cannot help observing with a critical eye and we have found it impossible to side with conventional sexual morality or to form a very high opinion of the manner in which society attempts the practical regulation of the problems of sexual life. We can present society with a blunt calculation that what is described as its morality calls for a bigger sacrifice than it is worth and that its proceedings are not based on honesty and do not display wisdom.”

FREUD recognized this mission of working for the liberation of man from the fetters of society as “deeply religious”:

“The man who goes no further, but humbly acquiesces in the small part which human beings play in the great world — such a man is, on the contrary, irreverent in the truest sense of the word.”

Thus FREUD fought militantly against the stale moralities and inherited moral systems, and against the institutionalizations of religion which backed such moral codes. With this, he thought, he gave only a “psychological twist” to the “criticisms of his great predecessors”.

E. FROMM concludes his analysis of FREUD’s mission with the state-

21. FREUD, quoted in E. JONES LWF II 199
22. FREUD, Resistances to Psycho-Analysis, GW XIV 106; SE XIX 219
23. FREUD, Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis (1917) GW XI 450 — 51; SE XVI 434
24. FREUD, The Future of an Illusion, GW XIV 355; SE XXI 32f
25. Ibid. GW XIV 357; SE XXI 35
ment that FREUD aimed at founding a movement for the ethical liberation of man, a new scientific religion. We do not know how far it is true. But one thing is certain: FREUD presented himself as an harbinger of freedom and love. Through another route he wanted to arrive at the same destination which religion expected from a God above, namely, "the love of man and the decrease of suffering". To some extent, he was aware of having a "prophetic mission". His authoritarianism can be explained from this point of view. However, he was always prepared to sit in the opposition row and fight against the status quo.

P. RIEFF argues that FREUD was engaged in a "great pacifying cultural mission, the moral disarmament of Western man". We agree with it, if he means a liberation from the repressing moral systems in their inherited and institutionalized forms.

3. FREUD, a Secularist?

FREUD was not interested in anything that might happen to him after he was dead, but his interest was, as he told us, in the blossom of this life. His greatest objection to the religio-moralistic civilization was that it "eschatologized" human life.

Religion for its own sustenance, contended FREUD, disfigured and transvalued human life in the name of a God beyond and a life after. The sweet promises of a future paradise were issued as compensations for instinct-renunciations. Gradually those promises became "transactional price" for the fulfilment of certain ethical demands.

"Psycho-analytic work is continually confronted with the task of inducing the patient to renounce an immediate and directly attainable yield of

27. FREUD, The Future of an Illusion, GW XIV 377; SE XXI 53
29. Cfr. E. JONES, LWF III 133, quoted above, Part Four, Ch. Nine, Note 134
30. FREUD, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW XV 180; SE XXII 167
pleasure. He is not asked to renounce all pleasure; that could not, perhaps, be expected of any human being, and even religion is obliged to support its demand that earthly pleasure shall be set aside by promising that it will provide instead an incomparably greater amount of superior pleasure in another world".  

But these "sacralized morals", FREUD wanted to convince us, do not help us any more. People are dissatisfied with them. They in their turn, can only add to the number of neurotics in our society.

Through the mechanism of the 'return of the repressed' the primitive taboos re-emerge in the unconscious of the individual. Man is then torn asunder. On the one hand he has insatiable instincts and on the other, those "sacred taboos" repress them with the weight of their 'sacredness'. Thus FREUD saw the sacralized morals as a source of estrangement and alienation. The only exit from this formidable situation left for him was to "dismantle" in all solemnity our cultural demands from their holiness and make them independent of a God above.

Then people will understand, FREUD contended, that these exigencies were made not to suffocate them but to serve their interests and betterment. Evidently these precepts will lose their unconditionality and immutability. For FREUD there was no other solution than to leave aside God totally from the game. In other words:

\[
\text{Den Himmel überlassen wir den Engeln und den Spatzen.}
\]

Moreover, according to FREUD, the god of our civilization is raised to the 'third heaven' in the course of time that one could communicate with him only through an intermediary — the priest. What can this God of heavens

31. FREUD, Some Character-types met with in Psycho-Analytic work (1915) GW X 365; SE XIV 311
32. FREUD, The Future of an Illusion, GW XIV 364; SE XXI 41; "... to leave God out altogether and honestly admit the purely human origin of all the regulations and precepts of civilization".
33. Ibid. GW XVI 365; SE XXI 42
34. Ibid. GW XIV 364; SE XXI 41; "Gott überhaupt aus dem Spiele zu lassen".
35. Ibid. GW XIV 374; SE XXI 50; "We leave Heaven to the angels and the sparrows"
36. FREUD, Totem and Taboo, GW IX 181; SE XIII 150; "God himself had become so far exalted above mankind that He could be approached only through an intermediary — the priest. At the same time divine kings made their appearance in the social
do for men on earth is the pertinent question here. In one word, FREUD called for a desacralisation of ethics through a "de-eschatologization" of our cultural demands.

There is yet another aspect of this secularization of ethics worthy of mentioning — its demythologization. According to FREUD, if the so called religious teachings and assets have any value at all, they must be stripped off their mythical garments and symbolic embodiments. Because:

"Thus religious doctrine tells us the historical truth — though subject, it is true, to some modification and disguise — whereas our rational account disavows it".37

It must be supposed that FREUD arrived at this conclusion already in his very early work, The Interpretation of Dreams. There he stated:

"The sanctity which we attribute to the rules laid down in the Decalogue has, I think, blunted our powers of perceiving the real facts".38

FREUD recognized it as a mechanism devised by religion in order to hide the facts from ordinary people:

"The truths contained in religious doctrines are after all so distorted and systematically disguised that the mass of humanity cannot recognize them as truth".39

What now remains is:

"Thus either those dangerous masses must be held down most severely and kept most carefully away from any chance of intellectual awakening or else the relationship between civilization and religion must undergo a fundamental revision".40

Finally, FREUD advised us to give up all the longings for an irrealizable future. Thus he contrasted his hopes with those of the religious defenders:

"We desire the same things, but you are more impatient, more exacting, and — why should I not say it? — more self-seeking than I and those on my side. You would have the state of bliss begin directly after death; you expect the impossible from it and you will not surrender the claims of structure and introduced the patriarchal system into the state. It must be confessed that the revenge taken by the deposed and restored father was a harsh one: the dominance of authority was at its climax".

37. FREUD, The Future of an Illusion, GW XIV 366; SE XXI 42
38. FREUD, The Interpretation of Dreams (1900) GW II / III 262; SE IV 256
39. FREUD, The Future of an Illusion, GW XIV 368; SE XXI 44
40. Ibid. GW XIV 363; SE XXI 39
Therefore, aware of the fact that we are thrown back upon ourselves, FREUD cordially invites us, each one shall cultivate for himself but honestly his plot as a small-holder. The promises of a future paradise as a compensation for renunciations on earth are mere individual illusions and collective projections. FREUD’s appeal: Leave God and the future paradise high above in the skies and come to the daily realities of life!

4. The Freudian Psycho-Analysis No More as a ‘Social Danger’

FREUD always welcomed fair criticism. Through his attack on the time-honoured cultural standards he drew to himself severe criticisms from different corners. Yet, according to him, this is the only means to cultural progress:

"As a result of these criticisms psycho-analysis is regarded as ‘inimical to culture’ and has been put under a ban as a ‘social danger’. This resistance cannot last for ever. No human institution can in the long run escape the influence of fair criticism; but men’s attitude to psycho-analysis is still dominated by fear, which gives rein to their passions and diminishes their power of logical argument".  

Thus it may be a surprise to see that FREUD as an uncompromising critic of the ‘status quo’, reproached an entirely negative and destructive criticism. FREUD once made an observation on BLEUER’s criticism in the Korrespondenzblatt.

"... intolerance is really not on our side. If my friends are now ready to accept what I say, that is only because they have found so much of it to be borne out, and a natural compensation for the incredulity which I have encountered for ten years ... In any case the criticism of his negativism in

41. Ibid. GW XIV 378; SE XXI 54
42. FREUD, Resistances to Psycho-Analysis, GW XIV 107; SE XIX 220
43. Referring to the criticism raised against him, FREUD once said: “It was very necessary that my ‘Illusion’ should be answered from within our own circle, and it is very satisfactory that it should be done in such a worthy and friendly fashion”, FREUD, letter to Pfister, (Feb. 24, 1928) FREUD / PFISTER, Psychoanalysis and Faith, 122
44. The Korrespondenzblatt, founded by International Psycho-Analytical Association in 1910, was merged with Zentralblatt. Cfr. Ibid. 45, footnote 3
the *Korrespondenzblatt* was not entirely appropriate ... Building the temple with one hand and with the other wielding weapons against those who destroy it — strikes me as reminiscence from Jewish history. On another occasion *FREUD* wrote:

“I have always made it my principle to be tolerant and not to exercise authority, but in practice it does not always work. It is like cars and pedestrians. When I began going about by car I got just as angry at the carelessness of pedestrians as I used to be at the recklessness of drivers”.

Reading between the lines one finds here the very core of Freudian challenges and attacks. Carelessness of pedestrians and recklessness of drivers will result in a chaos in the street. Analogically, carelessness of “men in the street” and recklessness of “the elite in power” will result in a chaos on earth. Thus we see that *FREUD*’s attacks were not diametrical and uncompromising. And it is with this premise in mind that one should look at the Freudian applications.

5. *FREUD*, an Iconoclast

Starting from the analogy of paternity, *FREUD* wanted to destroy the *image of God*. One should immediately note that *FREUD* did not speak of God as such but only about a god whom man has made. In parenthesis we add that this was the greatest mistake *FREUD* ever committed — abolishing the “man-made-image” of God, he wanted to wipe away God as such. No wonder, if he did not succeed in abolishing the “unmade image of God in man”.

On the other hand, if the man-made image of god becomes a threat and peril to the identity of the individual, “a reckless driver against careful pe-

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47. *FREUD*, The Future of an Illusion, GW XIV 377. “Unsere Gegnerschaft ist nur eine einstweilige, keine unversöhnlliche”. SE XXI 53 — 54. “This being so, we may tell ourselves that our antagonism is only a temporary one and not irreconcilable”.  
destrians“, who will dare to turn against, if this driver is imprisoned and in some extreme cases even made subject to capital punishment? That is why PFISTER told FREUD: “Disbelief is after all nothing but negative belief. I do not believe that Psycho-analysis eliminates art, philosophy, religion, but it helps to purify and refine them“. 49

According to FREUD, the religious “truths“ are enwrapped in mythical elaborations. Hence they must be made more realistic and simple, if at all they should have any value: They must be made free of their mystical masks. 50 Ordinary people can no longer recognize them as truths. Hence FREUD preferred a more realistic language to a symbolic one. According to the intellectual development the truth must be communicated more realistically. 51

FREUD’s study on Leonardo da Vinci offers us a better example of his iconoclasm. There he met with an interrelation between Leonardo’s scientific independence and his irreligiosity.

“When anyone like Leonardo escaped being intimidated by his father during his earliest childhood, and has thrown away the fetters of authority, it would be in sharpest contradiction to our expectation, if we found that he had remained a believer and had been unable to escape from dogmatic religion“. 52

One should recall to mind that it was from this analysis that FREUD concluded that a personal God was merely a “psychologically exalted father“ and that religiousness was to be traced back biologically to “the small human child’s long-drawn-out helplessness and need for help“. 53

Thus, moved by an over-confidence in his psycho-analytic findings, FREUD went beyond the limits of a “positive“ iconoclasm and constructive

49. FREUD / PFISTER, Psychoanalysis and Faith, 67 (Italics mine)
50. FREUD, The Future of an Illusion, GW XIV 368; SE XXI 44 - 45. “We have become convinced that it is better to avoid such symbolic disguisings of the truth in what we tell children and not to withhold from them a knowledge of the true state of affairs commensurate with their intellectual level“.
51. Ibid. GW XIV 372; SE XXI 48. “How can we expect people who are under the dominance of prohibitions of thought to attain the psychological ideal, the primacy of intelligence?“.
52. FREUD, Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of his Childhood, GW VIII 195; SE XI 123
53. Ibid.
criticism in his applications to religion.

Hence we find PFISTER's charge quite right: PFISTER wrote to FREUD: "Our difference derives chiefly from the fact that you grew up in proximity to pathological forms of religion and regard these as 'religion', while I had the good fortune of being able to turn to a free form of religion which to you seems to be an emptying of Christianity of its contents, while I regard it as the core and substance of evangelism ...".54

B. FREUD Challenging the Christian Concept of Religion

The Freudian definition of religion can be summed up in two phrases — an unconscious projection and a universal neurosis, one complementing the other.

1. Religion as an Unconscious Projection

In order to understand the Freudian description of religion as an unconscious projection, we should recapitulate here, though briefly, the essential features of the unconscious.

a) The Language of the Unconscious

The unconscious is, according to FREUD55, first of all, a quality of mind; it is not to be understood in a metaphysical sense here.56 The unconscious proper,57 that is, in a dynamic sense, must be distinguished from a latent un-

54. O. PFISTER, letter to S. FREUD (Feb. 20, 1928) FREUD / PFISTER, Psychoanalysis and Faith, 122 (Italics mine)
57. Cfr. above, Part Three, Chapter Seven, C 3
conscious, which is only descriptively named so;\textsuperscript{58} it is capable of becoming conscious and therefore is called also the preconscious.\textsuperscript{59} The unconscious proper contains the instinctual cathexes of the id, not only elements which have been forgotten or repressed, but also instinctual urges which have never been conscious. In other words, it contains all that is repressed and all that is inherited or laid down by constitution.\textsuperscript{60} It is the repository of the instinctual drives of the id which can be differentiated into two main groups: Eros which longs for union and (Thanathos) the destructive instincts which aim at dissolution and disintegration. By nature primitive and unorganized, they follow the pleasure principle;\textsuperscript{61} they undergo the ‘lawlessness’ of the primary process.\textsuperscript{62}

The unconscious betrays itself through dreams, parapraxes, slips of the tongue, neurotic symptoms and the like. As it discloses a symbolic language,\textsuperscript{63} we approach it through analogies. Thus FREUD found dream-analysis as the royal road to the unconscious.

The unconscious represents the primitive and infantile part of the human being, a cauldron of pleasure-seeking and reality-evading wishes. When those wishes are not directly satisfied, substitutive channels are sought.

Moreover, the unconscious with its constitutional and inherited contents displays itself as the connecting link between the individual and the species. Thus FREUD believed that all the old cultural powers and their thought-patterns whether of the middle ages, of the animistic phase or even of the stone-age appear to be active in man.\textsuperscript{64} Here again we find that FREUD senses
what C.G. Jung calls the "archetypal ground of being",⁶⁵ but he missed it as he escaped the positive content of the unconscious.

On the phylogenetic level, the language of dreams is now applied to myths and fairy tales. Accordingly, the history of mankind was seen comparable to individual growth. As an individual passes through different stages, from infancy to senility, so too the history of mankind evolves. Phylogeny repeats itself in ontogeny.

"And here again mythology may give you the courage to believe psychoanalysis ... that in the mental life of children to-day we can still detect the same archaic factors which were once dominant generally in the primaeval days of human civilization. In his mental development the child would be repeating the history of his race in an abbreviated form, just as embryology long since recognized was the case with somatic development".⁶⁶

b) Religion and Unconscious Projections

Religion is, according to Freud, the infantile stage of mankind. As a child in early years, mankind cherishes infantile and sometimes irrealizable wishes. It is motivated by pleasure principle, always looking for gratifications of drives. When those wishes are not satisfied, in the individual they take the form of dreams, illusions, delusions and projections. In the same way, mankind developed myths, religion and fairy tales.⁶⁷ The whole process can be expressed in the following scheme:

⁶⁵. This concept of Jung will be briefly considered in the next pages.
⁶⁶. Freud, The Question of Lay Analysis, GW XIV 240; SE XX 211 - 12
Individual

Instincts, Passions
Emotions, Wishes

Reason, Organization
Socialization

Precipitate of early Experiences

ID

Illusions, Dreams Parapraxes

Myths, Folklores Fairy Tales

Human Nature

Cultural Development

Cultural Super-Ego

Ontogeny

Phylogeny

EGO

SUPER-EGO

Neurosis

Cult. Institutions
Religion-Morality

Mankind
FREUD concluded:

"Myths, religion and morality find their place in this scheme as attempts to seek a compensation for the lack of satisfaction of human wishes. Our knowledge of the neurotic illness of individuals has been of much assistance to our understanding of the great social institutions. For the neurosis themselves have turned out to be attempts to find individual solutions for the problems of compensating for unsatisfied wishes, while the institutions seek to provide social solutions for these same problems". 68

The discovery of the 'historical' element in the content of religion, that is, religion as a social solution to the problem of unsatisfied human wishes, prompted FREUD to modify his early definition of religion as an illusion and to describe it as a delusion. In substance, as wish-fulfilments, both remain the same, that is, both have no contact with actuality. FREUD characterized a psychiatric delusion in his early descriptions 69 as a contradiction to reality. Now that he has discovered a "small fragment of truth" 70 in psychiatric delusions, he described religion in terms of delusion and thus could give a basis to his thesis formulated earlier in a polemic language, 71 with which he was fully unsatisfied as he narrated to FERENCZI. 72

Yet, in spite of this "small fragment of truth", religion, according to

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68. Ibid. GW VIII 416; SE XIII 186
69. FREUD, The Future of an Illusion, GW XIV 353; SE XXI 30 – 31
70. FREUD, Moses and Monotheism, GW XVI 239; SE XXIII 130. "We believe we have a right to make the same assumption about the earliest experiences of humanity. One of these effects would be the emergence of the idea of a single great god — an idea which must be recognized as a completely justified memory, though, it is true, one that has been distorted. An idea such as this has a compulsive character: it 'must' be believed. To the extent to which it is distorted, it may be described as a 'delusion'; in so far it brings the return of the past, it must be called the 'truth'. Psychiatric delusions, too, contain a small fragment of truth and the patient's conviction extends over from this truth on to its delusional wrappings". Compare with L. FEUERBACH who stated that religion was a dream of waking consciousness, while dreaming was the key to the mysteries of religion. Cfr. H. B. ACTION, The Illusion of the Epoch (London 1955) 122
71. It is clear from the way in which Freud speaks in this work. "Thus I must contradict you when you go on to argue ...", FREUD, The Future of an Illusion, GW XIV 372; SE XXI 49; "You will not find me inaccessible to your criticism". Ibid. GW XIV 376; SE XXI 53. Cfr. especially the last pages of this work.
72. After completing this book, FREUD wrote to FERENCZI: "Now it seems to me childish; fundamentally I think otherwise; I regard it as week analytically and inadequate as a self-confession". Letter (Oct. 23, 1927) quoted in E. JONES, LWF III 147
FREUD, creates a world of its own, a value system of its own. An unfulfilled wish is perceived here as an ideal, a symbol (mis)taken for reality. Religion thus does not allow man to insert himself in the history of mankind; it rather ties him to the past. The a-historicity and the immutability of the past give rise to repetition compulsions. Religion does not allow man to live the present. The mythical transmissions are carried through delusional projections into the actuality. Reality is distorted, the individual retreats to a world of illusions. The religious ideas are therefore, "illusions, fulfilsments of the oldest, strongest and most urgent wishes of mankind. The secret of their strength lies in the strength of those wishes". Through those paranoic projections they find some satisfaction for the inhibited wishes. In this sense it spares to a large extent individual neurosis. As long as it is the return of the repressed, it is truth, the historical truth; as long as it is an unconscious projection, it is a delusion. In FREUD's words:

"Thus we are faced by the phenomenon that in the course of the development of humanity sensuality is gradually overpowered by intellectuality and that men feel proud and exalted by every such advance. But we are unable to say why this should be so. It further happens later on that intellectuality itself is overpowered by the very puzzling emotional phenomenon of faith. Here we have the celebrated 'credo quia absurdum', and, once more, anyone who has succeeded in this regards it as a supreme achievement. Perhaps the common element in all these psychological situations is something else. Perhaps men simply pronounce that what is more difficult is higher, and their pride is merely their narcissism augmented by the consciousness of a difficulty overcome".

73. FREUD, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW XV 81; SE XXII 74 — 75; Moses and Monotheism, GW XVI 239; SE XXIII 130
74. FREUD, The Future of an Illusion, GW XIV 352; SE XXI 30
75. FREUD, Moses and Monotheism, GW XVI 226; SE XXIII 118. FREUD added to it later: "It is asserted, however, that each one of us behaves in some one respect like a paranoic, corrects some aspect of the world which is unbearable to him by the construction of a wish and introduces this delusion into reality. A special importance attaches to the case in which this attempt to procure a certainty of happiness and a protection against suffering through a delusional remoulding of reality is made by a considerable number of people in common. The religions of mankind must be classed among mass-delusions of this kind. No one, needless to say, who shares a delusion ever recognizes it as such". FREUD, Civilization and Its Discontents, GW XIV 440; SE XXI 81
At this stage FREUD broke up his discussion and added: man cannot remain a child for all eternity; the world is no nursery.  

Therefore, man and mankind must overcome this neurotic phase through an education to reality, through the primacy of reason with the help of scientific spirit, which is the only road to the real.

c) Should Christianity Face the Freudian Challenge?

First of all, we take the liberty to affirm here that every religion must be prepared to meet new challenges and demands. If religion is a concern of man, a dimension of human life, then there is no meaning in affirming that it is beyond all criticisms. An historical synthesis demands antitheses to theses. Religion has a complementary duty to pay attention to such criticisms. Only because it has been authoritatively handed over, only because it is forcibly dictated, religion does not escape the test of reason. FREUD would say:

"Whatever may be the value and importance of religion, it has no right in any way to restrict thought — no right, therefore, to exclude itself from having thought applied to it".  

We add to it that such an approach should be necessarily objective and free from all personal interests. We find confirmation for it in FREUD himself:

"It would be so insolent to let one's own arbitrary will to step into the breach and, according to one's personal estimate, declare this or that part of the religious system to be less or more acceptable. Such questions are too momentous for that; they might be called too sacred".

The relevant question now is whether Christianity is able to face the following "psychoanalytic hermeneutics" of religion:  

76. FREUD, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW XV 181; SE XXII 168; The Future of an Illusion, GW XIV 373; SE XXI 49  
77. FREUD, The Future of an Illusion, GW XIV 373; SE XXI 49. "But surely infantilism is destined to be surmounted. Men cannot remain children for ever; they must in the end go out into 'hostile life'. We may call this 'education to reality'. Need I confess to you that the sole purpose of my book is to point out the necessity for this forward step?"
78. FREUD, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW XV 183 — 84; SE XXII 170  
79. FREUD, The Future of an Illusion, GW XIV 354; SE XXI 32
"In the first place, it seems possible to apply the psycho-analytic views derived from dreams to products of ethnic imagination such as myths and fairy tales ... some 'secret meaning' has been suspected to lie behind ... The study made by psycho-analysis of dreams and neuroses has given it the necessary experience to enable it to guess the technical procedures that have governed these distortions. But in a number of instances it can also reveal the hidden motives which have led to this modification in the original meaning of myths ... It looks for that impulse in the same psychological 'complexes', in the same emotional trends, which it has discovered at the base of dreams and symptoms. A similar application of its point of view, its hypotheses and findings has enabled psycho-analysis to throw light on the origins of our great cultural institutions — on religion, morality, justice and philosophy. By examining the primitive psychological situations which were able to provide the motive for creations of this kind, it has been in a position to reject certain attempts at an explanation that were based on too superficial a psychology and to replace by a more penetrating insight".80

At any rate, we would state here that all attempts from the part of religion to evade 'critical' situations by affirming that religion is a special field directly established by God, having its own ideas and ideals, terminology and epistemology, exegesis and hermeneutics, anthropology and psychology, having an island of its own to be inhabited and governed by chosen elites, would be labelled as delusional escapisms. Hence we find it at least no more prudent to affirm, for example, that "Catholic truth is not determined by sociological data and analyses".81

At this point, we want to delineate two aspects of the Freudian challenge: a positive and a negative one — a challenge and a warning, namely the importance of the language of the unconscious for religion and secondly, a warning against making religion an arena of infantile illusions and psychiatric delusions.

80. FREUD, The Claims of Psycho-Analysis to Scientific Interest; GW VIII 414; SE XIII 185
81. This was the reaction of the 'official Church' to a recent sociological analysis on the declining Church of America, A. M. GREELY / W. C. McCREADY / K. McCOURT, Catholic Schools in a Declining Church (Sheed & Ward 1976) The authors trace the main reason back to the Papal Encyclical (1968) against birth control, "one of the worst mistakes in the history of Catholic Christianity". Cfr. the comments in Time (April 5, 1976) 43
d) The Language of the Unconscious and Its Significance for Religion

The Freudian concept of the unconscious discloses to a theologian something more than what it is generally understood to be. According to E. JONES, it throws "new light upon two basic questions: the problem of free will and the relativity of ethics." A motive that determines the conscious decision or selection seems to be coming from the unconscious; but the subject is unaware of it and therefore the act is said to be spontaneous and free. Again ethics comes to be recognized as relative to racial factors, social situations and individual constitutions. Thus the Categorical Imperative of KANT with its incontrovertible air of final authority is put into question.

It is true that FREUD described the unconscious in negative terms as a cauldron, a deep well of primitive urges by nature unorganized and confused, containing the inhibited and the repressed. Yet he was not unaware of the other side of it, the inherited part, containing the endless stream and numberless chains going back to the very human stock.

"When we interpret a dream we are simply translating a particular thought-content (latent dream-thoughts) from the 'language of dreams' into our waking speech. In the course of doing so we learn the peculiarities of this dream language and it is borne in upon us that it forms part of a highly archaic system of expression".

We must say that FREUD deplorably missed the positive contents of the unconscious which ultimately lead to an 'archetypal' ground of being. Thus in a small child, in which those primitive urges and wishes betray themselves without any reserve, FREUD found only an object-relation, a wish (sexually) to 'possess' the parents, and he could not perceive the eternal bliss reflected in the smile of a baby. The same way, though he was aware of "the 'secret meaning' lying behind myths and fairy tales", he could not read in them the "inborn symbolism" and the eternally lingering sigh for love and union which is not satiated by any power on earth. If he could, that is to say, if he

82. E. JONES, LWF III 468
83. FREUD, The Claims of Psycho-Analysis to Scientific Interest, GW VIII 403; SE XIII 176
84. Ibid, GW VIII 414; SE XIII 185
85. J. SCHARFENBERG, Sigmund Freud und Seine Religionskritik, op. cit. 171
succeeded in clearly differentiating the creative and dynamic insertion of man in the history of mankind from an unconscious and ahistoric repetition of the past, the infinite landscape and open-ended vistas of the unconscious would have led him to their deep roots, to a transpersonal power, the source of life, love and beauty. Probably he did not want to salute the Eternal either because it was already out of fashion to speak about religion or God, or because he was angry with God and religion for personal reasons. He broke up the discussion here.

Christian theology must start from where FREUD stopped and must re-discover and integrate the concept of the unconscious, probably with the further explorations of C.G. JUNG. The unconscious is an endless source of insight and suggestiveness. As Western mind is deeply fascinated by the conquest of the conscious, Christianity is today dried up by "theo-logy", by an hypertrophy of the conscious ego, by rational proofs. Accordingly, creeds are clearly articulated, formulas compulsively repeated, images externalized, rituals stultified, rites 'politicized', symbols rationalized; the phenomenal fascinations are enthroned at the expense of the numinous values. Where the original numinous energy is lost, no real religion is possible. The Freudian concept of the unconscious as the seat of infinitely inherited potentialities

86. In the first place, FREUD has given us the hint: "the universality of symbolism in language". FREUD, Moses and Monotheism, GW XVI 205; SE XXIII 98. "Die Allgemeinheit der Sprachsymbolik". He further explained it: "The behaviour of neurotic children towards their parents in the Oedipus and castration complex abounds in such reactions, which seem unjustified in the individual case and only become intelligible phylogenetically — by their connection with the experience of earlier generations. It would be well worth while to place this material, which I am able to appeal to here, before the public in a collected form. Its evidential value seems to me strong enough to venture on a further step and to posit the assertion that the archaic heritage of human beings comprises not only dispositions but also subject-matter — memory-traces of the experience of earlier generations. In this way the compass as well as the importance of the archaic heritage would be significantly extended". Ibid. GW XVI 206; SE XXIII 99

Thus one may recognize "the historical truth lying behind the legendary material".

may help to rediscover religion as an experience of the numinosum. We do not know whether FREUD did really mean it when he defined mysticism as "the obscure self-perception of the realm outside the ego, of the id".

At any rate, this is a great challenge to the 'extremely anguished existentialists in theology' who cry for a thorough de-mythologization of the Scriptures and an overall demystification of religious life. FREUD warns them: the language of the unconscious is equally, if not surpassingly, important as that of the conscious; reason is not to be enthroned at the expense of emotions.

We think that Western Christianity must at last shift its emphasis from dogma and theology to meditation and mysticism, from external and organized form of religion to real experiences of religion. The individual as a synthesis of the internal and external worlds, of reason and passion, true religion must reflect his total personality, it must be an experience of the microcosm as well as of the macrocosm. The eternal conflict between the two aspects of religion, the internal experience of the self and the external, social aspect must be overcome.

e) No Canonization of Delusional Projections

In the Freudian psycho-analytic language a projection means a kind of shielding against stimuli producing too great an increase of unpleasure.

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88. R. OTTO, Das Heilige (Berlin 1917)
89. FREUD, Findings, Ideas, Problems (1941) GW XVII 152; SE XXIII 300
90. ‘demythologization’ was the slogan of 1960s. But now the trend seems to be reversed. It must be stated that today myths and mythologies are coming back to life. The modern psychologists remind us that we have not yet outgrown mythology and will never outgrow it so long as we have hopes and fears beyond the other animals. Thus, for instance, J. Campbell, a widely appreciated mythologist of our time, sees the 'necessity' of myths and mythologies for our social and psychological development “from the childhood condition of dependency through the traumas of adolescence and the trials of adulthood to, finally, the deathbed”. J. CAMPBELL, Myths to Live By (New York 1972); J. A. ARLOW, “Ego Psychology and the Study of Mythology”, JAPA 9 (1961) 371 – 93
91. Cfr. A. RESCH (Hsg.), Imago Mundi, V, Mystik (Innsbruck, Resch Verlag 1975); besonders, J. ZAPF, Mystik aus religionsgeschichtlicher und religionsphilosophischer Sicht (SS 61 – 85), Wesen und Formen christlicher Mystik (SS 267 – 279); E. SCHWAB Fascinosum und Mystik bei Immanuel Kant und Sigmund Freud (SS 207 – 233)
"And secondly, a particular way adopted of dealing with any internal excitation which produce too great an increase of unpleasure: there is a tendency to treat them as though they were acting, not from the inside, but from the outside, so that it may be possible to bring the shield against stimuli into operation as a means of defense against them. This is the origin of projection".  

As we have repeatedly said, FREUD defined religion as an illusion where unsatisfied wishes are projected to an outside power, real or imagined. In an illusion there is the polarization between the reality and the wish-fulfilment. Already from the very beginning FREUD stated that all psychic life sprouts from these basic opposition.

The longing for happiness due to the domination of the pleasure principle is fundamental in every human being. FREUD stated categorically:

"As we see, what decides the purpose of life is simply the programme of the pleasure principle. This principle dominates the operation of the mental apparatus from the start".

FREUD immediately added to it, "What we call happiness in the strictest sense comes from the (preferably sudden) satisfaction of needs which have been dammed up to a high degree". But a number of difficulties block the pursuit of happiness, because "our possibilities of happiness are already restricted by our constitution", or because the "the defence against suffering" through the "killing off the instincts" or through the "displacements of the libido" into an "enjoyment of beauty" is not fully successful. Thus man is left to "Utopian expectations" because "Obscure, unfeeling and

92. FREUD, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, GW XIII 29; SE XVIII 29  
93. Cfr. above, Part One, Chapter Three. B, 1,2,3  
94. FREUD, Aus den Anfängen der Psychoanalyse: Briefe an Wilhelm Fliess (Frankfurt 1962) 238  
95. FREUD, Civilization and Its Discontents, GW XIV 434; SE XXI 76  
96. Ibid. GW XIV 434; SE XXI 76  
97. Ibid. GW XIV 434; SE XXI 76 — 77  
98. Ibid. GW XIV 437; SE XXI 79. "One may therefore hope to be freed from a part of one's sufferings by influencing the instinctual impulses. This type of defence against suffering is no longer brought to bear on the sensory apparatus; it seeks to master the internal sources of our needs. The extreme form of this is brought about by killing off the instincts, as is prescribed by the worldly wisdom of the East and practised by Yoga".  
99. Ibid. GW XIV 441; SE XXI 82  
100. FREUD, Why War?, GW XVI 24; SE XXII 213
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unloving powers determine men’s fate"101 and happiness remains for him "a supplementary fulfilment of a prehistoric wish".102 The result is:

"It is asserted, however, that each one of us behave in some one respect like a paranoic, corrects some aspect of the world which is unbearable to him by the construction of a wish and introduces this delusion into reality".103

And the conclusion:

"The derivation of religious ideas from the infant’s helplessness and the longing for the father seems to me incontrovertible, especially since the feeling is not simply prolonged from childhood days, but is permanently sustained by fear of a superior power of Fate".104

In metapsychological terms, the external authority is now introjected, idealized and ultimately ‘idolized’. Biologically necessitated by one’s own sheer helplessness before the interior or exterior powers and psychologically inhibited in the original wishes, one projects the best one has to an outside power, to God and thus impoverishing oneself, surmounts the difficulties at least in an illusorial manner. The process culminates in sadomasochistic tendencies.105 The individual displays an excessive submission and resignation which is to be psychologically termed as masochism. Corresponding to the hard, violent and cruel authority of the father, “the super-ego has become sadistic and the ego becomes masochistic, that is to say, at bottom passive in a feminine way ... a fulfilment of the old passive attitude towards the father. Even Fate is, in the last resort, only a later projection of the father".106 Here FREUD sees no clear difference between the normal and abnormal processes107 Thus religion as an institution is a sadistic authority and from the part of the individual it is a passive, feminine, masochistic submission. Here reli-

101. FREUD, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW XV 180; SE XXII 167
102. FREUD, Aus den Anfängen der Psychoanalyse, 209
103. FREUD, Civilization and Its Discontents, GW XIV 440; SE XXI 81
104. Ibid. GW XIV 430; SE XXI 72
105. E. FROMM put it as follows: “Everything he has is now God’s and nothing is left to him. His only access to himself is through God”. Psychoanalysis and Religion (London / New Haven 1967) 50
106. FREUD, Dostoevsky and Parricide, GW XIV 408f; SE XXI 185. Cfr. the full quotation in Chapter Nine, Note 100
107. Ibid.
igion and morality coincide. Man is caught in a painful dilemma, he ‘empties’ himself in order to “raise” and praise God, he denies himself in order to affirm God.\textsuperscript{108}

“A man who has begun to have an inkling of the grandeur of the universe with all its complexities and its laws readily forgets his own insignificant self. Lost in admiration and filled with true humility, he all too easily forgets that he himself is a part of those active forces and that in accordance with the scale of his personal strength the way is open for him to try to alter a small portion of the destined course of the world — a world in which the small is still no less wonderful and significant than the great”.\textsuperscript{109}

This is no doubt a challenging question to Christian theology. Should Christian theology make man weak in order to make God great? Should a Christian “deny himself” in order to affirm his God? Should he ‘overcome’ this world in order to reach the other world? What interpretation should he give to Jesus’ appeal to ‘renounce oneself’?\textsuperscript{110}

We must admit that the so called “secularization” movement within Christianity in the past decade has already discussed this question elaborately, and some radical solutions are proposed.\textsuperscript{111} Yet this is a field which is further to be explored.

Another important question in this connection is: how far Christian preaching propagates the ‘infantilism’ of the ‘children of God’? Should man remain always a ‘child’ so that God may ever stand as the Father? However, we think that the spiritual childhood and psychological childhood are two different things. Yet it must be admitted that the consolations promised by Christian preaching often remain in the realm of infantilism under the wings of paternalism and protectionism. They are often dominated by narcissistic pleasure principle rather than by reality principle. Thus religion possesses a narcotic,

\textsuperscript{108} In the words of E. FOMM, “the more he praises God, the emptier he becomes. The emptier he becomes, the more sinful he feels. The more sinful he feels, the more he praises God — and the less able is he to regain himself”. Psychoanalysis and Religion, 51

\textsuperscript{109} FREUD, Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of His Childhood, GW VIII 142 — 43; SE XI 75 — 76

\textsuperscript{110} Cfr. for instance, Mt. 16 : 24; Mc. 8 : 34; Lc. 9 : 23

\textsuperscript{111} G. VAHANIAN puts it in very radical terms: “It is not the wretched sinner who stands before the majesty of God but it is man in all his strength who stumbles against the weakness of God”. “Theology and the End of the Age of Religion” in J. B. METZ (ed.) Is God Dead? (New York 1966) 107
sedative and intoxicant characteristic in the individual, as FREUD qualified, it operates in the individual as “das süße — oder bittersüße — Gift von Kindheit”,112 as a “Rauschgift”,113 with an allusion to the Marxian terminology, — religion as “the opium of the people”.114

Another point religion in general and Christianity in particular should put under a critical eye is the value of traditions. What is the meaning of real traditions? Is it a mere regressive retreat to the past and a compulsive repetition? Thus rituals, for example, degenerate into what P. TILLICH called an “institutional profanation” of religious acts.115 What about the “repetitive practices” of rituals? FREUD was very much interested in the genealogy of the Christian practice of communion. When it means a mere ‘material repetition’, we doubt how much value is to be given for that. At any rate, the study of FREUD will help to purify some “ideals” and practices of Christianity; it will help us to overcome “the moral perversion of the concept of the holy”116 and to see God as a personal principle and not as “deus ex machina”.

2. Religion as Neurosis

From a genetic point of view FREUD perceived religion as a neurosis, a neurotic regression to an early phase. Here according to J. SCHARFENBERG117 the early impressions of religion on FREUD influenced him much, where two basic elements can be distinguished: one that is more intellectual, masculine and determined by the fatherly traditions, and the other, emotion-bound, Catholic popular piety. As it is clear from his self-analysis,118 in

112. FREUD, The Future of an Illusion, GW XIV 373; SE XXI 49
113. FREUD, Moses and Monotheism, GW XVI 157; SE XXIII 54
114. K. MARX, Zur Kritik der Hegelischen Rechtsphilosophie I, 1 (Engl. tra., Early Writings London 1963) 44. “Religious suffering is at the same time an expression of real suffering. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the sentiment of a heartless world, the soul of soulless conditions. It is the opium of the people”.
116. J. SCHARFENBERG, Sigmund Freud und seine Religionskritik, S. 34
117. Ibid. 138
FREUD's unconscious the Catholic piety (represented by the Nannie)\textsuperscript{119} was connected with feminine elements and therefore subject to stronger repression than the first.\textsuperscript{120} But it cannot be denied that he was always concerned with the "father-problem", with a "monomaniac" addiction to the primal tragedy.\textsuperscript{121}

Nonetheless, FREUD was interested only in the external pathological forms of religion which he identified with religion as such and affirmed that individual pathological forms are collectively practised. He was addicted to his "dogma of reductionism", even if it was false.\textsuperscript{122}

\textbf{a) The Neurotic Form of Religion}

FREUD included religion in the obsessive-compulsive form of neurosis.\textsuperscript{123} He started with the similarities between the two, for example, the unconscious sense of guilt lurking behind both these phenomena. In view of the similarities and analogies FREUD regarded "obsessional neurosis as a pathological counterpart of the formation of religion", neurosis as an individual religiosity and religion a universal neurosis.\textsuperscript{124}

"Religion would thus be the universal obsessional neurosis of humanity; like the obsessional neurosis of children, it arose out of the Oedipus complex, out of the relation to the father".\textsuperscript{125}

An emotional ambivalence or conflict is said to be lurking behind the formation of religion as well as of neurosis. Thus Oedipus complex plays the signal role in the formation of both:

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{119} Cfr. above, Part Four, Chapter Nine, A 1
  \item \textsuperscript{120} Cfr. I. VELIKOVISKY, "The Dreams Freud Dreamt"; PsA R 28 (1941) 487 – 511; He argues that throughout his life Freud suffered from being a Jew and therefore longed for becoming a Catholic; KENNETH A. GRIGG, "All Roads Lead to Rome: the Role of Nursemaid in Freud's Dream"; JAmPsA 21 (1973) 108 – 26
  \item \textsuperscript{121} J. SCHARFENBERG, Sigmund Freud und seine Religionskritik, S. 165
  \item \textsuperscript{122} Cfr. FREUD, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW XV 195 – 97; SE XXII 180 – 82
  \item \textsuperscript{123} Cfr. above, Part One, Chapter Three, A, 1, 2, 3
  \item \textsuperscript{124} FREUD, Obsessive Actions and Religious Practices, GW VII 138 – 39 SE IX 126 – 27
  \item \textsuperscript{125} FREUD, The Future of an Illusion, GW XIV 367; SE XXI 43
\end{itemize}
"Thus we recognize that the roots of the need for religion are in the parental complex; the almighty and just God, and kindly nature, appear to us as grand sublimations of father and mother, or rather as revivals and restorations of the young child's ideas of them. When confronted with the great forces of life, he feels his condition as he did in childhood and attempts to deny his own despondency by a regressive revival of the forces which protected his infancy. The protection against neurotic illness, which religion vouchsafes to those who believe in it, is easily explained; it removes their parental complex on which the sense of guilt in individuals as well as in the whole human race depends and disposes of it, while the unbeliever has to grapple with the problem on his own." 126

This is all what FRED met with in religion. It must be repeated here that he faced only a religion of rites and rituals, probably of barren ceremonials; he met only the stereotyped rites and rituals, the meaning of which was hidden from the participants. The unfortunate thing is that FRED stopped short there and explained religion as such through them and imagined that "this great concourse represents no more than the procedure of the obsessional neurotic". 127

We do admit that there may be hidden unconscious motives in the formation and development of religion, that in the popular piety a symbol may be confused with and (mis) taken for reality, that there may be compulsive types of repetition in religion. But they do not disprove nor are they reasons to dispose of religion as such. Here again FRED is guilty of generalization due to the reductivism of "nothing-but-ness".

b) Ancestor-Religion an Inherited Illness?

It was a surprising and far reaching discovery for FRED that:
"All the wishes, instinctual impulses, modes of reaction and attitudes of childhood are still demonstrably present in maturity and in appropriate circumstances can emerge once more". 128

126. FRED, Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of His Childhood, GW VIII 195; SE XI 123
128. FRED, The Claims of Psycho-Analysis to Scientific Interest, GW VIII 412 – 13; SE XIII 184
Thus neuroses were explained as a "return to psychical infantilism (regression)." Parallel to it FREUD found on the phylogenetical level that "the child is father to the man" and "ontogeny is a repetition of phylogeny." In other words history repeats itself through the individual. This is particularly true of the cultural institutions of religion and morality.

It is worth while to ask here whether Christianity is a regressive renovation of the early experiences of human race, and how far does it leave room for progressive projects? A repeatedly recurring element in FREUD is this tension of the present between the past and future. We think that the historical and monumental elements of Christianity should not be understood as material repetition of the past, but as a dynamic evolution through a living in the present and 'projection' into the future. Here the "sacred traditions" and the "immutable rituals" especially of the Catholic Church must be made subject to deeper analysis.

c) Religion a Source of Neurosis?

In later years FREUD gave a "simple formula for the origin of a neurosis". A neurosis is thus the result of a conflict between the ego and the id. It is a "feebleness of the ego". Economically, it arises out of the inhibition of basic human drives, especially of the sexual instincts subject to repression. Hence, all throughout his life FREUD was engrossed in the problem of repression coming from external authority, from civilization. From the fact of a "very decided interruption" in the development of libido FREUD deduced the following conclusion:

"This led us to suppose that something momentous must have occurred in the vicissitudes of the human species which has left behind this interruption in the sexual development of the individual as a historical precipitate".

129. Ibid.
130. Ibid. GW VIII 412; SE XIII 183
131. Ibid. GW VIII 413; SE XIII 184
132. FREUD, The Question of Lay Analysis, GW XIV 231; SE XX 203
133. Ibid. GW XIV 231; SE XX 203 - 204
134. Ibid. GW XIV 275; SE XX 241
135. FREUD, Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety, GW XIV 187; SE XX 155. About
Religion, according to FREUD, here forcibly fixes man "in a state of psychical infantilism". The conclusion:

"If, on the one hand, religion brings with it obsessional restrictions, exactly as an individual obsessional neurosis does, on the other hand it comprises a system of wishful illusions together with a disavowal of reality, such as we find in an isolated form nowhere else but in amnesia, in a state of blissful hallucinatory confusion".

FREUD confirmed his position in the analysis of a case history. In An Infantine Neurosis he wrote:

"Apart from these pathological phenomena, it may be said that in the present case religion achieved all the aims for the sake of which it is included in the education of the individual. It put a restraint on his sexual impulses by affording them a sublimation and a safe mooring, it lowered the importance of his family relationships, and thus protected him from the threat of isolation by giving them access to the great community of mankind".

And, this is the celebrity of religion. "Religion thus affords the believer satisfaction, sublimation, diversion from sensual processes to purely spiritual and social relationships", and thus, to some extent, it keeps away individual neurosis. But this in no way changed FREUD's conclusion:

"Those historical residues have helped us to view religious teachings, as it were, as neurotic relics, and we may now argue that time has probably come, as it does in an analytic treatment, for replacing the effects of re-

the earliest years of childhood, Freud wrote: "Under the extraordinary burden of this period of childhood — we have in a few years to cover the enormous developmental distance between stone-age primitive men and the participants in contemporary civilization, and, at the same time and in particular, we have to fend off the instinctual impulses of the early sexual period — under this burden, then, our ego takes refuge in repression and lays itself open to a childhood neurosis, the precipitate of which it carries with it into maturity as a disposition to a later nervous illness". FREUD, The Question of Lay Analysis, GW XIV 275; SE XX 241

136. FREUD, Civilization and Its Discontents, GW XIV 443; SE XXI 85;
137. FREUD, The Future of an Illusion, GW XIV 367; SE XXI 43. Cfr. FREUD, Civilization and Its Discontents, GW XIV 498 — 99; SE XXI 139. "As we have learned, neurotic symptoms are, in their essence, substitutive satisfactions for unfulfilled sexual wishes".
138. FREUD, An Infantine Neurosis, GW XII 150; SE XVII 114 — 15
139. Ibid. GW XII 151; SE XVII 115
140. FREUD, Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of His Childhood, GW VIII 195; SE XI 123
pression by the results of the rational operation of the intellect".\(^{141}\)

For F.R.E.U.D neurosis always remained as "a caricature ("Zerrbild") of religion",\(^{142}\) and religion a universal neurosis.\(^{143}\)

It is true that F.R.E.U.D adhered to a narrow picture of a religion of stereotyped rites and rituals; he confronted only those who were suffering out of religion and not those who were saved by it.\(^{144}\) Yet his comparative study poses a number of questions to religion in general and to Catholic Christianity in particular. It must be admitted that the number of neurotics increases day by day in the Western (Christian) society, and on the other hand, religious practices become more and more compulsive, tabuistic, superstitious and 'neurotic'. The immediate question then is, how far is 'religion' related to mental illness?

Some scholars have tried to prove that religious genius and nervous instability are some how related to each other.\(^{145}\) The psychotic share of a religious person is said to be the social deviancy, "a tendency to withdrawal and isolation from their fellows, and to act out their central impulses with less than normal inhibition".\(^{146}\)

One may say that there is the possibility of association of peculiarity and religious genius as long as popular concepts of the supernatural tend to lead to an overvaluation of the strange, of the fascinosum. Hence there is the danger that eccentricity may be mistaken for religious genius, inspiration or even possession.\(^{147}\) But this in no way diminishes the fundamental distinction be-

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141. F.R.E.U.D, The Future of an Illusion, GW XIV 368; SE XXI 44
142. F.R.E.U.D, Totem and Taboo, GW IX 91; SE XIII 73
144. We do not deny that at least in the case of O. Pfister, F.R.E.U.D appreciated his "enjoyment of religion". But he met mostly neurotic patients with a 'religious bent' and also, his impressions on "religious-ethical conversions were not very inviting". Cfr. above, Part Four, Ch. Nine, A 3
146. Ibid. 363
tween the two, between religion and mental illness. And that is the fact of a superior religious sensitivity that brings the individuals in touch with a more profound reality, which promotes their cosmic relationships, heroic endurances and religious perseverance. That is the reality of God through whom a religious person sees himself linked with others, having a God-given mandate to serve others. This contact with their "God" and the divine mission to a cosmic relationship keep them sane, vitalize and stimulate their personality, instead of disorganizing it. Actually, this is a warning to psychotherapists, including FREUD, to respect genuine religious and moral values in mental illness, and a challenge to theologians to take into consideration the psychology of human personality in full, in their search for the reality behind the popular idea of "God".

More than the religious genius, FREUD's main concern was the popular religion, religious manifestations in ordinary people. It is this religion that he defined as a universal neurosis. His arguments are based mainly on the resemblances between the two. He delineated a number of such resemblances, and we think that they deserve serious considerations of a theologian, for example, the pangs of conscience and sense of guilt. Respecting the existence of an authentic guilt, it should be stated here that such a real guilt should not be confused with pathological anxiety. Christian morals should not canonize pseudo-religious sentiments or neurotic guilt that may arise, say, from the omission of religious rituals or from the inaccuracy in carrying out the minutest details of religious observances. Christian preaching should not inculcate an irrational guilt-feeling in cases of "voluntary commissions" and "sacrilegious omissions". An unconscious guilt-feeling is no real guilt. Should the Church insist upon the religious observances under the pain of sin at all?

Again, FREUD contended that religious rituals are completely isolated from realities of life. Here, the religious rites, especially, the Catholic sacraments and sacramentals should be made subject to deeper analysis. In spite of their being signs and symbols, there is the danger that popular mind confus-

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149. FREUD, Civilization and Its Discontents, GW XIV 431; SE XXI 74
150. FREUD, Obsessive Actions and Religious Practices, GW VII 135ff; SE IX 123ff
sesh symbols with reality. The need for constant renewal of liturgical practices may be pointed out here. Christian liturgy must further guard against the tendency to displace petty ceremonials into the essence of religion.

Another important factor that recur in the Freudian identification of religion with neurosis is the question of psychic infantilism. Should the Church "forcibly fix in a state of psychical infantilism" its members? Should they be always kept as children without intellectual awakening and enlightenment? The notion of the 'children of God' is often misunderstood! Can the Catholic Church be satisfied with a feminine, passive popular piety as a masochistic return? As an institution should religion constantly show an addiction to primitive practices, simply inherited and not consciously transmitted, and to repetition compulsions?

In one word, how far is Christianity an inhibitive power? An excessively authoritarian and legalistic frame of religion can no doubt become an inhibitive power. This refers to the field of morality which will be considered subsequently.

d) From Father on Earth to Father in Heaven?

The Freudian research into neurotic troubles was always focussed on the father-complex. An authoritarian father stands in the ultimate analysis behind every neurotic outburst. FREUD brought the question of the father-complex applied to religion into an elaborate discussion first in an essay of 1910.

151. Cfr. FREUD, Moses and Monotheism, GW XVI 208; SE XXIII 98 – 99
152. FREUD, Civilization and Its Discontents, GW XIV 443; SE XXI 85
153. Freud made a distinction between the two. Cfr. FREUD, Moses and Monotheism, GW XVI 208; SE XXIII 100
155. FREUD, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW XV 90 – 97; SE XXII 85 – 93
156. Cfr. FREUD, Totem and Taboo, GW IX 189; SE XIII 157
157. FREUD, Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of His Childhood, GW VIII, SE XI
belief in God, he concluded that the personal God is merely "an exalted father". He repeated this conclusion in his later works. As a substitute for a longing for the father the ego ideal contains "the germ from which all religions have evolved".

FREUD seems to have got new inspiration in 1911 when he spent a vacation in Tirol. The popular Tirolian piety equated the images of the 'Crucified' with 'Lord-Gods' ("Herrgötter"). This fusion of father with the crucified seemed to him tallying with a religious need, which satisfies a wish for overcoming the father. This confirmed his conclusion that the great cultural institutions took shape from "the crime of liberation" and that father-religion had to give way later on to the son-religion.

Thus Oedipus complex becomes the nucleus of the formation of religion and the personal God, an "exalted father":

"He exalts the image into a deity and makes into something contemporary and real. The effective strength of this mnemic image and the persistence of his need for protection jointly sustain his belief in God".

Hence FREUD would say that the primal father was the original image of God from which later religions have shaped the figure of God:

158. Ibid. GW VIII 195; SE XI 123
159. FREUD, Some Reflections on a Schoolboy Psychology, GW X 206; SE XIII 243; Totem and Taboo, GW IX 177; SE XIII 147; Civilization and Its Discontents, GW XIV 431; SE XXI 74
160. FREUD, The Ego and the Id, GW XIII 265; SE XIX 37
161. In the same year he confronted the "Moses-problem" from which he could not free himself for life long. Cfr. A. A. BRILL, Freud's Contribution to Psychiatry (New York 1944) 192
163. A. WUCHERER-HULDENFELD, "Postulatorischer Atheismus", in Wort und Wahrheit 3 (1967) 193
164. FREUD, Preface to Reik's Ritual 'Psycho-Analytic Studies', GW XII 328; SE XVII 262
165. FREUD, Moses and Monotheism, GW XVI 245; SE XXIII 136
166. FREUD, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW XV 176; SE XXII 163. "Our further path is made easy to recognize, for this god-creator is undisguisedly called 'father'. Psycho-analyis infers that he really is the father, with all magnificence in which he once appeared to the small child. A religious man pictures the creation of the universe just as he pictures his own origin". Ibid. GW XV 175; SE XXII 163
But, as was shown by arguments which I need not repeat here, the primal father was the Original image of God, the model on which later generations have shaped the figure of God."

"A child’s emotional impulses are intensely and inexhaustibly deep to a degree quite other than those of an adult; only religious ecstasy can bring them back! A rapture of devotion to God was thus the first reaction to the return of the great father".

Thus according to FREUD, it is not God who created man, but man creates god. A personal god is merely a "Vaterersatz", which is in the ultimate analysis an "Ersatzlibido", a compensation for the original (lost) object — mother. Looking for an exit from the impasse of interior conflicts, one introjects the external authority represented by the father and then projects partly the elements of those conflicts and partly the powers of this authority to an external object, often imagined rather than real. This new authority replaces the father and provides the individual a frame of illusory wish-fulfillments through protection. This is the Freudian image of a personal God.

We find the Freudian theory of the origin of the idea of God, as it is a clearly manipulated speculation, as such untenable. FREUD saw only those people suffering from religion and he gave his own interpretation to this ‘suffering phenomenon’. Yet we must admit with FREUD that “God” is often an elusive concept where considerable subjectivity is involved. There is the danger that God and religion are sought as the goal of escapism, as a source of social isolation. Psychic undernourishment produces the need for affection and recognition, and the individual may retreat to delusional projections and paranoid phantasies. A wife, for example, unsuccessful in marital life, may expect affection and ‘love’ from “God”. Earthly problems are thus simply brought for heavenly solutions. Those “pseudo-religious sentiments” are often (mis)interpreted as real religious commitments.

167. FREUD, The Future of an Illusion, GW XIV 365 – 66; SE XXI 42
168. FREUD, Moses and Monotheism, GW XVI 242; SE XXIII 134. Cfr. New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW XV 176 — 77; SE XXII 164. “All these relations are afterwards introduced by men unaltered into their religion”.
170. As it shall be explained later in this book, suffering taken in the proper sense, is a road to religious growth. Cfr. H. W. CLARK, The Psychology of Religion, 170ff
Further we confront one of the central problems of Christian theology here. How shall we speak about God, the Father? Is He really a "Father in Heaven", analogous or in opposition to the father on earth? If not, what "fâcon de parler" shall we adopt? Can we speak about God in a human language at all? Will it not end up in a kind of anthropomorphism, making God a "cosmic Papa", as FREUD put it, God the Father who "once walked upon earth in bodily form and exercised his sovereignty as chieftain of the primal human horde"?  

Nevertheless, it should be remembered that it is Jesus Christ who taught us to pray to "Our Father" who is in heaven, even though in his preaching he referred also to "your father" and to "my father". Through these statements Christ assures us that there is a Father in heaven.

In the biblical context the father is made known through the Son (Jo. 1:18). The truth of the fatherhood is thus the revelation of the Son, so that only through Him is it truth for his disciples. When a Christian speaks of the Father, therefore, he means also the Son and God the Spirit — the triune God.

However, in the idea of God as the Father are contained His care for men, His generous love, His forgiveness and the like, which evidently can be attributed to the earthly father. But the problem is, in what language shall we express this 'similitude' and antinomy?

171. For a recent analysis of this subject, Cfr. W. DIRKS, "Schwierigkeiten und Zugänge: Zur Krise des Vaterglaubens", in, Hochland 63 (1971) 522 - 32
172. FREUD, Preface to Reik's Ritual: 'Psycho-Analytic Studies', GW XII 328; SE XVII 262
173. Cfr. Mt. 6: 9; Lc. 1: 55, 72 - 73; 3: 8
174. Cfr. Mt. 5: 48; 6: 1, 4, 6, 8, 18, 26, 32; 7: 11; 10: 20, 29; Mc. 11: 25, 26;
Lc. 6: 36, 11: 13, 47, 48; 12: 30, 32; Jn. 8: 41, 42, 44
177. Mt. 6: 26, 32; Lc. 12: 30
178. Mt. 1: 45; 7: 9 - 11; Lc. 11: 11 - 13
179. Mt. 6: 12, 15
It should be pointed out here that the belief in the fatherhood of God should not be the end-result of a fixation on a ‘father-image’. In Christian preaching there is a danger of presenting God as an authoritarian monarch who stands to punish than to reward. Obedience is often preached under the pain of fear than under the gain of love. This is equally true of those who represent authority in the Church. No wonder, if relations in such a form of religion becomes sadistic dominations and masochistic returns.

We conclude this part with a final observation. FREUD seems to have devalued the old metaphysical argument which deduced the existence of God from our idea of Him. The Freudian theory of wish-fulfilment appears to have reversed it, to a large extent, and changed the ontological argument into a psychological one, which is also no more valid. What remains now, a ‘moral argument’?

C. Freud Challenging the Christian Concept of Morality

We have delineated the Freudian concept of morality from three different angles: moral development in the individual, morality as an institution, and morality as a humanistic ethics. We follow the same pattern of thought here.

1. Morality and the Interior Forces in Man

As it was repeatedly pointed out, FREUD envisioned “the core of our being” as “formed by the obscure id”, which comprises the “organic instincts” which “are themselves compounded of fusions of two primal forces (Eros and destructiveness) in varying proportions”. Hence here we have to go back to “the dialectic-evolutionary position implied in Freud’s concept of the human mind as presented in the ‘Two Principles’”. Now we consider

181. FREUD, An Outline of Psycho-Analysis, GW XVII 128; SE XXIII 197
182. Ibid.
both these principles, Eros and destructiveness as applied to the moral development in the individual.

a) Morality Inhibited or Elevated?

According to FREUD, moral norms understood as parental introjects, emanate from the inhibition of instinctual drives, more precisely, from the repression of libido and destructiveness. In an initial stage the libido, "the total available energy of Eros"\(^{184}\) "serves to neutralize the destructive tendencies"\(^{185}\). In later stages, as FREUD admitted, it is relatively easy to follow the vicissitudes of the libido, but more difficult it is with destructive instincts\(^{186}\).

The process by which the biological infant becomes an experimental and historical man — the id becoming the ego — is long and arduous. First of all, "the id obeys the inexorable pleasure principle"\(^{187}\). It is directed exclusively to obtaining pleasure. Gradually another agency is developed out of the id's cortical layer, which, through being adapted to the reception and exclusion of stimuli, is in direct contact with reality — the external world. It transfuses the events of the id into a higher dynamic level, transforming freely mobile energy into bound energy; "its constructive function consists in interpolating, between the demand made by an instinct and the action that satisfies it, the activity of thought which, after taking its bearings in the present and assessing earlier experiences, endeavours by means of experimental actions to calculate the consequences of the course of action proposed"\(^{188}\). Here a portion of the instinctual drives of the id is given up in consideration of the safety of the ego:

184. FREUD, An Outline of Psycho-Analysis, GW XVII 72; SE XXIII 149
185. Ibid. GW XVII 72; SE XXIII 149 – 50
186. Ibid.
187. Ibid. GW XVII 129; SE XXIII 198. In another place Freud stated: "From the point of view of instinctual control, of morality, it may be said of the id that it is totally non-moral, of the ego that it strives to be moral and of the super-ego that it can be super-moral". FREUD, The Ego and the Id, GW XIII 284; SE XIX 54
188. Ibid. GW XVII 129; SE XXIII 199
“In this way the ego comes to a decision on whether the attempt to obtain satisfaction is to be carried out or postponed or whether it may not be necessary for the demand by the instinct to be suppressed altogether as being dangerous. (Here we have the reality principle). Just as the id is directed exclusively to obtaining pleasure, so the ego is governed by considerations of safety”.\(^{189}\)

Under this formula FREUD traced the neurotic symptoms back to erotic instinctual components. Human beings fall ill, he stated, “when, as a result of external obstacles or of an internal lack of adaptation, the satisfaction of the erotic needs in reality is frustrated”\(^{190}\). The withdrawal from reality is the main purpose of illness as well as the main damage caused by it. Such a flight from unsatisfactory reality to illness takes place along the path of involution, of regression, of a return to earlier phases of sexual life. Here FREUD concluded:

“...The deeper you penetrate into the pathogenesis of nervous illness, the more you will find revealed the connection between neuroses and other productions of the human mind, including the most valuable. You will be taught that we humans, with the high standards of our civilization and under the pressure of our internal repressions, find reality unsatisfying quite generally, and for that reason entertain a life phantasy in which we like to make up for the insufficiencies of reality by the production of wish-fulfilments ... If there is persistent rebellion against the real world and if this precious gift is absent or insufficient, it is almost inevitable that the libido, keeping to the sources of the phantasies, will follow the path of regression, and will revive infantile wishes and end in neurosis. To-day neurosis takes the place of the monasteries which used to be the refuge of all whom life had disappointed or who felt too weak to face it”.\(^{191}\)

Repression in this case will be “replaced by a condemning judgement”\(^{192}\) and the inhibited drives look for “substitutive satisfactions”\(^{193}\). 

This, however, does in no way imply that all repressions are pathogenic defence mechanisms. There is yet another method of dealing with those drives,

\(^{189}\) Ibid. GW XVII 129 – 30; SE XXII 199
\(^{190}\) FREUD, Five Lectures on Psycho-Analysis (1910) GW VIII 53; SE XI 49
\(^{191}\) Ibid. GW VIII 53 – 54; SE XI 49 – 50
\(^{192}\) Ibid. GW VIII 57; SE XI 53
\(^{193}\) FREUD, An Outline of Psycho-Analysis, GW XVII 132; SE XXIII 201
a desirable defence mechanism where the aim and object of the original drives (both of Eros and destructiveness) are transformed into non-sexual and higher accomplishments. FREUD called it sublimation. The original energy is ‘purified’ through a desexualization and ‘deaggressivization’ and is discharged in a socially acceptable manner:

“We know of a far more expedient process of development, called ‘sublimation’, in which the energy of the infantile wishful impulses is not cut off but remains ready for use — the unserviceable aim of the various impulses being replaced by one that is higher, and perhaps no longer sexual ... It is probable that we owe our highest cultural successes to the contributions of energy made this way to our mental functions”.

Thus FREUD saw sublimation primarily as a neutralization of instinctual drives, a "modification of the aim and a change of the object". We do admit that such a concept of sublimation has its drawbacks and loop-holes and therefore it calls for a reinterpretation. But we want to underline a Freudian warning that it is dangerous to base our moral and cultural standards on sublimation as a "scarcity dominated, elitist and totalitarian value", as a kind of deus ex machina, "as the reification of a chemical and poetic metaphor". It emphasizes on a thorough renunciation of instincts. FREUD believed that such a sublimation is constitutionally possible only for a small minority and with great difficulty. The majority are constitutionally unfit to face this task. Moreover, "the extirpation of the infantile wishful impulses is by no

194. FREUD, Five Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW VIII 57 — 58; SE XI 53 — 54; Civilization and Its Discontents, GW XIV 461; SE XXI 101 — 102
196. FREUD, Five Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW VIII 58; SE XI 53 — 54
197. FREUD, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW XV 103; SE XXII
199. H. B. LEVEY, “Critique of the Theory of Sublimation” Psy II (1939) 239 —70
200. F. J. HACKER, “Sublimation Revisited”, art. cit. 221. “In the past limitations of collective human ignorance necessitated dominant (and often exclusive) emphasis on adjustment through autoplastic changes, on the maximal use of the pitifully few given gratification opportunities and on instinctual renunciation in the name of the reality principle”.
201. FREUD, Civilized Sexual Morality and Modern Nervous Illness, GW VII 154; SE IX 193
means the ideal aim of development',\(^\text{202}\) while "premature repression makes the sublimation of the repressed instinct impossible":\(^\text{203}\) In one word, sublimation should be rediscovered as a positive value. We will take this point into consideration later in this work.

b) The Gulf between the Strategy of Desires and the Tactics of Practice

Another important factor moralists must take into consideration in assessing individual morality against interior forces of man is the long distance between the strategy of the pleasure principle and the tactics of the reality principle, between emotions and reason, between the id and the ego.

According to F R E U D, the id is "a chaos, a cauldron full of seething excita-
tions":\(^\text{204}\) The desires of the id remain immortal:

"Wishful impulses which have never passed beyond the id, but impressions, too, which have never been sunk into the id by repression, are virtually immortal; after the passage of decades they behave as though they had just occurred".\(^\text{205}\)

As stated before, the overcoming of those wishes and passions through sublimation is possible only for a privileged minority, while for the majority a limit is determined by their constitution. All others, F R E U D would say, who want to be "nobler" beyond their constitutional claims, fall into neurosis.\(^\text{206}\)

This, however, is no reason to think that F R E U D advocated an indiscriminate shedding of instinctual impulses and an overall sexual promiscuity. He ruled out, on the contrary, surprisingly enough, a total and absolute gratification of instincts, especially in the field of sexuality:

"It is my belief that, however strange it may sound, we must reckon with the possibility that something in the nature of the sexual instinct itself is

\(^{202}\) F R E U D, Five Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW VIII 58; SE XI 53
\(^{203}\) Ibid. GW VIII 59; SE XI 54
\(^{204}\) F R E U D, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW XV 80; SE XXII 73
\(^{205}\) Ibid. GW XV 80-81; SE XXII 74
\(^{206}\) F R E U D, Civilized Sexual Morality and Modern Nervous Illness, GW VII 154; SE IX 191
\(^{207}\) F R E U D, The Psychology of Love (II), GW VIII 89; SE XI 188
unfavourable to the realization of complete satisfaction”.207

Here we underline the fact that FREUD never proposed eroticism as the
cure for neurosis. In his own words:

‘To believe that psycho-analysis seeks a cure for neurotic disorders by giv-
ing a free rein to sexuality is a serious misunderstanding which can only be
excused by ignorance”.208

At the same time FREUD appealed for a reconsideration of the moral
standards of this civilization. In the educational process of socialization, he
contends, one must take human nature for what it is, “the indelible stamp of
its origin (as it might be ‘Made in Germany’)”.209

Moral principles often start from the premise that human being as a rational
animal can and therefore should subdue emotions and passions. The pertinent
question is therefore, should reason subdue emotions? Is the ego an extirpa-
tion of the id? Should our moral principles be based on “a triumph of intel-
lectuality over sensuality or, strictly speaking, an instinctual renunciation”210
With an insistence upon the rational side of human beings, one forgets easily
the animal side which is equally, at least in some cases surpassingly, important.
We find here some justification for the conclusion of E. JONES that “man is
essentially not a rational animal”,211 and we agree with O. PFISTER’s advice
to FREUD that here a psychic balance is to be obtained “not by better theo-
ries about marriage tie, but by an improvement in social conditions, healthier
education and a healthier outlook on life”.212

Any social institution, we think, must take into account this phenomenon
of the contraposition between the mountain of desires and the valley of life.

208. FREUD, Psycho-Analysis, GW XIII 227; SE XVIII 252;
209. FREUD, An Outline of Psycho-Analysis, GW XVII 129; SE XXIII 199
210. FREUD, Moses and Monotheism, GW XVI 220; SE XXIII 113
211. E. JONES, “Psychology and War Conditions”, S. LORAND (ed.) YBPsa
II (1946) 190. “However highly we may treasure as perhaps our most precious possession
the procedure known as reasoning, and I would yield to no one in prizing its value, we
have now reached a state of psychological knowledge that compels us to recognize that
man is essentially not a rational animal: that is to say, the greater part of his behaviour
and thought processes are profoundly influenced by affective agencies of a definitely
non-rational or even irrational order. To a psychiatrist that means admitting that the un-
conscious is a constant and formidable factor in human activity”.
212. O. PFISTER, letter to S. FREUD (Feb. 18, 1909) FREUD / PFISTER, Psycho-
analysis and Faith, 18
There is always a danger that the ideologies remain on the mountain-top and the moral principles are calculated accordingly. Is Christian morality an exception to it? At any rate, we think that we should take with all seriousness the Freudian statement: "instinctual passions are stronger than reasonable interests".  

(c) The Case against Natural Goodness in Man

Contradicting “many religious presumptions and social conventions”, FREUD warned against too great an optimistic view about the nature of man, that “man must be naturally good or at least good natured”:

“Unfortunately what history tells us and what we ourselves have experienced does not speak in this sense but rather justifies a judgement that belief in the ‘goodness’ of human nature is one of those evil illusions by which mankind expect their lives to be beautified and made easier while in reality they only cause damage”.  

In other words the animal basis of human nature cannot be ignored:

“The suggestion that art, religion and social order originated in part in a contribution from the sexual instincts was represented by the opponents of analysis as a degradation of the highest cultural values. They emphatically declared that men have other interests besides this eternal one of sex, overlooking in their zeal the fact that animals too have other interests ... overlooking too, the fact that the existence of these other interests in men had never been disputed and that nothing can be altered in the value of a cultural achievement by its being shown to have been derived from elementary animal instinctual sources”.  

Human life must be seen as a continuous struggle between the two ba-

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213. FREUD, Civilization and Its Discontents, GW XIV 471; SE XXI 112
214. FREUD, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW XV 110 — 11; SE XXII 106
215. FREUD, Resistances to Psycho-Analysis, GW XIV 105 — 106; SE XIX 218
216. In Freud’s own words: “And now, I think, the meaning of the evolution of civilization is no longer obscure to us. It must present the struggle between Eros and Death, between the instinct of life and the instinct of destruction, as it works itself out in the human species. This struggle is what all life essentially consists of, and the evolution of civilization may therefore be simply described as the struggle for life of the human species. And it is this battle of the giants that our nurse-maids try to appease with their...
sic groups of instincts — the erotic (life) instincts which seek to combine more and more living substance into ever greater unities and the death-in-
stincts which oppose this effort and lead what is living back into an inorganic state:

"From the concurrent and opposing action of those two proceed the phe-
nomena of life which are brought to an end by death".217

As a rigid determinist FREUD believed that "obscure, unfeeling and unloving powers determine men's fate"218 and we have to surrender ourselves before "the painful riddle of death against which no medicine has yet been found, nor probably will be",219 and human destiny is "within human limits — so far as external reality, 'Ανάγκη, allows it".220

The thoroughly pessimistic Freudian outlook on human nature as such is, undoubtedly unacceptable to us. Yet, Christian morality must reconsider its anthropological premise which sees man "a little less than the angels". The Freudian warning should help us to overcome "a false antinomy"221 between morality and life rooted on a 'Cartesian split' between body and soul.

d) "Homo homini lupus"222

According to FREUD the case against a naturally good human nature is the ubiquitous presence of sado-masochistic tendencies. Sadism and masochism are immediately related to sexual satisfaction, as it is derived from inflicting pain or from suffering it,223 and "a certain admixture of these two trends

lullaby about Heaven". FREUD, Civilization and Its Discontents, GW XIV 481; SE XXI 122. Here there is an allusion to HEINE's poem 'Deutschland', Caput I — "Eiapopeia vom Himmel".

217. FREUD, New Introductory Lectures on Pscho-Analysis, GW XV 114; SE XXII 107
218. Ibid. GW XV 180; SE XXII 167
219. FREUD, The Future of an Illusion, GW XIV 336; SE XXI 16
220. Ibid. GW XIV 377; SE XXI 53
222. "Man is a wolf to man". Derived from PLAUTUS, Asinaria II, iv, 88. Freud uses this phrase in Civilization and Its Discontents, GW XIV 471; SE XXI 111
223. FREUD, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW XV 111; SE XXII 104
is included in normal sexual relations, and we speak of perversions when they push the other sexual aims into background and replace them by their own aims".224

Sadism and masochism are "two excellent examples of a mixture of the two classes of instinct, of Eros and aggressiveness; ... every instinctual impulse that we can examine consists of similar fusions or alloys of the two classes of instinct".225 Sadism in simple terms is "destructive instinct directed outwards, thus acquiring the characteristic of aggressiveness".226 The death-drive is, therefore, intimately related to sado-masochistic tendencies.227 And, FREUD spoke of an "inborn human inclination to 'badness', to aggressiveness and destructiveness and so to cruelty as well".228

Thus FREUD believed that it is the aggressiveness and not the sex instinct that constitutes a real danger to personal identity and a threat to civilization. When the little child's wishes are frustrated, as it frequently and inevitably happens, they arouse anger and aggression. The situation is often aggravated by the mode of behaviour of the parents who punish him, withdraw their help, love and approval. As the child is too weak to direct his aggression to the outside world, it is turned against the self together with the introjection of the forbidding and commanding parents. "The aggressiveness of conscience keeps up the aggressiveness of the authority".229 Thus the power of the individual super-ego which is by nature aggressive as a forbidding agent is now doubled.230

224. Ibid. Cfr. also, Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW XI 333 — 34, 350; SE XVI 322 — 23, 338
225. FREUD, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW XV 112; SE XXII 104 — 105
226. Ibid.
227. Cfr. O. STERNBACH, "Aggression, the Death Drive and the Problem of Sado-masochism: A Reinterpretation of Freud's Second Drive Theory", IntJPs 56 (1975) 321 — 33; Freud put it bluntly in the following words: "Impeded aggressiveness seems to involve a great injury. It really seems as though it is necessary for us to destroy some other thing or person in order not to destroy ourselves, in order to guard against the impulsion to self-destruction". FREUD, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW XV 112; SE XXII 105
228. FREUD, Civilization and Its Discontents, GW XIV 479; SE XXI 120
229. Ibid. GW XIV 487; SE XXI 128
230. Ibid. GW XIV 487 — 92, 497 — 99; SE XXI 127 — 32, 137 — 39
As the claims of the individual and of the society are in permanent collision, FREUD thought that there is "a primary mutual hostility of human beings" which threatens society with disintegration.

It will be too naive to think that with these statements FREUD wanted to call forth an anarchist dissolution of mankind. On the contrary, he suggested that a pious preaching of the commandment of love is too weak to maintain human co-habitation:

"If the sole reason why you must not kill your neighbour is because God has forbidden it and will severely punish you for it in this or the next life — then, when you learn that there is no God and that you need not fear His punishment, you will certainly kill your neighbour without hesitation, and you can only be prevented from doing so by mundane force".  

The only mundane force FREUD saw, was the need for survival, which alone prevents the total disintegration of humanity on earth.

Christian preaching should, no doubt, insist upon the vertical reasons and motivation for the love of neighbour. But one finds that the horizontal motivations are equally important. Moreover, FREUD contended that it is those people who preach love in the name of God and religion that perpetuate enmity and intolerance:

"... but unfortunately all the massacres of the Jews in the Middle Ages did not suffice to make that period more peaceful and secure for their Christian fellows. When once the Apostle Paul has posited universal love between men as the foundation of his Christian community, extreme intolerance on the part of Christendom towards those who remained outside it became the inevitable consequence. To the Romans, who had not founded their communal life as a State upon love, religious intolerance was not a matter of choice..."

231. Ibid. GW XIV 471; SE XXI 112; The following passage gives a summary of Freud's outlook. "The element of truth behind all this, which people are so ready to disavow, is that men are not gentle creatures who want to be loved, and who at the most can defend themselves if they are attacked; they are on contrary, creatures among whose instinctual endowments is to be reckoned a powerful share of aggressiveness. As a result, their neighbour is for them not only a potential helper or sexual object, but also someone who tempts them to satisfy their aggressiveness on him, to exploit his capacity for work without compensation, to use him sexually without his consent, to seize his possessions, to humiliate him, to cause him pain, to torture and to kill him. 'Homo homini lupa'". Ibid. GW XIV 470 — 71; SE XXI 111

232. Ibid. GW XIV 471; SE XXI 112

233. FREUD, The Future of an Illusion, GW XIV 363; SE XXI 39
something foreign, although with them religion was a concern of the State and the State was permeated by religion". 234

And the reason given for it is:

"It is always possible to bind together a considerable number of people in love, so long as there are other people left over to receive the manifestations of their aggressiveness". 235

This evidently is a sad disclosure to Christian altruists!

e) Sublimation Reconsidered

We have to start from a fundamental Freudian thesis that "civilization is built upon a renunciation of instinct", 236 where, to use the metapsychological terminology, gratification of the impulses of the id is exchanged for a portion of security of the ego:

"If civilization imposes such great sacrifices not only on man's sexuality but on his aggressivity, we can understand better why it is hard for him to be happy in that civilization ... Civilized man has exchanged a portion of his possibilities of happiness for a portion of security". 237

It must be granted that FREUD spoke of sublimation primarily in negative terms. First of all, it is a scarcity structure available only to a privileged minority 238 under favourable circumstances. Economically it is a neutralization of instincts, resulting from a thorough renunciation of satisfaction. Thus he described it as a "cultural frustration" 239 as "displacement of libido" 240 as "desexualization" 241 as "aim-inhibited love" 242 where "the unserviceable aim of the various impulses being replaced by one that is higher, and perhaps no longer sexual ... comparatively remote and socially valuable". 243 Here

234. FREUD, Civilization and Its Discontents, GW XIV 474; SE XXI 114
235. Ibid.
236. FREUD, Civilization and Its Discontents, GW XIV 457; SE XXI 97
237. Ibid. GW XIV 475; SE XXI 115
238. FREUD, Civilized Sexual Morality and Modern Nervous Illness, GW VIII 154; SE IX 193
239. FREUD, Civilization and Its Discontents, GW XIV 457; SE XXI 97
240. Ibid. GW XIV 437; SE XXI 79
241. FREUD, The Ego and the Id, GW XIII 258; SE XIX 30
242. FREUD, Civilization and Its Discontents, GW XIV 463; SE XXI 103
243. FREUD, Five Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW VIII 58; SE XI 54
FREUD concluded:

“Our civilized standards make life too difficult for the majority of human organizations. Those standards consequently encourage the retreat from reality and the generating of neuroses, without achieving any surplus of cultural gain by this excess of sexual repression”. 244

Nevertheless, this psychic mechanism allows the discharge of instinctual energy “by the indirection of change to elevated, ego and society syntonic aims and objects”. It prevents neurotic development by creating the higher and lasting forms of artistic, social and cultural accomplishments by which “personal, idiosyncratic, subjective strivings are transformed into socially valuable, altruistic and objective functions and structures”. 245

Yet, in addition to its scarcity structure, this concept of sublimation fails to bring out by what standards the ethical or other excellence and desirability of the higher goal and elevated aim are to be judged. 246 There is the danger that the very same conduct is differently or even contradictorily judged by persons of different cultural backgrounds. 247

At the same time it must be stated that FREUD considered sublimation also in its positive contents. He suggested that all sublimations take place through the agency of the ego. 248 He described the process as “the transformation and rearrangement of (his) libidinal components which is indispensable for later achievements”. 249 Thus sublimation was seen as a condition for universal love and as a source of individual happiness:

“A small minority are enabled by their constitution to find happiness, in spite of every thing, along the path of love. But far-reaching mental chan-

244. Ibid.
245. F. J. HACKER, “Sublimation Revisited”, art. cit. 219
246. Ibid. “The absence of clinical or scientific criteria left this value judgement uncritically to the ‘expertness’ of arbitrarily selected, or self-appointed societal representatives, thus permitting and perpetuating a heavily conformist, tradition-inspired bias”.
248. FREUD, The Ego and the Id, GW XIII 274; SE XIX 45. “If this displaceable energy is desexualized libido, it may also be described as ‘sublimated’ energy; for it would still retain the main purpose of Eros — that of uniting and binding — in so far as it helps towards establishing the unity, or tendency to unity, which is particularly characteristic of the ego”.
249. FREUD, Civilization and Its Discontents, GW XIV 443; SE XXI 84
ges in the function of love are necessary before this can happen. These people make themselves independent of their object’s acquiescence by displacing what they mainly value from being loved on to loving; they protect themselves against the loss of the object by directing their love, not to single objects but to all men alike; and they avoid uncertainties and disappointments of genital love by turning away from its sexual aims and transforming the instinct into an impulse with an inhibited aim.  

Sublimation is undoubtedly a necessary factor in the process of socialization and in the development of civilization. It is necessary as long as “the realm of the potential (in individual and social life) does not coincide with the actual”. As a promise of individual happiness and as a hope of a better world, it is projected into the not-yet-realized goals of civilization. It offers “the possibility that the world will be taught by the ego, i.e. made more liveable and reliably gratifying in terms of legitimate, mature human expectations”.

Hence sublimation means a progressive transformation of reality through a cognitional participation in the meaning of history where not only creative values are accepted but also acceptable values are created, and it is not merely a regressive resignation to inevitable renunciations, preventable sufferings and avoidable indignity. True sublimation demands something more than a passive submission to the prevailing social norms and existing establishments.

Christian thinking must rediscover sublimation as a more positive value. It must overcome a disappointed, dissatisfied and unhappy notion. In this connection a Freudian statement deserves closer attention:

“A certain portion of the repressed libidinal impulses has a claim to direct satisfaction and ought to find it in life”.

250. Ibid. GW XIV 461; SE XXI 101 – 102
251. F. J. HACKER, “Sublimation Revisited”, art. cit. 222
252. Ibid. “The mature experience of reality comprises the recognition of reality as being in process and in need of change, possibly of fundamental change. In that sense beauty rather than image cosmetic, autonomy through critical judgement, rather than conformity, and truth rather than salable plausibility, may well be valid (realistic because realizable) components of the reality principle of the future”.
254. FREUD, Five Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW VIII 59; SE XI 54
The reason given to it is much more important. Alluding to the "horse of Schilda", FREUD wrote:

"We ought not to exalt ourselves so high as completely to neglect what was originally animal in our nature. Nor should we forget that the satisfaction of the individual's happiness cannot be erased from among the aims of our civilization. The plasticity of the components of sexuality, shown by their capacity for sublimation, may indeed offer a great temptation to strive for still greater cultural achievements by still further sublimation. But, just as we do not count on our machines converting more than a certain fraction of the heat consumed into useful mechanical work, we ought not to seek to alienate the whole amount of the energy of the sexual instinct from its proper ends. We cannot succeed in doing so; and if the restriction upon sexuality were to be carried too far it would inevitably bring with it all the evils of soil-exhaustion".

In reconstructing the concept of sublimation, we think, Christian theology must come to grips with this Freudian warning. What can Christian morality offer to the 'by-standers' and 'losers of the sexual game'?  

f) Sex Lovable and Love Sexual — Personalization of Human Sexuality

A final observation we make in this connection is about the interrelation between sex and love. This is all the more an important theme today as a "play-boy subculture" tries to replace the Biblical thesis 'God is love' by an antithesis 'love is sex', and to give birth to a new synthesis — an idolatry of sex. The 'Christian repression' of Victorian morality is said to have been overcome by a 'New morality' of secularism. But the outcome is deplorably a 'No-morality-sex'. If sex was 'sin' in the past, it is mere 'fun' today and it is

255. The story refers to the inhabitants of Schilda known for "clever tricks of every sort". They possessed a horse and were proud of its strength. But they were not very happy that this animal consumed large quantity of expensive oats. They decided to stop this bad habit by reducing its ration by a few stalks every day, till they had accustomed it to complete abstinence. Freud continues: "For a time things went excellently: the horse was weaned to the point of eating only one stalk a day, and on the succeeding day it was at length to work without any oats at all. On the morning of that day the spiteful animal was found dead; and the citizens of Schilda could not make out what it had died of". Ibid. GW VIII 59 - 60; SE XI 54 - 55

256. Ibid. GW VIII 59; SE XI 54
going to be a ‘gun’ tomorrow. Curiously, the new prophets take FREUD as their starting-point. But we find that this tendency of “erotico-commercial aggression” remarkably found everywhere in the world, but cleverly conducted by Western man is a sheer exploitation of FREUD’s ideas.

It is true that the Freudian psycho-analysis “stands in opposition to everything conventionally restricted, well-established and generally accepted”. Thus FREUD wanted to remain a “sexual protestant”. Yet, on several occasions he underlined his position in unequivocal terms. Once he wrote to PFISTER as follows:

“... our treatment generally results in seeking satisfaction. On top of this there is the fact that we are unable to see anything forbidden or sinful in sexual satisfaction. You are aware that for us the term ‘sex’ includes what you in your pastoral work call love, and is certainly not restricted to the crude pleasures of senses. Thus our patients have to find in humanity what we are unable to promise them from above and are unable to supply them with ourselves”.

Thus FREUD widened the concept of sex which embraces all that St. Paul includes under love in the Epistle to the Corinthians. In their origin and function, FREUD stated, both love and sex are inextricably intertwined:

“In its origin, function and relation to sexual love, the ‘Eros’ of the philosopher Plato coincides exactly with the love-force, the libido of psychoanalysis ... and when the Apostle Paul, in his famous epistle to the Corinthians, praises love above all else, he certainly understands it in the same ‘wider’ sense. But this only shows that men do not always take their great thinkers seriously, even when they profess most to admire them. Psycho-analysis, then, gives these love instincts the name of sexual instincts, a potiori and by their origin”.

257. FREUD, Psycho-Analysis and Telepathy, GW XVII 28; SE XVIII 178
258. In a letter to Pfister (Feb. 20, 1909) Freud wrote: “In the historical sense of which you speak I too call myself a protestant, and in that connection I recall that my friend Professor von Ehrenfels coined the term ‘sexual protestants’ for us both”. FREUD / PFISTER, Psychoanalysis and Faith, 19. (Christian Freiherr von Ehrenfels, 1885 – 1932, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Prague)
259. Letter to Pfister, Feb. 9, 1909, Ibid. 16
260. In I Cor. 13, St. Paul praises charity above all. He begins as follows: “I may speak with every tongue that men and angels use; yet, if I lack charity, I am no better than echoing bronze, or the clash of cymbals”.
261. FREUD, Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, GW XIII 99; SE XVIII 91
Thus the German term ‘Liebe’ and the Greek word ‘Eros’ were seen as synonyms:

“I cannot see any merit in being ashamed of sex; the Greek word ‘Eros’, which is to soften the affront, is in the end nothing more than a translation of our German word ‘Liebe’.”

FREUD dealt with this theme elaborately in his Contributions to the Psychology of Love (1910). Here he established a double-way-relation between love and sex. To ensure a fully normal attitude to sex, to sexual love and lovable sex, two currents of feelings must blend together, namely, affection and sensuality – “die zärtlichen und sinnlichen Strömungen”.

Sex must therefore become the language of love, and love in its turn some way or other becomes the expression of sex. That is to say, sex properly understood, must be an expression of the total personality, a blend of body and mind, of physical qualities and spiritual attributes, where the behavioural movements are governed by psychic inspirations and not by animal instincts. Nevertheless, those psychic movements are regulated not only by conscious selections, but often by subconscious or unconscious insinuations. It is here that we owe tribute to the contributions of FREUD.

Thus FREUD clearly differentiated sexuality from genitality, genital love from the (wider) concept of sexuality (love):

“It is necessary to distinguish sharply between the concepts of ‘sexual’ and ‘genital’. The former is the wider concept and includes many activities that have nothing to do with the genitals.”

That is to say, he included a certain amount of sublimated energy in sexuality as such; for him sexuality meant more than genital contacts, and love more than anatomical discovery of sex. It is true that he viewed genital love as pivotal in human life and therefore, the prototype of all earthly satisfactions:

“We said there that man’s discovery that sexual (genital) love afforded him the strongest experiences of satisfaction, and in fact provided him with the prototype of all happiness, must have suggested to him that he should con-

262. Ibid.
263. GW VIII; SE XI
264. Ibid. GW VIII 79; SE XI 180
265. FREUD, An Outline of Psycho-Analysis, GW XVII 75; SE XXIII 152
continue to seek the satisfaction of happiness in his life along the path of sexual relations and that he should make genital erotism the central point of his life".  

This is, nevertheless, no reason to argue that sex has no other function than a sensual yield of pleasure. FREUD is often misinterpreted on account of a confusion of language. A simple equation of love and sex (meaning sensual gratification) is to be ruled out for the clear reason that love is more than sex. Love is not, as E. FROMM put it, the result of adequate sexual satisfaction, but sexual happiness is the result of love.  

The Freudian concept of love must undoubtedly be freed from its negative connections. Love is not merely an 'aim-inhibited-sex'. Granted that there is a nature-determined inhibition of the aim, there is also a 'transformation and rearrangement', as FREUD himself admitted. That is why the joy of love dilutes the disappointments of sex. Yet, we doubt whether such an 'inhibited' love should be included among the 'neurotic disorder of Love'.  

Again, FREUD qualified love as "prefigurative", as permanently turned towards the original object-cathexis (mother). The mother-child relationship is unique in the revelation of love. But that is no reason to affirm that it is the sole motive-force of love. On the other hand, it is also no reason to bring love to the opposite extreme — to a transfiguration, to "an enormous inflation of love", making it completely "the other-worldly" through rationalizations. Through such a love Plato could make angels happy, but not men.  

Contemporary Christian preaching has an inescapable obligation to help especially Western man to rediscover the sex he missed through a misuse of FREUD — sex as a basic human value, sex in the service of love. Sex must be made free from the repressions and the consequent perversions of the id and must be made available to the sublimations of the ego. Eros must become a

266. FREUD, Civilization and Its Discontents, GW XIV 460; SE XXI 101  
269. P. RIEFF, Freud: the Mind of the Moralist (London 1965) 167  
270. Cfr. FREUD, Civilization and Its Discontents, GW XIV 461ff; SE XXI 102ff  
271. Ibid. GW XIV 503; SE XXI 143
source of liberation and not a 'cause of alienation. True love must be clearly differentiated from neurotic disorders and psychotic perversions.

In spite of all its supposed drawbacks, the Freudian contribution helps us to understand better the nature of human sex. To a large extent, FREUD humanized and personalized human sexuality. Sexuality was recognized as part and parcel of human being, as an existential dimension and not merely as a function (reproduction) of the 'lower' nature. As H. THIELICKE pointed out, sexuality even from the point of view of Eros exhibits personal features beyond the functional and even Agape has a place and mission in it. According to M. ORAISON a human being can say "I" only when sexuality has already assumed its function.

Sexuality and love, as they are grounded on the person himself, on the mystery of humanity, are inseparably interwoven. Sexuality must, no doubt, be allowed to play its proper role in the total pattern of the whole personality, so that it may contribute to the development and maturity of both the individual and the society.

One confronts here very delicate questions in sexual ethics and moral theology. Christian theology must digest the sanctity of sex and the 'animality' of love. Has Catholic moral theology yet succeeded in answering whether or not a fully human love that unites man and his wife is _per se_ sexual? New explorations in this field are needed; it is not enough to state that masturbation, extra-marital relations or homosexuality are wrong; cogent reasons must be presented. The interrelation between sex and love may be a help here, and FREUD must necessarily be consulted in such questions.

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274. H. THIELICKE, The Ethics of Sex (New York-Evanston-London 1964) 44

275. M. ORAISON, La mystere humain de la sexualite (Paris 1965) 21. "Un être humain ne peut dire 'je' qu'en fonction de la sexualite assume ou non".


277. M. ORAISON, La mystere humain de la sexualite, 21. It must be admitted that remarkable changes of attitude have been taking place in the sexual mores of large population, and to a large extent it is to the credit of Freud. Cfr. F. REDLICH / R. F.
There is undoubtedly from the part of the Church a readiness today to make dialogues and to integrate positive elements from the secular sciences. For that reason we reject extremely manipulated criticisms against the position of the Church. The importance of a personalization of human sexuality has been restated with greater emphasis by the Second Vatican Council. The Council Fathers spoke on the nature of conjugal love as follows:

"This love is eminently human one since it is directed from one person to another through an affection of the will. It involves the good of the whole person. Therefore it can enrich the expressions of body and mind with a unique dignity, ennobling these expressions as special ingredients and signs of the friendship distinctive of marriage".

The sanctity of sex is clearly recognized in these statements. On the other hand, Christianity cannot "animalize" human sexuality. Christian anthropology proceeds from the premise of human dignity, the dignity of the human person and therefore the nobility of human sex must remain intact. Sexuality has no meaning outside the context of love. Sex is destined by the Creator to be used in the service of love.

What Christian ethics has yet to learn from Freud is perhaps the 'animal' side of human love. Freud's warning: "We ought not to exalt ourselves so high as completely to neglect what was originally animal in our nature".


278. For example: W. G. COLE, Sex in Christianity and Psychoanalysis (New York 1955) 155. "... in short, as celibate and ascetic males continue to control the moral theology of the Church, Rome can never whole heartedly give its full benediction to human sexuality".

279. Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World, GS 49, ABBOT, 252

280. B. Häring states: "Any false biological views which overlook or underestimate the immense difference between merely animal structure and human sexuality is most expressly excluded. The norm of moral action must preserve the specific character and dignity of human sexuality. The starting-point of the doctrine of natural law is not that of biological laws regarded as inviolable, but the essence ("natura") of the person and of personal actions". B. HÄRING, "Fostering the Nobility of Marriage and Family", in H. VORGRIMLER (ed.), Commentary on the Documents of Vatican II, vol. V (New York 1969) 243

281. FREUD, Five Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW VIII 59; SE XI 54; Cfr. the full text quoted above, note 256
2. Morality as an Inherited Institution

FREUD attacked unabatedly all inherited forms and institutionalized codes of morality. He found very little that is 'good' in them. The only explanation to the archaic inheritance of a moral code is the relation to the 'father'.

"Psycho-analysis has been reproached time after time with ignoring the higher, moral, supra-personal side of human nature. The reproach is doubly unjust, both historically and methodologically. For, in the first place, we have from the very beginning attributed the function of instigating repression to the moral and aesthetic trends in the ego... 'Very true', we can say, 'here we have that higher nature, in this ego ideal or super-ego, the representative of our relation to our parents. When we were little children, we knew these higher natures, we admired them and feared them; and later we took them into ourselves'."  

a) Non-Conformism to an Authoritarian Conscience

FREUD tried to explain the ontology or the 'existential axis' of moral conscience, which he considered ultimately as "a function" of the super-ego, as follows:

"We are far from overlooking the portion of psychological truth contained in the assertion that conscience is of divine origin; but the thesis needs interpretation. Even if conscience is something 'within us', yet it is not so from the first. In this it is a real contrast to sexual life, which is in fact there from the beginning of life and not only a later addition".

Genetically speaking, such a conscience has its origin back in the early childhood, where, from an economic point of view, the original impulses are repressed and interfered with non-sexual sublimations. The young children are "amoral and possess no internal inhibitions against their impulses striving for pleasure". The inhibitive process starts with the introjection, idealiza-
tion and idolization of the parental images, and a conscience comes to being as a final outcome of this inhibitive process, where the child incorporates into itself the social standards and communal conventions handed over from generation to generation. Thus ‘sacred’ traditions are established and moral codes stabilized.

In the individual, the frustrated impulses turn against the self through displacements, as there is no other way of discharge. Thus, “the super-ego, which represents the internalized, forbidding parents, is already endowed with the aggression naturally attributed to them as frustrating agents”. Reinforced by the child’s own aggression, it becomes more stern, cruel and aggressive than the introjects.

In the final outcome the moral conscience becomes a masochistic compensation for and a return to the cruelty of the introjected repressive agents. Conscience as a masochistic submission brings with it a certain amount of satisfaction, “sexually tinged enjoyment”. Freud identified such a moral conscience with “Taboo-conscience” and defined it as “the internal perception of the rejection of a particular wish operating within us”. It is “the normal, conscious sense of guilt”, an “ego-censor” which has a twofold origin, “the fear of the authority” and the fear of the super-ego. Thus the external authority is accepted as a ‘legislator’ whose laws and sanctions are incorporated into oneself. If obedience is the cardinal virtue, disobedience becomes the ordinary sin. Such an authority then demands submission as a tribute to its moral superiority and right. Respect due to it, carries with it the taboo on questioning, and the mere fact that an individual dares to criticize it is ipso facto a proof that he is guilty.

286. J. C. Flugel, “Psychoanalysis and Morals”, art. cit. 204
287. Ibid. 206
288. Freud, Totem and Taboo, GW IX 85; SE XIII 68
289. Ibid. GW IX 85; SE XIII 69
290. Freud, The Ego and the Id, GW XIII 280; SE XIX 51
291. Freud, Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW XI 444; SE XVI 428
292. Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, GW XIV 486; SE XXI 126
293. Cfr. E. Fromm, Man for Himself; An Enquiry into the Psychology of Ethics (London 1949) 143 – 44
294. Cfr. Ibid. 148
our culture, Freud considered their techniques of exercising authority too costly".  

Thus FREUD could find a certain clumsiness and crudity in the operations of man's powers of moral control. Such a conscience is capable of doing not only good but also harm. A conscience that is built upon an excessive repression of the impulses can be a source of conflicts.

Christian moral codes had been for a long time insisting upon an authoritarian morality. A "religious moralism" influenced by rationalism lost to a large extent the purity of the expressions of the Scriptures and the ineffability of the formulations of the sacred writers. Moralists constantly directed their efforts towards "strengthening man's supposedly all too feeble control over his impulses". Moral codes attempted mainly to strengthen the repressions. Morality itself became an over-zealous repression and an unconscious censor. Authority was interpreted as an archaic institution standing for rigid domination, and an infantile, guilt-laden anxiety as virtue of obedience. Conscience then will be the humble acceptance of what is dictated, only because it is dictated.

It must be stated that authority as a taboo, as an unconscious censor and as an over-zealous repression is not acceptable. Hence Christian morality must try to overcome "the representatives of the anonymous authority of the market" in favour of an "education to reality". We need a transition from the crudity and cruelty of an authoritarian super-ego to the invitations and responsibilities of an adult ego, from a moralism to a humanistic ethics.

b) Against a Taboo-Morality

FREUD believed that our present code of conduct is a "secondary elabo-

297. J. FRLUGEL, "Psychoanalysis and Morals", art. cit. 198
298. We borrow this phrase from E. FROMM, Man for Himself, 155
299. Freud considered it as the core of his legacy: The Future of an Illusion, GW XIV 373; SE XXI 50
ration” of the two primitive taboos — on incest and parricide. In a taboo there is always a contrast between the desired and the forbidden. The primitives thus renounced the women they highly desired. FREUD contended that the content of the primitive taboos coincided with the content of the Oedipus complex, which persists to some extent throughout one’s life and accounts for man’s unique and inevitable tragedy that “he is compelled to hate those whom also he most loves”. He established an analogy between a taboo as a collective neurosis and neurosis as an individual taboo.

The fundamental characteristic of a taboo-morality is its unconscious determination and motivation. The energy of the impulses retained in the unconscious through repression is transformed into anxiety and sense of guilt and it works in the individual as a moral norm:

“But the anxiety points to unconscious sources. The psychology of the neuroses has taught us that, if wishful impulses are repressed, their libido is transformed into anxiety. And this reminds us that there is something unknown and unconscious in connection with the sense of guilt, namely the reasons for the act of repudiation. The character of anxiety that is inherent in the sense of guilt corresponds to this unknown factor”.

The only explanation to the contention that morality is inherited from a higher source, is according to FREUD, its connection with the contents of the Oedipus complex:

“The super-ego is in fact the heir to the Oedipus complex and is only established after the complex has been disposed of. For that reason its excessive severity does not follow a real model but corresponds to the strength of the defence used against the temptation of the Oedipus complex. Some suspicion of this state of things lies, no doubt, at the bottom of the assertion made by philosophers and believers that the moral sense is not instilled into men by education or acquired by them in their social life but is implanted in them from a higher source”.

300. FREUD, Totem and Taboo, GW IX 173; SE XIII 144
301. Ibid. GW IX 45; SE XIII 34
302. Ibid. GW IX 188; SE XIII 156
303. J. C. FLUGEL, “Psychoanalysis and Morals”, art. cit., 203
304. FREUD, Totém and Taboo, GW IX 24, 38 – 39; SE XIII 17, 28 – 29
305. FREUD, Totem and Taboo, GW IX 85 – 86; SE XIII 69. Thus Freud considered a “Papal Interdict” as a “general taboo”. Ibid. GW IX 30; SE XIII 21
306. FREUD, An Outline of Psycho-Analysis, GW XVII 137; SE XXIII 205 – 206
Even though the Freudian conjecture as such is unacceptable to us, it must be stated here that FREUD should help us to differentiate a conscious moral value from an unconscious guilt-feeling. Unconscious anxiety should not be mistaken for a morality of inspiration. Moral values are certainly to be chosen in the God-given moments. But the spontaneity of the Kairos is quite different from the determination and return of the repressed. Moral values must rather be based on conscious motivations.

Yet the influence of the id on the ego, of emotions on reasoning and of the unconscious insinuations upon the conscious motivations cannot be ignored. Christian moralists must be willing to admit this psychotherapeutic claim\(^{307}\) in assessing individual freedom and responsibility.

c) Freedom from Repressive Codes

The super-ego as a moral force operates in the individual, according to FREUD, in a vicious circle. It arises “from an identification with the father taken as a model”\(^ {308}\). Such an identification implies a desexualization and sublimation, that is, the transformation of libido into socially acceptable discharge, and an instinctual defusion:

“After sublimation the erotic component no longer has the power to bind the whole of the destructiveness that was combined with it, and this is released in the form of an inclination to aggression and destruction. This defusion would be the source of the general character of harshness and cruelty exhibited by the ideal — its dictatorial ‘Thou shalt’”.\(^{309}\)

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308. FREUD, The Ego and the Id, GW XIII 284; SE XIX 54

Thus the super-ego "calls the ego to account not only for its deeds but equally for its thoughts and unexecuted intentions, of which the super-ego seems to have knowledge". Hence the introjected parental image becomes not only an irrational moral agent, a taboo, but more often than not it stands as a sadistic 'institution' against the ego. The cruelty or the sadism of the moral models is incorporated into the ego along with other characteristic attitudes. The more rapidly the instinctual drives succumbed to repression under the influence of moral models, "the stricter will be the domination of the super-ego over the ego later on — in the form of conscience or perhaps of an unconscious sense of guilt". Thus the super-ego displays a "super-moral" attitude towards the ego which "strives to be moral". Here FREUD concluded:

"The fact remains, however, as we have stated it: the more a man controls his aggressiveness, the more intense becomes his ideal's inclination to aggressiveness, against his ego. It is like a displacement, a turning round upon his own ego. But even ordinary normal morality has a harshly restraining, cruelly prohibiting quality. It is from this, indeed, that the conception arises of a higher being who deals out punishment inexorably".

Neurosis, FREUD believed, owes its origin to an inner conflict between the repressed desires and the repressing moral agent. It is rather an unsatisfactory compromise between them. The ego, pressed from inside and repressed from outside, tries to mask the interior demands with preconscious rationalizations and colours reality with interior conflicts. Therefore, the whole aim of analysis, FREUD contended, was to set out "to give the patient's ego freedom to decide one way or the other".

Thus FREUD appealed to the institutionalized and legalized moral codes to be more tolerant and permissive to contemporary man who is trapped in a "moral masochism" on account of the cruelty and sadism of the cultural

310. FREUD, An Outline of Psycho-Analysis, GW XVII 137; SE XXIII 205
311. FREUD, The Economic Problem of Masochism, GW XIII 380; SE XIX 167
312. FREUD, The Ego and the Id, GW XIII 263; SE XIX 35
313. Ibid. GW XIII 284; SE XIX 54
314. FREUD, The Ego and the Id, GW XIII 284; SE XIX 54
315. FREUD, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW XV 84; SE XXII 77
316. FREUD, The Ego and the Id, GW XIII 279; SE XIX 50, footnote 1
super-ego. The post-freudian society has indeed become more tolerant, sometimes, however, bringing FREUD, unfortunately, into the farthest extremes. Nevertheless, the relevant question is, how far are Christian communities — particularly the Catholic Church — ready to pay heed to more radical appeals? A genuine moral code shall not only stand for maintaining the interests of an already established order, but it must necessarily account for the process of social changes.  

3. Morality as a Humanistic Ethics

M. KYRLE once pointed out: “No special analytical knowledge is required to convince us that there must be another aspect of morality based not on fear but on love”. As we have already mentioned FREUD himself was not unaware of it. He considered himself a very moral person who could subscribe to the maxim, “what is moral is self-evident”.  

FREUD pleaded for a freedom of the individual self. For a kind of ‘cultural frustration’ (“Kulturversagung”) dominates the large field of social relationships from which ensue serious disorders in the society: “It is not easy to understand how it can become possible to deprive an instinct of satisfaction. Nor is doing so without danger. If the loss is not compensated for economically, one can be certain that serious disorders will ensue”.

The only exit from this impasse is said to be a more tolerant attitude from moral institutions which should respect individual freedom. Thus a sincerity of conduct and honesty of life were said to be the raison d’être of the Freudian ethic. An unreserved love of humanity was considered to be the ulti-

319. Cfr. above Part Two, Chapter Six  
320. Cfr. above, Chapter Six, Note 3  
321. FREUD, Civilization and Its Discontents, GW XIV 457; SE XXI 97  
322. Cfr. above, Part Two, Chapter Six
mate ground of morality.\textsuperscript{323} \textsc{Freud} thus condemned an absolute war\textsuperscript{324} and demanded some more truthfulness and sincerity from every side.\textsuperscript{325}

Nevertheless, \textsc{Freud} did not develop this point, probably because he wanted to remain always in the opposite front\textsuperscript{326} as a thoroughly secular humanitarian. It is here that Christian theology is invited to complete \textsc{Freud}, even though he himself repudiated such an attempt.

By way of conclusion we would say that the very dialectical and ambivalent approach of \textsc{Freud} to morality — morality in its inherited form as an institutionalized repressive code, and morality as a humanistic ethics of personal responsibility — is a great challenge to Christian theology and way of life. There is no exaggeration in saying that \textsc{Freud} confronted a "moral paradox" in Christianity, and therefore in religion as such. He traced the origin of such an antinomy between ideology and practice back to the severity of 'religious codes'.

\vspace{1cm}

D. Religion as the Root of Morals: The Core of the Freudian Protests

\vspace{1cm}

1. The Grandiose Nature of Religion

In one of the succinct but sufficiently clear passages \textsc{Freud} ever wrote about "the grandiose nature of religion", he attributed three different functions to it:\textsuperscript{327}

1) "It gives them information about the origin and coming into existence of the universe'.

2) "It assures them of its protection and of ultimate happiness in the ups and downs of life'.

\vspace{1cm}

323. \textsc{Freud}, Letter to R. Rolland, GW XIV 553; SE XX 279
324. \textsc{Freud}, Why War?, GW XVI 26f; SE XXII 214 — 15
325. \textsc{Freud}, Thoughts for the Times on War and Death, GW X 340; SE XIV 288
326. \textsc{Freud}, An Autobiographical Study, GW XIV 35; SE XX 9
327. \textsc{Freud}, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW XV 174; SE XXII 161
3) "It directs their thoughts and actions by precepts which it lays down with its whole authority".

FREUD tried to explain away all these functions of religion with his thesis that "religious Weltanschauung is determined by the situation of our childhood".\(^{328}\) Thus "A religious man pictures the creation of the universe just as he pictures his own origin".\(^{329}\) Again, when he needs protection, he harks back to the mnemonic image of the father whom in his childhood he greatly overvalued and from whom he received protection. "The effective strength of this mnemonic image and the persistence of his need for protection jointly sustain his belief in God".\(^{330}\) Moreover, the same father introduces the child into social precepts. "The child is brought up to a knowledge of social duties by a system of loving rewards and punishments ... All these relations are afterwards introduced by men unaltered into their religion".\(^{331}\)

Here FREUD concluded:

"But religion cannot achieve this. Its doctrines bear the imprint of the times in which they arose, the ignorant times of the childhood of humanity. Its consolations deserve no trust. Experience teaches that the world is no nursery. The ethical demands on which religion seeks to lay stress need, rather, to be given another basis".\(^{332}\)

2. FREUD as a Liberator of Ethics

Throughout this work we tried to make one point clear, that FREUD's atheism was in favour of a humanism; his vertical opposition made horizontal compromises; he denied religion in order to affirm ethics; he dethroned God in order to enthrone man and his well-being. Thus he arrived at a denial of God and religion via morality, or better what he experienced as morality.

The future of ethics is in peril, he stated, as long as it is rooted in relia-
igion. He proclaimed that the fundamental ethical values, “which are indis-

pensable for human society” were at stake, as they were encapsulated in a “religio-moralistic” civilization:

“Is there not a danger here that the hostility of these masses to civiliza-
tion will throw itself against the weak spot that they have found in their
task-mistress?”

This weak spot will be left unnoticed, FREUD continued, so far as the
masses remain ignorant. But once they are intellectually awakened, either
they must be suppressed or, “the relationship between civilization and reli-
gion must undergo a fundamental revision”. Such a fundamental revision
proposed by FREUD was a radical detention of God from the world of mora-
lity, a renunciation of the “transfiguration of the cultural prohibition”, “no
longer attribute to God what is our own will and ... content ourselves with
giving the social reason”. For, as the infantile and primitive phase of man-
kind religion has no more future, and “mankind will surmount this neurotic
phase just as so many children grow out of their similar neurosis”.

Yet, FREUD presenting himself as a “very moral person”, wanted to do
something for the “poor humanity”, for the “great mass of the uneducated
and oppressed”. Partly moved by personal reasons and partly encouraged
by the anomalies and antinomies found in his society, he declared a war
against this form of civilization. In order to facilitate this war, he con-
structed a theory about the origin and development of this “religio-mora-
listic” civilization. Ethics, he concluded, is to be saved from the religious
backing, while religion is to be dismissed with as the neurotic stage of hu-
manity.

333. Ibid.
335. Ibid.
336. Ibid. GW XIV 364; SE XXI 41
337. Ibid. GW XIV 377; SE XXI 53
338. Ibid. GW XIV 362; SE XXI 39
339. Freud qualified his most radical attack on religion, The Future of an Illusion, as
a “declaration of war”. Letter to Pfister, Oct. 22, 1927, FREUD / PFISTER, Psychoana-
lysis and Faith, 112
3. Religion as a Moral Test — the Interrelation between Religion and Morality

Morality as FREUD understood can be said to be an introjected ideal, and religion a projected power. Metapsychologically, the super-ego is said to be the seat of both religion and morality.

In the individual two highly important factors work at the origin of the super-ego, one biological, and the other, historical, namely, the instinctual drives and the need for protection, and the consequent repressions and identifications.340

FREUD contended that religion and morality took origin ontogenetically as well as phylogenetically "through the process of mastering the Oedipus complex itself".341 Here an identification342 dissolves to a certain extent the regression to early object choices and replaces the libidinal tie through an introjection of the object into the ego. The ego remains yet a pleasure-ego. Such an introjection has only an 'historical', but not a personal value. Hereafter the child is acting out of an "affective conviction".343 The child is convinced that its parents will continue to protect and rule not only its world but the whole world for ever. The very introjected imagos with "their strength, their severity, their inclination to supervise and to punish"344 operate now in the individual as moral conscience. After they have ceased to be objects of libidinal impulses of the id, now they belong to the outer world.345

A formula can be briefly expressed:

340. Hence human civilization is said to be resting upon "two pillars of which one is the control of natural forces and the other restriction of our instincts". FREUD, Resistances to Psycho-Analysis, GW XIV 106; SE XIX 219
341. FREUD, The Ego and the Id, GW XIII 265; SE XIX 37. "durch Bewältigung des eigentlichen Odipuskomplexes".
342. Cfr. FREUD, Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, GW XIII 117 — 18, SE XVIII 107
344. FREUD, The Economic Problem of Masochism, GW XIII 380; SE XIX 167
345. Ibid.

In Freud's own words: "But the same figures who continue to operate in the super-ego as the agency we know as conscience after they have ceased to be objects of libidinal impulses of the id — these same figures also belong to the real external world. It is from
The biological helplessness and the need for protection persist in every individual to a large extent always. Throughout life one feels a kind of isolation in oneself and helplessness before interior as well as exterior powers. One tries to ignore or even to overcome them through the same affective conviction, through "the regressive renewal of the infantile protective powers". There is no conscious memory or experience that can prove this confidence. Hence the early experiences are now revived through symbolic means. On the one hand, man is pushed into a world of illusions through "externally projected libidinal cathexes", where the totem became the first "father-surrogate" and a personal God a later one. On the other hand, as a condition and at the same time as a consequence of these affective beliefs one is compelled to abandon one's selfish and opportunistic interests for the sake of society. Religion thus becomes an "Ersatzlibido", a compensatory satisfaction. But it is an illusory wish-fulfilment, as one who tries to satisfy hunger before a wall-picture of a well supplied table, or through its memory.

Religion is thus accepted as "a test of social reliability", which puts on man "a moral test of utmost stringency". Moral precepts are prescribed in the name of a God above and a life after:

"Their parent’s prohibitions and demands persist within them as a moral conscience. With the help of this same system of rewards and punishments God rules the world of men. The amount of protection and happy satisfaction assigned to an individual depends on his fulfilment of the ethical demands".

Thus people obey the existing moral precepts because they "let themselves

\[346.\] FREUD, Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of His Childhood, GW VIII 195; SE XI 123. "die regressive Erneuerung der infantilen Schutzmächte".
\[347.\] FREUD, Psycho-Analytic Notes on an Autobiographical Account of a Case of Paranoia (Dementia Paranoïdes) GW VIII 315; SE XII 78
\[348.\] FREUD, Totem and Taboo, GW IX 170, 178; SE XIII 141, 147
\[349.\] J. KLAUBER, "Psychical Roots of Religion", art. cit. 251
\[350.\] FREUD, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW XV 177; SE XXII 164
intimidated by the threats of religion". The parental introject (=the 'god-project') becomes sadistic as the super-ego stands with all its severity against the ego. The total energy — the repressed libido plus aggression — is now introverted and turned against the self. The ego from its part reacts through masochistic returns. Religion thus becomes the cement of civilization and God, the 'projected' father, the root of moral conduct.

Moral norms, FREUD concluded, that are based on a fear of the projected father-image crumble down, when the infantile fear is overcome. At the same time ethics is "indispensable to human society". Therefore, the only choice before us is, FREUD believed, to free ethics from the bondage of religion.

4. Ethics of Coming Ages

Religious morality, especially as it was developed in Western Christianity, became in the course of history a moral test of utmost stringency. An afterlife either as a reward or as a punishment was promised for the deeds on earth. Whether one passes or fails it in this life would determine his fate for ever. Morality was preached in the name of an eternal reward in heaven or under the pain of the ultimate horror of damnation. "But so long as virtue is not rewarded here on earth, ethics will, I fancy, preach in vain". The only solution FREUD had to propose was "no longer to attribute to God what is our own will", to renounce "the transfiguration of the cultural prohibition", "the character of sanctity and inviolability — of belonging to another world". Ethics must be freed from the fear of the father, from the will of the father:

"Going back to ethics, we may say in conclusion that a part of its precepts are justified rationally by the necessity of delimiting the rights of society

351. FREUD, The Future of an Illusion, GW XIV 370; SE XXI 47
352. FREUD, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW XV 181; SE XXII 168
353. FREUD, Civilization and Its Discontents, GW XIV 503; SE XXI 143
354. FREUD, The Future of an Illusion, GW XIV 384; SE XXI 41. In the original; "Gott überhaupt aus dem Spiele zu lassen".
as against the individual, the rights of the individual as against society and those of individuals as against one another. But what seems to us so grandiose about ethics, so mysterious and, in a mystical fashion, so self-evident, owes these characteristics to its connection with religion, its origin from the will of the father.\footnote{355}

5. Either Religion or Ethics but not Both Together

FREUD seems to have posed a radical question to contemporary man. What shall we opt for the future, religion or ethics? According to him religion shall not outlive history, we are already living in a post-religious epoch. Religion is simply unnecessary and therefore not normal for this epoch of civilization.\footnote{356} Time has come to entomb its skeleton and skull. One shall not remain a neurotic child for ever.

FREUD opted for ethics as a guarantee of social reliability, an ethics freed from its connection with religion, from the will of the father. God must be detained, he contended, from the entire game. We have “to leave God out altogether and honestly admit the purely human origin of all the regulations and precepts of civilization”.\footnote{357} Thus he argued, if the sole reason of prohibition against killing is God’s will or his punishment, one will unhesitantly kill his neighbour, when he learns that there is no God and that he need not fear his punishment; he can “only be prevented from doing so by mundane force”.\footnote{358} Thus FREUD objected to a god seen as the “moral governor” of the world.

Here we face the “Freudian enigma”. On the one hand, he condemned absolutely religion in all its contemporary manifestations. On the other hand, he appears to have adhered to high ethical values.\footnote{359} The immediate question is, how far moral principles and ethical values require a backing of God and

\footnote{355. FREUD, Moses and Monotheism, GW XVI 230; SE XXIII 122  
356. Cfr. E. FROMM, Beyond the Chains of Illusion, 65  
357. FREUD, The Future of an Illusion, GW XIV 364; SE XXI 41  
358. Ibid. GW XIV 363; SE XXI 39  
religion? Is ethics ‘valid and licit’ without a God above and a life after? This is the target of the Freudian attack. This candidly anti-religious approach to ethics is a radical attack and at the same time a great challenge to theological ethics in general and to Christian morals in particular.

In the next Chapter we will try to clarify the interrelation between religion and morality. Here we want to lay stress on one aspect of the Freudian attacks, namely, the opposition between religious ideals and moral practices.

6. High Religion and Low Morals?

All great critics of religion, one must say, not excluding Freud, were very particular to point out a kind of moral deterioration among ‘religious people’. Strange indeed, they often attributed it to the very religiosity of the persons concerned. Religion was often criticized as the cradle of moral atrophy; it has a dehumanizing and depersonalizing tendency, which reduces human beings into mechanisms responding to stimuli, or puppets twitched into sacrifice and suffering by the dictates of the leaders. Religion was often perceived as an obnoxious obstacle to ethics.

Even though such attacks are not fully justified, as they are often emotionally induced peripheral stoning coming from a superficial approach to religion, we think, Christianity must time and again examine whether there exists an antinomy between the ideals preached and the life lived, between what was taught by Christ and what is being taught by the Church, between the ideal content and the ideological structure. Freud denied religion in order to affirm ethics. Do we Christians sometimes deny ethics in order to affirm “religion”? Where there is a sadistic domination, there is the danger of masochistic returns. The ‘serenity’ of submission often found in such societies is not to be attributed to the ideal commitments of love but to the masochistic compensations for the inhibited wishes. Faith is not something to be imposed under the pain of punishment, but something to be accepted

out of love. According to what Christ taught us, "each tree is known by its fruits", and not by the label given to it.

E. Conclusion to Part Four
From Resistance to Co-existence

S. FREUD was no theologian but a psycho-analyst. Perhaps his greatest contribution to mankind was his attempt to make man happy by liberating him from "interior hooks". "Man's chief enemy and danger is his own unruly nature and the dark forces pent up within him". FREUD fought against all those forces, which he considered were a danger to human happiness. Yet, he admitted that "opposition is not necessarily enmity" and "we desire the same things".

Christianity also aims at making man happy, even if not completely and exclusively in this world. And therefore we think that the separating wall between the two must be abolished. It is time to come down from resistance to co-existence. Ours is an age of dialogue and synthesis.

The mere fact that FREUD "unmasked the pretensions of conscience as the perfect guide, that he had exposed the primitive crudity of the repressing forces" does in no way imply that he dispensed with all fundamental human values. He counselled neither greater gratification of impulse nor greater submission to the dictates of moral authority. He rather exposed to light certain intricate problems connected with the moral, cultural and historical development of man. Accordingly, human conduct should be measured against the background of the particular context of each individual, such as racial factors, social situations and individual constitution. For this reason, we think, Christianity must integrate the Freudian analytical findings and attempt at a synthesis.

361. Lc. 6 : 44; Mt. 7 : 17 – 18
362. E. JONES, LWF III 472
363. FREUD, Civilization and Its Discontents, GW XIV 472; SE XXI 112
364. FREUD, The Future of an Illusion, GW XIV 377; SE XXI 54
366. J. C. FLUGEL, "Psychoanalysis and Morals", art. cit. 200
As it was already pointed out, the fundamental interest of this work is not to contradict the fallacies of FREUD’s speculations, but to assess and assimilate the solid claims of his psycho-analysis as a method of study, as a technique of treatment, and above all, as a “new instrument of research”. As his subjective speculations about the cultural institutions were intensely charged with deep personal feelings, they must be looked upon with sympathetic understanding rather than with apologetic anger.

It is true that he placed before us a number of anti-theses against the already established values. But, as aforesaid, they were directed rather against the concrete embodiments than against the values themselves. Thus he dismissed a “church-bound-religion” and a “religion-bound-morality” as a danger to the well-being of man. He forsook God for the sake of man, religion for the sake of ethics. Here we are confronted with the actual Freudian enigma.

A. The Freudian Legacy

In spite of all its drawbacks the Freudian psycho-analysis radiates a fundamental message, namely an appeal to the well-being of man through a libera-

1. FREUD, The Question of Lay Analysis (1926) GW XIV 276; SE XX 248. In the words of a contemporary author: “... the work of psycho-analysis puts itself at the orders of precisely the highest and most valuable cultural trends, as a better substitute for the unsuccessful repression”. R. F. STERBA, “The humanistic Wellspring of Psycho-analysis”, PsA 43 (1974) 174

2. D. STAFFORD-CLARK, What Freud Really Said (Penguin books 1967) 199. “We may wonder whether his own unresolved conflict and intensely charged feelings about his father, and his background of paternal race and creed, were not perhaps as much responsible for his views about conscience and religion, particularly as exemplified by the Jewish and Christian idea of the personal God, as were any of his scientific abilities”. 
tion from all kinds of fetters, making him more free in order to be more responsible and therefore, more noble. In the psycho-analytical language it means a freedom from the beastly impulses of the id as well as from the floating authority of the super-ego and a transition to mature choices of the ego. Thus the ultimate aim of his psycho-analysis and the apex of his therapy, as FREUD saw it, was to bring about a psycho-synthesis in the individual.

Here we agree with H. HARTMANN: "I think one can say that Freud's system of moral values though marked by his strong individuality, is not in radical opposition to the partly Greco-Roman, partly Jewish-Christian moral traditions of Western civilization. ... In clearly rejecting any and all religious creeds and systems, he did not reject the moral aspects of the Western-tradition". Here we add: In clearly rejecting any and all religious creeds and systems, he did not reject, at least the possibility of a genuine religion.

Therefore we need a new synthesis, and we think it is possible. Certainly one should keep in mind here a warning of Jesus Christ that no cut-piece of any old cloth shall match a new cloak, nor any new piece an old garment. A psycho-synthesis, as designed by FREUD, demands freedom from the neurosis of the id as well as from the domination of the super-ego.

1. Freedom from the Neurosis of the Id

FREUD described neurosis as a lack of synthesis in the individual:

"For neurosis is after all only a sign that the ego has not succeeded in
making a synthesis, that in attempting to do so it has forfeited its unity”.

Hence psycho-analysis aims at “giving the patient’s ego freedom to decide one way or the other”, where the physician has to take up even the role of a teacher and mentor. Thus Freud epitomized the whole purpose of therapy in the following words:

“It may be laid down that the aim of the treatment is to remove the patient’s resistances and to pass his repressions in review and thus to bring about the most far-reaching unification and strengthening of his ego, to enable him to save the mental energy which he is expending upon internal conflicts, to make the best of him that his inherited capacities will allow and so to make him as efficient and as capable of enjoyment as is possible”.

Hence, even though Freud drew attention to the domination of the pleasure principle in the instinct-life of the id, he did not make an appeal “in favour of unfettering instincts that would injure the community”, but to “its displacement by what is called the reality principle” which regulates the operations of the ego.

2. From Domination of the Super-ego to Maturity of the Ego

Maturity of the ego presupposes freedom from domination and inhibition of the super-ego:

“Nevertheless it may be admitted that the therapeutic efforts of psychoanalysis have chosen a similar line of approach. Its intention is, indeed, to strengthen the ego, to make it more independent of the super-ego, to widen its field of perception and to enlarge its organization, so that it can appropriate fresh portions of the id. Where the id was, there ego shall be. It is a work of culture — not unlike the draining of the Zuider Zee”.

8. Freud, Dostoevsky and Parricide, GW XIV 402; SE XXI 179
9. Freud, The Ego and the Id, GW XIII 279; SE XIX 50, footnote 1
10. Freud, Advances in Psycho-Analytic Therapy, GW XII 191; SE XVII 165, Cfr. above Note 4
11. Freud, Psycho-Analysis (Two Encyclopedia Articles — A) GW XIII 227; SE XVIII 251
12. Freud, Resistances to Psycho-Analysis, GW XIV 106; SE XIX 219
13. Freud, An Autobiographical Study, GW XIV 85; SE XX 55
14. Freud, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW XV 86; SE XXII 80
This process meant for FREUD primarily an education to reality, which demands a freedom from all intoxicants, that is, an overthrow of psychic infantilism and, above all, a conquest of, or mastery over, man's search for sweet consolations from religion, especially in times of troubles in life:

"They will have to admit to themselves the full extent of their helplessness and their insignificance in the machinery of the universe; they can no longer be the centre of creation, no longer the object of tender care on the part of a beneficient Providence! They will be in the same position as a child who has left the parental house where he was so warm and comfortable. But surely infantilism is destined to be surmounted. Men cannot remain children for ever; they must in the end go out into 'hostile life'. We call this 'education to reality'."

These texts indicate that FREUD never wanted to establish an unilinear and one-dimensional "Id-psychology". On the contrary, unravelling the complicated network of the super-ego and high-lighting the wide spectrum of the interior forces and their endless possibilities, he tried to establish a proper psychology of the ego.

3. An Ego Psychology

Here we do not intend to deal with the modern trend in psycho-analysis which tries to construct a new clinical theory instead of the Freudian metapsychology. We want to take FREUD as the starting-point. At least he has given some hints, as the above given texts indicate. The Freudian concept of the ego, even in its most developed form is not free from some fundamental ambiguities. As FREUD defined human personality from the point of view of the id, the ego was seen merely as a shell "developed out

15. FREUD, The Future of an Illusion, GW XIV 373; SE XXI 49
17. Cfr. above Part Four, Chapter Nine
19. FREUD, An Outline of Psycho-Analysis, GW XVII 128; SE XXIII 197
of the id’s cortical layer".  

Yet, as we see from the above given texts, his willingness to bring the ego to the centre of personality and to relate it to consciousness and his repeated appeal to the increased role of reality as a determinant of behaviour suggest a new direction towards what is called ego-psychology. Thus we find an ‘existential twist’ in later years which gave birth to ego-psychologies and value-oriented psychologists who emphasize the role of personal responsibility and decision against the irrational and determined aspects of human behaviour.

Today we find different directions in this line of thought. We understand ego-psychology here in a rather broad sense as it is interpreted by Anna Freud, Heinz Hartmann and David Rapaport and their adherents. It is true that, as sciences grow, schools wither. But the above mentioned authors in general insist on an autonomous ego, which chooses values, morals, norms and standards of living, and develops a coherent and effective adaptation to the external world. Belief systems and value orientations find their way in this movement which is concerned mainly with an effective and coherent ego-structure.

20. Ibid. GW XVII 129; SE XXIII 198
23. H. Hartmann, Psychoanalysis and Moral Values (New York 1960); Essays on Ego Psychology (New York 1964); Id et R. M. Loewenstein, Notes on the Super-ego”, PsyStC 17 (1962) 42 - 81
27. E. M. Pattison puts it in the following terms: “These autonomous ego functions assume the function of ‘Ego-drives’ in contradistinction to ‘instinctual drives’. The ego drives are dependent upon the beliefs and values of the culture and these drives become important, if indeed not the overriding determinates of behaviour. Thus it can be
FREUD saw religion and morality in their inherited and institutionalized forms as derivatives or better as dimensions of a domineering and repressive super-ego. As we have tried to prove in this book, FREUD objected to these forms of religion and morality; neither was he unaware of their positive aspects. Here he evaded some profound questions, as he was particular to adhere to his own dogmas and premature conclusions. Christianity has yet the obligation to present to psycho-analysis the religion and morality FREUD missed, and to complete it.

Thus, we think that on a level of the ego, of the true personality, a dialogue and eventually a synthesis is possible. Not the super-ego but the ego properly understood, not the unconscious determinations but the conscious choices must be seen as the reservoir of human values. A psycho-synthesis, which points to a transcendental ego will not contemplate the destruction of morality nor the dethronement of religion, but a revitalization of man’s search for meaning and of his ultimate concern.

In any attempt at a new dialogal synthesis one should first delineate, though briefly, the true nature of Christian religion and morality together with their interrelationship.

B. Religion and Morality as Commitments of the Ego

We understand the ego here in an existential, and not merely in a structural sense. It points to an autonomous and responsible self as the source of function that belief or value systems are the data that the ego uses to organize individual behaviour. ... Belief systems, whether they be religious or otherwise are both necessary and influential in the development of personality”. “Ego Morality: An Emerging Psychotherapeutic Concept”, PsA 55 (1968) 199


damental values and moral standards. It must be distinguished from an ego which is the mere source of perception. Religion and morality as human values are not derivatives of the super-ego as FREUD believed, but are dimensions of the ego.

1. What is Religion?

Here we intend to give some illustrations on the meaning of religion by way of negations showing what it is not.\textsuperscript{31} Parting from FREUD's disagreements and attacks we look for an existential, and commonly acceptable notion.

a) Definition of Definitions

It must be frankly admitted that any definition of religion is a 'definition' or 'delimitation' of its meaning. Religion is so large and comprehensive a concept that it can hardly be confined to any stringent definition. Scholars give different reasons for it.\textsuperscript{32} According to H. R. SCHLETTE, the basic difficulty in defining what religion exactly is, lies in the fact of contrast between apriori and a posteriori elements in religion.\textsuperscript{33} H. W. CLARK sees its highly individualized nature responsible for it.\textsuperscript{34} There is always a potential


32. According to ALLPORT: "The roots of religion are so numerous, the weight of their influence in individual lives so varied, and the forms of rational interpretation so endless, that uniformity of product is impossible". G. W. ALLPORT, The Individual and His Religion, 26 – 27

33. H. R. SCHLETTE, "Religion", LThK VIII 1164

emotional charge lurking in the background in any discussion on the meaning of religion. Moreover, a definition of religion will be influenced by the interests of the person defining it.

As an all-inclusive value the concept of religion as such remains indefinable. The given definitions are mostly valutative than descriptive, functional than substantive. They often tell us what religion ought to be, and how it frequently operates in the individual.

In the psychology of religion H. W. CLARK distinguishes three types of such conceptions: an existential trend which refuses to mark off religion from other aspects of psychic life; a sociological trend which emphasizes the social aspect of religion, and tends to see it as arising from the give-and-take between human beings. (Religion is here more or less identified with ethics); and finally, a psychological trend which puts the whole emphasis on the individual and his experiences.

Evidently any psychological description of religion must be corroborated by theological considerations which place the individual first and foremost at the feet of the Beyond. A comprehensive description must therefore include all the different aspects.

b) What Religion Is Not

Taking FREUD as our point of departure, whose speculations were based more on observation of actual (acute neurotic) cases than on a thoroughgoing analysis of man's total personality, we establish the following negative conclusions.

1. Religion is not merely *an imitative repetition* of ritualistic verbalizations. Religious rites and rituals, as they call forth the aspirations and anxieties, pe-
titions and promises, availability and gratitude of the worshipper, have evidently meaning in the total context of a truly religious way of life. It is a pity that FREUD could see "nothing but" neurotic symptoms there. But those observances should not become a matter of religious routine or convention accepted solely on authority, nor a mechanical process of conditioning and imitation. We do not deny that ritualistic verbal expressions can be a stimulus and help to genuine spiritual life. A child-like reliance can certainly grow from credulity to real faith. Hence we do not share the opinion that the religious observances of a rather considerable number of church-goers whose spiritual capacities are "just invincibly absent" are useless and rewardless, having nothing to contribute to genuine religion. Yet the child-like spontaneity and awe demanded by Christ should not be interpreted as a childish credulity. It is true that Christ chose simple and child-like fishermen to be his disciples and eventually pillars of the Church. But they never remained childish; they were considerably critical, creative, tolerant and autonomous.

2. Consequently, religion is not an escape from or into reality.

FREUD believed that the return of the repressed exhausted the content of religion. As a regression to the past and as a projection into the future, religion does not leave the individual in the present. The magical religion of early childhood is not far different from the magical practices of primitives. Both long for security. Religion stands to promise and to offer consolation and security. But it cannot be denied that a religion that offers too much security in life here or hereafter, often invites at least the average believer to magical beliefs and practices. Christianity with its dogma of universal re-

39. In questions about religion and God Freud preferred to use the phrase "nothing but" ("nichts anderes als"). Thus the religious view of the world "nothing but psychology projected into the external world". The Psychopathology of Everyday Life, GW IV 257; SE VI 258; Again, a personal God "nothing other than an exalted father". Totem and Taboo, GW IX 177; SE XIII 147
41. Many of the social scientists who analysed the churches have not painted a very flattering picture. E. L. Thorndike, a careful investigator concluded that the churches are no more than clubs of estimable people, interested in preserving traditional rites and ceremonies rather than forces for human betterment. E. L. THORNDIKE, Your City (New York 1939) 99
42. Cfr. above, Part One, Chapter Three, C 2
demption and of predestination, with its practice of 'absolving' sin and guilt has a greater danger in this respect. A theology which explains life on earth as a mere preparation for the life to come is often (mis)interpreted in the literal sense. Religion is seen as "wholly the other."

An "escape into reality" is equally regrettable. It breeds a narrow outlook on life and a kind of shallowness in thinking. In extreme cases it drives a believer into a state of a mania; he is distracted in thinking about himself because of an over-concern for the insignificant details of his immediate environment. "He is just a little too afraid of living and letting live; of tolerating opinions opposed to his own". Religion exists for him, as W. JAMES puts it, as "an acute fever". Religious scapegoatism and a "martyr complex" come to crown this attitude.

3. Religion is not a spiritual rarity. Religion offers high ideals and sublime goals. W. JAMES describes "saintliness" as the flower of religious life. A pure giving up of the conventional life in an urge to serve God is said to be the hallmark of a saint. One honours certainly St. Francis of Assisi or a Carthusian monk, but can hardly imagine imitating them, much less placing them as a common ideal. An "abnorm" cannot be taken as a norm.

We cannot call saintliness a suffering in the form of masochism, which in extreme forms involves deliberately inflicted privations, tortures or even mutilations 'for the sake of God'. W. JAMES quotes from the autobiography of the Blessed Henry Suso, a 14th century German mystic and ascetic as an

44. Long ago Jesus had condemned this attitude of looking for splinter in neighbour's eye neglecting the beam in one's own. Lc. 6 : 41 — 42
45. W. H. CLARK, The Psychology of Religion, 26. "Many sturdy sons of the Church are of this type. They are people who vigorously defend her interests and lay about them with lusty strokes to see that others are coerced by the letter of Church law, just as they themselves are coerced by forms, the substance of which they have never experienced and cannot understand".
46. He wrote the 'Varieties of Religious Experience' about this kind
47. H. W. CLARK, The Psychology of Religion, 175
48. Varieties, Lectures 11 — 13
49. He is said to have devised such methods as an undergarment studded with a hundred and fifty brass nails, sharpened and so fixed as to pierce his skin, a cross with thirty protruding needles and nails just under his body; over a period of twenty-five years he never took a bath, and strove to attain such a high degree of purity that he would neither
example of pathological extremes.

4. Religious belief is never a purely passive acceptance of an imposed dogmatic proposition. It is rather a personal commitment to the propositions accepted as a basis for living. It involves a total commitment, including instinctual and affective elements. Faith is "I believe in..." more than "I believe that...".  

5. From a sociological point of view, religion is not a mere "religious civilization". No true religion is monogamously married to a particular form of civilization. Partly we agree with P. TILLICH that "religion is the substance (the meaning-giving substance) of culture and culture the form of religion". Yet, is it not the sad fate of Christianity today that the dynamic and partly radical message of Christ is encapsulated in the conservative social structure of Western civilization? Where vested interests are sustained, hypocrisy is inevitable. We are afraid, a certain amount of self-congratulation resulting from a sense of economic and social superiority breeds a smugness and a kind of religious bigotry, at least tolerantly overlooked, if not pragmatically cherished, even today in (Western) Christianity, be it in questions of colonial and neo-colonial exploitations or in racial problems or the like.  

6. Religion is not an interest, but a value. Any true religion must outgrow social, political and economic interests of a particular group, be it the power-drive of the luxury-seeking Western man, or the beggar-mentality of the poor.

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scratch nor touch any part of his body other than hands and feet. Cfr. H. W. CLARK, The Psychology of Religion, 176 — 77

50. L. HODGSON, Christian Faith and Practice (Oxford 1950) Ch. 1

51. P. TILLICH, Die verlorene Dimension: Not und Hoffnung unserer Zeit (Hamburg 1964) 59

52. By this term we refer to those social and political structures which try to preserve the existing 'status quo', precisely because they are in a better position, whatever be the reasons for their material success.

53. The moral norms of the Church are said to be mitigated according to the needs (situations) of man. But we are afraid, the Western way of life is often taken as the standard here. Thus the pragmatic (pastoral?) position of the Catholic Church on problems connected with birth-control is a source of confusion today. Consequently, countries like India, where people at large (93% not Christians) respect the teachings of Christ, but suffer poverty and hunger because of population explosion, stand between the devil and the deep sea. At the same time leaders of Western (Christian) countries lament over the dwindling number of birth rate today.
circles. There are people today who think that Christianity has long been a possession of the so-called First World and therefore cherishes its interests. We do not deny that the Churches are doing much for the betterment of the poor nations. Yet, we do not think that the Churches do full justice to the teachings of Christ merely by attempting to collect and distribute the *bread of charity* to the starving and the dying. The Churches seem to preach even today especially to the Third and Fourth worlds a kind of "predestined" resignation in view of the "eschatological" triumph and consolations. No wonder, if the poor nations are going after the Marxian promises. Is FREUD justified in his claim: "The writings of Marx have taken the place of the Bible"?54

In conclusion, it must be said that religion is no guarantee for any social structures. If ideologies and concrete systems are in continuous flux, religion must incarnate itself in particular cultures according to time and place. That is why we said, FREUD was wrong when he arrived at religion *per se* from its Western form alone.55 If a concrete form of religion became an inhibitive super-power, as FREUD suspected the Christianity of his time, it was no reason to conclude that religion as such was an alienating force.56

Moreover, we leave some room for illusions, projections and wish-fulfillments, even for neurosis in the concrete form of religion. But, what is projected is more than the projection itself, the illness more than mere symptoms. Not only healthy-mindedness but also suffering, feelings of helplessness, uncanniness and mystery can and do insinuate a 'religious' sense.57 Do they have any further existential value at all? Psycho-analysis is not the sole yardstick here and it cannot utter the last word about it.58

54. FREUD, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW XV 195; SE XXII 180
55. FREUD, The Future of an Illusion, GW XIV 363; SE XXI 38; New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW XV 182; SE XXII 168—69
56. As R. GARAUDY said: "Religion cannot be considered solely in terms of alienation: alienation is in the answers, but not in the questions". From Anathema to Dialogue (New York 1966) 89
57. Cfr. E. WESTERMARK, Christianity and Morals (London 1939) 6ff
58. A good number of contemporary phenomenologists, for example, welcome religion as "manifestly a content or element of human experience". J. C. FEAVER, "Philosophy and Religion", in Id. / W. HORASZ, Religion in Philosophical and Cultural Perspective (Princeton-Toronto-London 1967) 6
In the institutionalized and organized form of religion there is always the danger of identifying the institution and dogmatism with religion as such. FREUD was no exception to such a guilt of generalization of pars pro toto.

c) From the Phenomenology to the Sources of Religion

Religion is generally understood as a meeting with God, contact with the Holy, a conscious union with the Divine or the apprehension of the Supreme.

RUDOLF OTTO stands unique in the history of the phenomenological studies of religion. His starting-point is the peculiarities of the religious phenomena. He defined the idea of the Holy as an apriori category and established a ‘schematization’ of the rational and irrational in the complex idea of the Holy. According to him religion begins with itself. The Holy or the Numinous stands on itself. God and religion must be considered in themselves (‘in reiner Wesenschau’) independent of any ‘Entwicklungsschema’ (scheme of development). Yet, the rational and the irrational sides are inextricably interwoven. OTTO helps us to dive deep into the transcendence of the phenomena, into the numinal reality, into the hidden substantive sources.

Contemporary phenomenologists of religion aim at reaching the same

59. H. R. SCHLETTE, “Religion”, LThK VIII 1164
60. S. RADHAKRISHNAN, An Idealist View of Life (London 1961) 161
62. Cfr. B. HÄRING, Das Heilige und das Gute (München 1950) 168f
64. “Religion fängt mit sich an”. Ibid. 160
65. Cfr. B. HÄRING, Das Heilige und das Gute, 170
66. “... die rationale Seite in der Gottheit ist von der rationalen keineswegs so unterschieden als ob diese ihr weniger wesentlich zukäme als jene”. R. OTTO, Das Heilige, 121
67. Some of the important works are: G. von der LEEUW, Phänomenologie der Religion (Groningen 1940); M. ELIADE, Images et Symboles (Paris 1952); Id., Mythes, Reves et Mystere (Paris 1956); H. DUMERY, Phenomenologie et Religion (Paris 1958); G. MENSCHING, Die Religion (Stuttgart 1959); M. ELIADE (ed.), The History of Religions: Essays in Methodology (Chicago 1959); B. KRISTENSEN, The Meaning of
goal of the totality of being. From the phenomena one can arrive at the numinous reality through different ways. Thus for instance, one may start from the universal and primal fact of finitude, or one may take the empirical ego as the point of departure and arrive at the transcendental ego, which is in close affinity with the transcendental realm or the totality of being. Even from the analysis of daily experience and frustration one can go back. Love as the highest form of intersubjectivity is placed here as the pivot of all human values.

Yet, the phenomenological approach to religion, as it is interested only in relating man to God, is incomplete in itself. If God leaves Himself to be sought by men, He Himself comes out to seek man. Moreover, the religion of the individual or the so called religious phenomena are transmitted through and conditioned by history. Man owes his faith, to a large extent, to the belief and value systems of an epoch of history, for the simple reason that man is born into a pre-existing society and to a pre-fabricated Weltanschauung. That is why M. BUBER said:

"Religion must, of course, be described in such a way that its special characteristics do not evaporate into universality but are instead seen as grounded on the fundamental relation to the whole of life".

In other words, the phenomenology of religion cannot isolate itself from theology (revelation) and from the history of religion.

d) Experience of Religion: Psychological Considerations

In considering the psychological sources of religion, FREUD started from the symbolism of paternity. The primordial sense of guilt and the consequent identifications were, according to him, the source of and the way to an ethi-
cal and religious awareness. Had he not stopped short on the way and introduced his fabulous murder-theory, his "father-image" would not have been encapsulated in the mythology of individual repressions. Yet, one should not forget that FREUD actually left the question of religious experience open. He never denied the possibility of a religious awareness, the so called 'oceanic feeling'. True, he could not witness to it in himself, yet he respected it in others, as he was convinced that he had no right to deny its occurrence in other people. The whole problem was whether or not such an experience the *fons et origo* of every religious need. Diving deep into its etiology, FREUD arrived at the primitive helplessness of man and no further. Nevertheless, the very fact that he posed such a question is important for us.

Among the short notes written by FREUD towards the close of his life, one reads: "Mysticism, the obscure self-perception of the realm outside the ego, of the id". One finds no further comments. Probably he meant that the drives of the id symbolize man's relation to the problem of meaning in life.

Phenomenologists argue that religious experience is a basic element of human experience as such, an element that intensifies, vitalizes, enhances every human function down through the various phases of life. One may here distinguish between primary and secondary experience, an essential or 'accidental' experience, parallel to R. OTTO's 'sacral ethos' and 'schematized ethos'.

72. Cfr. A. VERGOTE, "Interpretazioni psicologiche dei fenomeni religiosi nell' ateismo contemporaneo", in Ateismo Contemporaneo I (Torino 1967) 352f
73. FREUD stated: "... darf ich aber sein tatsächliches Vorkommen bei anderen nicht bestreiten". Civilization and Its Discontents, GW XIV 432; SE XXI 65
74. P. HOMANS argues that "Freud created two levels of psychic reality, assigning religious experience to the repressed unconscious, thereby ... removing it as a factor in any normative understanding or interpretation of psychic life". "Toward a Psychology of Religion: By Way of Freud and Tillich", in Id. (ed.) The Dialogue between Theology and Psychology (Chicago-London 1968) 59
75. They are some short notes written by Freud as 'daily agenda', and published as "Ergebnisse, Ideen, Probleme", GW XVII 151f; SE XXIII 299f
76. Ibid. GW XVII 152; SE XXIII 300
77. P. KOESTENBAUM, "Religion in the Tradition of Phenomenology", op. cit. 207. "Eros symbolizes man’s relation to being as a whole. It contains in germinal form the answer to the problem of the meaning of life offered by religion through its command ‘Love thy neighbour’.
From the "ambiguous fringes of experience" a phenomenologist arrives at an "intentional stream of consciousness" and finally, at the totality of being. The primordial form of meeting or encounter with the totality or ground of being, with the Holy, is a religious awareness. It is more than a mere feeling ("ein Gefühl"). It is rather a basic existential confrontation which involves an "audio-visual-contact". Even if it is only a momentary 'Blick', it goes to the innermost depth of being. More than a feeling it is a witnessing. Call it ecstasy, rupture, transcendental awareness, mysticism or the like, it is something of everything — an ineffable human awareness at its richest. Thus a true religion is no apriori categorization.

Nevertheless, religious experience should not be confined to some peak-occurrences, such as sudden conversions or dramatic forms of ecstasy; nor is it a "warm puppy-hugging emotion". That is why G. SANTHAYANA wanted to confront God in "the mysterious but momentous background, which philosophers and other men mean to describe by their definitions of myths or sensible images".

In short, the individual consciousness unfolds also a 'transcendent' or 'religious' layer of reality. An individual in his self-awareness integrates past and future into a coherent biography. "The personal identity of an historical individual is, thus, the subjective expression of the objective significance of a

80. P. KOESTENBAUM, "Religion in the Tradition of Phenomenology", op. cit. 191f
81. G. MENSCHEING mentions a vision and an audition in such an experience. Cfr. Id., 'Religion' RGG V 963
82. Cfr. A. VERGOTE, Psychologie religieuse (Bruxelles 1966) 90ff; In addition to the works quoted above in note 31, cfr. also: M. SCHELER, Vom Ewigen im Menschen (Leipzig 1921); A. KINAST, Religionspsychologische Grundlegung (London 1928); C. G. JUNG, Psychologie der Religion (Zürich 1940); W. TRILLHASS, Die Innere Welt (München 1953); W. H. CLARK, The Psychology of Religion (London 1958); J. RUDIN, Psychotherapie und Religion (Frankfurt 1960)
83. "It is experience revealed in a certain light, perspective or horizon. We commonly designate this light, perspective, horizon, this receptive openness or availability, as faith". E. G. BOZZO, "Theology and Religious Experience", Theological Studies 31 (1970) 419
84. Ibid.
86. G. SANTHAYANA, "Dewy's Naturalistic Metaphysics" in, Obiter Scripta (New York 1936) 240

Kottayarikil, FREUD
historical world-view". Hence a psychology of the human person, in the ultimate analysis, is also a psychology of religion, even in the Freudian psycho-analysis.

e) Love as a Potent Source of Religious Experience

WILLIAM JAMES distinguished two different but basic expressions of religious sentiment: the religion of healthy-mindedness and that of the sick soul as two roads to religious growth. They should not be understood as two diametrically opposed routes, because each individual is a blend of the two: a "healthy-mind" and a "sick soul". They could be compared to the life instinct and death urge of the Freudian theory.

Religion of healthy-mindedness as described by CLARK is: "1) optimistic and happy, 2) extroverted and unreflective, 3) usually associated with a more liberal form of theology, and 4) conducive to a gradual form of religious growth".

Biologically speaking healthy-mindedness implies an immunity from disease and suffering, conflict and passivity. It is a condition in which the life-urge dominates, and activity reduces inhibitions to the minimum. But this life-wish is ultimately a wish for response which will provide security. FREUD thus described the Eros as the urge for union and communion, standing to unite ever more living substances to greater communion which, of course, is threatened by the equally potent death-urge. The life-wish comes to its peak in the reproductive urge by which the individual attempts to paint his name in the history of eternity. Thus the life-urge goes back, and at the same time

88. P. HOMANS, "Toward a Psychology of Religion: By Way of Freud and Tillich", op. cit. 67f
89. Cfr. W. H. CLARK, The Psychology of Religion, Ch. 8, pp.154f. He concluded: "The religious consciousness may grow through two opposed psychological modes, that of healthy-mindedness or suffering ... While it is the healthy-minded who are the executives or religious action, it is those who are able to face and give meaning to their sufferings from whom come the profoundest interpretations of the spiritual life" Ibid. 187
90. Ibid. 155
forward. Here the individual senses a return to the "Father" as an indispensable condition of human existence. In some sense FREUD was not wrong when he said that the individual projects the father image onto God. At the same time it is a forward process. As FREUD once said, "the child is father to the man".91

Thus any true religion is an answer to the life-wish, to the wish for response. It is a religion of love. In Christianity "God is love" who is made manifest in Jesus Christ who brings to the world the love of the Father and brings back to the Father the love of the children. He is the eternal model of friendships and fellowships among men.

Equally important is the other route — suffering. Long ago CARLYLE wrote: "Man's unhappiness comes of his greatness; it is because there is an Infinite in him, which with all his cunning he cannot quite bury under the Finite".92 Suffering from external sources such as catastrophes, dangers, sickness and the like as well as from internal sources such as conflicts, neurosis and so on may insinuate religious sentiments. From the analysis of different religious leaders including the prophet Jeremiah, W. H. CLARK concluded: "Suffering has been the matrix out of which have emerged life's greatest activities".93 In and through their suffering they recognized the God-given mission of loving and serving fellowmen. "Through God they saw themselves linked with others. Their God-given mandate was to serve others, and it was their contact with reality through their service that kept them sane".94

This is valid not only for the religious leaders, but for human beings in general. If suffering is so to say ingrained to the human nature, some time or other every one has to be confronted with that God-given moment — the Kairos — in pain and suffering, sickness and "evil". After all, every suffering is a call for love; it is an expression of the need for love. Suffering is ultimately the feeling of the distance from God, and only God can provide an an-

91. FREUD, The Claims of Psycho-Analysis to Scientific Interest, GW VIII 412; SE XIII 193
94. Ibid. 362
Hence in healthy-mindedness as well as in suffering love becomes a potent source of religion. The life-wish of the healthy-minded as well as the death-urge that dominates the sufferings on earth appeal to the need for love. A personal God, who is Love, is the only ultimate answer to this need.

f) Religion an Existential Dimension

From the above given descriptions it becomes clear that the genuine form of religion is always an existential dimension, a deeper 'layer' of the self-consciousness of the individual. Thus G. MENSCHING defined religion as an experiential meeting with the Holy Reality and a corresponding moral conduct of the existentially determined man. According to G. ALLPORT:

"A man's religion is the audacious bid he makes to bind himself to creation and to Creator. It is his ultimate attempt to enlarge and to complete his own personality by finding the supreme context in which he rightly belongs."

However, we find the definition given by W. H. CLARK more realistic:

"It is our feeling that religion can be most characteristically described as the inner experience of the individual when he senses a Beyond, especially as evidenced by the effect of this experience on his behavior when he actively attempts to harmonize his life with the Beyond."

All these descriptions of religion agree on one point: religion is seen not as a unilateral conformation but as a dialogal confrontation. In a true religion a vertical commitment co-ordinates the horizontal connections. Thus religion is at the same time a call and a response, conquest and surrender, "Wort" and "Antwort". It points not only to a man who seeks God in the desert of his loneliness but also to a God who 'seeks' man in the fullness of His Being. As it shall be explained further, one perceives the intimate relationship between religion and morality at this point.

If existence implies co-existence, if self-awareness implies an awareness of

95. G. MENSCHING, "Religion", RGG V 961
96. G. W. ALLPORT, The Individual and His Religion, 142
the ‘otherness’, if subjectivity implies an ‘outgoing’ into the world around oneself, intentionally reshaping it, the highest form of such an intersubjectivity, signifies a meeting of the I with the Thou in order to form the We. Thus from the phenomena of being one arrives at its totality, and ultimately at the very Ground of Being. A true religion is therefore, “an existence-communication”, a kind of “personal community in word and response”.

Moreover, the quest for meaning is crucial in human life. Some time or other, every one feels the need for meaning in life, which enables one to come out of the prison of his solitude. P. TILlich qualified it as “existential anxiety”, the normal form of anxiety inherent in human life and universally present. Religion supplies the answer to this cry for meaning and thus it becomes a unique means of coping with anxiety. Religion is therefore not, as FREUD thought, a tyranny over the native impulses of the individual.

g) Beyond Neurotic Projections: Christianity as Religion ‘par excellence’

As FREUD looked at religion not from its real sources, but from what it developed into, he saw in it only a neurotic projection, a defence mechanism used by the individual ego in order to surmount the anxiety aroused by the super-ego. The ego here attempts to achieve a partial or substitutive satisfaction through a compensation for the originally lost object-cathexes. The God of religion thus becomes an “Ersatzlibido”, and religion, a reservoir of illusions and neurotic projections of intra-family relations.

It should be observed here that a projection per se need not mean a neurotic symptom or a defence mechanism of the ego. It can be a mere “apperceptive distortion”. Moreover, in the religious sphere a projection can be “a mediate form of activity about another activity rooted in the creative mo-

98. G. M. A. JANSEN, An Existential Approach to Theology, 4f
99. B. HARING, Das Gesetz Christi (Freiburg 1963) 76: “... personale Gemeinschaft in Wort und Antwort”.
100. P. TILlich, The Courage to Be (New Haven 1952) Chapters 2 and 3
101. L. E. ABT / L. BELLAK, Projective Psychology (New York 1950) 7f
ment of the immediate form of religious experience ... The projective world is subjectivized world of personal interpretations”. 102

Even though projection comes to be counted as a neurotic symptom, it does not indicate that religion *per se* is a neurotic projection; neurotic projections may find their way also in the field of religion. 103

From a closer analysis of the religion preached by CHRIST one sees that this is a religion of mature relationships, of sincere conduct and of honest behaviour. One time he asked us to love him more than father and mother, son and daughter. 104 On another occasion he asked ‘man’ to leave father and mother and join his wife in order to create a communion. 105

Moreover, one cannot blame Christianity for using a projective language. The Second Vatican Council, for example, using the analogy of the ‘Word’ present in both Testaments, 106 insisted that ours is an economy of *word and faith*. God sent his son, the eternal Word, who enlightens all men, so that he might dwell among men and tell them the innermost realities about God. 107 Jesus Christ, therefore, the Word made flesh, sent as ‘a man to men’, speaks the words of God 108 and completes the work of salvation which his Father gave him to do. 109

As J. RATZINGER pointed out, intellectualism and doctrinalism can comprehend very little about the nature of this language, “which is not concerned with talking *about* something that is quite external to the person, but with the realization of the existence of man, with the relation of the human ‘I’ to the divine ‘Thou’, so that the purpose of this dialogue is ultimately not information, but unity and transformation”. 110

102. W. HOROSZ, “Religion and Cultures in Modern Perspective”, op. cit. p 311
104. Mt. 10:37 – 39
105. Mt. 10:4f
106. Cfr. Heb. 1:1 – 4
109. Dei Verbum, Art. 4, ABBOT, 113
In this connection R. LATOURELLE observes that, through faith in the message of the Word we achieve an encounter with the living God, as a prelude to the face-to-face final vision. The language of revelation is, therefore, a language of Word, Testimony and Encounter. Hence Christianity uses a language of love and communion.

"The revelation of God to mankind was thus formed in the conscious human experience of Jesus Christ, sustained by his love". Thus revelation and faith have to be counted as a "work of love":

"Faith is thus not submission to the arbitrary will of God who is pleased to claim the homage of the human mind, but rather man's recognition of God's plan of love and his free entry into that plan; it is an overture to divine friendship, inviting us to share in God's own life". If God revealed Himself as love, He is Love. St. John qualifies this love as follows:

"That love resides, not in our showing any love for God, but in his showing love for us first, when he sent out his son to the atonement for our sins". God thus unfolds Himself through the mystery of love. Man in his turn, comes across the love of God in the innermost recesses of his heart, when he "keeps true to his Word". In love God reveals Himself to man, and in love man surrenders himself to God. If Christ is the fullness of this love, Christianity is the visible sign of the same love.

2. What is Morality?

Here again, we analyse the concept of morality, particularly as related to the Freudian conclusions.

111. R. LATOURELLE, Theology of Revelation (New York 1966) 315f
112. G. MORAN, Theology of Revelation (London 1967) 71
113. R. LATOURELLE, Theology of Revelation, 327
114. 1 Jn. 4 : 10 - 11
115. 1 Jn. 2 : 5
a) Morality, a General Outlook

As we pointed out earlier, Freud used the terms ‘morality’ and ‘ethics’ almost synonymously. But some technical differences between them cannot be overlooked.

Morality, derived from the original “mos, moris” (‘Sitte’) denotes “the harmonizing of human conduct to the idea of the good”. ‘Morals’ as understood today are of a more ‘juridical’ connotation. Moral norms and prescriptions — morality from an objective point of view — are distinct from morality as an existential relation of the free will to the good.

Ethics as such reflect and concentrate upon the ‘natural’ morality of human acts, relating man as a human being to his ‘natural’ virtues. It is generally understood as the science of morals independent of faith and religion.

A moral action is, to a large extent, determined by a pre-made mould. “Moral action is action in accordance with values. Fundamentally these values are determined by our biological nature and our innate psychological equipment”.

E. H. Erikson differentiates an ethical sense from a moral sense, basing himself on the psycho-dynamics of development; for a moral sense develops at an earlier and more immature stage.

“The moral sense in its perfections and in its perversions, has been an intrinsic part of man’s evolution, while the sense of ideological rejuvenation has pervaded his revolutions, both with prophetic idealism and with destructive fanaticism.”

116. Cfr. above, Chapter Four
118. Freud used the terms: “Moral”, “Sittlichkeit” and “Moralität”
119. W. Tillehass, “Sittlichkeit”, RGG VI 60
120. J. C. Flugel, Man, Morals and Society (London 1945) 16
121. E. H. Erikson, Insight and Responsibility (New York 1964) 222
121. Ibid. 226
FREUD defined morality in its inherited and institutionalized form as "renunciation of instincts", more concretely as a curtailment of the sexual drives. P. TILLICH identified it with the "European moralism" and the "American Puritanism". P. RIEFF went a step further and stated: "Our inherited moral systems have not been either alive enough or dead enough to permit fulfilment of our rising expectations of happiness". E. H. ERIKSON brings the antinomy between moralism and ethics in the following words: "Highly moralistic people can do unethical things while an ethical man's involvement in immoral doings becomes by inner necessity an occasion for tragedy".

Such a polarisation between ethics as a human value and morals as a source of inhibition is clearly manifest in FREUD's approach to morality. We agree with FREUD on the insufficiency and danger of an authoritarian moralism of the super-ego, and we are of opinion that it must be replaced by an ego-morality. On the other hand, an unbiased student of ethics cannot stop short where FREUD stopped and wanted to stop others.

b) The Case against an Authoritarian Super-Ego Moralism

As we have dealt with this point sufficiently on earlier occasions, here it is enough to refer to a key-statement of FREUD:

"The super-ego applies the strictest moral standard to the helpless ego which is at its mercy; in general it represents the claims of morality, and we realize all at once that our moral sense of guilt is the expression of the tension between the ego and the super-ego".

123. FREUD, Moses and Monotheism, GW XVI 187 — 88; SE XXIII 81 — 82
124. FREUD, Civilized Sexual Morality and Modern Nervous Illness, GW VII 157 — 58; SE IX 194 — 95
125. P. TILLICH, Morality and Beyond (New York 1963) 14f
127. E. H. ERIKSON, Insight and Responsibility, 222. According to him, a true ethical sense of the young adult finally encompasses and goes beyond moral restraints and ideal visions, and insists on concrete commitments.
128. FREUD, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW XV 67; SE XII 61
This super-ego morality seems to represent "only the parent's strictness and severity". 129

J. C. FLUGEL, following the Freudian line of thought, delineated four main elements or sources of such a super-ego moralism: 130 1) The narcissistic libido directed to the formation of the ego-ideal — the first step to the formation of the super-ego. For part of the libido directed to oneself, conceived as the 'real-self', does not permanently satisfy one's narcissism. Conscious of this limitation, one forms the ideal. 131 2) Through the process of introjection moral attitudes and precepts, primarily the negative ones, are incorporated into oneself from outside world. 3) On account of a recoil against the self of aggression aroused by frustrating objects in the outer world, the moral standards in the individual become more severe. 4) The relations between the super-ego and the ego become more sado-masochistic in character. On account of these sado-masochistic tendencies the individual becomes, concludes E. FROMM, "not only the obedient slave but also the strict task-master who treats himself as his own slave". 132

An authoritarian conscience is, therefore, the final outcome of an internalization of an external authority, which is consciously or unconsciously accepted as a moral legislator. 133 It is in this sense that FREUD says that the individual ego will be changed according to the father image. 134 Thus the super-ego morality obtains an extremely legalistic and severe character.

The super-ego moralism has further a taboo-nature. FREUD believed that our inherited moral codes are rationalizations or secondary elaborations of the two primitive taboos, on incest and parricide. 135 Hence, "Taboo conscience is probably the earliest form in which the phenomenon of conscience is met with". 136 It has also an obsessive-compulsive characteristic and it demands an unconditional conformism to the objectively dictated norms. Thus the

129. Ibid. GW XV 68; SE XXII 62
130. J. C. FLUGEL, Man, Morals and Society, 34 — 39
131. FREUD, The Ego and the Id, GW XIII 258; SE XIX 30
132. E. FROMM, Man for Himself, 150 — 51
133. Ibid. 144
134. FREUD, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW XV 69; SE XXII 63; ("... nach dem Vorblld des Vaters verändert")
135. FREUD, Totem and Taboo, GW IX 173; SE XIII 143
136. Ibid. GW IX 85; SE XIII 67
super-ego morality becomes in the individual a principle of pre-personal or impersonal, anonymous and unconscious censorship and control. J. GLASER compared this super-ego norm to a genuine form of conscience. We give here the important points with some adaptations:

**Super-ego**

- commands performance of acts to make oneself lovable
- introverted, self-value oriented
- static, repetition of primitive commands
- authority-oriented, rotating around the axis of father-figure
- "atomised", mechanical functioning,
- faced to the past

- urge for punishment in order to earn reconciliation
- exaggeration of and disproportion between guilt experienced and norm transgressed; weight of the authority is the determining factor

**Conscience**

- invites to love, an act of other-oriented commitment, to create self-value
- extroverted value-centre
- dynamic, integrative and contextual
- value-oriented, response to the chosen values
- total personality involvement
- faced to the future, the past is used in order to structure the future
- awareness of self-repair

- guilt experienced in proportion to the value transgressed

Thus it becomes a fundamental task for moral theories and practices to distinguish the genuine moral sense from a pseudo-moralism, an ethics

138. Cfr. C. ODIER, Les deux sources consciente et inconsciente de la vie morale (Neuchatel 1943); I. LEPP, The Depth of the Soul (New York 1965); D. BELGUM,
emanating from love and self-awareness from morals based on helplessness and fear of the individual. Here one cannot overlook FREUD who "subverted the expectations of a life based on older schemes of an authoritative, set, hierarchical order of conduct".  

**c) Moral Development**

We acknowledge the value and worth of the Freudian contributions, particularly on the danger of the super-ego moralism. Yet, the Freudian conceptions do not and cannot give a full account of the moral development in the individual. Acquisition of morality meant for FREUD the installation of an extraneous agency. Though its content is determined by the content of human civilization and particular culture, such a moral sense is according to him, neither infused by God nor ingrained to human nature:

"We may reject the existence of an original, as it were natural, capacity to distinguish good from bad."

It is instead acquired from the society, more concretely from one's parents. Thus the Freudian concept of morality is imitational, it is learned. But such a learning process as described by FREUD in his theory of identification is almost equivalent to the classical respondent conditioning, that is, a conditioning primarily of the emotional responses. It is but one, though substantial, part of the complicated process of acquiring and developing a moral sense.

According to modern social psychologists, individual morality has three essential dimensions — knowledge, feeling and conduct, and at least four different sorts of learning are involved in the process of the moralization of the individual. They are:

Guilt: Where Psychology and Religion Meet, (New Jersy 1963); M. ORAISON, Was ist die Sünde? (Frankfurt 1968); P. TOURNIER, Echtes und falsches Schuldgefühl (Freiburg 1967)

139. P. RIEFF, The Triumph of the Therapeutic, 56
140. Cfr. FREUD, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW XV 67; SE XXII 61
141. FREUD, Civilization and Its Discontents, GW XIV 483; SE XXI 124
— cognitive learning (of concepts or norms)
— instrumental learning or operant conditioning (behaviour reshaped by selective reinforcement)
— imitation or learning by identification (one models oneself on another)
— respondent conditioning (of automatic, especially emotional responses)

"The acquisition of moral knowledge must chiefly involve cognitive learning; conduct seems to depend on both instrumental conditioning and imitation; feeling probably depends on classical conditioning".\(^ {143} \)

The Freudian concept of morality as the idealized parental imago — the super-ego with its manifestations in moral anxiety and guilt-feeling, seems to be rooted in the realm of moral feeling. Thus it must be presumed that the moral feeling determines here moral knowledge and moral conduct.

Such a moral theory of "unprocessed reflection" is no more tenable. As there are inconsistencies in adult moralities, it must be taken for granted that a child does process his standards according to his intellectual capacities. PIAGET, for example, has come to this conclusion.\(^ {144} \) Thus the conscious determination of an adult moral conduct comes from a moral judgement which is founded primarily on knowledge, and not on feeling. At the same time, the unconscious determination of individual feelings cannot be under-valued. In practical life it will be no easy task to differentiate the one from the other. Is that the reason why FREUD never tried to combine the emotional and rational elements in morality — the super-ego morality and the adult (ego) ethics?

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143. Ibid. 412
d) Ego-Morality a Universally Acceptable Concept

As FREUD insisted on establishing the primacy of the ego over the id,\(^{145}\) we assume that the ethics of honesty formulated by him belongs to the realm of ego-morality. As H. HARTMANN observed, FREUD never identified himself with any moral systems, nor did he develop any. He rather preferred to talk about the difference between true statements about facts and what one often calls ‘moral truth’.\(^{146}\)

Yet his approach as such points to the ego as the source of moral values. E. M. PATTISON defined ego-morality\(^{147}\) as “the process and mechanism of balanced independent interplay between superego, ego ideal, narcissistic image and autonomous ego values”.\(^{148}\) The ego is seen as the ultimate ground and final common pathway for establishing values and moral choices. Nevertheless, the ego is conditioned by several factors. Consciously chosen values cannot be completely isolated from the unconscious ‘values’ of the superego, and from other factors of personality. Moreover, the ego translates the absolute and perennial values into a concrete world of other egos. Therefore, the mature commitments of an individual are influenced by “his social matrix, and his mature moral decisions are not his alone to make but interdependent on the judgements and evaluations of his peers”.\(^{149}\)

Few people will deny that a moral sense is deeply embedded in the human mind. J. C. FLUGEL defined man as a “fundamentally moral animal”.\(^{150}\) Such a moral sense unfolds itself in different directions: ideals to be attained, restraints to be exercised, guilt to be felt and punishments to be endured. As

\(^{145}\) FREUD, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, GW XV 86; SE XXII 80

\(^{146}\) H. HARTMANN, Psychoanalysis and Moral Values, 14f


\(^{148}\) E. M. PATTISON, “Ego Morality”, op. cit., 201

\(^{149}\) Ibid. 204

\(^{150}\) J. C. FLUGEL, Man, Morals and Society, 240
we have pointed out, FREUD condemned mainly a transfiguration of values, and therefore, HARTMANN called him “a non-transvaluer of values”.\(^\text{151}\) Morality as such implies all the above mentioned elements, but none of them alone is the whole of morality.

Morality must be seen against the background of the totality of human person. As L. JANSENS observes, a morally good act is one which corresponds objectively in truth, to the human person considered in the light of reason and faith.\(^\text{152}\) Here reason and faith must be understood as meaning the totality of person. Thus true moralities are grounded on the (individual) person, who by nature transcends himself and ultimately ‘touches’ the totality of Being in the community of persons.

Here it should be concluded that the great critics of morality, including FREUD, do not preach a total subversion of all moral principles and ethical values, but they protest against a “moralistic super-structure”,\(^\text{153}\) and plead for a transition from the super-ego moralism to an ego-morality or humanistic ethics. J. C. FLUGEL advocated a transition from egocentricity to sociality, from the unconscious to the conscious, from autism to realism, from moral inhibition to spontaneous goodness, from aggression to tolerance and love, from fear to security, from heteronomy to autonomy, from orectic (moral) judgement to cognitive (psychological) judgement.\(^\text{154}\) And, that is the history of moral progress which we want now to apply to Christian morality.

e) Morality under a Christian Perspective

We distinguished a genuine form of morality from different kinds of smug moralisms. If moralism is a distortion of true moral imperatives into oppres-

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151. H. HARTMANN, Psychoanalysis and Moral Values, 19  
153. F. B. ELKISCH, “Morality and Psychology”, in J. M. TODD (ed.), The Springs of Morality: A Catholic Symposium (London 1956) 83. “It is not morality as such which psychology protests, but the false moralistic superstructure which is the cause of many neurotic tensions and breakdowns and which is wrongly identified with Christian morality by many psychologists”.  
154. J. C. FLUGEL, Man, Morals and Society, 242 – 55
sive laws which give birth to repressive moral systems and codes, a genuine morality is an experience of the moral imperatives that enable one to act as a person. P. TILLICH brings out the clear antinomy between the two as follows:  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Moralisms conditioned</th>
<th>Morality unconditional</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moralisms of authority</td>
<td>Morality of risk</td>
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<tr>
<td>Moralisms of law</td>
<td>Morality of Grace</td>
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<tr>
<td>Moralisms of justice</td>
<td>Morality of Love</td>
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This does not mean that a true morality is in no way conditioned, having no authority, law or justice. The difference lies evidently in attitude and approach. A genuinely religious morality, with a greater reason Christian morals, must be founded on the (human) person, on the ego. The independence of the ego should not be interpreted as an absolute relativism.

Here one has to look back to the history of moral progress. To some extent, FREUD was not wrong, when he said that religion and morality were inextricably intertwined in the primitive communities, where religion permeated social values, and social values animated religion. Judeo-Christian religion is no exception to it. Certainly it must be properly understood.

**Morality in the Old Testament** was determined by customs and traditions. Moral teachings of the OT must be traced under the perspective of the fidelity or infidelity to the great *Covenant* of Jahwe with his chosen people. The whole moral conduct was directed under the heavenly authority and the whole morality was attributed to Jahwe as if everything was willed and ordained by him directly. The demands of God of the Alliance are of moral order. Thus God gave directly commandments and laws. Israel, the

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155. P. TILLICH, Theology of Culture, 133
156. Ibid. 135 — 45
158. For a general outlook cfr., J. KOBELLE, Sünde und Gnade im religiösen Leben des Volkes Israel bis auf Christentum (München 1905); A. BÜCHLER, Studies in Sin and Atonement (London 1928); J. HEMPEL, Das Ethos des Alten Testamentes (München 1938); C. TRESMONTANT, La doctrine morale de Prophetes d’Israel (Paris 1958); J. SCHAMBERT, Urgeschichte und Heilsgeschichte (Mainz 1961); P. SCHOONENBERG, Man and Sin (London 1965)
chosen people of God thus received the law of holiness, which "originates from the two poles of the sanctification of life and the love towards the folk".\(^{160}\)

In the preaching of the Prophets 'ethical monotheism' came to the fore. Amos was thus regarded as "almost the incorporation of the moral law", and Isaiah as "the preacher of universal moral order".\(^{161}\) Moreover, "from the earliest to the latest period, it is God's demand, which comes vested with absolute authority, which is the strongest and dominating motive of human conduct".\(^{162}\) Gradually in the Jewish tradition religion and morality became almost identified.\(^{163}\) Morality here means moral laws and codes — Torah and Talmud.

In the New Testament, Jesus has, to a large extent, reversed the picture.\(^{164}\) By word and deed he actually preached a moral revolution. "You have heard that it was said to the men of old ... but I tell you ..." Such an antinomy expressed in six antitheses in Matthew\(^{165}\) must be understood, as W. GRUNDMANN tells us,\(^{166}\) in the light of the "better righteousness or justice ("die bessere Gerechtigkeit") introduced by Christ at the opening of

\(^{160}\) G. FOHRER, "Sittlichkeit; III. im AT", RGG VI 68. "Das Heiligkeitsgesetz geht von den beiden Polen der Heiligung des Lebens und der Liebe zum Volksgenossen und Fremdling aus".

\(^{161}\) G. von RAD, Old Testament Theology II (Edinburgh-London 1967) 298

\(^{162}\) W. EICHRODT, Theology of the Old Testament II (London 1967) 316


\(^{165}\) Mt. 5 : 21 – 22; 27 – 28; 31 – 32; 33 – 34; 38 –39; 43 – 44

\(^{166}\) W. GRUNDMANN, Das Evangelium nach Matthäus: Theologischer Handkommentar zum Neuen Testament I (Berlin 1968) 151f

47 Kottayarikil, FREUD
his great sermon on the mount\(^\text{167}\) and at the conclusion of its first part.\(^\text{168}\) "The better righteousness is unfolded in six antitheses".\(^\text{169}\)

This does not mean that Jesus completely subverted the Old Law. Those antitheses point rather to the radicalism of the New Law. Jesus contrasted his 'yoke' (Mt. 11: 28–30) with the yoke of the law — a familiar rabbinic expression. He called for a rest from "the intolerable burden of many commandments and precepts that formed the 'hedge' around the Jewish Law (Mt. 23: 4)".\(^\text{170}\) However, the radical preaching of Christ was no appeal to licence and lawlessness. The moral demand itself was radical. One is asked to leave away everything that comes as a hindrance (Mk. 9: 43–47) for the sake of the "kingdom of God and His Justice" (Mt. 3: 33). Jesus demanded an absolute and unconditional obedience to the Holy Will of God.\(^\text{171}\)

Jesus summed up his moral teaching in the new commandment of love.\(^\text{172}\) And, that is the golden rule:

"Do to other men all that you would have them do to you. That is the law and the prophets". (Mt. 7: 12)

Jesus witnessed to this commandment through word and deed. The prayer taught by him insists on the importance of forgiveness.\(^\text{173}\) The parable of the Good Samaritan (Lc. 10: 30–37) is the peak of the New Law of love. Do ut des does not work any more in the NT (Lc. 14: 12ff). A love of the master who washes the feet of his servants (Jn. 13: 4–15) is the new ideal.

"But that the world may know that I love the Father, and as the Father had given me commandment, so do I". (Jn. 14: 31)

"A new commandment I give unto you that you love one another, as I have loved you". (Jn. 13: 34)

Saint Paul epitomized his whole vision in one proposition: "Love of our neighbour refrains from doing harm of any kind; that is why it fulfils all the demands of the law" (Rm. 13: 10). Thus Christian morality comes to be

\(^{167}\) Mt. 5: 20: "And I tell you, if your justice does not give fuller measure than the justice of the Scribes and Pharisees, you shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven". 
\(^{168}\) Mt. 5: 48: "But you have to be perfect as your heavenly father is perfect". 
\(^{169}\) W. GRUNDMANN, Das Evangelium nach Matthäus, op. cit., 151 
\(^{171}\) Ibid. 74f 
\(^{172}\) Mt. 22: 34 – 40; Mc. 12: 28 – 34; Lc. 10: 25f 
\(^{173}\) Mt. 6: 12, compare with Mt. 5: 23f, Mc. 11: 25
recognized as "community in call and response". Thus love is the beginning of morality, it is the fullness of it, a love that does not exclude other virtues but animates them all. As B. HÄRING says: "Before one receives love as a commandment or moral law, one has the initial experience of the reality of love". Thus contemporary theologians insist on the profound existential values in moral theology — on Kairos (vigilance, metanoia), on the autonomy of the individual person, or on the so called Golden Rule. They all point to the great reality of love and its significance in human life.

The Second Vatican Council puts it in very clear terms:

"It grows increasingly true that the obligations of justice and love are fulfilled only if each person, contributing to the common good according to his own abilities and the needs of others, also promotes and assists the public and private institutions dedicated to bettering the conditions of human life".

The Council Fathers insisted on the need of a vital synthesis of the Christian life today. This is what the Council meant when it said that Moral Theology today must be renewed "by livelier contact with the mystery of Christ and the history of salvation".

In sum:

"Hence the norm of human activity is this: that in accord with the divine plan and will, it should harmonize with the genuine good of the human race, and allow men as individuals and as member of society to pursue..."

174. B. HÄRING, Das Gesetz Christi, 79
176. This is the central point of Prof. B. HÄRING's approach to moral problems, as we understand him from his lectures, seminars, articles and books.
177. K. RAHNER speaks about a formal existential ethics based on his existential notion of the human person. Theological Investigations II (Baltimore 1963)
178. For a summarised study on the 'renaissance' of the 'regula aurea' Cfr. J. van OYEN, "Die Goldene Regel und die Situationsethik" in Id. / J. GRÜNDEL, Ethik ohne Normen? (Freiburg-Basel-Wien 1970) 113ff
179. GS art. 30, ABBOT, 228
180. Ibid. art. 43, ABBOT, 243. "This split between the faith which many profess and their daily lives deserves to be counted among the more serious errors of our age. Long since, prophets of the Old Testament fought vehemently against this scandal (Is. 58: 1, 12) and even more so did Jesus Christ Himself in the New Testament threaten it with grave punishments (Mt. 23: 3 — 23, Mc. 7: 10 — 13)",
181. Optatam Totius, art. 16, ABBOT, 452 (Italics mine)
their total vocation and fulfil it". 182

C. Morality with or without Religion?

Here we attempt to answer the delicate question about the interrelation between religion and morality. As we have pointed out, FREUD posed a question of either/or, either religion or ethics, either God or men, and he opted for ethics at the risk of religion, man at the expense of God. He cut religion to a size chosen by him and told that that religion did not suit to ethical principles. Somewhere he took an old wine-skin and wanted to pour new wine into it. No wonder, if the wine was spilt.

Hence the question must be reformulated: how far is a genuine form of religion related to a genuine form of morality? We analyse the problem primarily under a Christian perspective, here again, taking FREUD as our starting-point.

The interrelation between religion and morality 183 had always been a matter of critical study. The classical questions are the following: Does religion per se imply morality? Then, are religion and morality derivatives of one and the same ethos? On the other hand, does morality per se imply a religious dimension? If so, what about a merely secular and humanistic form of ethics?

We consider the problem under two different aspects: morality as an existential dimension of religion, and secondly, the phenomenon of 'religionless' morality.

182. GS art. 35, ABBOT, 233
183. On this point a special section of bibliography will be given. Here we refer to a classical work of B. HÄRING, Das Heilige und das Gute (München 1950). Cfr. also a recent article on this point by the same author, “Morale e religione in una prospetiva cristiana”, in Ateismo Contemporaneo IV (Torino 1971) 201 – 220
1. Morality as a Dimension of Religion

A moral sense is an essential dimension of a true religious awareness. But, as human values both religion and morality keep their identity and autonomy.

a) Identity and Autonomy of Religion and Morality

In the history of moral philosophy, particularly applied to the interrelation between religion and morality, E. KANT stands unique. According to him, religion begins when man believes in God's existence ("Dasein"). Such a belief is procured only through ethical sentiments. Hence, a moral argument is alone valid for the existence of God. "The idea of God grows out of morality and it is not its foundation".

As B. HARING concludes, "Religion begins for Kant first with morality". KANT thus attributed to God a "kingdom of norms" ("Reich der Sitten"), where God is a moral head. The existence and worth of the sacred can be perceived only through the good. Thus for KANT religion and morality are somehow identical. Ethics can have no theoretical value until God is brought to it, and God is known only through ethics. Religious principles are, therefore, per se moral principles.

A similar view has been recently expressed by an "Empiricist". Accordingly, to be moral means to live agapeistically, and to live agapeistically means to believe in God.

184. I. KANT, Kritik der reinen Vernunft (Cassirer III) 555. "Die (religiöse) Überzeugung ist nicht 'logische' sondern 'moralische' Gewißheit und da sie auf subjectiven Gründen (der moralischen Gesinnung) beruht, so muß ich nicht einmal sagen: es ist moralisch gewiß, daß ein Gott sei und so weiter, sondern: 'ich bin' moralisch gewiß und so weiter".

185. Id., Vorrede zur ersten Auflage der "Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft" (Cassirer VII) 143

186. B. HARING, Das Heilige und das Gute, 135. "Religion beginnt für Kant erst mit der Moral".

We admit that religion and morality compenetrate in practical life. But the relevant question is whether they lose their identity and dissolve one into the other. It cannot be overlooked that a true moral sense can stand on itself as ‘self-supporting’ and ‘self-structured’. It can be conceived and actualized without any direct and immediate reference to any religion whatsoever. Yet, as long as all basic human values ultimately sprout from the person himself, from the transcendental ego, who stands in communion with the Ground of Being, religion and morality are inextricably interwoven.

The mere fact that I believe in God does not automatically make my actions morally good. On the other hand, a true faith translated into actual life cannot support conscientiously evil actions. In the same way, my humanism, however exalted it might be, does not per se include a religious assent. Yet, though I am not aware of it, I do at least implicitly acknowledge the guaranteeing of a higher authority behind and above me, no matter whether I call him God or not.

At this stage a word must be added to the specific nature of revealed religion in relation to morality, more precisely, on Christianity. Christianity is a vital synthesis of faith, hope and love (service). A communion with God necessarily implies a community with others in Christ who proclaimed himself as the beginning and end of everything: “I am the Alpha and Omega, the first and the last, the beginning and the end”.188

The whole moral life of a Christian must be related to him as a man created in the image of God, who received the mandate “to govern the world with justice and holiness”, a mandate to relate himself and the totality of things to Him who is to be acknowledged as the Lord and Creator of all.191 Thus in a Christian synthesis of life “apprehensio boni” becomes an “appre-

188. R. HOFFMANN, “Sittlichkeit”, LThK IX 803. As E. McDONAGH recently stated: “The human person has an inbuilt capacity to react to the morality of the situations in which he is involved. He has some direct moral awareness”. “Towards a Christian Theology of Morality”, The Irish Theological Quartlery 37 (1970) 190
189. GS, art. 45, ABBOT, 247f
190. Genesis 1 : 26f; 9 : 3; Wisdom 9 : 3
191. GS, art. 34, ABBOT, 232
hensio Christi". Hence a vital synthesis does not destroy the identity and individuality of either religion or morality.

b) Permeation of Religion and Morality in Life

Religion, as we said, is an intrinsic value, and not merely an instrumental activity. Cult alone does not constitute religion proper. Thus magic and sterile rites do not come to be counted as religion. Religion is an inner experience of a Beyond. Such an experience impels one to harmonize one's life with the Beyond. Thus the inner experience and the external harmonization of life go hand-in-hand and remain inseparable. Any inner experience will have some influence on external behaviour. Sooner or later one will actively attempt to co-ordinate one's life in accordance with the apprehended reality. Hence an authentic religious experience and an immoral (conscious) life are contradictory. A 'moralless' religion is impossible. Hence it is not the supposed oral prohibition of a feared father that impedes man from killing his neighbour, as FREUD believed; on the contrary, an awareness of a cosmic communion holds mankind together. In this sense we defined religion as a basic existential dimension, an awareness of the ego of the totality and community of being, and a dialogue between being and Being. One meets Being only through beings. Thus B. HÄRING defines religion:

"Religion is the community with God, and with that the supporting ground of really personal communion with men".193

Through God one sees oneself linked with others. One takes to oneself the God-given mandate of serving other people. Thus people become convinced that their relationship with others is rooted in a deep cosmic relationship symbolized in the word 'God'.

As a proper religious consciousness evokes moral awareness, a profound


moral awareness, as it animates the total personality, ultimately involves religious consciousness. Why should people act and react in a specifically human way? Why do people grow in an awareness of ‘cosmic communion’?

“A devotion to the welfare of one’s fellow men is a particularly rewarding way of life, yet in itself it leaves the question of a reason for such activity in abeyance. Religion provides a cosmic explanation at the same time that it may be a quest that has its own reward, like the search for beauty. In the great religions it blends with the life of service to one’s fellow men and provides a reason for that life. It involves three faculties of reason, emotion, and will”. 194

These altruistic sentiments grow together with a sense of sin and guilt ingrained to human nature. Thus “Conscience in the strict sense of the word involves a consciousness of sin”. 195 Nevertheless, we cannot say that the mere fact of belief in God will guarantee wholesome results, for “events have shown that men of God can also be destructive”. 196 It must be granted that people speak with some justification about the moral deterioration in religion or about the so called “moral paradox of religion”. 197 The probable answer to it is:

“If there is a large-scale crisis of moral life today among Christians as among other people, especially in younger generation, faulty, but long established ideas as the nature of moral theology and morality itself are partly, though by no means entirely, to blame for it”. 198

Therefore, once again we have to tell FREUD that it is not religion itself, but a faulty practice of it or an insincere approach to it that is responsible for a contrast between religious ideals and moral practices.

An analysis of the Christian concept of love (Agape) 199 may further eluci-

195. G. S. SPINKS, Psychology and Religion, 109
197. S. RADHAKRISHNAN, Religion in a Changing World, 50. “The more orthodox the Christian Catholic becomes doctrinally the less sensitive he becomes morally”.
198. H. D. LEWIS, Morals and Revolution (London 1951) 19. “The damage to the Morals fabric of Western civilization is already recorded very grimly in the woeful pages of recent and contemporary history”.
199. Cfr. J. MOFFATT, Love in the NT (London 1929); A. NYGREN, Agape and Eros (London 1932 — 39); A. WARNACH, Agape: die Liebe als Grundmotiv der neu-
date how religion and morality are interrelated. The New Testament bases all moral laws on the law of love. JESUS gave priority to love over all external acts of worship, even over other virtues. His command in the parable of the Good Samaritan "go and do likewise" (Lc. 10 : 37) stands unique in the history of religious practices. St. JOHN brings the new law of love to its peak in the following words:

"Beloved let us love one another; love springs from God; no one can love without being born of God, and knowing God. How can the man who has no love have any knowledge of God, since God is love". 

He goes on describing love as a communion between God and His children.

According to the text quoted above, love is placed as a manifestation of two factors: "the birth from God" and "the knowledge of God". Here the phrase "to know God", used six times in the first epistle of JOHN, stands in strict relation to and parallel with other formulas expressing communion with God, as 'remain (be) in God', 'be of God', 'born of God' etc. This knowledge of God identified with the birth from God is realized in faith, in love. It is an experimental knowledge of God with a corresponding fidelity to His ways for men expressed in the work of salvation.

St. PAUL places the death of Christ as the culmination of this Agape.

In the words of A. NYGREN:

"In the cross of Christ, God and Agape are seen to be one ... Now it is this intimate connection between God and Agape that makes Paul speak at once sparingly of our love of God and so profusely of love for our neighbour ... On the other hand, the Christian's love for his neighbour is no longer merely something of his own, but an overflow of God's Agape".

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200. Mt. 22 : 34 - 40; Mc. 12 : 13 - 37; Lc. 10 : 25
201. 1 Jn. 4 : 7f; As A. NYGREN puts it: 'The Johannine idea of love marks the culminating point of the New Testament Agape motif'. Agape and Eros (New York-Evanston 1969 reprint) 149
204. Cfr. HOSEA 6 : 6
205. Rom. 5 : 8. "But here, as if God meant to prove how well he loves us, it was while we were still sinners that Christ, in his own appointed time, died for us".
206. A. NYGREN, Agape and Eros, 147
As we have pointed out, FREUD identified his "wider" concept of sex with the notion of Agape in St. PAUL. Moreover, he stated:

"I was myself a disciple of the love of mankind, not from sentimental motives. ... I could not but regard that love as no less essential for the survival of the human race than such things as technology".

Thus we have two different ethical motives here — Agape and Eros. As NYGREN pointed out, there are fundamental differences between the two, and the ethical outlook varies according to those differences. Eros is an upward movement in contrast to Agape which is a downward movement.

Even though theoretically a compromise between them seemed to have been impossible, historically a synthesis was inevitable:

"If Agape was to be of any importance at all, a modus vivendi between it and Eros had to be found".

Probably that is the reason why FREUD stated: "I see in life a continual struggle between Eros and the death-instinct, the outcome of which seems to be indeterminable".

At this point, we add that the love preached by Christ as a moral motive includes both Agape and Eros. If there was a kind of polarization between the two some time ago, we need today a new synthesis. Here we admit with H. HARTMANN that there is no "radical opposition" between FREUD's system of moral values and Western moral tradition. We have already explained how religion and morality converge in the value of love. On the same basis, we believe, a dialogal synthesis is possible between Christianity and the Freudian Psycho-analysis.

207. FREUD, Group psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, GW XIII 99; SE XVIII 91
208. FREUD, Brief an R. Rolland, GW XIV 553; SE XX 279. Elsewhere Freud wrote: "I may now add that civilization is a process in the service of Eros, whose purpose is to combine single individuals, and after that families, then races, peoples and nations, into one great unity, the unity of mankind. Why this is to happen, we do not know; the work of Eros is precisely this". FREUD, Civilization and Its Discontents, GW XIV 481; SE XX 122
209. A. NYGREN, Agape and Eros, 200 — 210
210. Ibid. 219
211. Ibid. 223
212. Letter to Pfister (Feb. 7, 1930), FREUD / PFISTER, Psychoanalysis and Faith, 132
213. H. HARTMANN, Psychoanalysis and Moral Values, 18
St. JOHN illustrated the convergence of religion and morality in love in the following words:

"If a man boasts of loving God, while he hates his own brother, he is a liar ... the man who loves God must be one who loves his brother as well". (1 Jn. 4: 20-21)

B. HÄRING concluded: "We distinguish between the love of God and the love of the neighbour; in a certain sense we can call the former religion, and the latter morality". The reason is clear: a true love of God necessarily implies a love of neighbour while a true love of neighbour is "God-oriented". An encounter with God is thus inextricably intertwined with a meeting with the fellow-men. Faith is a communion with God in the community of men. "Believe me, when you did it to one of the least of my brethren here, you did it to me". (Mt. 25: 40) "Pure, unspoilt religion, in the eyes of God our Father is this: coming to the help of orphans and widows when they need it, and keeping oneself uncontaminated by world". (Jl. 1: 27)

In short, Christian love implies a rebirth in God, an experience of grace, a knowledge of God, which, in the ultimate analysis, implies a fidelity to the ways expressed by Him in the history of salvation. Love proved in action leads man to God. This love receives its impetus, its life-energy from a love of God which is the very ground of every true religion. Only in love of God one realizes the full communion with one's neighbour. It is here that the 'rootlessness' of FREUD's Menschenliebe betrays itself. An unconditional dedication to the service of fellow-men should have a proper ground. FREUD dedicated himself for the cause of men; he pleaded for a life of service for the 'poor' humanity. What reason accounts for such an activity? If every one follows his narcissistic pleasure ego, as FREUD argued, what reason can be accorded to a life of sacrifice freely chosen for serving humanity? Christianity gives the following answer: it is the brotherhood of mankind supported by the fatherhood of God that calls for a dedication to others.

Furthermore, a Christian is called to be perfect (Mt. 5: 20f). This perfection is the peak of love. The expression 'be perfect' ('tamin') means

214. B. HÄRING, "Morale e religione in una prospetiva cristiana", art. cit. 204
215. Jesus concluded the first part of the sermon on the mount in which he summarized the whole Christian teaching on the commandment of love with the following words: "But you have to be perfect, as your heavenly father is perfect" (Mt. 5: 45)
according to R. SCHNACKENBURG, 'intact', 'faultless', 'sound'.\textsuperscript{216} That is to say, a Christian communion with God requires indispensably an innocence and a purity of heart, an Agapeistic way of life.

To conclude: if a true religion means an intimate relationship with God, an upward orientation and a downward movement at the same time, love is the apex of such a relationship. The moral task set before everyone is to transcend oneself through a discovery of the depth of his own being. So becomes everyone more and more perfect "as the Heavenly Father is perfect". Such a perfection for man means a pure and honest life. Love accomplishes this task at its best. Therefore, in a certain sense, we call the vertical dimension of love religion, and the horizontal dimension morality.\textsuperscript{217}

To Christian love belong in an inseparable and mutually inclusive manner a call and response, an invitation and responsibility, "Wort" and "Antwort".

2. A "Religionless" Morality, its Possibility, Value and Limits

As we have already pointed out, the whole moral legacy of S. FREUD can be summed up in an appeal for liberating ethics from a backing of religion. He wanted to present himself as a "religionless" moral person. But, as we interpreted FREUD, his atheism was more of a nature of an antitheism, against a theism which appeared to him as a "gigantic hypocrisy". That means, he contrasted ethics with a religion interpreted solely as a hypocrisy.

To some extent, FREUD deceived himself when he proclaimed himself as a liberator from a (supposed) hypocrisy. If he had time to think that such a hypocrisy was only a temporal decay and not an incurable disease, probably his whole approach would have been otherwise.

Hence we agree with G. ZILBOORG that "somewhere, in someway, Freud seems to have sensed the transcending truth."\textsuperscript{218} As FREUD loved truth

\textsuperscript{216} R. SCHNACKENBURG, The Moral Teaching of the New Testament, 108f
\textsuperscript{217} P. TILICH saw the ultimate source of both religion and morality in Agape. "If love is the ultimate norm of all moral demands, its 'agape' quality points to the transcendent source of the content of the moral imperative". P. TILICH, Morality and Beyond, 40
\textsuperscript{218} G. ZILBOORG, Freud and Religion, 60
and stood for it, O. PFISTER called him a Christian, in the best sense of the term.\textsuperscript{219} Thus it is doubtful whether FREUD was a completely "religionless" moral person.

The question whether or not there can be an authentic morality without an explicit adherence to religion, must be answered affirmatively.\textsuperscript{220} Let us take FREUD as an example. From the very beginning to the end of his life he fought militantly against "religion", or what he found as religion, against pseudo-religious symptoms which he identified with religion \textit{per se}. He wanted to have no personal God behind him; he proclaimed himself an atheist. Yet he held himself to the basic ethical principles and moral standards. H. HARTMANN comments:

"From the documents available it appears that Freud had very definite and strong moral feelings, strong moral reaction to persons, to social and political events. He admired independent, autonomous morality and despised moral weakness and the tendency to compromise".\textsuperscript{221}

Now, if a true religion and a true morality are ultimately grounded on one and the same foundation — a love that vitalizes the very person and animates one's whole moral conduct, there is a \textit{religious} dimension\textsuperscript{222} in every true moral imperative, no matter whether one recognizes it explicitly or not. P. TILLICH saw a religious \textit{dimension} in moral imperative, a religious \textit{source} in moral demands and a religious \textit{element} in moral motivation,\textsuperscript{223} and traced all the three to Agape.

Nevertheless, a secular humanist believes in the total autonomy of ethics either through the autonomy of the moral agent or of the moral standard. When FREUD spoke of the self-evidence of morality ("das Moralische als das Selbstverständliche"), he must have meant such an autonomy of the moral standard rather than an autonomy of the moral agent. Evidently autonomy is applied only analogically to the moral standard. It would mean that "it does not need and in fact morally excludes any divine basis or divine approba-

\textsuperscript{219} Letter to Freud, (Oct. 29, 1918) FREUD / PFISTER, Psychoanalysis and Faith, 63
\textsuperscript{220} Cfr. B. HÄRING, Das Gesetz Christi, 76
\textsuperscript{221} H. HARTMANN, Psychoanalysis and Moral Values, 16
\textsuperscript{222} P. TILLICH, Morality and Beyond, 17f
\textsuperscript{223} Ibid. 17 — 64
tion". Even in this case, placing such a standard as a law which prescribes or forbids something, one presupposes an institution or authority behind it. In FREUD's case this factor is located in the area in which the passage from nature to culture, from need to desire, from individual to language and speech is effected.

Even though in such cases there is no conscious and explicit reference to God and His will, there is yet somebody or something behind. That is why E. FROMM attributed some "faith", a profound faith in life, to the Freudian "scepticism". He explained this faith, as a faith in goodness, in love and in justice with which a child begins its moral life. In other words, whenever there is a question of a genuine ethics based on the perennial values in life, there is also a 'religious reference'.

The conscientious realization of ethical values points to the fact that the world and life have a meaning corresponding to the universal and inborn quest for meaning, which is simultaneously a quest for self-transcendence. Moved by the unremitting need for otherness, man comes out of the prison of his solitude and isolation. This fundamental urge for self-transcendence and quest for meaning of life is not stilled by a mere appeal for more permissiveness nor by a total rejection of already established values.

At this point FREUD's ethical message vacillates. He had nothing more to offer. He tried, though vainly, to convince us that it is all about, and nothing

224. C. F. WOODS, A Defence of Theological Ethics (Cambridge 1966) 81
226. As B. HARING says: "nella conscienza morale sembra sempre essere implicito in qualche modo un assoluto". "Morale e religione in una prospettiva cristiana", op. cit. 215
227. E. FROMM, The Heart of Man, 147
228. Ibid. 20
229. As V. E. FRANKL put it: "In one word, each man is questioned by life; and he can only answer to life by answering for his own life; to life he can only respond by being responsible". Man's Search for Meaning, 172. This quest for meaning leads man to the 'inborn religiosity': 'Wir bestreiten also keineswegs, daß der Mensch für seine Religiosität etwas vorfindet, — daß es ein faktisch Vorgefundenes ist, das er sich existentiell angeeignet. Aber dieses Vorgefundene, diese Urbilder — das sind nicht irgendwelche Archetypen, sondern das sind die Gebete unserer Väter, die Riten unserer Kirchen, die Offenbarungen unserer Propheten und die Vorbilder unserer Heiligen". Id., Der unbewußte Gott: Psychotherapie und Religion (Kösel 1974) 60
more. He should have kept himself faithfull to his "faith": "there may be something further behind that, but for the present it is wrapped in obscurity". The mere fact that something is wrapped in obscurity, is no argument for its "nothingness".

A theologian goes a step further and affirms that the actualization of a genuine and personal (autonomous) ethics, in the ultimate analysis, presupposes a foundation on which the ego as a person accepts himself as aware of and obliged to a gift and a call. This ground of meaning of life, in a genuinely theological perspective, cannot be a mere abstract principle nor an impersonal sanction; it can only be an absolute personal value, whom we call God. In other words:

"Morality and religion must have ultimately the same centre: the community with God in the community of salvation called by Him (in the ekklesia)".

D. Christianity and The Freudian Psycho-Analysis —
The Possibility of a Synthesis

We arrive at the conclusion that between Christianity and the Freudian Psycho-analysis a synthesis is possible. We assume that love understood by both serve as a common ground of a dialogue.

1. Love as a Uniting Force

Christianity is a religion of love. Outside the "new commandment of love" given by Christ this religion is inconceivable. The mere fact that the world in 20 centuries has not fully succeeded in living the ideal preached by Christ does not destroy the focal position of love in Christianity. The Christian

230. FREUD, Civilization and its Discontents, GW XIV 430; SE XX 72
231. B. HÄRING, Das Gesetz Christi, 82; "Sittlichkeit und Religion müssen im letzten die gleiche Mitte haben: die Gemeinschaft mit Gott in der von Ihm gerufenen Heilsgemeinschaft (in der ekklesia)".
religion thus represents the cosmic mission of love and synthesis.

On the other hand, the Freudian Psycho-analysis as a therapy aims at healing and helping the individual through love — a non-judgemental, understanding and accepting attitude. FREUD wrote to PFISTER: “I have, as you admit, done a great deal for love”.

Moreover:

“If willingness to engage in war is an effect of the destructive instinct, the most obvious plan will be to bring Eros, its antagonist, into play against it. Anything that encourages the growth of emotional ties between men must operate against war ... There is no need for psycho-analysis to be ashamed to speak of love in this connection, for religion itself uses the same words: ‘thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself’.”

Thus Christianity and the Freudian Psycho-analysis — religion and psychotherapy — can come closer on the common ground of “the cosmic relationship”. Each should keep its function separate and be aware of the other’s role as well as its own and should not interfere in areas where it has no competence.

2. A Dialogal Synthesis

O. H. MOWRER concluded his inquiry into the possibility of a synthesis between Christianity and the Freudian Psycho-analysis with the following question: “Is this the best the modern church can do — merely to ape medieval Catholicism and contemporary psycho-analysis?”

His proposal can be summed up in the following formula:

232. Letter to PFISTER, March 17, 1910, FREUD / PFISTER, Psychoanalysis and Faith, 35

233. FREUD, Why War?, GW XVI 22–23; SE XXII 212

MOWRER's proposal is indicated by the line in strokes. That means, we shall leave out supernaturalism from Christianity and antinormativism from psycho-analysis, and make a normative naturalism or naturalistic normativism.

In our opinion, this is not an ideal solution. It seems to be a "simplistic accommodation": The mere fact that both are cut into pieces, they lose their identity. A genuine synthesis is not a conglomeration of cut-pieces.

Nevertheless, the Freudian anti-theses have not destroyed every possibility of a synthesis. By a synthesis we mean here not a merging or fusion of either one into the other, but only a "dialogal co-existence".

Our dialogue with FREUD concluded that FREUD's approach to both religion and morality was ambivalent and dialectical. He pointed out a number of anomalies in religion and morality in their inherited and institutionalized forms. From the point of view of the interrelation between religion and morality, those distortions, were, according to FREUD, retroactive and complementary. Very briefly they are:

Religion = Projected Father — Morality = Introjected Authority

Dominion — Submission
Authoritarian — Obedient
Protectional — Dependent
Sadistic — Masochistic

We already pointed out that the Christian values are more profound than these distortions. FREUD was not unaware of this fact. Almost at the end of a half-a-century-long war against religion, he had to confess:
"It is likely that we have not achieved more than a certain degree of probability ... There is an element of grandeur about everything to do with the origin of a religion, certainly including the Jewish one, and this is not matched by the explanations we have hitherto given. Some other factor must be involved to which there is little that is analogous and nothing that is of the same kind, something unique and something of the same order of magnitude as what has come out of it, as religion itself." 235

Years ago FREUD had already confessed that he had no right to fight against the fact of religious experience in others, though he himself could not bear witness to it.236

All these would mean that FREUD left something of religion intact, in the same way as he respected fundamental ethical values. His antipathy was directed mainly against religion as an alienating institution with its sadistic domination and against morality as a repressive code of conduct with its masochistic submission.

Though FREUD was right, to some extent, in pin-pointing some of the anomalies found in his contemporary "religio-moralistic civilization", he went wrong when he transgressed the boundary and tried to reconstruct every Weltanschauung according to his psycho-analytic mould. Hence the truth of his legacy is valid only to the point, where his psycho-analytic hermeneutics is valid. For further questions, psycho-analysis has to depend on other sciences and Weltanschauungen.

However, neither the Freudian psycho-analysis nor Christianity should be seen primarily in terms of distortions found in them. A distortion is, after all, a deviation from the original ideal. It is in the light of those positive elements present in both that we propose a "dialogal synthesis" between Christianity and Psycho-analysis.

In our opinion, the possibility of a synthesis must be sought for, not between cut-pieces of either Christianity or of Freudian psycho-analysis, but between a refined and genuine Christianity as preached by CHRIST himself, and a purified psycho-analysis freed from its totalitarian rationalism and materialistic scientism. Both come face-to-face in the love-motive.

235. FREUD, Moses and Monotheism, GW XVI 236; SE XXIII 128
236. FREUD, Civilization and Its Discontents, GW XIV 422; SE XXI 65
Christianity would lose here its “quasi-transfiguration” of love (the “other-worldliness” of love) and the Freudian psycho-analysis in its turn, its total “pre-figuration” (the completely “mother-orientedness” of love).

A formula can thus be briefly expressed:

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{Christianity} \\
\downarrow \text{Agape} \\
\downarrow \\
\downarrow \text{Theistic}
\end{array}
\quad
\begin{array}{c}
\text{Freudian Psycho-analysis} \\
\downarrow \text{Eros} \\
\downarrow \\
\downarrow \text{Secular}
\end{array}
\quad
\begin{array}{c}
\text{Love - motive} \\
\downarrow \\
\downarrow \\
\end{array}
\]

The proposed synthesis implies a “secularization” of Christian theism in order to make it more man-centred, and a kind of “theologization” of psycho-analytic humanism in order to make it more value-oriented; the values ultimately emanate from the Ground of values.

CONCLUSION

After a life-long, weary fight against the religious civilization, FREUD wrote:

“‘And as regards the therapeutic application of our knowledge, what would be the use of the most correct analysis of social neuroses, since no one possesses authority to impose such a therapy upon the group?’”

He added to it: “‘Thus I have not the courage to rise up before my fellow-men as a prophet’.” A psychologist does not evidently have the last word about

1. FREUD, Civilization and Its Discontents, GW XIV 505; SE XXI 144
2. Ibid. GW XIV 506; SE XXI 145
religion and morality, but his discipline qualifies him to raise issues which deserve considerations of a theologian. To put it in other words, a theology of religion and morality cannot isolate itself from psychological analyses. Hence in this book we made an attempt to distil the chief insights of FREUD, as he stands out even today as one of the important moulders of our culture.

FREUD's approach to religion and morality was shrouded in an emotional ambivalence, and therefore, we found it extremely difficult to assess his contributions. But that is no reason to ridicule and deride his theories.

The Freudian message seems to head toward three basic appeals:

1) Ethics needs a new foundation other than religion, a rational but not rationalized foundation. One has to renounce "the transfiguration of cultural prohibition", and one should allot a reasonable place for "the eternal Eros" in the economy of life, because "man's judgements of value follow directly his wishes for happiness".

2) The civilized man needs more freedom for spontaneous self-disclosure. Human wishes and longings cannot be completely removed through full satisfaction. They should be partly fulfilled and partly sublimated. Our civilization, however, exercises too heavy a repression on individual instincts; the result is a mass-neurosis.

3) Consequently, a mass-therapy must be effected and that through Eros, through love. For, according to FREUD, "the individual perishes from his internal conflicts, the species perishes in its struggle with the external world, to which it is no longer adapted". Hence Eros must be re-discovered as the principle of unity:

"I may now add that civilization is a process in the service of Eros, whose purpose is to combine single human individuals, and after that families,

3. FREUD, The Future of an Illusion, GW XIV 364; SE XXI 41
4. FREUD, Civilization and Its Discontents, GW XIV 506; SE XXI 145
5. Ibid. GW XIV 505; SE XXI 145
6. Ibid. GW XIV 503 – 504; SE XXI 142 – 43
7. FREUD, Findings, Ideas, Problems, GW XVII 151; SE XXIII 299
then races, peoples and nations, into one great unity, the unity of man-
kind".8

Our dialogue with FREUD concentrated upon the above mentioned
appeals. Our investigations disclosed the followings facts. FREUD was interest-
ed in the problems of religion and morality all throughout his life. As the
above given graphic structures9 point out, there was a gradual growth in his
interest in the problems connected with religion and morality. Again, he
adopted an ambivalent and dialectical approach towards both these institu-
tions.

FREUD defined religion as an unconscious projection of the past into the
future, and as a universal neurosis. He then applied to it his basic thesis: only
when one is relieved of the harmful memories of childhood, one can re-live
the present. FREUD saw practically nothing of worth in the then-present
concrete form of religion, which, as a super-power, inhibited individual spon-
taneity and collective ambitions. Hence he would have us believe that we
have to do away with it at any cost. A neurotic plays upon the games he
learnt as a little child. He always longs for a regression to the pre-natal protec-
tion of the mother's womb. In the religious sphere he expects such a security
from the "mother-church". Religion thus becomes a universal refuge for the
unfulfilled infantile wishes, an Ersatzlibido.

Nevertheless, FREUD admitted that his outlook on religion was deeply
personal. Therefore, in spite of all his hair-splitting attacks, he preferred to
leave open the question of a genuine form of religion.

Morality in its inherited form was seen by FREUD as a repressive code of
prescriptions and prohibitions, a 'causal' and casuistic catalogue of impera-
tives. It arouses pharisaism and hypocrisy, particularly in the field of sexual-
ity. As it is built upon a 'surplus repression' of the individual instincts, it can
create no more than "moral morons". FREUD traced the origin of such a
formidable situation to the religious backing of ethics.

In order to unveil the deceptions of such a moral code backed by religion,

8. FREUD, Civilization and Its Discontents, GW XIV 481; SE XXI 122
9. Cfr. above pp. 9, 65, 154
FREUD fabricated a theory of his own. Accordingly, both these institutions of religion and morality originated and developed *inextricably intertwined*. In the individual they take shape together with the process of identification with the ‘father-image’, who is *idealized* in order to form a moral code, and is at the same time ‘*idolized*’, in order to form a source of security. Thus, in the course of time, moral conduct was sacralized and transvalued ("transfigured") in the name of a God above and a life after. Thus we are privileged to have a ‘sacred’ morality and a ‘good’ religion. Religion became a sadistic domination and morality, a masochistic submission. A formula can thus be expressed:
D — Superego = Identification with the parental image, with the external world.

C — Introjection
   - Idealization of parental image

C¹ — Projection
   - Idolization of parental image

B — Instinct-renunciations

B¹ — Compensatory wish-fulfilments

A — Masochism
   - Unconditional Submission
   - Joy in suffering

A¹ — Sadism
   - Domination
   - Demand for further renunciations

At this point Freud claimed to have brought the inherited institutions of religion and morality into an impasse. The only exit proposed by him is a desacralization or a "de-religionization" of morality, which means a transition from a 'supernatural' morality to a natural (humanistic) ethics.

*Our response* to the 'Freudian enigma' is twofold: first of all, the Christianity preached by Christ and lived by millions all throughout history is more than the supposed distortions enumerated by Freud. That is why we stated that Freud was wrong when he identified these distortions with religion *per se*. We cannot find any justification for his transition from analogy to identity, from individuals to the species, from nature to culture, from (neurotic) ontogeny to (normal) phylogeny.

Apparently Freud himself was not unaware of a profound element in the religious civilization. But he 'prudently' (?) evaded its positive side. He was not prepared to undertake unbiased investigations and open discussions in matters of religion and morality.

Nevertheless, Freud poses a number of questions to Christian theology. First and foremost, what is religion? Is it primarily an interior value or an exterior establishment? Psychologically, is it an "Ersatzlibido", that is, a compensatory satisfaction for the repressed and unfulfilled wishes of man-
Secondly, what is morality? Can a genuine form of morality be encapsulated in a repressive code of prescriptions or in a casuistic catalogue of imperatives? Again, does human moral conduct per se require the backing up of religion? Is a specifically human act morally ‘valid and licit’ without a God above and a life after?

Furthermore, we tried to underline the important corner-stones of religion and morality. The bridging up of the two poles of religion, namely the interior value and the exterior social organization has been always an extremely difficult task. At any rate, an externalism shall not override the interior values, no matter whether there is an adherence to a particular religious confession or not. Nor shall religion become a repressive super-power. A proper religion must rather be envisioned as a basic existential dimension that embraces every other human value and at the same time harmonizes human cohabitation. For religious maturity and human self-unfolding interact with each other. Religion and moral sense are rather experiences of the person here and now, living in the present, influenced by the past, but no way tied down to it, and oriented towards the future, but not overthrown to it.

A true religion then does not give birth to a repressive code of conduct; it would rather animate and inform all genuine human values. Love becomes the ultimate norm of action. Christianity calls this love Agape. The Freudian Psycho-analysis named it Eros. Nevertheless, in the ultimate analysis Eros implies an Agapeistic element, while Agape does not exclude an Eros-dimension.

Love has a vertical orientation and a horizontal dimension. Some way or other, this vertical orientation can be called religion, while the horizontal dimension, morality. Both these sides of love come face-to-face in any true religion, not in the form of a dialectical contrast, but in the form of a dialogal synthesis. St. JOHN gives the best expression to this fact in the following words:

“If a man boasts of loving God while he hates his brother, he is a liar ...; The man who loves God must be one who loves his brother as well”. (1 Jn. 4: 20 – 21)
Religion and morality must therefore be re-discovered as *human* values — religion as a dimension of the specifically human (moral) awareness, and morality as a meditational way of life. Christianity must re-focus its attention from a set of rationalized principles and a dogmatized organization to religion as a human experience, which will enable Christians to overcome the schizoid contrast between the natural and the 'supernatural', between reason and emotion, between interior experience and exterior observances, between prayer and life, between Sundays and weekdays, between Church services and street practices, between 'religion' and 'morality'.
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